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2Abstract
The thesis explores the autonomous standing of victims in the proceedings and in the
evidentiary process before the International Criminal Court (‘the ICC’). For the purpose
of elucidating the part played by victims as protagonists in their own right, the thesis
brings forth a number of core characteristics that delimit the status of victims and
distinguish it, accordingly, from the standing of the parties and from other non-party
participants.
Chapter I illuminates the eligibility of a person as a victim pursuant to rule 85 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as the starting point for any involvement of victims
in the course of the proceedings. The thesis explores the multifaceted matters ensuing
from the application and interpretation of this provision as a whole, as well as of each of
the eligibility criteria. An important highlight into the independent yet non-party standing
of victims within the ICC’s procedural design is provided in Chapter II by way of a
comprehensive and innovative categorization of the array of rights afforded to victims by
the normative framework. Chapter III embarks on a thorough analysis of the nature and
the confines of the core right of victims to participate in the criminal justice process and
the manifold issues ensuing from each of the prerequisites of article 68(3) of the Rome
Statute. The intriguing phenomenon of duality of victim-witness status is contemplated in
Chapter IV in light of the overarching principles and fundamental concepts in the realm of
evidence law. The part played by victims in the evidentiary process on the merits of the
criminal case, as well as in reparation proceedings is elucidated in Chapter V against the
backdrop of the overall rationale of the ICC’s fact-finding mechanism, including the
respective roles of the parties and of the Chamber. The thesis lends support to the
conclusion that the standing and the part accorded to victims throughout the ICC’s process
ensue from the purpose of their participation, as well as from the objective and subject-
matter of the proceedings at hand.
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8INTRODUCTION
Whenever the issue of victims and international criminal justice comes to the fore it is
commonplace to portray the victims’ standing designed by the drafters of the International
Criminal Court (‘the ICC’; ‘the Court’) as an unprecedented phenomenon in the
international realm. Indeed, on the plane of international criminal justice the Rome Statute
(‘the Statute’) introduces the first codification of the right of victims to participate in
criminal proceedings in their own right, i.e. in their capacity as victims.1 As such, the
permanent international criminal court is the first forum for the participation of victims of
the most heinous crimes of concern to the international community in a capacity, separate
and distinct from that of witnesses.2 The ICC is also the first criminal justice body at the
international horizon empowered to adjudge claims for reparations for the harm sustained
by victims as a result of the commission of crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. In this
respect, it is essential to note that participation in proceedings adjudicating the individual
criminal responsibility of the alleged offender(s) and participation in reparation
proceedings following conviction are two separate and distinct possibilities accorded to
victims at the ICC that may be employed independently of one another.3
1 In the same vein, it has been observed that ‘[a] victim’s primary status is that of a person who has suffered; he
may also have the secondary status of a person who has seen or heard things. The one does not exclude the other,
but the injury suffered is enough in itself to justify the entitlement of such a person to express his concerns and
complaints to the Court.’ – see Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and Role of the Victim’ in
Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. II,
Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1387-1419, p. 1397, citing Elisabeth Guigou, Address of the French Ministry
of Justice at the International Colloquium on ‘L’Acces des victimes á la Cour pénale internationale’, 27 April
1999.
2 Victim-participants at the ICC are also referred to by some commentators as ‘courtroom participants’ – see Eric
Stover, Mychelle Balthazard and K. Alexa Koenig, ‘Confronting Duch: civil party participation in Case 001 at
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93 No. 882
(June 2011), pp. 503-546, p. 513.
3 The independent character of proceedings on the merits and reparation proceedings has also been endorsed in
the Court’s jurisprudence. See e.g. the recent jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber in the case of the Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga), where it is observed that ‘a request for reparations pursuant to rule 94 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is not dependent upon either the filing of an application for participation
pursuant to rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or being granted the right to participate in the
proceedings in relation to the accused person's guilt or innocence or the sentence.’ See the Decision on the
admissibility of the appeals against Trial Chamber I’s “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be
applied to reparations” and directions on the further conduct of proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-2953, 14
December 2012 (Lubanga, Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 14 December 2012), para. 69. The
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have made similar observations. See The Prosecutor v.
KAING Guek Eav alias Duch, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC (ECCC, Case 001), Trial
Chamber, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party
Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused,
Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character, 9 October 2009 (ECCC, Case 001, TC, Decision of 9 October
9The participation as a victim in proceedings before the Court represents a novel
phenomenon which reflects the aspiration of the international community towards the
recognition of the victim as an autonomous protagonist on the international criminal
justice scene. Viewed in a historical context, the standing of victims in proceedings in
their own right is unfamiliar to the predecessors of the first permanent international
criminal jurisdiction – the post-World War II tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo and the
more recent ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (‘the ICTY’) and Rwanda (‘the
ICTR’). At the trials taking place in Nuremberg and Tokyo due to a variety of reasons, not
least because most victims had perished or had fled to other continents, the tribunals heard
the voices of the perpetrators and not of the victims.4 Subsequently, the first criminal
justice forum that afforded Holocaust victims the possibility to share their experience with
the world was the Eichmann trial.5 Therefore, the Eichmann proceedings are widely
acknowledged as having launched an ‘era of testimony’ for victims of mass atrocities6 that
marks to a great extent also the ICTY’s and ICTR’s proceedings.
Although the ad hoc tribunals are commended as ‘bringing a sense of justice’ to
victims,7 still, the lack of a role beyond that of witnesses is perceived as ‘objectifying’
victims and turning them into mere instruments for securing convictions.8 At the same
time, in comparison to the virtually non-existent victims in the courtroom before the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the gradual appearance of the victims as witnesses
before the ICTY and the ICTR represents a step forward towards the introduction of the
victim as a protagonist at the international arena adjudicating mass atrocity crimes. Hence,
by allowing some form of involvement in proceedings (albeit confined to their appearance
as witnesses)9 the ad hoc tribunals ‘paved the way for the inclusion of victims in the
narrative’.10
2009), para. 38: ‘a civil action is not a prerequisite for victim participation in criminal proceedings before the
ICC.’
4 See Susanne Karstedt, ‘From Absence to Presence, From Silence to Voice: Victims in International and
Transitional Justice Since the Nuremberg Trials’, International Review of Victimology, vol. 17: 9 (2010), pp. 9-
30, at p. 13.
5 See Stover et al., supra note 2, p. 510.
6 Ibid.
7 See Karstedt, supra note 4, p. 21.
8 See Stover et al., supra note 2, pp. 513-514.
9 See further Gerard J. Mekjian and Mathew C. Varughese, ‘Hearing the Victim’s Voice: Analysis of Victims’
Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court’, Pace International Law
Review, vol. 17, Issue 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 1-46, p. 15, footnote 52, where the authors suggest that the ICTR
afforded victims a greater inclusion through different levels of quasi-participation, that is, participation in an
10
The progressive apparition of the victim at the international horizon has reached its
peak in the recognition of the latter as an independent stakeholder in proceedings taking
place at the ICC. The autonomous place and role accorded to victims by the Court’s
founders are thus among the most salient features that differentiate the ICC both from its
immediate and from its more remote predecessors. For the purpose of elucidating the
specificities of the independent place accorded to victims by the Court’s normative basis,
the thesis brings forth a number of core characteristics that delimit the standing of victim-
participants and distinguish it, accordingly, from the standing of the parties, i.e. the
Prosecutor and the defence, as well as from other non-party participants, such as
witnesses.
The first question that the victim-related context brings to the surface concerns the
eligibility of a person as a victim pursuant to rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (‘the Rules’), which is the starting point for any involvement of victims in the
course of the proceedings. Accordingly, Chapter I of the thesis will explore the
multifaceted matters ensuing from the application and interpretation of the provision as a
whole, as well as of each of the eligibility criteria which it delineates. The study will focus
on multifarious and/or contentious issues which have either already emerged in practice or
need yet to be addressed by the Court, such as the identification requirements for victim-
applicants; deceased persons as victims; the problem of disappeared individuals; the
implications of the introduction of certain legal entities as victims; the notion, substance
and compass of the relevant harm depending on the group of victims (natural or legal
persons); interpretation and application of the requirement for a causal link between the
harm suffered and the alleged crime(s). This part of the research will conclude with the
discussion of the interrelation between the victim definition and, respectively, the
recognition of a person as a victim and one of the ‘backbones’11 of international criminal
procedure - the presumption of innocence.
An important highlight into the autonomous yet non-party standing of victims
within the ICC’s procedural design is provided in Chapter II by way of a comprehensive
informal way (in town-hall settings where victims were given the possibility to act as judges and jury with
respect to low level perpetrators).
10 Valentina Spiga, ‘No Redress without Justice. Victims and International Criminal Law’, Journal of
International Criminal Justice 10 (5) (2012), pp. 1377-1394, p. 1378.
11 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’, Journal of International Criminal
Justice 8 (2010), pp. 137-164, p. 140.
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categorization of the array of rights afforded by the ICC’s normative framework to
persons who meet the criteria of rule 85.12 The classification of the rights that victims may
employ in the course of the proceedings, suggested herewith, proves innovative and
unprecedented, as it goes beyond the commonplace division of victims’ rights between the
right to participation, the right to reparations and the right to protection advanced so far in
the legal literature. The review of the victims’ rights will attest to the fact that the
involvement of victims is neither indispensable at the inception of the criminal process,
i.e. for the initiation of an investigation, nor subsequently, for the further development and
conduct of proceedings. In other words, the substance and the scope of the rights accorded
to victims by the drafters will reveal that the participation of victims in the ICC’s
proceedings ‘is not strictu sensu essential’, since the criminal process can take place
without them.13 Furthermore, as evidenced by the present classification, the victims’ rights
are more limited in scope and substance than the rights accorded to the Prosecutor and the
defence. By contrast to the parties, victims are neither vested with an automatic nor with
an untrammeled right of participation.14
The substance and the contours of the right of victims to take part in proceedings
pursuant to the general participation scheme set forth by the drafters is addressed,
accordingly, in Chapter III. The thesis suggests a thorough dissection of the nature and the
confines of the fundamental, core right of victims to participate in proceedings enunciated
in article 68(3) and the manifold issues which it entails. The proper interpretation of each
of the prerequisites for victims’ involvement in proceedings set forth in article 68(3), such
as the correct connotation of the notion ‘personal interests’, ‘appropriateness’ of the
proceedings and of the intervention, ‘are affected’, as well as ‘views and concerns’, has a
direct bearing on the manner and the extent to which victims may intervene in the ICC’s
proceedings. As the scrutinized study of the prerequisites of article 68(3) will underscore,
the intervention of victims in proceedings on the merits, unlike the Prosecutor and the
12 For the sake of brevity, any reference to ‘article’ denotes ‘article of the Rome Statute’, as well as any reference
to ‘rule’ denotes ‘rule of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, unless stated otherwise in the text.
13 See David Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 68: Protection of victims and witnesses and their participation in the
proceedings’, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court , Observers’ Notes Article
by Article, Otto Triffterer (ed.), 2nd edition, Beck/Hart, pp. 1275-1300, p. 1280 and footnote 17, as well as ‘The
Role of Victims in the ICC Proceedings’, in F. Lattanzi (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Comments on
the Draft Statute, Teramo: University of Teramo, 1998, pp. 251-272, p. 266. However, in the view of the present
author the suggested distinction between ‘necessary’ parties to the proceedings (the Prosecutor and the defence)
and ‘potential’ or optional parties (the victims) should be avoided. The term ‘parties’ should be construed strictly
and employed in tune with the ICC’s legal framework, i.e. as comprising only the Prosecutor and the defence.
14 See, inter alia, Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1406; Donat-Cattin, supra note 13.
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defence, can neither take place as of right nor without limitations at the expense of other
equally essential criminal justice values, such as due process, fairness, impartiality and
expeditiousness of the proceedings.
The conditional possibility of victims to intervene in proceedings, by contrast to
the parties, further resonates in the manner and the extent to which victims could engage
in the ICC’s fact-finding procedure on the merits of the criminal case. It is rather striking
that the relevant literature to date does not provide a thorough insight into the engagement
of victim-participants in the evidentiary process taking place at the ICC. Similarly, only
sporadic attention is paid by commentators to the phenomenon of duality of status, that is,
the possibility of victims to appear simultaneously as witnesses in the one and the same
case. As Chapter IV will show, the latter issue has an impact on the quality and the
completeness of the evidentiary material collected in the course of the proceedings. The
study on duality of victim-witness status elaborated herewith touches upon a multitude of
central evidentiary matters, such as relevance, admissibility, reliability and credibility of
evidence. A meticulous consideration is also given to the repercussions on the conduct
and the outcome of the case ensuing from the collection of insufficient and, accordingly,
of superfluous evidence alike. Likewise, the discussion of duality of victim-witness status
contributes to shedding further light on the parallel between the standing of victims before
the ICC and the legal condition15 of other non-party participants, in particular, witnesses.
The research on duality of victim-witness status will reiterate the fact that victims have the
right to intervene in the ICC’s proceedings upon their individual choice and initiative, as
well as in their own interest. Unlike victims who enjoy the autonomy to decide whether to
avail themselves of their right to play part in the criminal justice process subject to the
relevant requirements enunciated by law, witnesses appear in the ICC’s proceedings not
upon their personal initiative, but only and as long as they are called to testify.16 In other
words, by contrast to victims, the participation of witnesses in proceedings is confined to
15 This wording is used interchangeably with the word ‘status’ (see in this respect, Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (Situation in the DRC), Appeals Chamber, Judgment on victim participation in the
investigation stage of the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7
December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I
of 24 December 2007, ICC-01/04-556, 19 December 2008 (Situation in the DRC, Appeals Chamber Decision of
19 December 2008), para. 44, according to which the ‘word “status” signifies a person’s legal condition, whether
personal or proprietary [with reference to Black’s Law Dictionary]’.
16 See article 64(6)(b) and rule 65.
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giving testimony before the Court, thus, to serving the interests of justice rather than their
own personal interests.
Equally pivotal for the proper illumination of the place and the role of victims
within the ICC’s architecture is the question regarding the possibility for victims to
contribute and, accordingly, to impact the evidentiary material germane to the subject-
matter of the case. The analysis in Chapter V lends support to the conclusion that the
involvement of victims in the fact-finding procedure is considerably restricted in
comparison to the Prosecutor and the defence. The limited intensity and extent of
engagement of victim-participants in the evidentiary process is another vital and
unequivocal indication of the distinct standing accorded to victim-participants as
compared to the parties. However, as the research endeavours to show, this conclusion is
without prejudice to the key role played by victims in proceedings on reparations and,
accordingly, in the collection and examination of evidence concerning reparation claims.
The part played by victims in the evidentiary process on the merits of the criminal case
and in reparation proceedings, as well as the duality of status phenomenon are
contemplated against the backdrop of the overall rationale of the ICC’s fact-finding
procedure, including the respective roles of the parties and the Chamber, together with
core evidentiary concepts and overarching principles in the realm of evidence law.
In view of the topics outlined above, the thesis does not purport to represent a
comprehensive analysis of all the victim-related issues. Such an objective would hardly
prove feasible due to the numerous and multifarious matters which the participation of
victims in the ICC’s proceedings entails. Instead, the research identifies and comprises
those matters that are of fundamental importance for delimiting the sui generis standing of
victims as protagonists in their own right and place in the ICC’s arena, both in the Court’s
procedural design and in its evidentiary process.
Given the fact that the role and the place of victims, just like the ICC’s legal
framework and system as a whole, are premised on the ‘common core of legal concepts
and precepts shared by some or even most of the world’s legal systems [of today]’,17 each
topic in the thesis is contemplated from a comparative perspective. The research aims at
providing an insight into the place and role of victims at the ICC against the backdrop of
the prevailing tendencies, modern trends and models of victims’ participation in criminal
17 Rudolph B. Schlesinger, Ugo Mattei, Teemu Ruskola, Antonio Gidi, Schlesinger's Comparative Law. Cases,
Text, Materials, 7th edition (University Casebooks), Foundation Press, 2009, p. 42.
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jurisdictions at both the domestic and the international levels alike. The comparative
analysis is, however, not confined to the field of criminal justice. As the present study will
reveal, a glance from a wider perspective provides equally useful guidance for the
accurate interpretation of some of the core issues addressed in the thesis. To start with, as
evidenced in the following chapter, considering the eligibility as a victim in light of the
legal frameworks and jurisprudence of regional human rights institutions, as well as other
(quasi)adjudicative bodies at the supranational level, affords an in-depth illumination of
the origins of the notion ‘victim’ and of the criteria for victim status set forth in rule 85.
15
CHAPTER ONE
Victims’ Eligibility Pursuant to Rule 8518
A thorough discussion of any involvement of victims in the ICC’s process is necessarily
preceded by the question of who qualifies as a victim before the Court. Consequently, any
provision envisaging victims’ rights and/or participation throughout the criminal justice
process19 comes into consideration only after the fulfillment of the requirements
delineated in rule 85.20 The latter is a concurrent fundamental provision in the ICC’s
statutory documents as it defines who qualifies as victim before the Court.21 This question
is the starting point for the recognition of an individual qua victim and, as such, represents
the first step in the assessment of any right of victims’ involvement in the proceedings.22
The recognition of victim status thus entails the possibility for the enjoyment of ‘benefits
associated with victimhood’.23 Bearing in mind the importance of rule 85, it is rather
striking that it is somewhat overlooked in the literature on the ICC. Reference to this legal
text is usually made in the context of the entire scheme for victims’ participation, but it
tends to be cursory and sporadic.
The centrality of rule 85 lies within its design to identify the ambit of the term
‘victim’ for the purposes of the ICC’s constitutive documents. According to this provision
‘victims’ means: (a) ‘natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’; and (b) ‘organizations or
institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated to
18 A previous draft of this chapter has been published as ‘Victims’ Eligibility before the International Criminal
Court in Historical and Comparative Context’, International Criminal Law Review, vol. 11, issue 4 (2011), pp.
665-706.
19 Such as, inter alia, article 15(3) read together with rule 50(3); article 19(3)  read together with rule 59(1).
20 See Susana SáCouto and Katherine Cleary, ‘Victims’ Participation in the Investigations of the International
Criminal Court’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 17:73 (2008), pp. 74-105, p. 88.
21 Although the victim-related provisions in the Statute may seem conditioned upon the application of one of the
Rules, in the hierarchy of the ICC’s constitutive documents the latter are subordinate towards the Statute. The
Rules complement the Statute and serve as an instrument for the application of its provisions by elucidating the
substance of certain notions used, but not defined in the Statute. See articles 21(1)(a) and 51(4) and (5), as well
as the explanatory note to the Rules.
22 Elisabeth Baumgartner, ‘Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International Criminal
Court’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 90, № 870 (June 2008), pp. 409–440, p. 417; Miriam Cohen,
‘Victims’ Participation Rights Within The International Criminal Court: A Critical Overview’, Denver Journal
of International Law and Policy, vol. 37, № 3 (Summer 2009), pp. 351–377, p. 366.
23 Joris van Wijk, ‘Who is the 'little old lady' of international crimes? Nils Christie's concept of the ideal victim
reinterpreted’, International Review of Victimology, vol. 19(2) (2013), pp.  159-179, p. 160.
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religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments,
hospitals and other places and objects of humanitarian purposes.’
Having in mind the broad nature of this victim notion, its accurate analysis proves
critical for the operation of the victims’ participation scheme and may have an impact on
the expeditiousness of the relevant proceedings before the Court.24 The present chapter
addresses the numerous important and complex matters originated by the interpretation of
the distinct eligibility requirements enshrined in rule 85, i.e. the victim must be a natural
person or a legal entity in the form of organization or institution; the victim must have
sustained harm; the crime from which the harm ensued must fall within the jurisdiction of
the Court; there must be a causal link between the crime and the harm. Although bearing
certain nuances depending on the group of victims, the eligibility criteria adhere to the
same overarching principles and thus, overlap to a great extent. The majority of the
requirements raise concerns as to their interpretation in the conflicting jurisprudence of
the ICC’s Chambers in that respect, especially at its inception.
I. Application of Rule 85 in the Course of the Proceedings
The legal condition of victim as delineated in the ‘catch-all’ provision25 of rule 85 cannot
be determined in the abstract, but in the context of concrete proceedings.26 As the ICC’s
Appeals Chamber  (‘the Appeals Chamber’) has observed, ‘[t]he location of rule 85 in the
Rules is indicative of a general provision relating to victims, applicable to various stages
of the proceedings’.27 Hence, the victim definition may attract two opposing views as
regards its application in the course of the proceedings: one advancing the uniform
application of the eligibility criteria irrespective of the particularities of the different
stages of the criminal justice process and another favouring an application depending on
24 As observed by commentators, ‘a broad interpretation of the notion of victim risks creating a backlog in the
proceedings, undermining the ability of the Court to efficiently implement its mandate [footnote omitted]’. See
Valentina Spiga, ‘Indirect Victims' Participation in the Lubanga Trial’, Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2010) 8 (1), pp. 183-198, p. 186.
25 Håkan Friman, ‘The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third Party to the
Proceedings?’, Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009), pp. 485–500, p. 490.
26 Note, however, the existence of an understanding in the opposite vein in the initial jurisprudence of Pre-Trial
Chamber I, according to which a ‘victim procedural status’ was to be assessed and, respectively, granted outside
a judicial proceeding.
27 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, 11 July 2008
(Appeals Chamber Judgment of 11 July 2008), paras. 57-58.
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the nature, purpose, scope and stage of the proceedings at hand. The first understanding
would prove untenable because it would fail to take into account the distinctiveness of the
various proceedings28 and stages of the criminal justice process at which the assessment of
the rule 85 criteria is to be performed. Furthermore, each subsequent stage of the criminal
justice process is marked by higher specificity and concreteness than the preceding one.
With the development of the proceedings the events and facts under consideration also
crystallize and narrow in scope. Similarly, the victims’ eligibility criteria become more
specific and precise. Hence, the more advanced the stage of the proceedings, the higher
the threshold of the victims’ eligibility requirements which must be met.
The temporal, geographic and personal parameters of a situation are considerably
wider and subsume the parameters of all cases which may arise from it. The investigation
of a situation takes place at an earlier stage of the proceedings and covers much broader
scale of events. Consequently, as potential cases originate from situations, they have a
significantly narrower ambit. Cases focus on particular crimes within the Court’s
jurisdiction individualized in terms of the identity of the alleged perpetrators and the
alleged harm inflicted through their commission. Logically, the victims’ eligibility criteria
should be applied and construed more flexibly within the context of a situation as they
bear less specificity and concreteness than they do in a case.
An illustration of an early procedural stage where the threshold of the rule 85
criteria is considerably lower and lacks much specificity are the proceedings pursuant to
article 15(3). This procedure takes place prior to the commencement of the actual criminal
proceedings and is based on the preliminary examination of the Prosecutor of the
information provided to him or her. The purpose of victims’ representations within this
particular proceeding is to express the prevailing stance of the community of individuals
affected as a whole by an alleged criminal conduct with regard to the Prosecutor’s request
to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization of an investigation. Victims’ representations
are confined to providing the Chamber with a general idea of the prevalent disposition of
the respective population towards the initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor in
order to make a useful contribution to the final determination to be made by the Pre-Trial
Chamber. Hence, the representations made by victims within the article 15(3) proceedings
serve exclusively the purpose of ‘express[ing] their position on a possible investigation [to
28 I.e. proceedings on the merits, proceedings pursuant to articles 15(3) and 19(3), reparation proceedings
pursuant to article 75.
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be undertaken by the Prosecutor] or not’.29 Evidently, at this specific stage a thorough,
strict and detailed assessment of the requirements pursuant to rule 85 to each person
within the affected community or group of individuals would be unwarranted.
A flexible approach in the application of rule 85 has been embraced by Pre-Trial
Chamber II (‘PTC II’) in the Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Section
Concerning Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3).30 The Chamber applied
the eligibility criteria creatively, emphasizing the particular nature and the narrow scope
of the article 15 proceeding, as well as the limited involvement of victims therein. The
rule 85 requirements were outlined in very broad and general terms and were applied to
groups of victims and even to a wider category of ‘affected groups’. The same principled
approach was subsequently endorsed in the more recent jurisprudence of the Court.
Noting the specific and limited purpose of representations within the context of the article
15 proceeding Pre-Trial Chamber III (‘PTC III’) applied the rule 85 criteria not only to
individual victims, but also to the victimized community represented by the respective
community leader(s).31
The need for a varied approach adapted to the stage of the proceedings has also
been addressed by Pre-Trial Chamber I (‘PTC I’), albeit in a different context. The
Chamber advanced the view that during an investigation of a situation the status of victim
will be accorded to applicants who fall within the victim definition in relation to the
situation, whereas, at the case stage, victim status will be accorded to applicants who meet
the eligibility criteria in the context of the case.32
Besides the specific stage of the ICC’s process, at which the victim status is to be
assessed, it is likewise pertinent that the victim’s eligibility criteria are considered in light
of the nature and object of the concrete proceedings, as well as the purpose of the victims’
intervention therein. This proves of particular importance in the context of the first
eligibility criterion – the ‘natural persons’ criterion – and, more specifically, for the proper
resolution of the issue concerning deceased individuals.
29 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) II, Order to the Victims Participation and
Reparations Section Concerning Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Statute, ICC-01/09-4,
10 December 2009, para. 10.
30 Ibid.
31 Situation in the Cote d’Ivoire, PTC III, Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Section Concerning
Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3), 6 July 2011, para. 10.
32 Situation in the DRC, PTC I, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, ICC-
01/04-101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006 (Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006), para. 66.
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II. The First Criterion: Natural Persons and Legal Entities
1. Natural Persons
Natural persons are the first group of victims set out in rule 85(a). The ‘natural persons’
eligibility requirement seems unequivocal at first glance and may be regarded as the ‘most
clear-cut and unproblematic’,33 and of little complexity.34 This criterion was interpreted by
the Court in ‘the ordinary meaning of the term “natural person” as “a human being”’.35
Consequently, the Court reached ‘the rather banal conclusion’36 that ‘[a] natural person is
any person who is not a legal person.’37 A more comprehensive consideration is suggested
in the legal literature, according to which ‘natural persons’ are ‘legal subjects (sujet[s] de
droit) with full juridical capacity since such a juridical relevance stems from the natural
capability of exercising inherent rights and duties.’38
Although the ‘natural persons’ requirement may appear straightforward, to
conclude that it does not cause any ambiguity or complexity would be impetuous. A
thorough scrutiny of the first criterion detects a number of contentious issues. Among the
most pressing ones are the identification of natural persons, as well as the highly
debatable question of deceased persons. In light of the ICC’s case-law both issues prove
to be far from unproblematic.
1.1. Identification Requirements
The need that the applicant’s identity be duly established is undoubtedly essential, so that
the victim status be accorded to actual individuals. At the same time, the scope and nature
33 Yvonne McDermott, ‘Some Are More Equal than Others: Victim Participation in the ICC’, Eyes on the ICC,
vol. 5:1 (2008-2009), pp. 23-48, p. 30.
34 Baumgartner, supra note 22,  p. 419.
35 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006. Recourse to the notion of ‘human being’ is also made in the
definition of the term ‘person’ in article 1(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, according to which
‘person’ “means every human being”.
36 Baumgartner, supra note 22, p. 418.
37 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006, para. 80; see also Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (2004),
according to which ‘[a] ‘natural person’ is a human being, as distinguished from an artificial person created by
law.’
38 See Gioia Greco, ‘Victims’ Rights Overview under the ICC Legal Framework: A Jurisprudential Analysis’,
International Criminal Law Review 7 (2007), pp. 531–547, p. 535.
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of the identification requirements must be tailored to the available means for proof of
identity. Hence, the application of the identification criteria must reconcile two major
concerns: 1) the identification materials should not be clouded with any doubt as to the
applicant’s actual identity and 2) the applicants should not be deprived of the possibility to
be recognized as victims due to impediments beyond their control. In order for the two
concurrent objectives to be achieved, a well-balanced and flexible approach must be
adopted when elaborating and applying the identification requirements.
This view finds support in the practice of international adjudicative bodies and in
the relevant literature. Commentators agree upon the creative application of the
identification prerequisites acknowledging that in conflict zones and areas lacking
operational registration systems individuals are very likely to lose their identification
documents and are often deprived of access to public records.39 Thereby, victim-
applicants encounter numerous obstacles in proving their identity ensuing from the
difficult conditions surrounding them. Destruction of documents and/or lack of
documentation are widely acknowledged in the legal literature as a common and a
frequent problem in the aftermath of mass atrocities.40 In view of the frustration of victim-
applicants who run the risk to be rejected admission in proceedings because of an inability
to generate evidence of their alleged victimization, commentators suggest that it is critical
that adjudicative institutions modify their standards of proof of the applicant’s identity
depending on the circumstances of the case.41
Observers point to the relaxed evidentiary standards with respect to a claimant’s
eligibility and the determination of claims in the context of mass claims processes, such as
the Claims Resolution Tribunals for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland and the German
Forced Labour Programme. Notably, the Rules of Procedure of the First Claims
Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland have introduced the explicit
stipulation that, when assessing the information submitted to them, the sole arbitrators or
the Claims Panel shall at all times bear in mind difficulties in proving a claim after the
destruction of World War II and the Holocaust and the long time elapsed since the
39 See Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1411; Heike Niebergall, ‘Overcoming Evidentiary Weaknesses
in Reparation Claims Programmes’ in C. Ferstman et al. (eds.), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, pp.
145-166, p. 149; Lutz Oette, ‘Bringing Justice to Victims? Responses of Regional and International Human
Rights Courts and Treaty Bodies to Mass Violations’, in C. Ferstman et al. (eds.) (in ibid.),  pp. 217-242, p. 226.
40 Ibid.
41 See Stover et al., supra note 2, p. 542.
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opening of the dormant accounts.42 This approach has been endorsed in the jurisprudence
of the Second Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland, which in
its determination on the claims applied rather relaxed criteria.43 In the same vein, the
German Forced Labour Programme44 has introduced relaxed standard of proof of a
claimant’s eligibility. To the same effect, with respect to the determination of claims, the
Programme’s Supplemental Principles and Rules of Procedure provide that ‘[a] claim
cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not supported by official documentary
evidence.’
The impediments in meeting the required standard of proof for victims in conflict
zones are duly acknowledged also by other adjudicative bodies at the international level.
The United Nations (‘UN’) Compensation Commission,45 for instance, took into account
the difficult circumstances of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait and ruled that
‘many claimants cannot, and cannot be expected to, document all aspects of a claim. In
many cases, relevant documents do not exist, have been destroyed, or were left behind’.46
This ruling portrays the general understanding of the UN Compensation Commission
about victims’ lack of access to documentation relevant to all aspects of a claim, the
identity of the claimant(s) being one of them. Similarly, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (‘the IACtHR’, ‘the Inter-American Court’) has recognized alternative
methods for the proof of victims’ identity depending on the peculiarities and accessibility
of the respective registration systems.47
42 The Tribunal was established in 1997 for the purpose of adjudicating claims concerning the entitlement of
non-Swiss nationals and/or residents to dormant bank accounts held in Swiss banks set out in published lists. See
in more detail on this issue Jacomijn van Haersolte-van Hof, ‘Innovations to Speed Mass Claims: New Standards
of Proof’ in Redressing Injustices Through Mass Claims Processes: Innovative Responses to Unique Challenges,
edited by The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.
13-23, p. 15 et seq.
43 See ibid., pp. 18-19. The Tribunal was established in 2001 on the basis of newly discovered additional
dormant accounts. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal applied presumptions as to the
entitlement of the claimants.
44 See ibid., pp. 20-21. Established by virtue of the German Law on the Establishment of a Foundation
‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’.
45 Established as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations Security Council pursuant to para. 18 of UN Security
Council Resolution 687/1991 of 3 April 1991 and UNSC Resolution 692/1991 of 20 May 1991 to process claims
and to pay compensation for any direct loss, damage and injury resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of
Kuwait and to administer the fund created for the payment of such compensation.
46 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the First
Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages above USD 100 000 (Category ‘D’ Claims) (S/AC.26/1998/1 of 3
February 1998).
47 Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment on the Merits and Reparations of 15 June 2005, Series C No.
124, para. 178; Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993 on Reparations and Costs, Series
C No. 15, para. 64; Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment on Reparations of 19 November 2004,
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Human rights bodies are sensitive to the fact that lack of access to evidentiary
material regarding identity is merely one among the numerous problems for victims in
conflict zones. Therefore, in addition to considerably lowering and adapting the
identification criteria to the factual circumstances, human rights bodies tend to adopt
flexible requirements concerning the filing of applications on behalf of victims. An
illustration of this approach is to be found in the legal framework of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the African Commission’). The relevant
provisions envisage the possibility for petitions or communications claiming human rights
violations to be filed on behalf of third persons, whom the petitioner neither knows nor
has any relationship with (kinship, representation) - also known as actio popularis.48 This
approach of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (‘the African Charter’)
may be explained by the fact that in conflict areas it is difficult if not even impossible for
victims themselves to pursue national or international channels of remedy.49
The initial jurisprudence of the ICC reveals a propensity towards a strict approach
governing the applicants’ identity. The requisites were applied uniformly, regardless of
the personal circumstances of the applicants.50 This understanding failed to consider the
specificities surrounding individuals and, thus, proved unsustainable. Furthermore, the
Court itself recognized the likelihood that in some areas the available proofs of identity
may not be of the same type as they would be in other less tumultuous areas.51
Subsequently, the requirements were adapted to the particular factual circumstances, thus,
Series C No. 116, para. 63; Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment of 1 July 2006, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 148, para. 94.
48 See articles 55 and 56 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and rule 104 of Procedure of the
African Commission.
49 Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), para. 78. Actio popularis is also envisaged
in article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as in article 87(d) of the Human Rights
Council Resolution 5/1 (Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 18 June 2007). On the
contrary, the legal framework of the ECtHR does not envisage such form of public interest litigation (see article
34 ECHR). For further reference on actio popularis see Oette, supra note 39, pp. 221-222.
50 Situation in Uganda, PTC II, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-101, 10 August
2007 (Situation in Uganda, PTC II, 10 August 2007) and The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot
Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen (Kony et al.), PTC II, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation,
ICC-02/04-01/05-252, 10 August 2007 (Kony et al., PTC II, 10 August 2007). A number of strict requirements
were set with regard to the nature and form of the identification documents, which significantly narrowed the
range of the admissible evidentiary material.
51 Ibid. Nevertheless, the strict approach was retained: a simple statement by an individual belonging to a local
authority that a given applicant ‘is a victim’ of a specific incident was regarded as falling short of the
requirements for an adequate proof of identity. By contrast, in the Situation in the DRC on the basis of similar
findings PTC I applied a more flexible evidentiary threshold - see the Decision on the Requests of the Legal
Representative of the Applicants on the application process for victims’ participation and legal representation,
ICC-01/04-374, 17 August 2007 (Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 August 2007).
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the threshold for the proofs of identity was lowered.52 Gradually the logical conclusion
was reached that a balance was needed between the establishment of the applicants’
identities with certainty and their personal circumstances. The Court acknowledged the
need to ensure that victims must not be unfairly deprived of an opportunity to participate
for reasons beyond their control.53 This positive development in the ICC’s jurisprudence is
a clear illustration of the untenability of the initial uniform and strict application of the
identification criteria. An inference along the same lines is premised on the fact that at
present the Chambers unanimously follow creative and moderate approach in the
assessment of the applicants’ proofs of identity.54
1.2. Deceased Persons
Another complex issue within the scope of the first eligibility criterion concerns deceased
persons. The jurisprudence of the Court is marked by the dilemma of whether persons
who are no longer alive are encompassed by rule 85(a).55 In other words, the issue arises
whether deceased persons are ‘natural persons’ and are, accordingly, entitled to victim
status in proceedings before the ICC.
The comparative review of the legal frameworks and jurisprudence of
international(ized) adjudicative institutions does not suggest a unanimous answer in that
52 Situation in Uganda, PTC II, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-125, 14 March
2008 (Situation in Uganda, PTC II, 14 March 2008), and Kony et al., PTC II, Decision on Victims’ Applications
for Participation, ICC-02/04-01/05-282, 14 March 2008. The Single Judge embraced the idea of a moderate
threshold of the identification criteria and their application in light of the specific conditions in the region
following the findings in the report of the VPRS. See in the same vein The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto,
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (‘Ruto et al.’), PTC II, First Decision on Victims’ Participation in
the Case, ICC-01/09-01/11-17, 30 March 2011 (First Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Case), paras. 7-8,
where the Single Judge acknowledged the ‘difficulties victim applicants […] may encounter in obtaining or
producing copies of official identity documents, such as a passport’ and thus regarded as acceptable other
substitute forms of identification to official documentation, in case the latter would be non-available.
53 Lubanga, Trial Chamber I, Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 18 January 2008
(Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008), para. 87; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo
Ngudjolo (Katanga and Ngudjolo), Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Treatment of Applications for
Participation, ICC-01/04-01/07-933-tENG, 26 February 2009 (Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 26 February 2009).
54 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 August 2007; The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (Abu Garda), PTC I,
Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage, ICC-02/05-02/09-121, 25 September
2009 (Abu Garda, PTC I, 25 September 2009), and The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Bemba), PTC
III, Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/05-01/08-320, 12 December 2008 (Bemba, PTC III, 12
December 2008).
55 The jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber lacks a clear and firm standpoint on this matter. The stance of the
Chamber remains vague. See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Victim Participation in
the appeal of the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence against PTC I’s Decision of 3 December 2007 and in
the appeals of the Prosecutor and the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence against PTC I’s Decision of 6
December 2007, ICC-02/05-138, 18 June 2008, para. 54(c).
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respect. On the one hand, the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure56 of East Timor’s
Special Panels for Serious Crimes in the District Court of Dili (‘East Timor’s hybrid
court’) do not consider deceased persons as victims. Instead, the relevant provisions
envisage the fact of death as a prerequisite for the individuals surviving the deceased to
qualify qua victims in their personal capacity and not on behalf of the deceased.
According to this approach, the death of an individual represents a harm suffered by the
next of kin due to the loss of a person of close relation as a consequence of the crime.
Hence, the successors are entitled to claim victim status only on their own behalf on the
basis of several distinct harms endured in their personal capacity – the loss of their next of
kin and also other damages sustained as a consequence of the alleged crime. The
successors can either be indirect victims due to their suffering from the loss of a family
member and all other secondary losses stemming from this fact or direct victims due to
harm(s) inflicted upon them through the commission of the alleged crime.57 Admittedly,
these two scenarios may often be interrelated. The harm sustained by the successor may
be both direct and indirect – such as the loss of a close relative and/or beloved one
combined with personal injuries suffered from the crime.
The roots of the approach just contemplated can be traced back to the early 1920s in
the wake of World War I in the jurisprudence of the USA-Germany Mixed Claims
Commission58 in the Lusitania cases.59 According to the Commission, in death cases the
basis of damages is not the physical or mental suffering of the deceased, their loss or the
loss to their estate, but the losses resulting to claimants from the death of the individual.
Notwithstanding the examples suggested hitherto, the conception favouring the
recognition of deceased persons as victims proves to be prevailing among human rights
56 Adopted by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) by virtue of Regulation
2000/30 (25 September 2000), amended by UNTAET/REG/2001/25 (14 September 2001). Section 1(x) of the
General Provisions of the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure in East Timor defines as victims ‘the spouse,
partner or immediate family member of a deceased person whose death was caused by criminal conduct’.
57 Such understanding is in tune with the ICC’s Appeals Chamber’s view that ‘the notion of victim necessarily
implies the existence of personal harm but does not necessarily imply the existence of direct harm’ –Lubanga,
Appeals Chamber Jugment of 11 July 2008, para. 38.
58 Established to settle specific categories of claims of American nationals by virtue of the Agreement of August
10, 1922 signed in Berlin between the USA and Germany. The Agreement was concluded pursuant to the USA
Congress’ Knox-Porter Resolution of 2 July 1921 and the Peace Treaty between Germany and the USA of 25
August 1921. The Commission functioned from 1922 until 1939.
59 Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, 1 November 1923, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. VII, United
Nations, 2006, p. 35. In these cases, which arose as a consequence of the sinking of the British ocean liner
Lusitania by a German submarine on 7 May 1915, Germany was found obliged to pay to the USA all losses
suffered by American nationals as a result of the death or other immaterial or material damages sustained in the
sinking of the liner.
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institutions. Within this approach the following nuances can be descried: 1) deceased are
explicitly envisaged as victims in the legal framework; 2) deceased are implicitly included
within the ambit of victims in the constitutive documents; 3) deceased are identified as
victims throughout the jurisprudence of the adjudicative body.
An illustration of the first variation is to be found in the legal framework of the
Human Rights Chamber of the Commission on Human Rights for Bosnia and
Herzegovina.60 The Rules of Procedure provide that claims for human rights violations
may be filed on behalf of alleged victims who are deceased or missing.61 In addition, the
Human Rights Chamber throughout its jurisprudence has acknowledged deceased persons
as victims of violations of certain human rights legal instruments.62
Features of the second prong can be discerned in the legal texts of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee.63 Although the Rules of Procedure do not refer to
deceased explicitly, they equally lack restriction as to the groups of victims (whether
children, disabled, disappeared or deceased) on whose behalf a submission can be made.64
Thus, the literal and contextual analysis of the relevant provisions lends support to the
inference that deceased persons are implicitly included within the compass of the victim
notion. An unequivocal indication in the same vein is premised on the numerous
occasions in which the Committee has recognized deceased as victims of violations of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.65
60 Established pursuant to article 2 of the Agreement on Human Rights (concluded as Annex 6 to the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 14 December 1995 between the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska – the ‘Dayton Peace
Agreement’).
61 According to rule 32(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Chamber (adopted pursuant to article
10(1) and (2), and article 12 of the Agreement on Human Rights) ‘[p]ersons, non-governmental organisations, or
groups of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation by any Party or acting on behalf of alleged victims
who are deceased or missing, may present and conduct applications under Article VIII para. 1 of the
Agreement’.
62 See E.M. and S.T. against the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on admissibility and merits, 8
March 2002, Case no. CH/01/6979. The Chamber with respect to the deceased S.T. found a ‘negation of […]
[the] right to life as protected by Article 2 of the [European Convention on Human Rights]’ and a ‘discrimination
[…] in the enjoyment [by the deceased] of Article 5(a) and (b) of the Convention for the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination’ – see paras. 59, 85(2) and 85(4).
63 Established pursuant to article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 stipulating the Committee’s competencies.
64 According to rule 90(b) of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.6 (as revised on
24.04.2001), ‘a communication submitted on behalf of an alleged victim may […] be accepted when it appears
that the individual in question is unable to submit the communication personally’.
65 Eduardo Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.7/30, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 130 (1982);
John Khemraadi Baboeram, Andre Kamperveen, Cornelis Harold Riedewald, Gerald Leckie, Harry Sugrim
Oemrawsingh, Somradj Robby Sohansingh, Lesley Paul Rahman and Edmund Alexander Hoost. v. Suriname,
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Similarly, although the Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure (‘the Provisional
Rules’)66 of the UN Compensation Commission do not make an express reference to
deceased persons, the latter have been recognized as victims upon the adoption of
Governing Council’s Decisions 767 and  12.68 The two decisions introduced an additional
category of individual claims (‘claims of individuals not otherwise covered’)69 which
covered the special installment of claims in the names of deceased detainees.70 Based on a
creative and broad interpretation of the terms ‘individual’ and ‘person’ pursuant to article
1(13) of the Provisional Rules read in conjunction with article 1(12) (delineating the scope
of victims eligible for compensation) the Commission acknowledged the deceased as
victims for the purposes of compensation.
The third variety of the approach contemplated above is prevalent among regional
human rights bodies. Though the legal framework of the IACtHR neither explicitly, nor
implicitly refers to deceased persons, its case-law identifies them as victims of violations
of the American Convention on Human Rights and other regional legal instruments.71
Similarly, on many occasions the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’, ‘the
European Court’) has deemed admissible applications made on behalf of deceased
individuals and has considered the latter victims of violations of certain provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the ECHR’).72 An
Communication No. 146/1983 and 148 to 154/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/40/40) at 187 (1985); Miango v.
Zaire, Communication No. 194/1985, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) at 218 (1988).
66 UN Doc. S/AC 26/1992/10 of 26 June 1992.
67 Decision S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1 of 17 March 1992.
68 Decision S/AC.26/1992/12 of 25 September 1992.
69 Pursuant to article 17 of the Provisional Rules the Commission established different categories of claims. The
additional category of individual claims related to deceased was introduced pursuant to article 6 of Decision 7
and article 1(b) of Decision 12. The two decisions read together entitle individuals to compensation for any
direct loss, damage or injury, including death, as a result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
70 In conformity with article 5(a) and (c) of the Provisional Rules this special installment of claims was
submitted to the Panel of Commissioners examining category ‘D’ claims.
71 Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993 on Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 15,
para. 54; Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Judgment of 27 August 1998 on Reparations and Costs, Series C
No. 39, para. 49; Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 22 February 2002, Reparations and Costs,
Series C No. 91, para. 62; ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia, Judgment of 15 September 2005, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 134, paras. 136-137 and paras. 283-284; Ituango Massacres v. Colombia,
Judgment of 1 July 2006, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 148, para. 355(a);
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment of 25 November 2006 on Merits, Reparations and Costs, 2006,
Series C No. 160; Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Judgment of 5 July 2006,
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 150, para. 60 (26)(1) and para. 119.
72 In the case of Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, Application № 22535/93, Judgment of 28 March 2000, the Court found
violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the ECHR in respect of the failure to protect the life of the deceased.
Similarly, in the case of Kişmir v. Turkey, Application № 27306/95, Judgment of 31 May 2005 (final as of 31
August 2005) the Court considered both the deceased and his mother, who had filed the application on behalf of
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identical interpretation is observed in the case-law of the African Commission. The
Commission has considered and pronounced on the merits of communications filed on
behalf of deceased persons as victims of human rights abuses.73
The brief comparative review shows that the majority of international adjudicative
bodies favour the recognition of deceased persons as victims. However, this approach
should not be transposed to the ICC automatically. Although, in general, an analogy
between various (international) adjudicative systems is conceivable, if not even
desirable,74 a very careful thought must be given whether the legal regimes governing
human rights jurisdictions and criminal justice systems chime together. Human rights
institutions and the relevant proceedings have a significantly different nature, focus and
ambit than criminal justice bodies. Institutions of the former kind pronounce on the
observance of internationally recognized standards for the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms by states and states’ bodies. The primary focus of examination,
albeit based on individual cases of human rights abuses, goes beyond the responsibility of
the state’s agents. It concentrates instead on the state’s policy in the field of human rights.
Accordingly, the alleged violation is considered not in the context of individual criminal
responsibility, but in light of the inferences it entails about the prevalent propensity or
unwillingness of the state towards its adherence to relevant international obligations.75
Furthermore, the recognition of deceased individuals as victims before human rights
bodies has an impact predominantly on the issue of reparations. Hence, the right of the
her dead son and on her own behalf, victims of violations of the Convention; see in the same vein the case of
Kiliç v. Turkey, Application № 22492/93, Judgment of 28 March 2000.
73 In Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. №
223/98 (2000), where the complaint was submitted by a non-governmental organization on behalf of executed
soldiers, the Commission found a breach of the due process of law as guaranteed under article 7(1)(a) of the
African Charter and declared that the execution was an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life provided for in
Article 4 of the Charter. Similarly, in the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad,
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. № 74/92 (1995) the Commission with regard to the
deceased individuals found violations of their right to life, to security and to a fair trial.
74 The comparison and analogy between different legal systems enhances the comparative legal skills of ‘global
jurists’, which as aptly noted by commentators, are required to ‘translate the foreign into the familiar’ – see
Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Gobalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz
Case’, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 56 (2008), pp. 363-402, p. 397.
75 The IACtHR itself noted that ‘[t]he international protection of human rights should not be confused with
criminal justice. […] The objective of international human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are
guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages resulting from
the acts of the States responsible’ - see Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment on the Merits of 29 July
1988, Series C No. 4, para. 134. Similarly, the ACHPR held that: ‘[t]he main goal of the communications
procedure before the Commission is to initiate a positive dialogue, resulting in an amicable resolution between
the complainant and the State concerned, which remedies the prejudice complained of ‘ - see Free Legal
Assistance Group and Others v. Zaire, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication №
25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (1995), para. 39.
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deceased recognized by such institutions is specific, limited in object and purpose,
confined to the right to compensation for the damages suffered by the deceased in their
own right.
In the present context another analogy is also worth contemplating. The following
suggests that the idea of deceased individuals and their posthumous legal interests is not
completely unfamiliar to the ICC’s statutory documents. The starting point for
consideration originates in article 84 which provides for the possibility of deceased
persons to be represented and their right(s) claimed on their behalf before the Court.
Although the provision enshrines explicitly the posthumous right of the accused and/or the
convicted person of revision of conviction or sentence, it advances the general stance that
death is not a fact which necessarily precludes all rights or legal interests accorded to the
individual. Such may be the right to have revision of conviction or sentence, the right to
compensation or the interest in a good posthumous reputation.
History bears witness to the fact that features of such post mortem rights and
interests date back centuries ago. An example portraying the vindication of the memory of
the deceased is to be descried in the nullification trial of Joan of Arc – also famous as the
Maid of Orleans - canonized in 1920 as a Catholic saint. The rehabilitation trial which
took place in the middle of the fifteenth century revised Joan of Arc’s earlier conviction,
sentence and execution for heresy and witchcraft by an ecclesiastical court in 1431. The
petition for a revision of the sentence was filed in the name of the deceased by her mother
and brothers before an ecclesiastical court in Paris following an official enquiry the
initiative for which was ascribed to the French king Charles VII. The sentence of
rehabilitation of 1456 declared the conviction for heresy and witchcraft void of effect and
vindicated Joan of Arc’s memory, thus, cleared her name posthumously.76
The right of good post mortem reputation is a variation of the right of the deceased
envisaged in article 84 of the ICC’s Statute and can be discerned in the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR, as well as in some common law jurisdictions.77 The ECtHR has
acknowledged this right provided that the next of kin show a legitimate material interest in
76 See for further information <www.jeanne-darc.info>. Another example in the same vein provide the Salem
Witch trials in the late 17th century in Massachusetts, USA, followed by the post-mortem exoneration of the
convicted.
77 See e.g. Swidler & Berlin et. al v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998),
<http://law.onecle.com/ussc/524/524us406.html>, where the US Supreme Court recognized the posthumous
application of the attorney-client privilege.
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their capacity as the decedent’s heirs and a moral interest in having the late individual
exonerated from any finding of guilt.78 On some occasions the ECtHR has reached an
even broader interpretation proclaiming that the violation itself of the right of good
reputation had occurred post mortem.79 Consequently, the issue of whether deceased
persons are entitled to any rights and/or legal interests seems far from straightforward.80
Given the above, the divergent approaches of the ICC’s Chambers with respect to
the issue of deceased individuals come to no surprise. In this respect, PTC I and Trial
Chamber II (‘TC II’) have consistently proclaimed that deceased persons do not meet the
victim criteria.81 The Chambers noted the lack of any provision in the ICC’s legal
framework that permits applications on behalf of deceased individuals in contrast to the
explicit stipulation of rule 89(3) allowing the submission of an application by another
person on behalf of the victim-applicant. Both PTC I and TC II concluded that deceased
persons could not be considered as ‘natural persons’ as they could not give consent for the
submission of the application on their behalf. Conversely, the view that ‘a victim does not
cease to be a victim because of his or her death’ was advanced by a Single Judge of PTC
78 Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, (1991) 13 EHRR 360 87/20, Judgment of 25 August 1987, para. 33. The
applicant – the heir (wife) of the deceased - claimed a posthumous violation of the presumption of innocence in
respect to her late husband.
79 Brudnicka and others v. Poland, №. 54723/00, ECHR 2005-II, Judgment of 3 March 2005. The application
was submitted by the relatives of sailors who had died in a shipwreck. The relatives claimed a violation of the
sailors’ right to a fair trial, in particular, with regard to their professional reputation alleging that it had been
compromised posthumously through the lack of fairness of the proceedings investigating the causes for the
shipwreck (see paras. 26, 27, 29, 31).
80 See Matthew H. Kramer, ‘Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights?’, Canadian Journal of Law and
Jurisprudence, vol. 14, № 1 (January 2001), pp. 29–54. See also the Individual opinion of the UN Human Rights
Chamber member Christine Chanet, concerning communications Nos. 717/1996 and 718/1996 and co-signed by
Mr. Fausto Pocar concerning communication No. 718/1996 in the case of Mrs. Maria Otilia Vargas Vargas
(represented by Fundacion de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas) v. Chile, Communication No. 718/1996,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/66/D/718/1996/Rev. 1 (24 September 1999), according to whom ‘[u]nder article 16 [of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], everyone has the right to recognition as a person before the
law. While this right is extinguished on the death of the individual, it has effects which last beyond […] death’.
81 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, ICC-
02/05-111, 6 December 2007 (Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I, 6 December 2007), and the Corrigendum, ICC-
02/05-111-Corr, 14 December 2007, paras. 35-36; Situation in the DRC, PTC I, Corrigendum to the Decision on
the Applications for Participation in the Investigation, ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, 31 January 2008, paras. 23-25
(Situation in DRC, PTC I, Corr., 31 January 2008), paras. 23-25; Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, Public Redacted
Version of the Decision on the 97 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-
01/07-579, 10 June 2008 (Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 10 June 2008), para. 63; Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II,
Grounds for the Decision on the 345 Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, ICC-01/04-
01/07-1491-Red-tENG, 23 September 2009 (Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 23 September 2009), paras. 49-56,
86.
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III.82 This stance has likewise been sustained by Trial Chamber I (‘TC I’)83 and Trial
Chamber III (‘TC III’).84
The analysis of the relevant jurisprudence shows that the discrepancy in the views as
regards the eligibility of deceased individuals pursuant to rule 85(a) ensues from the
different starting points of the consideration of the ‘natural persons’ criterion employed by
the various Chambers. The reasoning of PTC I and TC II implies that the moment taken
into consideration by the two Chambers to determine whether the ‘natural persons’
prerequisite is met is at the time of the filing of the application.85 Whereas, the wording of
the decisions of PTC III, TC I and TC III suggests that these Chambers assessed the
‘natural persons’ requirement retrospectively, at the moment of the commission of the
alleged crime - the moment of the actual occurrence of the harm.86
Logically, when the first prerequisite under rule 85(a) is assessed at the time of the
filing of the application, at that instant the deceased no longer exists as a living human
being, consequently, does not fall within the purview of the ‘natural persons’ criterion. At
the same time, when the ‘natural persons’ prerequisite is considered at the moment of the
commission of the crime, deceased individuals qualify as victims of the alleged crime in
their personal capacity. Being alive at that time, the individual personally suffered harm as
a result of the crime(s) under examination.
At this point it is to be noted that, while PTC III favoured the recognition of
deceased persons as victims, it nevertheless acknowledged that a deceased person cannot
be a participant, thus cannot present his or her views and concerns in the proceedings.87
Consequently, notwithstanding the lack of an express finding or any discernible
consideration in this regard, actually the Chamber recognized the late individual as a
82 Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008, paras. 39–43. Deceased persons were recognized as victims of the case
provided that ‘(1) the deceased was a natural person [emphasis added], (2) the death of the person appears to
have been caused by a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court and (3) a written application on behalf of the
deceased person has been submitted by his or her successor’.
83 Lubanga, TC I, Public annex to the Decision on the applications by 7 victims to participate in the proceedings
of 10 July 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/06-2035), ICC-01/04-01/06-2065-Anx2, 23 July 2009 (Lubanga, TC I, Public
annex of 23 July 2009 to the Decision of 10 July 2009), pp. 14-16.
84 Bemba, TC III, Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications by victims to
participate in the proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-807, 30 June 2010, and the Corrigendum, ICC-01/05-01/08-
807-Corr, 12 July 2010 (Bemba, TC III, 30 June 2010, and Corrigendum, 12 July 2010), paras. 78-85.
85 Situation in DRC, PTC I, Corr., 31 January 2008, para. 24; Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 26 February 2009,
para. 41.
86 Lubanga, TC I, Public annex of 23 July 2009 to the Decision of 10 July 2009, p. 15; Bemba, TC III, 30 June
2010, and Corrigendum 12 July 2010, para. 85. In Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008, para. 43, the Chamber
explicitly noted in this regard that ‘the deceased father [of the victim applicant] was a natural person at the time
of the crime(s) allegedly committed.’
87 Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008, para. 44.
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victim eligible for compensation (i.e. for the purpose of potential reparation proceedings)
rather than as a victim eligible for participation in the criminal justice process for the
purpose of presentation of views and concerns. This train of thought lends support to the
self-evident conclusion that the recognition of victim status is not a stand-alone event or
an end in itself. The determination of victim status takes place in the context and for the
purpose of given proceedings, whether proceedings adjudicating the individual criminal
responsibility of the alleged offender(s) or proceedings on reparations. This observation
reinforces the view, posited at the outset of this chapter, that the prerequisites for victim
status should not be assessed in the abstract, but should be considered in light of the
nature and object of the proceedings at hand.
It is worth reiterating that rule 85 is of a universal character and, as such, governs
the eligibility of a person in proceedings on the merits, as well as in specific proceedings
alike. In fact, the universality of the victim definition ensues from rule 85 itself which
proclaims that it serves the purpose of the Statute and the Rules. Consequently, the victim
eligibility criteria are of a ‘catch-all’88 character, which implies that they comprise equally
the eligibility of a person as a victim for the purpose of participation in proceedings and
the eligibility of a person as a victim for the purpose of reparation proceedings. Therefore,
the ‘natural persons’ criterion (and eligibility in general) should be assessed in an
ingenious way reflecting the specificities and the purpose of the proceedings at which
admission is sought. The contextual interpretation of the victim definition would efface
the concerns raised by some commentators that rule 85 could create the risk ‘of granting
participatory rights to persons who can merely claim compensation or restitution’.89
In passing, it should be recalled that participation in proceedings adjudicating the
individual criminal responsibility of the accused (i.e. proceedings on the merits) and
participation in reparation proceedings are two separate and distinct avenues of victims’
involvement at the ICC that are independent of one another. Accordingly, construed in
light of the object and purpose of reparation proceedings, it would be logical to conclude
that the purview of the ‘natural persons’ criterion pursuant to rule 85(a) encompasses
deceased individuals harmed by the alleged crime(s). This conclusion is premised on the
following line of reasoning. The subject-matter of reparation proceedings is the harm
suffered as a result of the crime(s) under examination. Consequently, the ultimate purpose
88 Friman, supra note 25, p. 490.
89 Zappalà, supra note 11, p. 159.
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of victims’ involvement therein is the award of reparations. Since the entitlement to
compensation arises at the date of the infliction of the harm, logic dictates that the
eligibility as a victim for the purpose of compensation should be assessed at the moment
of the commission of the crime. Hence, even if a person perishes prior to the
commencement of reparation proceedings, at the relevant moment at which his or her
entitlement to compensation arose – at the moment of the infliction of the harm - that
person was alive and endured the damage in his or her personal capacity. It thus follows
that deceased individuals would meet the victim eligibility criteria for the purpose of an
award of compensation in their name. An indication in this strain is premised on the
provision governing reparation proceedings - article 75 - which envisages reparations not
only to victims but likewise in respect of victims. The inference advanced herewith is also
in line with the jurisprudence of human rights institutions, already contemplated in detail.
It is worth recalling that, according to the latter, the fact that a person is no longer alive
either at the moment of the filing of the compensation claim or at the moment of the
determination of the harm does not preclude the award of reparations being made in the
name of the deceased. An understanding in the same vein transpires also from the relevant
findings of PTC III, discussed above.
On the other hand, the fact of the harm suffered does not automatically entail that the
person would be willing to intervene in proceedings adjudicating the crime(s) that
inimically (and/or fatally) affected him or her and express opinion and preoccupations
therein. Heedful of the purpose of victims’ participation in proceedings adjudicating the
individual criminal responsibility of the alleged offender(s), in order to give effect to
article 68(3) the Court should assess the victim eligibility criteria not retrospectively, but
at the moment of the filing of the application for participation. Consequently, persons who
have passed away prior to filing an application would not meet the ‘natural persons’
criterion for the purpose of participation in proceedings pursuant to article 68(3), i.e. for
the purpose of presenting views and concerns.
A challenge in this respect might pose the scenario whereby the late individual has
given an express consent90 to another person to apply for participation in his or her stead
for the purpose of conveying the views and preoccupations as enunciated by the former
90 See rule 89(3), first proposition, which reads as follows: ‘An application referred to in this rule [89
‘Application for participation of victims in the proceedings’] may also be made by a person acting with the
consent of the victim’.
33
prior to death. The Court could either determine that, notwithstanding such an express
consent, the late individual does not qualify as a victim for the purpose of participation,
since at the moment of the filing of the application the ‘natural persons’ criterion is no
longer met. Alternatively, the Court could assess the victim eligibility criteria at the
moment of the express consent given by the individual prior to death for the filing of an
application for participation on his or her behalf. This latter approach could lead to a
positive determination pursuant to rule 85(a) regarding the late individual, which would
result in an expansive interpretation of the victims’ eligibility criteria.
Logically, the latter scenario occasions the question as to the practical implications
of the recognition of deceased persons as victims for the purpose of participation pursuant
to article 68(3). Conceivably, individuals who pass away prior to the actual criminal
justice process could not form and present opinion as regards any potential particular
issues that might emerge in future proceedings and be of their concern. Thus, it is
questionable whether the views and concerns related to specific issues arising in the
course of the criminal process conveyed by the individual acting upon the decedent’s
authorization would not in reality rest on his or her own perceptions rather than on the
speculation of what the opinion of the deceased might have been had the latter still been
alive.91 In other words, the question that remains is: who would in fact be the actual
victim-participant?92
Be that as it may, the question regarding the eligibility of deceased persons pursuant
to rule 85(a) provides a vivid illustration of the fact that the ambit of the victim’s
definition assessed in light of the object and purpose of participation in the criminal
justice process does not necessarily coincide with the purview of the victim’s definition
for the purpose of award of reparations.
91 See in support of this understanding Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 23 September 2009, para. 54. The Chamber
noted that the person acting on behalf of a deceased cannot be in a position to convey his or her views and
concerns accurately.
92 In its interpretation of the rule 85 criteria TC III went even further by stating that ‘relevant representations
from the person fatally affected’ by the alleged crime(s) could be made by another person in the course of the
proceedings. At the same time, the Chamber did not require any evidence of an express consent by the late
individual to be represented in proceedings for that purpose. The Chamber merely held that in order to enhance
the ‘Court’s understanding of the relevant events’ an ‘appropriate individual […] [acting on behalf of the
deceased] [should be allowed] to provide the Chamber with relevant information (reflecting the views and
concerns of the victim who died).’92 See Bemba, TC III, 30 June 2010, and Corrigendum,12 July 2010, para. 83.
In the view of the present author, this approach finds no basis in the Court’s legal framework. In order to provide
the Chamber with relevant information reflecting the views and concerns of the victim who died, the person
should be called as a witness to testify rather than being admitted as a participant.
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1.3. Disappeared (Missing) Persons93
Another problem that is related to the present discussion and deserves a brief
consideration concerns disappeared (missing) persons. The missing person could be either
deceased or alive. In the event that the disappeared is deceased, the arguments advanced
above would equally apply. However, if still alive, even though his or her whereabouts are
unknown, the disappeared meets the ‘natural persons’ criterion. The question which
comes into light is whether victim status could be accorded to such an individual in the
absence of an explicit will for his or her recognition as victim before the Court. Premised
on the wording of rule 89(3) the reasonable inference should be that a disappeared person
who meets the rule 85 criteria could not be granted victim status, unless an express will in
this regard is manifested.
In case the missing person is a child it is presumed that he or she cannot form the
required will ‘by reason of […] physical and mental immaturity’94. Consequently, the
child’s rights and legal interests must be safeguarded and represented by another person.
Hence, victim status could be claimed on behalf of the disappeared child through other
persons.95
With respect to a disappeared individual who is disabled two different scenarios
come to the fore. If that person suffers physical and/or mental disability which does not
affect the capacity to form will and express it accordingly, victim status could be claimed
on behalf of the disappeared with his or her express consent. In case the missing person
has diminished mental capacity and/or physical impairment which affect(s) his or her
powers of discernment, victim status could be claimed on behalf of the individual by
another person (such as a legal guardian).
A swift glance at the ICC’s jurisprudence shows that the issue of
disappeared/missing persons has not yet been addressed in detail. The few sporadic
references made by the Chambers have contemplated the disappearance of an individual
93 The wording ‘disappeared’ and ‘missing’ are used interchangeably throughout the text.
94 Preamble to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) (G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(№ 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354.
95 The question emerges of whether a person who does not have a formal status in relation to the child (such as a
parent or legal guardian) could represent the child and properly decide on the best way to safeguard his or her
legal interests. The issue of children’s representation has been tackled differently by the Pre-Trial Chambers, on
the one hand, and TC I, on the other. See e.g. Situation in Uganda, PTC II, 14 March 2008, para. 7; Abu Garda,
PTC I, 25 September 2009, para. 88; Lubanga, TC I, Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the
proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-1556, 15 December 2008 (Lubanga, TC I, 15 December 2008), para. 64 et seq.
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as a fact inflicting harm to the family members which entitles the latter to claim victim
status in their own right.96 With regard to the recognition of disappeared as victims
themselves, the Court has ruled that applications on their behalf cannot be considered due
to the lack of consent required under rule 89(3).97
2. Legal Persons
The introduction of legal entities98 as the second group of victims pursuant to rule 85(b)
grants an independent standing of juridical persons in their own right before the ICC. This
new class of victims on the international criminal justice scene is likely to originate
various concerns in practice. Any additional category of victims entails the possibility for
a potential increase in the number of persons appearing before the Court.99 At the same
time, the fact that legal entities often sustain harm as a result of violations of international
law must not be neglected, but should be given due consideration.100
The wording of rule 85(b) advances the conclusion that the drafters have been
heedful of both concerns.101 This legal text reveals an intention towards achieving a
balance between two concurring goals: safeguarding the expeditiousness of the
proceedings (by preventing myriad victims from appearing before the Court) and
acknowledging the existence of a separate, wide category of persons harmed as a result of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.102
96 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I, 6 December 2007, para. 35; Situation in DRC, PTC I, Corr. 31 January
2008, paras. 24 and 85.
97 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I, 6 December 2007. Likewise, in the Situation in Uganda, PTC II,
Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-172, 21 November 2008, the Chamber rejected
an application submitted on behalf of a disappeared person on the grounds that the latter was neither a child, nor
disabled, thus did not meet the rule 89(3) requirements (paras. 214–217).
98 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a legal person is a fictitious/legal/moral person, as well as ‘artificial
person’. The latter is referred to as ‘an entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights
and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purposes of legal reasoning is treated more
or less as a human being.’
99 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 366.
100 See article 8(2)(b); Dinah L. Shelton, ‘Reparations for Victims of International Crimes’ in Dinah Shelton (ed.)
International Crimes, Peace and Human Rights: The Role of The International Criminal Court, Transnational
Publishers, 2000, pp. 137-147, at pp. 142-143; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’
Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 6, № 2 (2006), pp. 203-279, p. 243, and Baumgartner, supra note 22, p.
420.
101 Rule 85(b) explicitly confines the group of eligible victims to juridical persons falling within the notion of
‘organization’ and/or ‘institution’.
102 See Silvia Alejandra Fernández de Gurmendi and Håkan Friman, ‘The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the International Criminal Court’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 3 (2000), pp. 289-336, p.
314 for an indication of the ‘major and fundamental division between those who wanted a definition of victims
confined to natural persons and those who wanted to include legal entities as well’.
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2.1. Victim Definitions Lacking Reference to Legal Persons
The introduction of legal persons into the notion of victims before the ICC broadens the
conventional concept of ‘victim’ found in the constitutive documents of the ad hoc
tribunals and some internationalized courts. The ICTY and the ICTRs’ legal frameworks,
as well as the normative basis of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘the SCSL’) do not
envisage legal persons into the victim definition. Although the wording ‘person’ may have
two different interpretations: restrictive (confined to natural persons) and broad
(encompassing legal entities), the review of the constitutive documents of the ad hoc and
the hybrid tribunal favours the narrow connotation.
Pursuant to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and the ICTR the
term ‘person’ is used both in the victim definition and in the definitions of the suspect and
the accused.103 The accused and the suspect can only be natural persons, according to the
explicit stipulation of article 6 of the ICTY’s Statute and article 5 of the ICTR’s Statute
defining the tribunals’ personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the rational conclusion is that the
general usage of the word ‘person’ in the tribunals’ legal framework is in the restrictive
meaning of this term and refers to natural persons only.
A similar inference is to be made with regard to the substance and ambit of the
term ‘person’ within the SCSL’s legal framework. Unlike the two ad hoc tribunals
established by resolutions of the UN Security Council, the SCSL is a treaty-based court of
mixed jurisdiction. Accordingly, the applicable law of this internationalized court includes
international as well as Sierra Leonean national law to the extent explicitly provided for in
its statutory documents.104 Neither the constitutive instruments of the SCSL, nor the
relevant Sierra Leonean legal framework105 relate the word ‘person’ to legal entities. On
the contrary, several provisions in the SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence explicitly
employ the word ‘entity’ when envisaging legal persons.106 In addition, pursuant to article
2 of the Sierra Leonean Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 which gives interpretation of
103 See rule 2 of the ICTY and ICTRs’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
104 See the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Document S/2000/915, and articles 1, 5, 14(2) of the SCSL’s Statute on the nature of SCSL and the applicability
of domestic legislation.
105 See the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 as an applicable national legislation pursuant to article 14(2) of the
SCSL’s Statute.
106 See rules 6(a), 70(b), (c) and (d) of SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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certain terms, the word ‘person’ is used in the context of natural persons only. The
definition of a ‘corporation’ contained in the same provision does not make recourse to
the word ‘person’.107 Furthermore, the SCSL in its jurisprudence has consistently ruled
that ‘‘victims’ means and includes victims of sexual violence, torture, as well as all
persons who were under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime.’108 The reference to age, as well as to crimes the commission of which involves
natural persons only both in terms of perpetrator and victim unequivocally shows that the
Court’s interpretation is confined to natural persons.
An additional argument in the same vein ensues from the fact that in the
proceedings before these tribunals victims appear solely in their capacity as witnesses.109
The witness capacity due to notorious reasons is attributable to natural persons only.
Hence, the overall conclusion to be advanced is that the ambit of the word ‘person’ in the
discussed victim definitions does not encompass legal entities.
The legislative approach found in the legal framework of another hybrid tribunal –
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘the STL’) – also merits a brief reference. Although
STL’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence delineate a victims’ participation
scheme akin to some extent to the one provided for in the ICC’s legal framework,110 rule
2(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence explicitly confines the victim definition to
natural persons.
The recognition of juridical entities as victims at the international level also proves
novel compared to the concept of ‘victim’ enshrined in basic international legal
instruments, such as the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime
107 See the 1965 Criminal Procedure Act, Part V ‘Special Trials. Trial of Corporations’ – articles 206–209
envisaging corporate criminal liability.
108 See the Decisions of the SCSL’s Trial Chamber on the Prosecutor’s motions for immediate protective
measures for witnesses and victims and for non-public disclosure and the orders annexed to them in: The
Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Case № SCSL-2003-08-PT, 23 May 2003; The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba
Brima aka Tamba Alex Brima, aka Gullit, Case № SCSL-2003-06-PT, 23 May 2003 and The Prosecutor v.
Moinina Fofana, Case № SCSL-2003-11-PD, 16 October 2003.
109 See articles 15, 18, 20 and 22 of the ICTY’s Statute and rules 34, 39, 69, 75, 96 of its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence; articles 14, 17, 19, 21 of the ICTR’s Statute and rules 34, 69, 75 of its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, as well as articles 15(2), 16(4), 17(2) of the SCSL’s Statute and rules 26bis, 34, 39, 40, 40bis, 69, 75,
105 of the SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Victims cannot claim compensation before the ad hoc and
the hybrid tribunal – this possibility is ruled out by virtue of rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
each of the two ad hoc tribunals and rule 105 of the SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Thus, victims
have no other standing before these courts than witnesses.
110 See, for example, article 17 of the STL’s Statute (S/RES/1757) and rules 50, 51, 86 and 87 STL’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (STL/BD/2009/01/Rev. 2).
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and Abuse of Power (‘the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims’)111 and the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law (‘the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedy and Reparation’).112
Both employ the term ‘persons’ without an explicit inclusion of legal entities.113 The
contextual analysis of the relevant provisions warrants the conclusion that this omission is
not fortuitous.
Article A (1) of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims uses the words
‘individual’, ‘physical’, ‘mental’, ‘emotional’, all of them attributable to natural persons.
Similarly, article 10 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedy and Reparation
proclaims the victims’ physical and psychological well-being, which advances the
conclusion that the concept of victims is confined to natural persons. Further, article 15 of
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedy and Reparation introduces the term ‘legal
persons’ as an example of entity liable for reparations to victims. This express use of the
word ‘legal’ in conjunction with ‘persons’ is another unambiguous indication that the
scope of the notion ‘persons’ used elsewhere in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on
Remedy and Reparation is confined to natural persons.114
2.2. Approaches Recognizing Legal Entities as Victims (Damaged Persons) at
the International Level
Notwithstanding the examples which lack reference to juridical persons, to conclude that
the acknowledgement of legal entities as victims is unique and exclusively characteristic
of the ICC would not only be hasty, but also incorrect. In fact, this legislative approach
chimes to a great extent with the legal texts of another criminal justice body - the East
Timor’s hybrid court, which recognizes juridical persons as victims and in a similar way
expressly confines them to ‘an organization or institution directly affected by a criminal
111 Adopted on 29 November 1985 pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/40/34.
112 Adopted on 19 April 2005 by Resolution 2005/35, E/CN.4/RES/2005/35.
113 See in the same vein Bassiouni, supra note 100, p. 243.
114 See in the same spirit Theo van Boven, ‘Victims’ Rights to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United
Nations Principles and Guidelines’ in C. Ferstman et al. (eds.) Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity. Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, p. 35,
according to whom the ‘victim’ definition ‘only mentions natural persons and not legal persons’.
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act.’115 Similarly, although the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the period of
Democratic Kampuchea (‘the ECCC’) lacks provisions stipulating juridical persons as
victims, according to the glossary to the ECCC’s Internal Rules the term ‘victim’
encompasses legal entities as well.116
The broadening of the ambit of the victim definition through the adoption of rule
85(b) is also in line with other recent developments on a larger international scale. Legal
persons are acknowledged as victims before supranational, regional, bilateral and
multilateral adjudicative institutions. The following approaches are to be discerned: 1)
recognition by the relevant legal framework; 2) recognition by virtue of the respective
jurisprudence; 3) recognition envisaged in legislative initiatives and projects under
consideration by the international community. The tendency towards the
acknowledgement of juridical persons as victims does not originate predominantly in the
realm of international criminal law, but is observed in the context of violations of
humanitarian and human rights law. Nevertheless, it entails the general inference of an
increasing drift towards the recognition of legal entities as victims (damaged entities) at
the supranational level.
2.2.1. Legislative Recognition
The roots of such a tendency can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century.
A glance at the aftermath of World War I reveals that in the 1920s certain legal entities
were granted plaintiff status before the USA-Germany Mixed Claims Commission. This
legal approach is an example of an implied legislative recognition of juridical entities as
victims (damaged entities). The legal framework does not elucidate the ambit of the
notion ‘American national’ which delineates the persons entitled to file claims before the
Commission.117 Nevertheless, legal entities are implicitly covered by this term. This
115 See section 1(x) of the General provisions of the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure in East Timor.
116 Notably, the ECCC differs from all other international(ized) criminal justice bodies contemplated above. Its
statutory documents recognize the right of persons to participate in their capacity qua victims as civil parties
before the Court - see e.g. article 36 new of the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (NS/RKM/1004/006 as
amended on 27 October 2004), as well as rule 23 of the ECCC’s Internal Rules (Rev. 5, as revised on 9 February
2010).
117 Pursuant to Administrative Decision № I of the Commission ‘American national’ is ‘a person wheresoever
domiciled owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America’, Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, vol. VII, United Nations, 2006, p. 21.
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inference is premised on the wide interpretation made by the Commission of the notion
‘nationals’ in article 1 of the Agreement of August 10, 1922 as including both natural and
juridical persons, such as corporations and companies.118
An illustration of an explicit legislative acknowledgment of legal persons as
victims of violations of international law dating back several decades after the end of
World War II is to be found in the compensation scheme pursuant to the Swiss Banks
Holocaust Litigation and Settlement.119 Both the Class Action Settlement Agreement120
and the Governing Rules of the Claims Reparation Process stipulate a broad victim
definition, which besides individuals expressly designates certain types of legal entities as
falling within its ambit.121
Other recent examples of an explicit legislative recognition of legal persons as
victims at the international level are to be descried in the legal frameworks of several
regional human rights institutions and bilateral adjudicative bodies. The constitutive
documents of both the ECtHR122 and the Commission on Human Rights for Bosnia and
118 See Decision of the Umpire in the case of Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Ltd. (United
States) v. Germany (Sabotage Cases, October 30, 1939) and the Supplemental Opinion of the American
Commissioner, October 30, 1939 in Mixed Claims Commission (United States v. Germany) constituted under the
Agreement of August 10, 1922, extended by Agreement of December 31, 1928, Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, vol. VIII, United Nations, 2006, p. 465, where the American Commissioner opined that ‘[i]t is clear
[…] that the term “national” [is] broader than “citizen”, and being used “in its broadest possible sense” includes
corporations. This is in accord with the decisions of the USA Supreme Court in Society for the Propagation of
the Gospel v. New Haven [reference omitted]; United States v. Northwestern Express Company [reference
omitted]’. See also American-Hawaiian Steamship Company (United States) v. Germany, September 30, 1926,
in Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. VIII, United Nations, 2006, pp. 26-30; Timandra Shipping
Company (United States) v. Germany, January 5, 1927 in Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. VIII,
United Nations, 2006, p. 30, in the part recognizing the locus standi of the legal entity as claimant before the
Commission. See also Wilhelm Kiesselbach, Problems of the German-American Claims Commission, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1930, p. 112.
119 Known as the Swiss Banks Settlement: In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, a series of class action
lawsuits filed in several US federal courts in 1996-1997 against certain Swiss banks and other entities, alleging
that Swiss financial institutions collaborated with and aided the Nazi Regime by knowingly retaining and
concealing assets of Holocaust victims, and by accepting and laundering illegally obtained Nazi loot and profits
of slave labor. All the cases were consolidated before Judge Edward R. Korman of the US District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, <www.swissbankclaims.com/InsuranceClaims.aspx>. See also Judah Gribetz and
Shari C. Reig, ‘The Swiss Bank Holocaust Settlement’ in C. Ferstman et al.(eds.) Reparations for Victims of
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Systems in Place and Systems in the Making, Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 115-142.
120 Settlement Agreement in the Holocaust Victim Assets class action litigation, 26 January 1999, which laid
down the foundations of the Claims Resolution Process before the Claims Resolution Tribunal.
121 Such as, corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, unincorporated association, organization which were or
were believed to be Jewish, Romani, etc. - see para. 1 ‘Definitions’, p. 4 of the Class Action Settlement
Agreement, as well as articles 7 and 46(20) in conjunction with article 46(6) of the Governing Rules. See also
article 46(26) according to which ‘Victim or Target of Nazi Persecution […] : means any person or entity
persecuted or targeted for persecution by the Nazi regime [...]’.
122 According to article 1 of Protocol I to the ECHR of 20 March 1952 ‘[e]very natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’. Article 34 of the ECHR stipulates the right of non-governmental
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Herzegovina123 provide for the protection of certain rights of legal persons (including non-
governmental organizations) and entitle them, accordingly, to claim violations of such
rights.124 The same approach is followed in the statutory documents of the Inter-American
system, which explicitly recognize legal persons as victims of violations of the legal
instruments for the protection of human rights at the Inter-American level.125
The legal framework of some bilateral and multilateral institutions also envisages
legal persons as victims. The constitutive documents establishing the Ethiopia-Eritrea
Claims Commission126 and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal127 include legal entities
in the notion ‘nationals’ used in the legal texts, which acknowledges them as victims
before the respective adjudicative body.128 In a similar way, the legal system of the UN
organizations to file an individual application claiming to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the
ECHR or the protocols thereto. See also rules 36 and 45(2) of the ECtHR’s Rules.
123 Articles 5(2) and 8(1) of the Agreement on Human Rights provide for the right of non-governmental
organizations to claim to be the victim of certain violations of human rights falling within the scope of the
Agreement. See also rule 32 of the Human Rights Chamber’s Rules of Procedure.
124 See Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands, Application № 14448/88, Judgment of 27 October 1993,
Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, Application № 22774/93, Judgment of 28 July 1999, and Comingersoll S.A. v.
Portugal, Application № 35382/97, Judgment of 6 April 2000 where the Court with respect to the applicant
companies found violations of article 6(1) of the ECHR; see the case of Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten
Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria, Application № 15153/89, Judgment of 19 December 1994, where the Court
with respect to the applicant legal person found violations of articles 10 and 13 of the ECHR; see also the case of
Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey, Application № 23885/94, Judgment of 8 December 1999,
where the Court found a violation of article 11 of the ECHR.
125 Article 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights entitles ‘any
person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of the Member States of
the OAS’ to submit petitions to the Commission on their own behalf concerning alleged violations of a human
right. See further articles 48-51 and article 61 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
126 Established pursuant to article 5(1) of the Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea concluded on 12 December 2000 with the
mandate to decide all claims for loss, damage or injury by the government of one of the parties to the Agreement
against the other, and ‘by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against the
[g]overnment of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the
conflict that was the subject of the [present] Agreement […] and (b) result from violations of international
humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law’.
127 Established by virtue of the Algerian Claims Settlement Declaration (Agreement) of 19 January 1981
(concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran) with the purpose to serve as one of the measures to resolve the crisis in the relations
between Iran and the USA arising out of the detention of 52 US nationals at the US Embassy in Tehran
(commenced in November 1979) and the subsequent freeze of Iranian assets by the USA.
128 Article 5(8) of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Agreement explicitly provides that ‘[c]laims shall be submitted to the
Commission by each of the parties on its own behalf and on behalf of its nationals, including both natural and
juridical persons.’ Similarly, pursuant to article 7(1) of the Algerian Claims Settlement Agreement: ‘[a] national
of Iran or of the United States […] means […] (b) a corporation or other legal entity which is organized under
the laws of Iran or the United States or any of its states or territories, the District of Columbia or the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, if, collectively, natural persons who are citizens of such country hold, directly or
indirectly, an interest in such corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its capital stock’.
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Compensation Commission acknowledges certain types of juridical entities as damaged
persons entitled to file claims before the Commission.129
2.2.2. Case-by-Case Acknowledgment
The case-by-case acknowledgment of juridical persons as victims (damaged entities) can
be observed in the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice,130 the
International Court of Justice (‘the ICJ’), as well as the African Commission. Such an
approach dating back to the late 1920s is to be discerned in the Judgment of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory of Chorzów case.131 The Court
recognized a company as a damaged entity which sustained harm as a consequence of a
state’s breaches of international obligations. Similarly, the ICJ identified legal persons as
victims of infringements of international law.132 The Court declared the entitlement of
both natural and juridical persons to compensation for the damages sustained.133 Hence,
the unambiguous inference is that legal entities are recognized as victims of violations of
international law in the jurisprudence both of the ICJ and its predecessor – the Permanent
Court of International Justice. Likewise, legal persons have been referred to as victims of
certain violations of the African Charter by the African Commission.134
129 Article 1(12) of the Provisional Rules envisages as ‘claimant’ any ‘corporation or other private legal entity,
public sector entity, Government or international organization that files a claim with the Commission’. It is
further clarified in article 1(13) of the Provisional Rules that the notion of ‘[p]erson or [b]ody’ includes, inter
alia, a ‘corporation or other private legal entity, public sector entity, Government, or international organization’.
The claims of corporations and other legal entities are classified as an additional category of claims (the so called
category ‘E’ claims) by virtue of Governing Council’s Decision S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1 of 17 March 1992. See
also articles 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c), 5(3) and 38 of the Provisional Rules.
130 Established in 1920 in conformity with article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It functioned
from 1922 until 1946.
131 Case concerning the Factory of Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity/Jurisdiction), Judgment № 8, 26 July 1927,
the Interpretation of the Judgment of 16 December 1927 and Judgment № 13 of 13 September 1928.
132 See e.g. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, paras. 114–138.
133 Ibid., paras. 152–153.
134 Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 225/98
(2000). The Commission deemed admissible the communication submitted on behalf of the non-governmental
organization Civil Liberties and found a violation of its right to property enshrined in article 14 of the African
Charter.
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2.2.3. Legislative Proposals
The concept of legal entities as victims of certain violations of international law has
originated legislative proposals and activities. An illustration of the recent impetus with
which this idea emerges on the international legal horizon is the initiative undertaken by
the International Law Association through the International Committee on Compensation
for Victims of War.135 The term ‘victim’ introduced in the Draft Declaration of
International Law Principles on Compensation for Victims of War (Substantive Issues) is
intended to designate natural and legal persons, who suffer harm as a result of violations
of international law.136 The Draft Model Statute of an ad hoc International Compensation
Commission also entitles legal entities to claim compensation before the Commission.137
2.3. Interpretation of Rule 85(b)
The gradual and consistent acknowledgment of legal entities as victims of violations of
international law lends support to the approach of the ICC’s statutory framework towards
legal persons. Hitherto, the Court has been concerned predominantly with matters related
to natural persons in their capacity qua victims due to the prevalent majority of
applications filed by individuals. Thus, the jurisprudence on the second group of victims
remains scarce. As applications stemming from organizations and/or institutions have
135 Draft Declaration on International Law Principles on Compensation for Victims of War (Substantive Issues)
prepared by Professor Rainer Hofmann (co-Rapporteur), Draft Declaration on International Law Principles on
Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (Procedural aspects) and Draft Model Statute of an Ad Hoc
International Compensation Commission prepared by Shuichi Furuya, all in the ‘Report on Compensation for
Victims of War’, ILA’s Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 2008.
136 See draft article 4(1), sentence 1 of the Draft Declaration on International Law Principles on Compensation
for Victims of War (Substantive Issues).
137 See draft article 2(3) of the Draft Model Statute of an ad hoc International Compensation Commission and the
commentary to the cited provision. According to the latter ‘victims […] encompass legal persons as well as
natural persons.’
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been an exception rather than a rule,138 the Court has touched upon the criteria for legal
entities on a limited number of occasions.139
The Court has made so far a scant reference to the identification requirements in
respect to legal persons. It has ruled that any constitutive document in accordance with the
law of the respective country will be taken into account, as well as any document proving
that the person submitting the application on behalf of the organization or institution has
the right to make such a request. That is, the person must demonstrate that he or she has
locus standi to do so.140 On the whole, the ICC proclaimed that the criteria pertaining to
the identity of a victim-applicant equally apply to the person acting on behalf of an
organization or institution. A thorough analysis of the criteria under rule 85(b) and
juxtaposition between the requirements applicable to the two groups of victims under rule
85 is not yet to be found in the Court’s jurisprudence. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the
principles underpinning the eligibility criteria pursuant to rule 85(a) and (b) are identical.
Thus, the requirements applicable to the two groups of victims concur to a very high
extent.
The entitlement of legal persons to victim status must be differentiated from
another separate and distinct matter – the question related to legal entities as persons
bearing criminal responsibility. As the ICC’s drafting history suggests, the issue
concerning the criminal liability of juridical persons was thoroughly considered by the
Court’s founders.141 Draft articles were elaborated stipulating both the criminal
138 To illustrate: in the Situation in DRC, PTC I, Corr., 31 January 2008, only one application was filed on behalf
of a legal person (a school). Similarly, in Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008, one application was submitted on
behalf of a legal entity (a church). Likewise, in Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 10 June 2008, only two
applications were filed on behalf of a legal entity. As it can be seen from the Grounds for the Decision in
Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 23 September 2009, only two applications were filed on behalf of legal entities
(two primary schools). In Lubanga, TC I, 15 December 2008, only one application was submitted on behalf of a
legal person (a school).
139 E.g. Situation in DRC, PTC I, Corr., 31 January 2008; Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 10 June 2008; Abu
Garda, PTC I, Decision on the 52 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Public
Redacted Version, ICC-02/05-02/09-147-Red, 9 October 2009 (Abu Garda, PTC I, 9 October 2009); Lubanga,
TC I, 18 January 2008.
140 Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008; Abu Garda, PTC I, 9 October 2009.
141 Per Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’ in Roy S. Lee (ed.) The International Criminal Court.
The Making of the Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 189-216, p.
199 et seq.; Andrew Clapham, ‘The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law Over Legal
Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court’ in M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia-
Zarifi (eds.) Liability of Multinational Corporations Under International Law, 2000, Kluwer Law International
2000, pp. 139-195, p. 146; Desislava Stoitchkova, Towards Corporate Liability in International Criminal Law,
School of Human Rights Research Series, vol. 38, pp. 13-16.
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responsibility of legal entities and the applicable penalties.142 The idea of corporate
criminal liability at the time of the drafting of the Statute was neither novel, nor alien to a
number of domestic legislations. Thus, the division of opinions on this matter was
conceivable. Nevertheless, in the final version of the legal texts the proposals envisaging
the criminal liability of legal entities were discarded. Eventually, the drafters embraced
the initial understanding143 that the personal jurisdiction of the first permanent criminal
court will extend to natural persons only.144
III. The Second Criterion: Harm
Harm denotes the second criterion pursuant to rule 85. The constitutive documents of the
ICC refer to ‘loss’, ‘injury’ and ‘damage’ as alternatives of the word ‘harm’, though they
all lack legal definition. Thus, the interpretation of the exact substance and connotation of
these notions is left to the discretion of the Court.
Rule 85(a) and (b) further differentiate between the harm eligible for natural
persons vis-à-vis juridical persons. The type of harm as regards legal entities is confined
to direct harm which is expressly related to certain types of property for humanitarian
purposes. By contrast, no restriction of this kind is envisaged for the harm suffered by
natural persons. This again illustrates the drafters’ cautious approach towards the
introduction of juridical persons as a new category of victims before the Court. In addition
to restricting the eligible legal persons to two types only, the ICC’s founders further
narrowed the ambit of the second group of victims through the explicit, albeit not
exhaustive, limitations of the relevant harm contemplated above.
142 See draft article 23(5) and (6) of the Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court in ‘The Report of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, Addendum, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1.
143 See draft article 25 of the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the Report of the
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. № 11, at 21-25, U.N. Doc.
A/2136 (1952)) and draft article 25 of the Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to
the Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. № 12, at
21, U.N. Doc. A/26645 (1954) in M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Documentary History, 1998, Transnational Publishers 1998.
144 See article 25(1) of the Rome Statute.
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1. Definition
Apart from such limitations, no other guidelines are provided for as to the nature and
scope of the damages sustained by the two groups of victims. The lack in the ICC’s
statutory documents of a definition of the notion of ‘harm’ and of any benchmark as to its
exact substance, with regard to natural persons in particular, warrants reference to other
legal instruments. On several occasions145 recourse was made by the Court to the ordinary
meaning of the word ‘harm’,146 as well as to articles 8 and 9 of the Basic Principles and
Guidelines on Remedy and Reparation as appropriate guidance in the assessment of the
nature and scope of the eligible harm. Admittedly, the reference to the Basic Principles
and Guidelines on Remedy and Reparation is construed in the context of harm suffered by
natural persons, because, as previously observed, the Basic Principles’ victim definition
does not envisage legal entities.
Similar guidance for the interpretation of the second criterion can be found in a
recent project of the International Law Association. The draft definition of harm in the
Draft Declaration of International Law Principles on Compensation for Victims of War
(Substantive Issues) overlaps to a great extent with the description of harm contained in
article 8 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Remedy and Reparation.147 However,
both legal texts suffer similar shortcomings. Instead of clarifying the essence of harm they
merely enumerate various types of damages as falling within its ambit. Albeit such an
approach may suffice in providing a ‘stipulative definition’148 for the purposes of the
particular legal instruments, it fails to suggest a general full meaning of the term ‘harm’.
A different way in explaining the notion of harm by presenting its distinctive
features rather than solely listing some of its manifestations is to portray it as ‘any
inimical consequence [effect, impact] of an act or omission, constituting an illegal
145 E.g. Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008, para. 92; Lubanga, TC I, 15 December 2008, para. 48.
146 The Appeals Chamber referred to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary and
concluded that the ordinary meaning of harm denotes hurt, injury and damage, carries the same meaning in the
ICC legal texts, denoting injury, loss, or damage and is the meaning of ‘harm’ in rule 85 - Lubanga, Appeals
Chamber, 11 July 2008, para. 31.
147 Article 8 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines envisages ‘physical or mental injury, emotional suffering,
economic loss, or impairment of […] fundamental legal rights’ as types of harm. Draft article 4(1), sentence 2 of
the Draft Declaration on International Law Principles on Compensation for Victims of War (Substantive Issues),
refers to ‘physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss’ as included in the notion of harm.
148 According to Black’s Law Dictionary stipulative definition is ‘[a] definition that, for [the] purposes of the
document in which it appears, arbitrarily clarifies a term with uncertain boundaries or that includes or excludes
specified items from the ambit of the term’.
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conduct, on the physical [material], mental, economic and/or social wellbeing [condition]
of a person’. The definition advanced herewith is intended only to promote an alternative
approach in determining harm distinct from those contemplated above without claiming
exhaustiveness or uniqueness.149
2. Types of Harm
2.1. Harm Suffered by Natural Persons
With respect to the specific manifestations of harm, the Court has entertained the view
that the recoverable damages suffered by natural persons are both direct and indirect.
According to the ICC’s jurisprudence, the harm may also be material, physical and
emotional (mental) - physical and psychological suffering, injuries, trauma - as well as
economic loss and substantial impairment of fundamental rights.150 A wide range of facts
and events have been identified as causing harm to the individual, such as, inter alia, the
loss of family members, enslavement and detention;151 incommunicado detention
accompanied by beating and other severe mistreatment, detention in an isolation cell in
which a person is denied medical treatment and is given limited access to food;152
exposure to fire and/or random shooting, as well as witnessing events of an exceedingly
violent and shocking nature;153 recruitment of a child soldier;154 pillaging and destruction
of property.155 It is of paramount importance that in order for the second eligibility
149 An attempt for clarification of ‘harm’ along the same lines may be detected in para. 4 of the commentary to
draft article 4(1), sentence 2 of the Draft Declaration on International Law Principles on Compensation for
Victims of War (Substantive Issues), which refers to harm as ‘the negative outcome resulting from the
comparison of two conditions of one person’. Another explanative definition of harm is suggested by Joel
Feinberg, Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 215, according to whom harm represents ‘those
states of setback interest that are the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions of others’. According to Black’s
Law Dictionary, harm is ‘material or tangible detriment’.
150 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006; Kony et al., PTC II, 10 August 2007; Bemba, PTC III, 12
December 2008; Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008; Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008; Kony et al.,
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeals of the Defence against the Decisions of PTC II of 14 March 2008
on Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Case, ICC-02/04-01/05-371, 23 February 2009 (Kony et al.,
Appeals Chamber, 23 February 2009).
151 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006.
152 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I, 6 December 2007.
153 Kony et al., PTC II, 10 August 2007.
154 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008.
155 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, PTC I, 6 December 2007; Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008.
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criterion to be satisfied, the facts generating the harm must ensue from the crime(s) under
consideration.156
Another vital point to be made in the present context is that in order to be
comprised by the ambit of the second requirement of rule 85 the harm must have been
suffered personally by the individual.157 Worth noting is that personal harm may relate
both to direct and indirect victims, that is, to individuals who suffered direct or indirect
harm. This view has been advanced by the ICC and can reasonably be explained by the
fact that one and the same event, such as the recruitment of a child soldier, can be the
source of harm in the form of personal suffering both as regards the child concerned (the
direct victim) and the parents (the indirect victims). 158
2.1.1. Pecuniary Damages
Pecuniary or material damages signify harm to tangible objects. As such, material
damages have monetary aspects and are subject to adequate financial redress. In the
context of the types and scope of pecuniary damages, the ICC Chambers have made
explicit reference to the jurisprudence of regional human rights bodies, in particular, the
Inter-American and the European Court of Human Rights. The legal texts of the first, akin
to the ICC’s constitutive framework, neither provide a definition of harm, nor elucidate
the substance of the different types of damages. However, in its case-law the IACtHR has
identified pecuniary damages as implying loss or detriment to the income, the expenses
incurred related to the events under consideration and the pecuniary consequences that
may have a cause-effect link with these events.159 The Inter-American Court has been
consistent in the view that both the loss actually suffered and the subsequent losses due to
156 According to Judge G. M. Pikis ‘[t]here must be a direct nexus between the crime and the harm suffered, in
the sense of cause and effect,’ that is ‘the crime itself must be the cause generating the harm’ - see the Dissenting
opinion of 11 July 2008 of Judge Georghios M. Pikis to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008
(dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the Appeals Chamber Judgment of 11 July 2008).
157 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, para. 32; Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008, para. 72 et seq.
158 Lubanga, TC I, Redacted version of ‘Decision on ‘indirect victims’’, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, 8 April 2009,
para. 49.
159 Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 27 November 1998, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 42; Acevedo
Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, Judgment of 7 February 2006, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Series C No. 144; Acosta-Calderón v. Ecuador, Judgment of 24 June 2005 on Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Series C No. 129; Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Judgment of 5 July 2006,
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 150; Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru,
Judgment of 25 November 2006 on Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 160.
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the sustained material harm (future losses) fall within the range of the eligible pecuniary
damages.160
Similar is the stand of the ECtHR. In its recent jurisprudence the European Court
has been facilitated in construing some aspects related to harm by the Practice Direction
on Just Satisfaction Claims.161 According to the latter, pecuniary damages cover both the
loss actually suffered (damnum emergens) and the loss, or diminished gain, to be expected
in the future (lucrum cessans).162 This understanding has been sustained by the ECtHR
throughout its jurisprudence.163
Although the prevailing view among international(ized) adjudicative bodies
construes pecuniary harm as including the material damages which have actually come
into being and the loss expected in the future, a different perception is to be discerned as
well. Pursuant to the ECCC’s legal framework the scope of the relevant harm is limited to
the actual damages suffered.164
A) Pecuniary Damages in Regard to Deceased
Pecuniary damages in the name of deceased persons have been recognized by a number of
human rights bodies, such as the Inter-American and the European Court of Human
Rights, as well as the UN Compensation Commission.
Throughout its jurisprudence, the IACtHR has acknowledged pecuniary damages
in favour of deceased persons not only up to the time of their death, but also as a
subsequent loss. On several occasions the Court has adjudged, for instance, compensation
in the name of deceased victims for the income they could have earned in the future.165
160 In the case of El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of 14 September 1996 on Reparations and Costs. Series C
No. 28, the Court adjudged indemnity to the victims for the period during which they were unemployed as a
consequence of the events under consideration.
161 Issued on 28 March 2007 by the President of the ECtHR in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Court.
162 Ibid., para. 10.
163 See e.g. the case of Ayder and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 23656/94, Judgment of 8 January 2004, in
particular, with respect to the claims for loss of income.
164 According to rule 23bis(1)(b) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules (Rev. 5 - as revised on 9 February 2010), civil
party-applicants must demonstrate that they have in fact suffered physical, material or psychological injury as a
direct consequence of at least one of the alleged crimes.
165 See Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment of 25 November 2006 on Merits, Reparations and Costs,
2006, Series C No. 160; Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Judgment of 5 July
2006, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 150; El Amparo vs. Venezuela,
Judgment of 14 September 1996 on Reparations and Costs. Series C No. 28, with regard to the work the
deceased individuals could have carried out in the future, respectively, the income they could have gained. The
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The ECtHR has voiced a different view as regards the entitlement of deceased
individuals to pecuniary damages.166 The Court rejected a claim on behalf of a deceased
on the basis that the pecuniary losses were allegedly accruing subsequent to the death of
that person. The conclusion a contrario is that had the asserted pecuniary damages been
incurred by the late individuals before their death, they would have been entitled to
compensation in their personal capacity as victims of the violations under consideration.
Therefore, one may reasonably infer that according to the European Court deceased
persons are entitled to pecuniary damages which have come into being up to the time of
death, but not to losses resulting after the death of the individual.
The question of pecuniary harm sustained by deceased victims has been touched
upon by the UN Compensation Commission as well. The Commission recognized the
right of deceased detainees to compensation for the pecuniary damages suffered in their
own personal capacity as a consequence of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.167
2.1.2. Non-Pecuniary Damages
Non-pecuniary damages have intangible, immaterial aspects. This type of harm is subject
to equitable redress, as no unified or standard scale of monetary indemnification is
applicable. Nevertheless, as the USA-Germany Mixed Claims Commission accurately
observed, moral damages ‘are very real, and the mere fact that they are difficult to
measure or estimate by money standards makes them nonetheless real’.168
Immaterial harm has been interpreted by the ICC as encompassing physical,
emotional, mental and psychological damages.169 In a similar way, the IACtHR has
construed moral suffering and has identified moral anguish, terror, insecurity among its
manifestations.170 Throughout its jurisprudence the Inter-American Court acknowledged
Court assessed the indemnification on the basis of the years remaining before the deceased victims would have
reached the age at which normal life expectancy is estimated.
166 Kiliç v. Turkey, Application № 22492/93, Judgment of 28 March 2000.
167 Report and Recommendations of the ‘D1’ Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Special Instalment of
Deceased Detainee Claims of 10 March 2005. Various types of pecuniary damages were identified as suffered by
the deceased: departure expenses, business and real property losses. An award of compensation in favour of the
deceased detainees was recommended.
168 Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, 1 November 1923, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. VII, United
Nations, 2006, p. 40.
169 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006; Kony et al., Appeals Chamber, 23 February 2009.
170 ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia, Judgment of 15 September 2005, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series
C No. 134.
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moral harm as including the suffering and hardship caused to the victims (both direct and
indirect), the harm to objects of value to the individual, as well as changes of a non-
pecuniary nature in the living conditions.171 An intriguing aspect of immaterial harm
exceeding the ambit of moral damages - spiritual damage (‘daño espiritual’)172 – has also
been suggested.
The issue of non-pecuniary damages has been addressed by the ECtHR both in its
case-law and in the Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims. Although the latter
does not provide an exhaustive definition of moral harm, it enumerates several forms
which this type of harm can take, such as mental or physical suffering.173 Throughout its
jurisprudence the ECtHR has identified as representations of immaterial harm anxiety,
inconvenience, frustration, distress, anguish and uncertainty caused by a violation.174
According to the ICTR, serious bodily and/or mental harm includes, inter alia, acts
of bodily or mental torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence and
persecution.175 The ICTR construed mental harm ‘as some type of impairment of mental
faculties, or harm that causes serious injury to the mental state’.176 Likewise, the ICTY has
interpreted inhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse, deportation, wounds and
trauma suffered by survivors of mass executions as being among the facts which may
cause serious moral harm, such as bodily and mental injury.177 Similarly, physical and
psychological harm as forms of non-pecuniary damages have also been identified by the
171 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment on Reparations of 19 November 2004, Series C No. 116;
Acosta-Calderón v. Ecuador, Judgment of 24 June 2005 on Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 129;
‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia, Judgment of 15 September 2005, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C
No. 134.
172 See the separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade to the Judgment in the case of Moiwana Community v.
Suriname, Judgment on the Merits and Reparations of 15 June 2005, Series C No. 124, according to whom
spiritual damage is an aggravated form of moral damage with a direct bearing on most intimate values to the
human person, such as inner self, beliefs in human destiny, relations with the dead.
173 See para. 13 of the Practice Direction.
174 Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal; McKerr v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 28883/95, Judgment of 4
May 2001 (final as of 4 August 2001); Kişmir v. Turkey, Application № 27306/95, Judgment of 31 May 2005
(final as of 31 August 2005).
175 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Chamber I, Judgment, Case № ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September
1998, para. 504; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, TC I, Judgment and Sentence, Case № ICTR-96-13-
T, 27 January 2000, para. 156.
176 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbtsi, TC III, Judgment, Case № ICTR-2001-64-T, 17 June 2004,
para. 291.
177 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case № IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001,
paras. 513-514.
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UN Compensation Commission. Both mental pain and anguish have been acknowledged
by the Commission as manifestations of psychological harm.178
An intriguing interrelation between the different manifestations of immaterial harm
has been advanced by the USA-Germany Mixed Claims Commission in the context of the
Lusitania cases.179 The Commission found that mental pain may result in physical
suffering due to the interdependency of the mind and the body. Accordingly, mental shock
(‘sickness of mind’) may produce physical disorders (‘sickness of body’). Explained in
other words, the mental suffering represents the primary (initial) harm which may lead to
the infliction of secondary harm - physical disorder. The Commission distinguished
different types of psychological trauma: injury to feelings, humiliation, shame,
degradation, loss of social position or injury to one’s credit or reputation. In this regard it
is worth mentioning that injury to honour has also been recognized as a type of harm in
the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.180 Likewise, more recently, the
interrelation between psychological and physical injury has been endorsed in the
jurisprudence of the ECCC, where it has been observed that the infliction of psychological
harm may result in a physical disorder.181
A) Non-Pecuniary Damages in Regard to Deceased
The entitlement of deceased persons to immaterial damages has been widely recognized at
the international level, in particular in the case-law of human rights bodies. In the
assessment of the non-pecuniary damages suffered by the deceased the Inter-American
Court has taken into account the manner in which the victims died within the context of
the violent events, whether they were subjected to abuse, torture and other degrading
treatment,182 and has awarded compensation in the name of the deceased.
178 See Governing Council’s Decisions 3 (S/AC.26/1991/3) of 23 October 1991 and 218 (S/AC.26/Dec.218
(2004) of 11 March 2004.
179 See the opinion of the Commission, delivered by the Umpire Parker on 1 November 1923 in Opinion in the
Lusitania Cases, 1 November 1923, Reports of International Arbitral Awards., vol. VII, United Nations, 2006, p.
36.
180 Article 244, Annex I (3) of the Treaty of Versailles.
181 ECCC, Case 001, Supreme Court Chamber, Appeal Judgment of 3 February 2012, para. 417.
182 Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment of 25 November 2006 on Merits, Reparations and Costs,
2006, Series C No. 160; Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993 on Reparations and
Costs, Series C No. 15; Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Judgment of 27 August 1998 on Reparations and
Costs, Series C No. 39; Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment of 1 July 2006, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, , Series C No. 148; Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 22 February
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In a similar way, both the ECtHR and the Human Rights Chamber of the
Commission on Human Rights for Bosnia and Herzegovina have acknowledged the right
of deceased victims to compensation for the immaterial harm suffered up to the time of
their death. The UN Human Rights Committee has ruled in the same vein.
An intriguing matter which arises within this context is related to the adjudication
and collection of the sum awarded as compensation in the name of the deceased
individual. Each of the human rights bodies – the IACtHR,183 the ECtHR,184 the Human
Rights Chamber of the Commission on Human Rights for Bosnia and Herzegovina185 and
the UN Human Rights Committee186 - granted compensation to the deceased persons in
their own right and adjudged that the awarded sum be held for their heirs as successors.
Although this understanding has been followed by the majority of the judges, some
have disagreed with this approach. The caveats raised in the dissents are predominantly
practical and, as such, irrelevant with regard to the correctness of the majority’s view.
Both the dissenting opinions to the findings of the ECtHR and the Human Rights
Chamber go beyond the legal issue of entitlement to compensation, as they question the
ways in which the award for damages is to be collected. Hence, the dissenting views
confound two different notions which have distinct ambit and implications – the award of
the compensation in the name of the deceased persons and the collection of the awarded
sum.187
2002, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 91; ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia, Judgment of 15 September
2005, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 134; Montero-Aranguren et al (Detention Center of Catia) v.
Venezuela, Judgment of 5 July 2006, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 150.
183 In the case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993 on Reparations and Costs,
Series C No. 15 the Court held that ‘[t]he damages suffered by the victims up to the time of their death entitle
them to compensation. That right to compensation is transmitted to their heirs by succession’. See in the same
vein ‘Street Children’ (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment of 26 May 2001 on Reparations and
Costs, Series C No. 77.
184 Kurt v. Turkey, Application № 24276/94 [1998] ECHR 44, Judgment of 25 May 1998; Mahmut Kaya v.
Turkey, Application № 22535/93, Judgment of 28 March 2000; Kiliç v. Turkey, Application № 22492/93,
Judgment of 28 March 2000; Kişmir v. Turkey, Application № 27306/95, Judgment of 31 May 2005 (final as of
31 August 2005).
185 Avdo and Esma Palic against the Republika Srpska, Decision on admissibility and merits, 11 January 2001,
Case № CH/99/3196, paras. 69-70, 90.
186 In the case of Eduardo Bleier v. Uruguay the Committee urged the Uruguayan government to pay
compensation to the victim for the injuries which he had suffered as a result of the violations found.
187 See the partly dissenting opinions of Judge Gölcüklü to the Judgments in the case of Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey
and the case of Kiliç v. Turkey of the ECtHR, who opined that: ‘[i]t is completely alien and contrary to the
Convention system and devoid of any legal justification for an abstract, anonymous and undefined group
(perhaps very distant heirs) that has suffered no non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violations found to be
awarded compensation.’ See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Vitomir Popovic to the Decision on admissibility in
the case of Avdo and Esma Palic against the Republika Srpska of the Human Rights Chamber of the
Commission on Human Rights for Bosnia and Herzegovina, who argued that: ‘it is not clear […] what the
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The approach adopted by the majorities of the two regional institutions
unambiguously entitles the deceased individuals in their own right to compensation for the
non-pecuniary harm which they have sustained. By doing so, the human rights bodies
recognize the suffering inflicted upon the deceased as a result of the violation(s) and
proclaim their right to indemnification. Thus, the issue concerning the award of the
damage suffered by the deceased person is straightforward and justified.
Another matter, separate from the question of the award, relates to the collection of
the adjudged sum. The majorities have properly ruled that the compensation be held by
and for the heirs of the late individual. The logic of this finding rests on the fact that the
compensation by virtue of inheritance passes into the patrimony of the heirs. The concern
raised in the dissents of whether or not the heirs themselves had suffered non-pecuniary
damages as a result of the violations found is also irrelevant to the particular subject-
matter and, respectively, to the issue of compensation. The right of the heirs to receive the
sum adjudged in the decedent’s name ensues from the precepts governing succession and
descent. The successors’ entitlement to receive the adjudged compensation does not
originate from the facts of the case under consideration, but arises by virtue of another,
juridical fact - the death of their predecessor.
2.2. Harm Sustained by Legal Persons
As previously noted, the damages sustained by the second group of victims pursuant to
rule 85(b) have a significantly narrower ambit than the harm suffered by natural persons.
Only harm caused to property of organizations and/or institutions is eligible. In addition,
the law does not favour harm to any property, but limits it to property related to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals,
other places and objects of humanitarian purposes. Notwithstanding these limitations, the
last part of rule 85(b) leaves certain latitude to the Court in the assessment of the exact
damages in light of the particularities of each case. This inference stems from the wording
‘other places and objects of humanitarian purposes’.188 The discussed part of the provision
compensation for non-pecuniary damage […] relates to, i.e. whether these damages are awarded to the applicant,
to her husband, or to his heirs’.
188 See article 8 which enumerates certain objects as forbidden targets of military operations.
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is left open-ended by the drafters and, as such, allows yet discretion to the Court in its
interpretation of the harm within the parameters delineated in the legal text.
An intriguing question in the present context is whether legal entities are entitled to
non-pecuniary damages, such as emotional harm, mental anguish or any other form of
‘intangible injuries’.189 The jurisprudence of the ICC has not addressed this issue.
However, this question has been considered by the ECtHR.
Albeit the characteristics ‘emotional’, ‘moral’ and ‘mental’ are not inherent
attributes to non-human entities, nevertheless the European Court has held that
compensation for moral damages claimed by legal persons is not generally excluded and
decided that such an entitlement should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.190 Thus,
even though the ECtHR did not take a firm position on this matter, it did not exclude such
a possibility. As illustrations of immaterial harm sustained by a legal entity, the Court
identified its reputation, uncertainty in decision-planning, disruption in the management,
as well as the anxiety and inconvenience caused to the members of the management team.
Although the ECtHR drew its findings on the judicial practice of domestic legal
systems and observed, accordingly, that the latter does not rule out an award of
compensation for non-pecuniary damages to legal persons, such an interpretation remains
far from unproblematic, especially within the context of the ICC’s legal framework.
Bearing in mind the specific nature of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, as well as
the cautious and restrictive legislative approach towards the introduction of the second
group of victims, a potential recognition of intangible damages sustained by juridical
persons seems neither rational, nor warranted.
IV. The Third Criterion: Jurisdiction
The third eligibility criterion for victims before the ICC provides that the crime from
which the harm ensued must fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. For the purposes of
the present analysis only a brief reference will be made to the basic features of this
requirement.
In order to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, the alleged events which
inflicted the harm must be crimes referred to in articles 5(1)(a) – 5(1)(c) and defined in
189 Shelton, supra note 100, p. 143.
190 Comingersoll S.A. v. Portugal, Application № 35382/97, Judgment of 6 April 2000.
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articles 6 - 8 (jurisdiction ratione materiae). The crime must have been committed within
the timeframe laid down in article 11, that is, since 1 July 2002 (jurisdiction ratione
temporis). Further, the alleged events must meet one of the two alternative conditions
embodied in article 12: 1) the crime must be committed on the territory of a State Party to
the Statute or a State which has made a declaration provided for in article 12(3)
(jurisdiction ratione loci) or 2) the crime must be committed by a national of a State Party
or a State which has made a declaration provided for in article 12(3) (jurisdiction ratione
personae).191
V. The Fourth Criterion: Causal Link
The causal link between the harm suffered and the crime is the last requirement which
must be met by victim-applicants. This eligibility criterion distinguishes itself as the most
debatable among the prerequisites set forth in rule 85. The fourth requirement originates
concerns as to whether any person who has suffered from a crime under the jurisdiction of
the ICC can be accorded victim status irrespective of any nexus with the subject-matter of
the pending proceedings or only persons who have sustained harm as a result of crimes
which are the subject-matter of a given situation or case. The accurate interpretation of the
last eligibility criterion has an important implication upon the potential number of victim-
applicants and participants192 and is essential for the efficient functioning of the ICC.
The initial jurisprudence of the Court proves inconsistent with regard to the
interpretation of the causal link criterion in view of the juxtaposition of the findings of the
Pre-Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber, on the one hand, with those of TC I, on the
other. The majority of the Chambers have adopted the understanding that only persons
who can establish a causal link between the harm suffered and the crime(s) under
191 See article 12(2) and (3) of the Rome Statute read in conjunction with rule 44. See also e.g. Situation in DRC,
PTC I, 17 January 2006, para. 85; Kony et al., PTC II, 10 August 2007, para. 29; Lubanga, Appeals Chamber,
Judgment on the Appeal of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the
Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, 14
December 2006, paras. 21-22; Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008, para. 67; Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
PTC II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 31 March 2010, paras. 36-39.
192 McDermott, supra note 33, p. 32; War Crimes Research Office, ‘Victim Participation at the Case Stage of
Proceedings. International Criminal Court Legal Analysis and Education Project’, American University
Washington College of Law (February 2009), p. 41; REDRESS, Victims and the ICC: Still Room for
Improvement - a paper prepared for the 7th Assembly of States Parties, The Hague, 14-22 November 2008.
57
consideration may qualify as victims pursuant to rule 85.193 The logic of this view is in
tune with universal principles of criminal justice, and accordingly, with the precepts
governing victims’ participation.
The relevant harm which entitles persons to claim victim status before a criminal
justice institution is the harm which results from the crime – the subject-matter of the
pending proceedings. If the alleged damages do not originate from an event pertaining to
the core of the particular criminal procedure, no causal nexus exists between the harm and
the crime(s) under consideration. Hence, applicants who claim to have suffered harm
which is not related to the subject-matter and has no bearing on the proceedings at hand
are extraneous to the specific criminal justice process. The pertinent inference is that such
persons have no legal standing before the Court in the situation or case in question and are
not entitled to be accorded victim status pursuant to rule 85.194
The opposite understanding would infringe overarching criminal justice postulates.
Judicial institutions are bound to pronounce solely on the events and facts constituting the
core of the proceedings. If the Court would consider issues falling outside the parameters
of the respective situation or case it would exceed its authority. As a consequence, the
final determination of the judicial body would have no legal effect (i.e. would be ultra
vires). Moreover, an interpretation rejecting the need of a causal nexus between the harm
and the crime(s) under consideration would also prove impractical. The consequence of
such a view would be the flooding of the proceedings with a myriad of persons who have
suffered from incidents wholly unrelated to the crimes that constitute the subject-matter of
the situation or case before the ICC. This would inadmissibly alter the legal nature of the
Court from a criminal justice institution, bound to adjudge exclusively on the facts which
are the subject of the pending proceedings, into a quasi- or non-judicial body. It holds
equally true that ‘[d]erogating from [the] requirement [for causal link between the harm
suffered by the victim and the crimes with which the accused has been charged] would
seriously jeopardize the right of the accused to be tried only in relation to the crimes
charged.’195
193 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006; Lubanga, PTC I, Decision on Victims’ Applications for
Participation in the Proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-228-tEN, 28 July 2006; Situation in Uganda, PTC II,
Decision of 10 August 2007; Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008.
194 See in this spirit Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, para. 63, where the Chamber underlined the need
for each applicant to demonstrate a link between the harm suffered and the particular crimes charged.
195 Spiga, supra note 24, p. 4.
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The findings of the majority of TC I merit a brief reference as they illustrate the
opinion that no causal nexus between the alleged harm(s) and the crime(s) under
consideration is required pursuant to rule 85.196 While holding that ‘a victim of any crime
falling within the jurisdiction of the Court can potentially participate’, the Chamber at the
same time noted that ‘it would not be meaningful or in the interests of justice for all such
victims to be permitted to participate’ because the evidence and issues for examination
will be ‘wholly unrelated’ to the crimes that caused harm to such victims. Instead of
construing the last eligibility criterion creatively in light of its object and purpose, the
majority of TC I made dubious findings, to say the least.197 Not surprisingly, this
interpretation of the causal link criterion was subsequently overruled by the Appeals
Chamber which recognized the crucial importance of a nexus between the harm suffered
and the particular crimes charged.198
The rationale behind the prevailing standpoint of the ICC’s Chambers with regard
to the causal link criterion informs the approach adopted at the STL and the ECCC
likewise. The requirement for a direct nexus between the alleged offence and the harm
suffered by the victim is explicitly stipulated in the definition of a victim pursuant to rule
2(A) of STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.199 In the same vein, the ECCC’s Internal
Rules contain an express requirement for a direct link between the alleged harm and the
crime(s) under consideration. Notwithstanding some contentions in the opposite vein,200
the careful perusal of rule 23 of ECCC’s Internal Rules both in its initial201 and amended
versions202 attests to the fact that the requirement for a causal link between the crime and
196 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008.
197 See in the same vein Christine H. Chung, ‘Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are
Concessions of the Court Clouding the Promise?’, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, vol. 6,
№ 3 (Spring 2008), pp. 459 – 545, p. 516.
198 See also the dissenting opinion of Judge René Blattmann to the Decision in Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008.
199 The provision reads as follows: ‘Victim: A natural person who has suffered physical, material, or mental
harm as a direct result of an attack within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction’.
200 Silke Studzinsky, ‘Victim`s Participation before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’,
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (www.zis-online.com) 2011 (10), pp. 887-891, p. 890.
201 Rule 23(2), second sentence of the Internal Rules (in its redaction of 2007) reads as follows: ‘In order for
Civil Party action to be admissible, the injury must be:
a) physical, material or psychological; and
b) the direct consequence of the offence, personal and have actually come into being.’
202 Rule 23bis (adopted on 9 February 2010, Rev. 8) reads as follows: ‘1. In order for Civil Party action to be
admissible, the Civil Party applicant shall:
a) be clearly identified; and
b) demonstrate as a direct consequence of at least one of the crimes alleged against the Charged Person, that he
or she has in fact suffered physical, material or psychological injury upon which a claim of collective and moral
reparation might be based.’
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the harm suffered as introduced at the outset, has remained unchanged.203 An eloquent
reflection of the causal nexus requirement provides also the ECCC’s jurisprudence
through the stipulation that injury resulting form the crimes charged is the only defining
and at the same time limiting criterion for the admissibility of civil party applications in
proceedings.204
In the same spirit, the Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims of the ECtHR
sets forth the requirement for a clear causal link between the damage and the alleged
violation, and elucidates that a merely tenuous connection would not suffice.205 Likewise,
the constitutive documents of the UN Compensation Commission also provide for the
need of a direct nexus between the harms inflicted and the violation(s) found.206 An
analogous view was entertained by the USA-Germany Mixed Claims Commission.
Pursuant to Administrative Decision II the cause of the suffering inflicted upon the
applicants – the loss, damage or injury suffered – must have been the act of Germany or
its agents.207
The present analysis shows that the eligibility as a victim before the ICC entails
multifarious and complex issues the accurate analysis of which proves critical for the
proper operation of the victims’ participation scheme. While some complicated matters
ensuing from the interpretation of rule 85 have already been resolved by the Court, others
need further consideration and clarification. While within the ambit of the first eligibility
criterion the approach followed by the ICC in construing the identification requirements is
nowadays unified, with respect to the complex issue of deceased the discrepancy among
the Chambers continues and is likely to persist. Other questions originating from the
eligibility criteria have not been addressed hitherto by the Court in detail. Therefore, it
may reasonably be expected that matters such as the nature and the scope of the harm
203 This observation finds further support in the relevant findings of the Supreme Court Chamber and the
acknowledgement that the admissibility criteria in the definition of a civil party as envisaged in the original
version of rule 23(2) have been clarified, but have not been changed by the subsequent amendments to the rule.
See ECCC, Case 001, Appeal Judgment of 3 February 2012, para. 412 and footnote 866.
204 Ibid., para. 415.
205 See paras. 7 and 8 of the Practice Direction.
206 See para. 18 in conjunction with para. 16 of UNSC Resolution 687 (1991), as well as Governing Council’s
Decision 15. See also Danio Campanelli, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC): Reflections
on its Judicial Character’, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, vol. 4, № 1 (2005), pp.
107-139.
207 Mixed Claims Commission (United States and Germany) (1 November 1923 – 30 October 1939), Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, vol. VII, United Nations, 2006, p. 22.
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sustained by the second group of victims and the relevant types of damages will require
thorough analysis and thought in future.
In addition to the objective to decipher and unfold major concerns arising from rule
85, the suggested juxtaposition of the ideas underlying the victims’ eligibility
requirements with the legal regime and practice of other international(ized) and regional
adjudicative institutions gives a broader view of the prevailing ideas, standards and trends
in the realm of victim-related issues on a larger international scale. However, it is of
pivotal importance that the experience of other international(ized) adjudicative bodies
should be used only as potential guidance and should not be adopted by the ICC
automatically, without demur.
VI. The Victim Definition and the Presumption of Innocence
Besides the manifold issues related to the interpretation of rule 85 and the requirements
which it delineates, the victim definition has been perceived as problematic with respect to
the presumption of innocence.208 While some commentators aver that the concept of
victim as formulated by the Rules appears to presuppose that a crime has been
committed,209 others directly challenge the victim definition as eroding the presumption of
innocence.210 In view of the contentions raised, the positive determination of victim status
has been equated to a premature judicial conclusion that the alleged crime has occurred. In
this regard it has been contended that the acknowledgment of victim status establishes two
key elements that the Prosecutor must prove beyond reasonable doubt, namely, that a
crime occurred and that there are victims.211 Following this line of reasoning it has been
208 Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1403. See in the same vein, Scott T. Johnson, ‘Neither Victims nor
Executioners: the Dilemma of Victim Participation and the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International
Criminal Court’, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 16:2 (2009-2010), pp. 489-496,
where the author contends that victims’ participation in proceedings erodes the presumption of innocence.
209 Ibid., Jorda and de Hemptinne.
210 Johnson, supra note 208.
211 In this regard it has been observed that ‘[o]ne is […] left to conclude that by finding that applicants are
victims of the alleged crime for which the defendant is prosecuted, judges also necessarily find that the alleged
crime has occurred’– see Mugambi Jouet, ‘Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the
International Criminal Court’, Saint Louis University Public Law Review, vol. 26 (2007), pp. 249-308, p. 271.
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suggested that a successful victim’s application or, in other words, the recognition of
victim status is the functional equivalent of a preliminary verdict.212
The contentions advanced above prove untenable in light of the following
considerations. The understanding that the victim definition pursuant to rule 85 infringes
the presumption of innocence falls short of discerning the substance and purpose of the
recognition of a person as a victim, on the one hand, and the essence of the presumption
of innocence, on the other. Indubitably, the presumption of innocence is an overarching
criminal justice tenet dictating that the proceedings should be conducted with respect to
the defendant as if innocent.213 Hence, the alleged perpetrator has the legal status of
innocence prior to conviction.214 As such, the presumption of innocence represents a
direction to officials about how they should proceed in respect to the alleged perpetrator,
not a prediction of the outcome of the proceedings at hand.215 Consequently, the
presumption of innocence safeguards the integrity of the criminal justice process through
the duty on public authorities to refrain from ‘prejudging of the outcome of a trial’.216 In
view of that, the logical conclusion to be advanced is that by virtue of the presumption of
innocence, until there has been an adjudication of guilt by a legally competent authority,
the issue concerning the guilt of the alleged perpetrator remains an open question.217
Along the same lines it is to be noted that the recognition of victim status pursuant
to rule 85 solely entails that the events as described in the victim’s application fall within
the compass of the charges brought against the alleged offender(s). In other words, as long
as the events described in the application for participation correspond with the scope of
the charges delimiting the subject-matter of the proceedings at hand (temporal, territorial
and material), this warrants the admission of victims in proceedings. The victim definition
serves the sole purpose of differentiating between persons who are entitled to a legal
standing in proceedings (thus, may be admitted as victim-participants in the criminal
212 See, inter alia, ibid., as well as Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1.
213 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’, International Journal of Evidence and
Proof, vol. 10:4 (2006), pp. 241-279, p. 250.
214 Ibid., p. 244.
215 See Herbert L. Packer, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol.
113:1 (1964-1965), pp. 1-68, p. 12.
216 Thomas Margueritte, ‘International Criminal Law and Human Rights’, Routledge Handbook of International
Criminal Law, William A. Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds.), Routledge, 2010, pp. 435-452, p. 441.
217 See Packer, supra note 215, who aptly notes that ‘until there has been an adjudication of guilt by an authority
legally competent to make such an adjudication, the suspect is to be treated, for reasons that have nothing
whatever to do with the probable outcome of the case, as if his guilt is an open question. The presumption of
innocence is a direction to officials how they are to proceed, not a prediction of outcome.’
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justice process) from persons who are not. Notwithstanding arguments in the opposite
vein advanced by commentators,218 the recognition of victim status neither predetermines
that the crimes as described have actually been committed, nor that the alleged events are
attributable to the individual criminal responsibility of the alleged offender(s). In the
course of the ICC’s fact-finding process it could, for instance, be established that the
alleged harmful events have either not taken place as described in the charges or do not
represent a crime pursuant to article 5 for different reasons (due to the lack of objective
and/or subjective elements of the crime as enunciated in the relevant statutory provision or
due to the existence of grounds excluding the criminal responsibility of the alleged
perpetrator(s)). Similarly, on the basis of the evidence gathered in the course of the
proceedings it could be established that, even though the alleged events represent a crime
within the ICC’s jurisdiction, they are not attributable to the individual(s) standing trial.
Accordingly, the recognition of a person as a victim pursuant to rule 85 does not in itself
entail a (pre-)determination of any element comprised by the subject-matter under
consideration. Moreover, unlike the ICTY’s and ICTR’s victim definition, the rule 85
definition focuses on the harm suffered, as alleged by the victim, rather than on the
purported crime itself or the identity of the perpetrator. In this regard, pursuant to the
relevant ICC’s jurisprudence the identification of the alleged perpetrator in the application
for participation is not among the prerequisites for a complete application. As also
acknowldeged in the legal literature, victims are not victims of the accused, but victims of
‘a crime’ which the defendant may or may not have committed - a fact that is to be
determined at trial.219 Furthermore, by way of reference to the UN Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Humanitarian Law commentators duly note that a victim is a victim
regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or
convicted.220 Given all the above, the logical conclusion to be advanced is that the victim
218 See e.g. Zappalà, supra note 11, p. 146-147, who contends that the recognition as victim entails ‘a preliminary
finding that a crime was committed against [the victim]’, which, on its part presupposes ‘a presumption as to the
unfolding of events.’ The author further avers that ‘[t]his implies the establishment (at least prima facie) of the
fact that a crime occurred and that the persons claiming the status of victims were somehow affected by this
crime’ and subsequently observes that the Court should ‘not take the factual basis of the crimes for granted.’
219 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Victims before the International Criminal Court: A New Model of Criminal Justice?’,
Victims of Crime Research Digest, Issue 5 (2013).
220 Mariana Pena, ‘Victim Participation in the International Criminal Court: Achievements Made and Challenges
Lying Ahead’, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law  16 (2010), pp. 497-516, p. 511.
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definition and, respectively, the recognition of a person as a victim pursuant to rule 85 has
no inimical bearing on the presumption of innocence.
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CHAPTER TWO
Classification of the Rights of Victims in the Proceedings
The fulfillment of the requirements delineated in rule 85 entails the entitlement to an array
of rights in the course of the proceedings. Therefore, once the prerequisites for the
eligibility as a victim have been deciphered, the consequent issue to be immediately
illuminated concerns the rights that persons qualifying as victims may employ throughout
the proceedings. At this point, before embarking on the review of the rights provided to
persons with victim status, a few introductory notes on the various avenues of
involvement available to victims at the ICC prove apposite.
Notwithstanding their independent place in the proceedings, victims do not have a
standing equivalent to the Prosecutor and to the defence. Thus, the possibilities for victims
to intervene in the ICC’s process accorded by virtue of the normative basis are more
limited in scope and nature than the rights bestowed to the Prosecutor and the defence.221
Still, as participants with an independent standing victims are entitled to participate
in the proceedings leading to the adjudication of the individual criminal responsibility of
the alleged offender(s), in specific proceedings of limited object and purpose, as well as in
reparation proceedings following a conviction. These possibilities for victims’
intervention in the ICC’s proceedings are separate and distinct and may be employed
independently from one another.
In principle, the involvement of victims in the proceedings is governed by article
68(3), unless the legal framework provides explicitly for victims’ participation in
particular proceedings. This observation is also echoed in the relevant jurisprudence.222
Thus, the regime of victims’ participation laid down in article 68(3) represents the
221 Among the rights which, according to the legal framework, pertain exclusively to the Prosecutor and the
defence, is the right to appeal the Trial Chamber’s decision (judgment) on the merits of the case (see article
81(2)), as well as the right to submit evidence. Whether the latter is an implicit right with respect to victims is,
however, a question open to discussion. Along the same lines, in the context of proceedings before the ECCC
commentators have observed that victims (i.e. civil parties) are ‘full parties’ to the trial, ‘since [the legal
framework] recognizes their right to appeal decisions of the Trial Chamber [as provided for in article 36 new of
the Law on the ECCC]’ – see David Boyle, ‘The Rights of Victims. Participation, Representation, Protection,
Reparation’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4 (2006), pp. 307-313, p. 308. Accordingly, the right to
appeal the Trial Chamber’s adjudication of the individual criminal responsibility of the accused is rightly
identified as a feature strictly characteristic of a party to the proceedings.
222 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, PTC II, Decision on Victims' Participation in Proceedings Related to the
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-24, 3 November 2010 (Situation in the Republic of Kenya, PTC
II, Decision of 3 November 2010).
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fundamental, general normative basis of the participation of victims in the ICC’s process.
The substance and the rationale behind article 68(3) will be examined in a separate
chapter. In the present context it suffices to note that this norm affords victims, where
their personal interests are affected, the right to intervene at stages of the proceedings
deemed to be appropriate by the Court. The legal regime set forth in article 68(3) vests the
relevant Chamber with the authority to assess whether the victims’ personal interests are
affected by the proceeding(s) at hand, as well as the appropriateness of their participation
at the particular procedural stage in light of the rights of the accused and the precepts of
fair and impartial trial. Article 68(3) neither predetermines the stages at which victims
may intervene, nor the exact scope or the concrete manner in which their participation
may take place.
Besides this general victims’ participation scheme designed by the drafters, the
Court’s statutory documents afford victims the possibility to intervene in proceedings of
limited object and purpose. Such, for instance, are the proceedings concerning the
Prosecutor’s request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization of an investigation
pursuant to article 15(3), as well as the proceeding with respect to challenges to the
jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case envisaged in article 19(3). These
specific proceedings represent a ‘separate form of victim involvement in the early stage of
the [ICC’s process], outside the general framework of [a]rticle 68(3)’.223 Consequently,
this lex specialis regime provides another concurrent possibility for victims to partake in
proceedings taking place before the ICC, albeit to a more limited extent. The input of
victims in the context of the proceedings of articles 15 and 19 is confined to making
representations and, accordingly, submitting observations. Once victims exercise their
right to make representations or to submit observations in these specific proceedings, their
intervention for the purposes of the proceedings at hand is exhausted, thus, comes to an
end.
Victims are also entitled pursuant to article 75 to the right to claim reparations
following a conviction.224 As previously mentioned in passing, the possibility to claim
reparations may be employed irrespective of whether a victim has exercised the right to
participate in the proceedings leading to the adjudication of the individual criminal
223 Baumgartner, supra note 22, p. 415.
224 This distinct regime has also been duly noted by the Appeals Chamber – see Situation in the DRC, Appeals
Chamber Decision of 19 December 2008.
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responsibility of the alleged offender(s). Thus, regardless of whether victims have taken
part in proceedings on the subject-matter of the criminal case, they are afforded the right
to apply for reparations after conviction. The same holds true as regards the opposite
scenario. Whether a victim intends to apply for reparations following a conviction has no
bearing on the right to take part in proceedings on the merits of the criminal case.
The particular purpose and scope of reparation proceedings, as well as the standing
of victims therein will be examined in more detail at a later stage. Still, at this point it is to
be noted that, by contrast to proceedings on the merits of the criminal case, as well as
proceedings concerning the authorization of an investigation and challenges to jurisdiction
and admissibility, the participation of victims in reparation proceedings is a condicio sine
qua non for the very existence of these proceedings. Unlike any other procedure before
the Court, the involvement of victims in the context of reparation proceedings is
indispensable. This is due to the fact that the harm sustained by victims lies at the core of
this type of proceedings. The harm purportedly ensuing from the commission of the
crime(s) alleged to have been committed by the person(s) standing trial represents the
subject-matter of reparation proceedings.
The few core rights of victims outlined above have so far been in the spotlight. The
right to participation pursuant to article 68(3), the right to take part in proceedings
pursuant to article 15(3) and 19(3), and the right to claim reparations have been discussed
in the legal literature in the context of the overarching precepts of victims’ right to access
to justice, to know the truth, to be heard and to receive compensation. These rights have
been examined against the backdrop of the rights of the accused, fairness and impartiality
of proceedings.225 However, besides the rights just mentioned, the statutory framework
entitles victims to a wider range of rights throughout the ICC’s proceedings. Accordingly,
notwithstanding the correct observation that the ICC’s framework contains the most
comprehensive and specific list of victims’ participatory rights in criminal proceedings,226
still, the literature to-date does not suggest a comprehensive review or a classification of
the rights of victims afforded by the Court’s founding documents. Besides the few
225 See e.g. Zappalà, supra note 11, p. 149.
226 Raquel Aldana-Pindell, ‘In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth and Justice for State-
Sponsored Crimes’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 35:5 (2002), pp. 1399-1501, p. 1429.
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sporadic distinctions between, for instance, absolute and discretionary rights,227 ‘primary’
and ‘subsidiary’ rights,228 the panoply of rights which ‘can be found scattered throughout
the various pieces of legislation that govern the proceedings of the Court’229 necessitate,
accordingly, a more comprehensive and scrutinized categorization.
Victims’ rights could be distinguished on the basis of a number of criteria, such as:
1) scope of applicability (applicable to all stages of the proceedings or confined to specific
stages; of uniform applicability or case-specific); 2) level of definiteness (express or
implied); 3) initiative for their employment (upon the victims’ initiative or upon the
initiative of another); 4) nature of the corresponding obligation of the criminal justice
authorities (positive rights, i.e. obliging certain action, or negative rights, i.e. obliging
inaction); 5) manner of employment (in person or through another); 6) specificity of the
right-bearer (any person qualifying as victim or only victims pertaining to a particular
class, such as victim-participants, traumatized victims, victims of sexual violence, etc.).
In view of the foregoing, the rights of victims before the ICC could be classified as
follows: 1) general and specific rights; 2) express and implied rights (rights stipulated
explicitly and rights ensuing from the Court’s jurisprudence); 3) rights of an imperative
character and rights of a non-imperative character; 4) conditional rights and non-
conditional rights; 5) ‘passive’ rights and ‘active’ rights; 6) ‘positive’ rights and ‘negative’
rights; 7) rights employed in person and rights employed through another; 8) ‘any-victim’
rights and class- or group-specific rights; 9) ‘service’ rights and ‘procedural’ rights; 10)
rights afforded solely to victims and rights afforded to victims and other persons alike.
Along these lines it should be mentioned that certain classifications may also
comprise rights of a mixed character, that is, rights which, depending on the
circumstances, may be employed in one variation or another. The present analysis will as
well demonstrate that depending on the distinctive criterion, one and the same right could
combine features pertaining to several classes of rights, thus, could fall within more than
one classification simultaneously. Consequently, the different classes of rights which the
eligibility as a victim before the ICC entails should be regarded as concomitant
227 See Mekjian and Varughese, supra note 9, where the authors distinguish between the victims’ ‘absolute right
to attend within trial proceedings under Rule 91(2) and discretionary right to participate under Rule 91(3)(a)’
(footnotes omitted).
228 Paulina Vega González, ‘The role of victims in International Criminal Court proceedings: their rights and the
first rulings of the court', SUR International Journal on Human Rights, vol. 3(5) (2006), pp. 19-42, p. 22.
229 Ibid., p. 21.
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(coexistent) rather than as mutually exclusive. As a result, the diverse classes of rights are
prone to various combinations.
1. General and Specific Rights
The first classification to be contemplated ensues from the criterion ‘applicability’.
Determinative in this respect is the answer to the question whether a right is applicable
throughout the criminal justice process as a whole or is confined to a specific stage and/or
to specific proceedings.
1.1. General Rights
The ICC’s legal framework is rich in examples of rights of general applicability (i.e. lex
generalis).230 In this respect, mention should be made of the right set forth in article 68(3)
and its complementing provisions in the Rules, namely rules 89-93, all of which represent
an apposite illustration of rights of general applicability. The right of victims to
participation for the purpose of expressing their views and concerns is applicable at any
stage of the ICC’s process, provided that the victims’ personal interests are affected by the
stage/the proceedings at hand and determined to be appropriate by the Court. The same
holds true as regards the corresponding provisions in the Rules.
In the same fashion, the right to counseling and other appropriate assistance as
provided for in article 43(6), including the right of victims to assistance in obtaining legal
advice and organizing their legal representation in accordance with rule 16(1)(b) are of a
general character, applicable at all stages of the proceedings. Similar is the nature of the
right to administrative and technical assistance pursuant to rule 18(c).
Another manifestation of a right of a general applicability is the right to protection
as provided for in article 68(1) and rule 17(2). Victims’ right to protection is generally
applicable from the early stages of the proceedings throughout the entire criminal justice
process. Indicative in this regard is the obligation vested not only upon the Chamber in
charge of the proceedings, but also upon the Prosecutor in the context of his or her
investigation to ensure the protection of victims by virtue of article 54(3)(f).
230 See McDermott, supra note 33,  p. 27.
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In the same way, the right of victims set forth in rule 16(2)(a) and (b) to be
informed of their rights afforded by law and of relevant decisions of the Chamber that
may have an impact on their interests is also of a general character. Notably, the right to
be informed and, in particular, to receive information about the progress of the case, is
considered to be among the internationally accepted basic elements of fairness for
victims.231 Alongside the right to be informed is the right of victims to be notified. This
right includes notification of developments in the criminal justice process in order to
allow victims to apply for participation in the proceedings as stipulated by rule 92(2) and
(3). To the same effect is the right to be notified of the date of hearings and of delivery of
decisions, of the filing of requests, submissions, motions and other documents as
envisaged in rule 92(5). The general character of the right to notification ensues from the
very wording of rule 92, which stipulates that this right is applicable throughout the ICC’s
process, except for proceedings related to specific issues, envisaged in Part II of the
Statute (i.e. the Prosecutor’s request to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization of an
investigation; challenges to jurisdiction and admissibility of a case).232
1.2. Specific Rights
Proceedings related to particular issues are, on their part, of narrow object and purpose. In
other words, they are specific procedures. This feature implies limited intervention on the
part of victims. Accordingly, the rights afforded to victims in proceedings of limited
object and purpose are tailored to the specificities of the proceedings at hand. A common
feature of the victims’ lex specialis rights is their limited applicability, confined to a
particular issue arising in the course of the proceeding or to a particular procedural stage
(such as the pre-trial stage of proceedings or the reparations stage of a case following a
conviction). The legal literature contains observations to the same effect, namely that ‘in
providing specific participatory rights to victims […] the drafters [have] also expressly
limited the scope of those rights.’233
231 See e.g. Aldana-Pindell, supra note 226, p. 30, where the author refers to the Tenth Congress for the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, as well as to supranational, international and regional legal
instruments, which stipulate the right to be informed among the core procedural rights of victims in the criminal
justice process.
232 See rule 92(1) read together with articles 5-21 (Part II of the Statute).
233 SáCouto and Cleary, supra note 20, p. 94.
70
At the beginning of the present chapter mention has been made of some specific
rights afforded to victims like the right to make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber
concerning the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation envisaged in
article 15(3); the right to make observations in proceedings regarding challenges to the
Court’s jurisdiction or to the admissibility of a case set forth in article 19(3); the right to
apply for reparations following a conviction as enshrined in article 75. Another specific
right which ensues from the employment of the right to claim reparations is the right to
appeal an order for reparations as envisaged in article 82(4).
An issue that is closely related to the present differentiation is how the general
right to participation pursuant to article 68(3) relates to the specific rights to partake in
proceedings of limited object and purpose envisioned in articles 15(3) and 19(3). Some
authors advance the view that the right to make representations before the Pre-Trial
Chamber, as stipulated by article 15(3), is to be interpreted as a ‘particular specification’
of the general right of participation envisioned under article 68(3).234 Others contend that
the applicability of article 68(3) and, accordingly, of rules 89-93 to the proceedings of
limited object and purpose of Part II of the Statute is not completely clear,235 since this
issue ‘was only touched upon very briefly in the discussions [related to the drafting of the
Rules]’.236 Along with the contention that the Court is to decide whether participation
pursuant to article 15 and article 19 should be confined to what is set out in these
provisions or should be extended in accordance with article 68 and rules 89-93, it is
observed that ‘[i]n any event, the right to make “representations” or “observations” […]
should not require a prior request and ruling by the Court under [r]ule 89.’237 In other
words, it is averred that in order to exercise the right to intervene in the articles 15 and 19
proceedings, victims would not be required to undergo the formal application procedure
for admission in proceedings.
Given the separate sets of provisions stipulating both the notification regime, as
well as the manner of participation of victims in specific proceedings, on the one hand,
and participation in general, on the other, it is to be inferred that the lex generalis regime
234 Mekjian and Varughese, supra note 9, p. 18.
235 Gilbert Bitti and Håkan Friman, ‘Participation of Victims in the Proceedings’, in The International Criminal
Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Roy S. Lee (ed.), 2001, Transnational
Publishers, pp. 456-474, p. 459; Cohen, supra note 22, p. 359.
236 Bitti and Friman, supra note 235, p. 459.
237 Ibid.
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and the lex specialis regime of victims’ involvement are distinct and independent from
one another. Accordingly, in proceedings of limited object and purpose the specific
regime takes precedence over the applicability of the general regime. Consequently, the
intervention of victims in proceedings pursuant to articles 15 and 19 rather than being
contingent on the requirements set forth in article 68(3) and rule 89 et seq. must be in line
with the relevant lex specialis provisions and their complementing rules.
This logic imbues the Court’s legal instruments. To this effect is, for instance, rule
92(1) which explicitly envisions the non-applicability of the general provision on
notification to victims in lex specialis proceedings. Another unequivocal indication in the
same vein stems from the perusal of rules 50 and 59. These norms introduce alternative
notification regimes to victims as regards the proceedings of article 15(3) and,
accordingly, of article 19, separate and distinct from the general notification regime
enunciated in rule 92. Furthermore, the wording of rule 89 itself makes an explicit
reference to the participation of victims for the purpose of presenting their views and
concerns, thus, excludes from its purview participation for the purpose of making
representations and/or submitting observations. To the same effect is rule 91, which
likewise makes an explicit reference to both rule 89 and article 68(3), thus, excludes from
its ambit participation in proceedings pursuant to articles 15 and 19. The above
considerations warrant the conclusion that the lex specialis regime of participation, that is,
participation in proceedings of limited object and purpose, is separate and independent
from the general regime governing the participation of victims enunciated in article 68(3).
1.3. Rights of Uniform Applicability and Case-Specific Rights
Besides the distinguishing features pointed out above, another distinction between the
general and the specific rights conferred to victims is also to be noted. The general rights
provided by the legal framework could be described as rights of uniform applicability.
The lex generalis rights are applicable throughout any criminal justice process taking
place before the ICC, irrespective of the particularities and of the development of a given
situation or case. The uniform applicability of the right of victims to present their views
and concerns to any ICC’s proceedings pursuant to article 68(3) represents an apposite
illustration in this respect. On the other hand, the lex specialis rights are case-specific.
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Specific rights, such as the rights pursuant to article 15(3) and article 19(3), are related to
a particular proceeding or issue which may or may not unfold in the course of a given
criminal justice process. For instance, the applicability of the victims’ right to make
representations in proceedings pursuant to article 15(3) ensues from a Prosecutor’s request
to the Chamber for authorization of an investigation. Similarly, the right to make
observations in proceedings pursuant to article 19(3) arises from a challenge to the
Court’s jurisdiction or to the admissibility of a case. In the same vein, the applicability of
the right to claim reparations in subsequent reparation proceedings results from a
conviction. Hence, unlike the rights of uniform applicability, the case-specific rights do
not necessarily unfold in each and every criminal justice process taking place before the
ICC. Whether they will find application or not in a particular ICC situation or case
depends on the development of the proceedings at hand.
2. Express and Implied rights
The present division of rights is founded on whether a right is explicitly stipulated by the
drafters or is identified and explained in the Court’s jurisprudence instead. While express
rights are meticulously and clearly fleshed out in the normative basis, implied rights
derive from the interpretation of the legal framework. Since the explicit rights of victims
are easily discernible through the perusal of the Court’s legal instruments, the analysis
will address directly the second group of rights within the present classification.
2.1. Implied Rights238
The review of the Court’s jurisprudence reveals that the rights of victims enunciated in the
case-law are aimed at giving effect to the victims’ participation scheme carved out by the
ICC’s founders. It thus follows that the implied rights of victims emanate from the express
right of victims to participation set forth in article 68(3). As such, implied rights are prone
to differing interpretations as regards their exact substance and compass, varying from one
238 Implied rights must not be confused with inherent rights. The latter concept comprises rights of a fundamental
character, i.e. essential, inalienable, natural rights. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (2004),
inherent or inalienable right is a ‘right that cannot be transferred or surrendered […] [that is] a natural right such
as the right to own property’. Other examples of inherent rights are the right to life, as well as the right to liberty.
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Chamber to another and depending on the circumstances of the case at hand.239 Victims’
implied rights may thus be described as flexible.
A suitable illustration of an implied right provides the right of victims to access
non-public information. The review of the relevant jurisprudence attests to varying
interpretations of its exact substance and compass given by the different Chambers. Some
Chambers sustain the view that the right to access information is encompassed by the right
to consult the record of the proceedings as envisaged in rules 121(10) and 131(2), thus, is
restricted to all public decisions and documents and ‘does not extend to those filed on a
confidential basis or, if applicable, under seal and/or ex parte’.240 Conversely, other
Chambers acknowledge victims the right to access non-public information for the purpose
of giving effect to article 68(3).
Notably, even among the Chambers that recognize the victims’ right to access non-
public information there is no unanimity as to the manner in which this right is to be
employed, i.e. whether it could be exercised by the victims or should be confined to the
victims’ legal representative(s), as well as to what types of confidential materials this right
relates. The majority of the Chambers have opined that the right to access non-public
information is to be exercised through the victims’ legal representative(s). In this strain in
the Bemba case TC III has opined that victims have the right to be notified through their
legal representative(s) of public and confidential filings which have a bearing on their
personal interests. Pursuant to the Chamber’s rulings, the legal representatives were
obliged not to communicate confidential information to their clients without the
permission of the Chamber.241
The Trial Chamber in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case acknowledged the right of
victims to access via their legal representatives confidential information except for
239 In the same vein is the observation advanced by commentators that the Chambers have adopted differing
approaches as regards the rights of victims which are not explicitly provided for: what is not explicitly provided
for is prohibited, what is not explicitly provided for is allowed. See Friman, supra note 25, p. 500.
240 See Bemba, PTC III, 12 December 2008, paras. 103 et seq., as well as Bemba, PTC III, Decision on the
Requests of the Prosecutor and the Legal Representatives of Victims for Re-classification of the Document
Submitted by the Authorities of the Republic of South Africa and for Notification of Other Documents, ICC-
01/05-01/08-480, 19 August 2009.
241 See Bemba, TC III, Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications by victims to
participate in the proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-807, 30 June 2010, para. 47. See also The Prosecutor v.
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus (Banda and Jerbo), PTC I, Decision on
Victims’ Participation at the Hearing on the Confirmation of the Charges, ICC-02/05-03/09-89, 29 October
2010, para. 62, where the Chamber underscored that it will decide on a case-by-case basis whether to grant
access to confidential information ‘upon receipt of a specific and motivated request, whether to grant victims’
legal representatives access thereto’.
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documents classified as ex parte.242 The Chamber extended the compass of the
information which the legal representatives could access on the victims’ behalf to
agreements pertaining to evidence between the Prosecutor and the defence as enunciated
by rule 69.243
The Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case ruled that ‘confidential filings which
include the names of the legal representatives of the victims on their cover shall also be
notified to the victims by the Registry.’244 However, TC I failed to specify whether the
right to access confidential filings would extend to victims themselves or would be
confined to their legal representative(s) only.
By contrast to the approach contemplated above, the jurisprudence of PTC I in the
Katanga and Ngudjolo case initially favoured the recognition of access to confidential
information to victims themselves. This ruling, however, engendered a variety of concerns
among the parties, as well as with the Registry which observed that ‘the victims are
neither specifically trained in handling […] sensitive information nor are they under a
specific professional obligation to adhere to a code of conduct.’245 Subsequently, the
Chamber revised its initial approach taking heed of these concerns together with the
acknowledgement of the lack of a secure communication and storage of information, as
well as of appropriate training of victims in handling sensitive information and
maintaining confidentiality.246 As a result, PTC I ruled that the confidential part of the
case record could be accessed by the victims’ legal representatives and obliged the latter
not to provide to their clients the information which would allow the identification of
specific witnesses.247
Besides the right to access non-public information, other implied rights ensuing
from the employment of the right to participation are: the right to respond to observations
made in accordance with rule 103; the right to request the Chamber in charge of the
proceedings to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation or not to
prosecute within the context of article 53; the right to intervene in procedures concerning
242 See Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-
01/07-1788-tENG, 22 January 2010 (Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010), para. 121.
243 Ibid., Katanga and Ngudjolo, paras. 121 and 124.
244 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008, para. 107.
245 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, Decision on Limitations of Set of Procedural Rights for Non-Anonymous
Victims, ICC-01/04-01/07-537, 30 May 2008, para. 4.
246 Ibid., para. 21.
247 Ibid., para. 25.
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the preservation of evidence in the context of a unique investigative opportunity as
envisaged in article 56; the right to request from the Chamber  to execute its powers as
regards the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses and the preservation of
evidence as enunciated in article 57(3)(c); the right to take part in hearings on matters
related to sentencing pursuant to rule 143.
Although rule 103 expressly bestows the right to respond to amicus curiae and
other forms of submissions to the Prosecutor and to the defence, this right has been
extended to victims subject to the discretion and the determination of the Chamber in
charge of the proceedings.248 Similarly, although neither article 53, nor articles 56(3) or
57(3)(c) contain an explicit stipulation of victims’ involvement in these proceedings, the
possibility for victims to intervene therein for the purpose of implementing their right to
participation finds reflection both in the Court’s jurisprudence and in the relevant
literature.
In this respect commentators observe that ‘participatory rights can only be attached
to articles 56 and 57 by application of article 68(3).’249 In the same spirit, the Court has
proclaimed the possibility for victims to be afforded intervention in proceedings pursuant
to article 56(3) or 57(3)(c) as ensuing from their right to participation endowed by the
drafters.250 As regards the procedure of article 53, PTC II has held that the right of victims
to request the review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation or not to
prosecute is in tune with the rationale behind rule 92(2) read together with regulation 87
of the Regulations of the Court.251 The relevant legal regime envisions that, in order to
allow victims to apply for participation in the proceedings in accordance with rule 89, the
victims or their legal representatives who have participated in the proceedings or who
have communicated with the Court shall be notified of any decision of the Prosecutor not
to initiate an investigation or not to prosecute. Although PTC I, on its part, did not grant
the request of the victims’ legal representative for a review of the Prosecutor’s decision
pursuant to article 53, it nevertheless did not deny, as a matter of principle, the possibility
248 Bemba, PTC II, Decision concerning the Application by the Legal Representative of Victims a/0278/08, a/0279/08, a/0291/08 to
a/0293/08, a/0296/08 to a/0298/08, a/0455/08 and a/0457/08 to a/0467/08 filed on 20 April 2009, 22 April 2009 (Bemba, PTC II,
Decision of 22 April 2009).
249 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 362.
250 Kony et al, PTC II, Decision on victims' applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06,
a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-101, 10 August 2007, paras. 97-98 and paras.
100-101; Situation in the Republic of Kenya, PTC II, Decision of 3 November 2010, para. 12.
251 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision of 3 November 2010, at footnote 15.
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for victims to intervene should the prerequisites for that arise.252 The applicability of the
general victims’ participation scheme to article 53 has likewise been acknowledged in the
literature by reference to rule 92(2). This provision has been identified as the legal text
which connects article 53 with the victims’ right of participation pursuant to article
68(3).253
Similarly, commentators have noted the implied nature of the right pursuant to rule
143 by observing that ‘[a]lthough it does not appear that victims may participate during
closing statements, if the Court decides to hold a sentencing hearing, victims might be
able to participate if requested to do so by the Chamber [footnote omitted].’254 As
correctly averred, the right of victims to take part in additional hearings on sentencing
matters is ‘implied from the language of [r]ule 143’.255
Still, not all rights identified in the Court’s jurisprudence as ensuing from the
general victims’ participation scheme pursuant to article 68(3) are beyond dispute. In
particular, specific consideration necessitates the possibility of victims to contribute to the
collection of evidence pertinent to the subject-matter of the case. In this context some
Chambers have construed the meaningful participation of victims as entailing the right to
tender evidence.256 As a result, the possibility of victims to impact the evidence-gathering
process and, eventually, to affect the outcome of the case, has been expanded to an extent
that blurs the distinction between the standing of the parties, on the one hand, and of
victims, on the other. In view of the foregoing, the extent to which victims may intervene
in the fact-finding process in proceedings on the merits remains a question open to
discussion. Due to its complexity, the issue concerning the possibility of victims to
partake in the fact-finding process, in particular, in the collection of evidence on the
merits of the case is the focus of a separate and detailed analysis further below.257
252 Situation in the DRC, PTC I, Decision on the request of the legal representative of victims VPRS 3 and VPRS
6 to review an alleged decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed, ICC-01/04-582, 25 October 2010.
253 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 362.
254 Aldana-Pindell, supra note 226, p. 34.
255 Ibid., footnote 182.
256 Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 18 January 2008.
257 See infra, Chapter Five.
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3. Imperative and Non-Imperative Rights
Next to be contemplated is the categorization distinguishing between imperative and non-
imperative rights afforded to victims in the ICC’s process. The classification criterion
applied herewith is the enforceability of a right. That is to say, the rights are classified on
the basis of whether the Chamber is duty-bound to ensure the employment of a particular
right or, conversely, has the discretion to decide whether to allow victims to make use of
the right in question. Hence, if the Chamber is obliged to allow the execution of a right,
this denotes the mandatory, unqualified character of the right. Conversely, if the exercise
of a right is subject to judicial discretion, the right is of a non-imperative, optional
character.
3.1. Imperative Rights
The legislative approach enunciating victims’ rights of an imperative character places the
Chamber under the obligation to undertake action or to refrain from action which has a
bearing on victims. Hence, a mandatory right ensues from the duty vested upon the
Chamber in respect of victims, which may either be of a positive (‘shall’) or of a negative
character (‘shall not’). As rightly noted by legal scholars, the drafting history indicates
that ‘the choice of language ‘shall’ instead of alternatively ‘may’ is a deliberate one’.258
An eloquent manifestation of a victims’ right of an imperative character is the right
to participate at appropriate stages of proceedings whenever their personal interests are
affected. The ‘mandatory nature of the language’ of article 68(3) has not gone unnoticed
in legal literature.259 Commentators acknowledge that ‘whenever all prerequisites [of
article 68(3)] are met, participation in the form of expression of ‘views and concerns’
becomes a right granting which is an obligation upon a Chamber.’260 An assertion in the
same vein has been advanced in the overall context of international criminal proceedings
based on the understanding that incorporating victims’ voice in proceedings is a
258 Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Article 68(3) and personal interests of victims in the emerging practice of the ICC’, The
Emerging Practice of the ICC, Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), Martinus Nijhoff, 2009, pp. 635-691, p.
648 (footnote omitted).
259 SáCouto and Cleary, supra note 20, p. 90.
260 Vasiliev, supra note 258, p. 648-649.
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component of the mandate of international criminal tribunals.261 Thus, when the
conditions for participation are met the respective international judicial institutions are
‘duty-bound to enable victims to participate in their own right’.262
Besides article 68(3) other provisions which contain rights of an imperative
character are: rule 87(2)(d) which envisions the right of a victim to respond to the
Chamber when the latter, acting on its own motion, considers ordering measures to protect
the victim concerned; rule 72(2) which empowers a victim to be heard and have his or her
views taken into account by the Chamber when considering the relevance or admissibility
of evidence concerning the victim’s alleged consent, words and conduct during the
commission of an alleged crime of sexual violence; rule 119(3) which affords victims the
right to have their views requested and taken into account by the Pre-Trial Chamber
before imposing or amending conditions restricting liberty. Just as is the case with article
68(3), common to each of these provisions is the usage of the imperative ‘shall’ vesting a
positive obligation upon the Chamber.
Also mandatory are the rights of victims stipulated in provisions employing the
language ‘shall not’ with respect to the Chamber. This wording embodies an imperative
that refrains the Chamber from action. Such, for instance, is the right of a victim of sexual
violence not to have information concerning his or her prior or subsequent sexual conduct
admitted as evidence in proceedings. This right is introduced through rule 71 placing an
obligation upon the Chamber not to admit such type of evidence. Another example in the
same vein is the victim’s right not to have an order for reparations delivered in his or her
interest ensuing from the Chamber’s duty enjoined by virtue of rule 95(2)(b) not to make
an order for reparations against the convicted person, upon the victim’s request.
A different example of a victims’ imperative right provides article 15(3). Although
this norm does not vest an explicit obligation upon the criminal justice authorities as
regards the right of victims to make representations, given the wording ‘victims may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber’, it is to be inferred that the enforcement of the
right is left entirely to the discretion of victims. Therefore, as long as victims decide that
they wish to avail themselves of their right pursuant to article 15(3), the Chamber is duty-
bound to allow victims’ representations with respect to the Prosecutor’s request for
authorization of an investigation. The same rationale underlies the victims’ right to submit
261 Spiga, supra note 10, p. 1381.
262 Ibid.
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observations to the Court in proceedings with respect to challenges to the Court’s
jurisdiction or the admissibility of a case as envisaged in article 19(3), as well as the right
to appeal against an order for reparations pursuant to article 82(4).
An imperative right ensues likewise from article 68(2), according to which when
the Court considers to conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the
presentation of evidence via alternative means for the purpose of protecting a particular
victim, such measures shall be implemented by the Chamber having regard particularly to
the views of the victim concerned. Since the Chamber must consider the views of the
victim concerned before proceeding with the implementation of protective measures, this
implies an imperative right on the part of the victim to give and have his or her views
considered by the Chamber before the latter reaches its determination. It thus becomes
evident that even in the absence of an explicit wording obliging the Chamber to act or to
refrain from action, a right bestowed on victims may still be categorized as being of an
imperative character.
3.2. Non-Imperative Rights
By contrast, the alternative category of rights – those of a non-imperative, optional
character – have no binding effect upon the Chamber. These rights are enforceable upon
the discretion of the judicial body. The Court has the latitude to decide whether the
exercise of the right in question is warranted and appropriate against the backdrop of the
circumstances of the proceedings at hand. This approach is demonstrated and effectuated
through the discretionary wording ‘the Chamber may’ as opposed to the imperative
‘shall’. Among the victims’ rights of a non-imperative character is the right to present
their views on any issue as provided for by rule 93. According to this norm, the Chamber
may seek the views of victims, hence, it is not obliged to do so. The same holds true as
regards the right of victims to question witnesses, experts or the accused through their
legal representative(s) which may only be exercised as long as the Chamber gives its
authorization by virtue of rule 91(3)(a) and (b). This right of victims to contribute to the
evidentiary material will be explored in more detail in a separate chapter in the context of
the involvement of victim-participants in the ICC’s fact-finding procedure.263
263 See infra, Chapter Five.
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4. Conditional and Non-Conditional Rights
Another classification which is worth considering is between conditional and non-
conditional rights. As the notion ‘(non-)conditional’ implies, the present classification
originates in the question of whether a right may be enforced automatically or is
contingent upon certain requirements envisaged by the drafters.
4.1. Conditional Rights
The right to participation pursuant to the general victims’ participation scheme set forth in
article 68(3) represents a right of a conditional character. The exercise of the right to take
part in proceedings depends, first, on the victims’ admission following the application
procedure set forth in rule 89 and, secondly, on the requirement that the victims’ personal
interests are affected.264 The right to question witnesses in accordance with rule 91(2) and
(3) is likewise conditional. The employment of this right is contingent on the
appropriateness of the requested intervention assessed in light of a variety of factors, such
as the stage of the proceedings, the rights of the accused, the interests of witnesses, the
need for a fair, impartial and expeditious trial. In addition, just like the participation of
victims pursuant to article 68(3) for the purpose of presenting their views and concerns,
rule 91(2) ‘makes clear that participation of the victims’ legal representative [in the
examination of evidence] is subject to the Court’s ruling under [r]ule 89.’265
4.2. Non-Conditional Rights
By contrast, non-conditional are those rights which may be employed by victims
autonomously, i.e. without prior judicial authorization. In other words, rights falling
within this category are directly enforceable by the victims concerned. The stipulation of
victims’ rights of an autonomous character reflects the understanding of the Court’s
founders that certain instances throughout the criminal justice process may affect by their
264 In the same vein is the description of article 68(3) as a potential right premised on the observation that ‘[t]he
victim, unlike the Prosecutor and the defence, is not entitled as of right to address the Chamber [emphasis
added]’, see Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1405.
265 Mekjian and Varughese, supra note 9, p. 27.
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very nature the victims’ personal interests. Thus, the intervention of victims at particular
instances has been deemed by the drafters to be per se warranted and appropriate, as a
matter of principle. Instead of entrusting the Chamber with the discretion to decide on a
case-by-case basis the appropriateness of victims’ involvement, the drafters have granted
in advance an express and a uniform authorization to victims to intervene whenever such
specific instances arise.
Not surprisingly, bearing in mind the rationale behind the phenomenon of victims’
participation at the ICC and the victims’ non-party standing, the non-conditional rights
bestowed by the legal documents are of limited scope. Accordingly, an example of an
autonomous right is the victims’ right to intervene in proceedings pursuant to article
15(3), as well as pursuant to article 19(3). Both the wording and the spirit of these
provisions imply that, as long as the proceedings in question unfold, victims may enforce
their respective right directly without further authorization by the Chamber or the
fulfillment of additional conditions. In the same vein, commentators observe that ‘the
right to make “representations” or “observations” […] follows directly from the Statute
[,thus] should not require a prior request or ruling by the Court’.266 That is to say, the
exercise of the right to make representations or to submit observations takes place
automatically without any further judicial assessment of the impact of the proceedings on
victims and their personal interests, as well as the appropriateness of the intervention.
Consequently, the intervention of victims pursuant to article 15(3) and aritlce 19(3) is
unconditional.
The logic behind this legislative approach is readily apparent. Due to their limited
object and purpose, proceedings pursuant to article 15 and 19 are identifiable in terms of
the issues which they entail and, accordingly, their impact on the victims’ interests. Given
the very specific nature of participation pursuant to these provisions,267 the matters which
may arise therein may be anticipated beforehand and, as such, are prone to an exhaustive
and express stipulation in advance. By the same token, the issues to which the proceedings
in question relate are likewise identifiable beforehand. Hence, whether the issues, as
envisaged by the drafters, affect the victims’ personal interests and warrant the victims’
intervention may likewise be ascertained in advance. For instance, the ICC’s founders
have pre-determined that the request of the Prosecutor for authorization of an
266 Bitti and Friman, supra note 235, p. 459.
267 McDermott, supra note 33, p. 33.
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investigation, as well as challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction and/or the admissibility of a
case affect per se the personal interests of victims. Therefore, instead of being left to the
determination of the Chamber, the right of victims to make (albeit a limited) contribution
to these proceedings is deemed warranted and apposite by virtue of law.
5. Passive and Active Rights. Rights of a Mixed Character
Next to be addressed is the distinction between victims’ ‘passive’ and ‘active’ rights. The
distinguishing criterion is premised on the initiative triggering the execution of a right. As
the wording ‘passive’ implies, this category includes those rights of victims the
employment of which depends on the initiative of the Chamber or of the parties, as well as
those rights which are effectuated through the Chamber or other organs of the Court.
Conversely, if victims are the triggering force for the enforcement of a right and, thus, the
right is exercised upon the victims’ own initiative, such a right could be termed as
‘active’.
5.1. Passive Rights
The first category comprises the rights pursuant to rule 93, according to which the
Chamber may seek the views of victims or their legal representatives participating in
proceedings, as well as of other victims on any issue, as appropriate. According to rule 93
victims may, upon the Chamber’s discretion, be solicited to give their views in the context
of, inter alia, proceedings upon request for review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to
initiate an investigation or not to prosecute (article 53(1) and (2), 53(3)(a) and rule 107);
proceedings upon the initiative of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review the Prosecutor’s
decision not to initiate an investigation or not to prosecute (article  53(1) and (2), 53(3)(b)
and rule 109); the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to hold a confirmation of charges
hearing in absentia (rule 128); amendment of the charges (rule 128); joining or severance
of proceedings (rule 136); proceedings on admission of guilt by the accused (rule 139). In
a similar fashion is the right of victims pursuant to rule 224(1) and (4) to participate in the
hearing on review concerning reduction of sentence or to submit written observations
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upon invitation by the judges appointed by the Appeals Chamber for the purpose of the
procedure pursuant to article 110(3).
Within the ‘passive’ rights category also fall the right of victims to be informed by
virtue of rule 50 of the Prosecutor’s intention to seek authorization from the Pre-Trial
Chamber to initiate an investigation pursuant to article 15(3); the right to be informed by
virtue of rule 59 of any question or challenge of jurisdiction or admissibility which has
arisen pursuant to article 19; the right to receive a notification for participation according
to rule 92; as well as the right to be notified of reparation proceedings set forth in rule 96
(a special provision intended to ‘augment’ the general norm on notifications of rule 92).268
These rights rather than being effectuated by the right-bearer, i.e. the victims, are
triggered by the relevant organ of the Court envisaged in the provision. For instance, the
right to information and/or notification is carried out via the Registry by virtue of rule
16(1)(a) and rule 92(1). Similarly, the right to information and/or notification is
effectuated through the Registry with respect to: protective measures ordered proprio
motu by the Chamber pursuant to rule 87(2)(d); any question or challenge of jurisdiction
or admissibility which has arisen according to article 19(3) as provided for in rule 59; the
decision of the Chamber to proceed proprio motu with issues relating to reparations as
envisaged in rule 95(1); publication of reparation proceedings under rule 96(1). The right
to information and/or notification is triggered through the Prosecutor in the context of rule
50. The right to information and/or notification is triggered via the Court in the context of
rule 92(2) and (3), via the Chamber - in the context of article 15(3) and rule 50(1).
Another passive right which is put in practice through the Chamber is the right
provided in rule 119(3). Pursuant to this provision victims, who have communicated with
the Court in respect to the case at hand and whom the Chamber considers could be at risk
as a result of the release or conditions imposed on the alleged perpetrator, are afforded the
right to give their views to the Chamber before the latter imposes or amends any
conditions restricting liberty.
268 Peter Lewis and Håkan Friman, ‘Reparations to Victims’, in The International Criminal Court: Elements of
Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Roy S. Lee (ed.), Transnational Pubilshers, 2001, pp. 474-492, p.
482.
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5.2. Active Rights
By contrast, among the rights which are triggered by victims upon their own initiative are
the right to intervene in proceedings pursuant to article 68(3) and the relevant rules; the
right to participate in proceedings pursuant to articles 15 and 19; the right to apply for
reparations in accordance with article 75; the right to appeal against an order for
reparations according to article 82(4); the right to make opening and closing statements
set forth in rule 89(1); the right to request protective measures for the purpose of giving
effect to an order for reparations pursuant to rule 99; the right to consult the record of the
case by virtue of rules 121(10) and 131(2).
5.3. Rights of a Mixed Character
Interestingly, the present classification accommodates a third category of rights that may
be described as rights of a mixed character. This group encompasses rights which,
depending on the circumstances at hand, may be exercised upon the initiative of victims
or, conversely, upon the initiative of the Chamber or other organs of the Court. Such, for
instance, is the victims’ right to protective measures pursuant to rule 87. This norm
unequivocally indicates that the implementation of protective measures may be invoked
by the victim concerned, as well as by the Chamber of its own accord or by the parties.
The right to receive reparations is likewise of a mixed character. The legal
framework provides for the possibility for reparation proceedings to be initiated by
victims themselves in accordance with rule 94, as well as for the initiation of reparation
proceedings proprio motu by the relevant Chamber by virtue of rule 95. As a result,
victims may exercise their right to reparations either through the submission of a request
for reparations pursuant to rule 94 or by joining reparation proceedings initiated by the
Chamber according to rule 95. As rightly noted in legal literature, ‘a victim who becomes
aware that the Court is acting on its own motion and then submits a claim for reparations,
will not be treated differently from a victim making a claim in the usual way [i.e. as
envisaged in rule 94].’269 The mixed character of the right to reparations thus ensures that
269 Ibid., p. 481.
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‘even where [the victim] neglects to claim […] reparations, the Court may take it upon
itself to ensure that [the victim’s] rights are safeguarded.’270
6. Positive and Negative Rights
Following the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ rights, the rights bestowed to
victims in the ICC’s process may further be categorized as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ rights.
The present classification distinguishes between: 1) rights which entitle victims to
perform an action or to have an action performed in their interest and 2) rights which
entitle victims to refrain from action and/or to request the criminal justice authorities to
refrain from action.
6.1. Positive Rights
The perusal of the constitutive instruments demonstrates that most of the rights conferred
on victims are of a positive character. A few examples of positive rights, among others,
are the right to apply for participation in proceedings pursuant to rule 89, i.e. the victims’
right to have their applications reviewed and considered by the Chamber in charge of the
proceedings; the right to apply for reparations set forth in article 75; the right to appeal an
order for reparations according to article 82(4); the right to intervene in proceedings
pursuant to article 15 and article 19; the right to be notified of developments in the
proceedings in accordance with rule 92.
6.2. Negative Rights
On the other hand, within the negative rights category one could associate the right of a
victim pursuant to rule 71 not to have evidence admitted in proceedings of his or her prior
or subsequent sexual conduct; the right of a victim under rule 81(3) and (4) to request that
his or her identity is not disclosed. Similarly, a right of a negative character is the right of
a victim according to rule 95(2)(b) not to have an order for reparations made in his or her
interest in the context of reparation proceedings initiated proprio motu by the Chamber.
270 Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1408.
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The introduction of this right represents an effective response to concerns voiced by some
delegations during the travaux préparatoires that victims who ‘would not wish to be seen
as benefiting from ‘blood money’ would object ‘as a matter of conscience’ an order for
reparations in their interest. This right likewise appeases the concerns of other delegations
voiced during the drafting of the rules that the Court may seem to be intervening in an
essentially civil matter, such as claims for reparations.271
A further example of a victim’s right of a negative character is the right not to have
(a) protective measure(s) implemented with respect to the victim concerned. Although this
right is not readily apparent from the wording of the respective provisions, it is implied in
the requirement that the victim concerned gives consent for the implementation of
protective measures. Hence, protective measures could not be imposed on the victim even
though they would be intended to safeguard his or her safety and well-being.
7. Rights Employed in Person and Rights Exercised Through Another. Rights
of a Mixed Character
The perusal of the ICC’s victim-related provisions shows that whereas some rights may be
employed by victims in person, other rights may be exercised either by victims themselves
or through another. In addition, a further category of rights within the present
classification is also to be outlined. This third group consists of rights that may be enacted
on the victims’ behalf solely through another. While the legal framework stipulates
explicitly whether certain rights are to be employed by victims in person and/or through
another, other rights lack an express proviso in this regard. Therefore, the present
distinction is premised on the interpretation of both the language, as well as the spirit of
the victim-related provisions.
7.1. Rights Employed in Person
The rights which are to be exercised by victims in person logically relate to strictly
personal, intimate values, such as the security, the protection, the well-being of the
individual, as well as other issues which depend on the victim’s sole discretion.
271 Lewis and Friman, supra note 268, p. 481.
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Consequently within this category fall: the victim’s right to participate for the purpose of
expressing his or her views and concerns pursuant to article 68(3); the victim’s right to
give his or her views as regards protective measures considered by the Court in respect of
him or her as provided for in article 68(2); the victim’s right to decide whether to give
consent or to oppose to protective or special measures which the Chamber considers to
implement in respect of him or her according to rules 87 and 88; the right to freely choose
their legal representative pursuant to rule 90(1); the victim’s right to have his or her
identity withheld from the public and/or the parties by virtue of rule 81(4). The same
holds true as regards the right envisaged in rule 95(2) to request the Chamber not to
proceed with an order for reparations against the convicted person in the interest of the
victim concerned.
7.2. Rights of a Mixed Character
Numerous examples could be given in respect of the second category of rights within the
present classification. A number of provisions stipulate that a victim’s right may be
employed in person or likewise through another. Such, for instance, is the right to file an
application for participation, which, according to rule 89(3), could be carried out by the
victim in person or by another with the victim’s consent. Furthermore, the right to file an
application could also be employed on behalf of the victim in case the victim is a child or
disabled (depending on the nature and the extent of the impairment).272 The right to
request protective or special measures with respect to a particular victim may equally be
exercised by the victim him- or herself and by his or her legal representative by virtue of
rules 87(1) and 88(1). Similarly, the right according to rule 224(1) and (4) is of the same
character. These provisions allow victims or their legal representatives to participate in the
hearing concerning reduction of sentence or to submit written observations on the review
concerning reduction of sentence conducted by the judges appointed for that purpose by
the Appeals Chamber.
Within the second category of rights comprised by the present classification special
attention should be drawn to the victims’ right to participate in proceedings for the
purpose of presenting their views and concerns as set forth in article 68(3). Given the
272 E.g. diminished mental capacity and/or physical impairment which affect(s) his or her powers of discernment.
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stipulation that the views and concerns of victims may be presented by the victims’ legal
representatives where the Court considers it appropriate, it becomes clear that the right to
present the views and concerns of victims may be employed also by the victims’ legal
representative(s). Although, at first blush, the perusal of article 68(3) may engender the
perception that the victims’ appearance in person is the rule, while the presentation of the
views and concerns through a legal representative is the exception, in fact such a
standpoint is untenable. As the ICC’s drafting history suggests, precisely due to concerns
of many delegations ‘that the potential numbers of victims could make their participation
practically impossible […] the modalities for exercising their right to participate in a
given case were left in the hands of the Court.’273
As the phenomenon of victims’ participation gains momentum at the ICC, the
modality of participation that would safeguard the proper conduct of proceedings together
with the precepts of due process, efficiency and expeditiousness is, indubitably,
participation through a legal representative. Ensuring that the exercise of victims’ rights is
ingeniously adapted to the context of trials for mass crimes274 proves exigent, in particular
given the overwhelming number of authorized victim-participants in the ICC’s
proceedings. Hence, notwithstanding the possibility for the expression of victims’ views
and concerns in person, the right of victims to participate for the purpose of presenting
their views and concerns should, as a matter of principle, be employed via their legal
representative.
In the same fashion, the relevant literature considers participation through joint
legal representation as a ‘logical means of accommodating [effective participation of]
large numbers of victims’ in international criminal proceedings.275 Said differently,
‘because of the uniqueness of international crimes and the sheer number of anticipated
victims there will always be an inherent collective aspect to participation.’276 This
understanding echoes the acknowledgement made in the context of criminal proceedings
in general that ‘the unprecedented complexity of contemporary realities’ represents a
challenge to the traditional understanding of the right of victims to be heard.277
273 Bitti and Friman, supra note 235, p. 457.
274 Boyle, supra note 221.
275 Ibid., pp. 310-311.
276 See McGonigle, supra note 362, p. 138.
277 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: a Comparativist’s Contribution’,
Buffalo Law Review, vol. 25 (1975-1976), pp. 643-690, p. 684 et seq. Equally true is the observation that the old
scheme of merely individualistic ‘procedural guarantism’ must be transformed in order to meet/adapt to the
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Undoubtedly, this is especially true in an international setting adjudicating the
commission of mass atrocities. Thus, logically, the new realities unfolding at the
international criminal justice scene entail changes of the traditional structures and long-
accepted concepts, such as the right of the victim to address the Court in person.278
Some recent developments before the STL and the ECCC provide a rather telling
illustration to the same effect. The review of these jurisdictions attests to a uniform and
steadfast shift away from the initial approach favouring the personal appearance of
victims in the criminal process towards indirect and collective participation, that is,
participation through a common legal representative. At the ECCC, in response to the
serious concerns279 raised by the participation of large numbers of civil parties in the Duch
trial proceedings (known also as ‘Case 001’),280 the provision allowing the personal
appearance of civil parties at a hearing has been repealed altogether in 2010.281 Following
this legislative amendment, at present the participation of civil parties at trial may take
place only in a collective and proxy way, either through a civil party lawyer or through a
victims’ association.282 In fact, these amendments emanate from judicial findings in the
same vein dating back to as early as 2008. Pursuant to the relevant jurisprudence at this
time the participation of the civil parties in person was ruled out and was substituted by
participation through the civil parties’ lawyer(s) strictly.283
changed needs of contemporary societies and the new phenomena. This, therefore, entails reconsideration and
adaptation of the old principles to the new realities.
278 This right is widely recognized to victims who assume the standing of parties in proceedings. However, as
will be seen shortly, some domestic jurisdictions also reveal a tendency towards restricting the right of the victim
to appear in person due to consideration of time constraints and efficiency of proceedings.
279 E.g. backlog, fairness and expeditiousness of proceedings. See, in more detail, on this issue Studzinsky, supra
note 200, Boyle, supra note 221. See also in the same vein, Mahdev Mohan, ‘The Paradox of Victim-Centrism:
Victim Participation at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal’, International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009), pp. 733–775,
p. 755.
280 The Prosecutor v. KAING Guek Eav alias Duch, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC.
281 Thus, the ‘more persmissive and lenient regime’ of the participation of civil parties characteristic of the
proceedings at the beginning of the ECCC was subsequently considerably restricted – see Michelle Staggs
Kelsall, Mary Kristerie A. Baleva, Aviva Nababan, Vineath Chou, Rachel Guo, Caroline Ehlert, Sovannith Nget
and Savornt Pheak, ‘Lessons Learned from the ‘Duch’ Trial. A Comprehensive Review of the First Case before
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ - a report produced by the Asian International Justice
Initiative’s KRT Trial Monitoring Group (December 2009), p. 32.
282 According to rule 23ter of ECCC’s Internal Rules, from the issuance of the closing order onwards civil
parties can take part in proceedings only through a civil party lawyer. If representation ceases for any reason, the
civil party should either engage alternative counsel or join an existing civil party group. Hence, except for
interviews, civil party action is exercised exclusively through a lawyer.
283 See in more detail on this issue, Studzinsky, supra note 200, pp. 889-890, where the author notes that
‘[w]hilst at the very beginning, civil parties were given a right to speak personally and directly in the hearings
[…] [w]hen the trial in [C]ase [001] […] started, civil parties could only speak in person when they were
summoned by the Court to testify.’
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Although at the STL the right of victims to participation, just like at the ICC, exists
in its two variations – in person and via a legal representative – still, the tribunal’s
framework, as well as its jurisprudence reveal a tendency towards vicarious and collective
participation almost exclusively. Indicative in this respect is rule 86(c)(ii) of STL’s Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, which provides that ‘[a] victim participating in the
proceedings may only do so through a legal representative unless the Pre-Trial Judge
authorises otherwise.’284 The understanding that participation via a legal representative is
the rule is likewise reflected in the relevant case-law.285
It is interesting to note that similar considerations aimed at ensuring the proper and
professional conduct of proceedings in case of a large number of victims lacking legal
expertise and professional skills inform the tendency towards vicarious participation in a
number of domestic jurisdictions. In this respect, for instance, the relevant legal
framework in Peru stipulates for the participation of common legal representative on the
part of victims in cases where the number of victims could jeopardize the normal conduct
of the proceedings.286 To the same effect, in criminal proceedings in El Salvador the
intervention of victims as complainants (auxiliary accusers) takes place through a legal
representative.287 The only exception to this principled stipulation is envisaged with
respect to a victim who is a lawyer him- or herself.288 This legislative approach reflects the
general understanding about the importance of the legal expertise of persons appearing as
victims or on behalf of victims in proceeding.289 In the same vein is the regime governing
criminal proceedings in the Dominican Republic, according to which the victim has the
right to intervene as a civil party through a legal representative.290 In adherence to the
same logic is the legislative approach in Taiwan, where the private prosecutor is obliged
284 As amended, 10 November 2010 and 8 February 2012. The previous version of rule 86(c) of STL’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence reads as follows: ‘The Pre-Trial Judge, after hearing the Prosecutor and the Defence
through written submissions, shall rule on the matter. Where justified by the criteria in paragraph (B), he may
limit the number of victims entitled to express their views and concerns in proceedings and shall appoint one or
more common legal representatives for multiple victims except where this results in a conflict of interest. Unless
authorized by the Pre-Trial Judge or a Chamber, as appropriate, a victim participating in the proceedings shall do
so through a legal representative’ (10 June 2009).
285 See Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash et. al. (Ayyash et al . case), STL-11-01/PT/PTJ, Decision on the VPU’s
Access to Materials and the Modalities of Victims’ Participation in Proceedings, 18 May 2012 (Ayyash et al.,
Decision of the Pre-Trial Judge of 18 May 2012), para. 20, where it is reiterated that authorized victim-
participants in proceedings take part through their legal representatives. That is to say, vicarious participation is
the rule.
286 Article 97 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
287 Article 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
288 Ibid., article 110.
289 Spiga, supra note 10.
290 Article 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
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to be represented in proceedings by a legal representative.291 It is worth noting that if the
private prosecutor has not retained an agent, the Court orders him or her to do so within a
prescribed time period. Non-compliance with this judicial ruling is followed by the
pronouncement of judgment of ‘Case not entertained’.292 Hence, as a result, the
participation of the private prosecutor is terminated.
In light of this succinct comparative note it becomes evident that the prevailing
manner of employment of the victims’ right to participation pursuant to article 68(3) at the
ICC is in tune with the overall tendency discussed above. Albeit the Court’s case-law
acknowledges the possibility for the participation of victims in person premised on the
wording of article 68(3),293 it favours, as a matter of principle, the presentation of the
victims’ views and concerns by their legal representative(s). Taking into consideration the
inimical impact which the personal appearance of a large number of victims could have on
the expeditiousness and fairness of proceedings, quite understandably the Court has been
cautious as regards the possibility for victims to be allowed to participate in person. The
Court has held that this requires a fact-specific determination, taking into account the
circumstances of the trial as a whole. Hence, the prevailing view in the ICC’s
jurisprudence is that the personal participation of victims would be allowed only as an
exception.294 In the Lubanga case, for instance, it has been opined that participation in
person is the ‘exceptional course’, otherwise given the trial management implications of
victims’ participation in person there would be real capacity for destabilizing the court
proceedings.295 Furthermore, the personal appearance of victim-participants in
proceedings could originate security concerns and would logically be time- and cost-
consuming.296 As a consequence, the proper and timely conduct of proceedings would be
affected in a negative way to the detriment of both parties, as well as of victim-
participants themselves. Therefore, although the possibility for victims to appear in person
291 Article 329 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
292 Ibid.
293 Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 18 January 2008, para. 115.
294 Lubanga, TC I, Status Conference, 12 January 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-101-ENG, page 43, lines 11-20.
295 Ibid.
296 In addition to the time which would be needed to put in place protective measures as regards victims wishing
to appear in person in order to safeguard their safety, the VWU has estimated that in order for a victim to be
brought to The Hague to participate in proceedings ‘35 days or more would be necessary in order to put in place
all necessary steps for a secure transfer’ – see Lubanga, TC I, Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06,
a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial,
ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, 26 June 2009 (Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 26 June 2009), para. 9(d).
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has not been ruled out by the ICC, as a matter of principle, this possibility has been
implemented on very rare occasions in practice.297
Conversely, given the legal representative’s ‘professional skills and code of
ethics’298 the presentation of victims’ views and concerns through a (common) legal
representative would safeguard the expeditiousness, fairness and impartiality of
proceedings. Thus, the employment of the victims’ right to participation through a legal
representative would ensure that ‘the proceedings are conducted with at least a minimum
degree of expedition and, above all, solemn decorum.’299 In addition, participation through
a legal representative would allow a potentially high number of victims to avail
themselves of their participatory rights in a meaningful way without compromising the
core principles of procedural fairness and expeditiousness.300 The same rationale
underpins rule 90(2), which envisages that for the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness
of the proceedings the Chamber may request the victims or particular groups of victims to
choose (a) common legal representative(s). This provision clearly reflects the correlation
between victims’ common legal representation and the imperative of expeditiousness.301
7.3. Rights Employed Through Another
The third category within the present class of rights are those rights which are employed
solely through the victims’ legal representative(s). The perusal of the Court’s normative
297 The personal appearance of three victims at a public hearing for the exclusive purpose of presenting their
views and concerns has been authorized by TC III (see Transcript of open session hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-
227-Red-ENG CT WT, 25 June 2012). By contrast, in the proceedings before TC I and TC II the appearance of
victims in the courtroom has been allowed solely for the purpose of giving testimony as witnesses. The issue of
the so called ‘dual status individuals’, i.e. individuals who combine the status of victim with the capacity of
witness in proceedings, will be examined in detail further below – see infra, Chapter Four.
298 Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1408.
299 Ibid.
300 See e.g. Kony et al., PTC II, Decision on victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06 ICC-02/04-01/05-252, 10 August 2007, para. 80;
Bemba, PTC III, Fifth Decision on Victims’ Issues Concerning Common Legal Representation of Victims, ICC-
01/05-01/08-322, 16 December 2008, para. 7; Ruto et al., PTC II, First Decision on Victims’ Participation in the
Case, para. 24; The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, PTC I, Decision on the 138 applications for victims’
participation in the proceedings ICC-01/04-01/10-351, 11 August 2011, para. 46; Lubanga, TC I, Decision on
victims’ participation, 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 116; Katanga and Ngudjolo., TC II, Order
on the organisation of common legal representation of victims, ICC-01/04-01/07-1328, 22 July 2009, para. 11;
Bemba, TC III, Decision on common legal representation of victims for the purpose of trial, ICC-01/05-01/08-
1005, 10 November 2010, paras. 7, 23, 31, 33.
301 William A. Schabas and Tatiana Bachvarova, ‘The Contribution of the ICC to the Protection of Human
Rights’, The Protection of Human Rights Through the International Criminal Court as a Contribution to
Constitutionalization and Nation-Building, collected volume funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
pending publication.
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basis warrants the conclusion that this category comprises the right to attend and to
participate in court hearings, as well as to file written observations or submissions
according to rule 91(2); the right to question witnesses upon authorization by the Chamber
by virtue of rule 91(3) and (4); the right to appeal against an order for reparations pursuant
to article 82(4); the right to request postponement of additional hearing on matters related
to sentence or reparations as envisaged in rule 143. The logic behind this legislative
approach is premised on the fact that the exercise of the rights falling within this group
necessitates legal proficiency. In other words, the employment of these rights is strictly
reserved to the victims’ legal representative in order to protect the rights of the accused302
and, likewise, the integrity of the proceedings. As the Court itself noted, the ICC ‘is a
court of law and, in particular, this is the criminal trial of the accused, and the
presumption is that those who participate in the proceedings will be lawyers […] acting
for [victims].’ Otherwise, as it may be expected, the lack of a legal training of persons
appearing before the Court and intervening in complex legal issues ‘could have a real
capacity for destabilising [the] court proceedings.’303 Therefore, as duly noted in the
relevant literature, the enhanced procedural rights of victims require the assistance of a
legal representative.304
8. ‘Any-Victim’ Rights and Group-Specific Rights
The present classification distinguishes between rights which relate to any person who
qualifies as a victim according to rule 85 and rights the exercise of which is restricted to
certain classes (groups) of victims. Said differently, the latter category comprises rights
that emanate from a specific distinguishing feature of the victim concerned, such as a
victim of a sexual violence; a traumatized or a vulnerable victim; a victim-participant in
proceedings on the merits of the criminal case; a victim-participant in reparation
proceedings, etc. Consequently, as correctly noted in literature, ‘not […] all those who fall
302 Baumgartner, supra note 22, p. 430.
303 Lubanga, TC I, Status Conference, 12 January 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-101-ENG, page 43, lines 11-20;
Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 26 June 2009, para. 40, where the Chamber observed that submissions concerning
complex legal issues are to be advanced by the legal representative.
304 Baumgartner, supra note 22, p. 430.
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within the [inclusive general victim definition] are entitled […] to all the rights contained
in the Statute and the Rules for victims.’305
8.1. ‘Any-Victim’ Rights
Common characteristic of the first group of rights is that they are endowed to any victim
in general. This group of rights comprises, among others, the right to apply for
participation pursuant to the general victims’ participation scheme as provided for in rule
89; the right to protection pursuant to article 68(1); the right to make representations with
respect to the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation to the Pre-Trial
Chamber according to article 15(3) and rule 50.
Notably, within the first category of rights falls likewise the right to apply for
reparations pursuant to article 75(2). This is due to the well-established fact that the right
to claim reparations may be exercised by any victim wishing to receive indemnification
for the harm sustained as a result of the crimes charged, irrespective of whether that
victim has availed him- or herself of the right to participate in the proceedings on the
merits of the criminal case. In other words, the right to claim reparations is not restricted
only to victim-participants in the proceedings adjudicating the individual criminal
responsibility of the accused. At this point it should be noted that the opposite holds
likewise true. Participation in proceedings on the merits of the criminal case is separate
and independent from a claim for reparations for the harm allegedly suffered.
These characteristics of the right to claim reparations, in particular, its ‘any-victim’
character are an essential feature that distinguishes the ICC’s reparations regime from the
reparations procedure set forth, for instance, at the ECCC.306 As previously observed, the
civil parties’ interest in indemnification is one of the two main purposes of civil party
action in the criminal proceedings taking place before the Cambodia tribunal.307 It thus
follows that the participation of civil parties in proceedings on the merits of the case is
contingent on a claim for reparations against the accused. Consequently, by contrast to the
305 SáCouto and Cleary, supra note 20, p. 91, footnote 82, referring to Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice.
306 By contrast to the ICC, the STL – the other international criminal justice body that affords victims the
possibility to take part in proceedings in their own right – does not provide victim-participants with the right to
claim reparations. Therefore, the present comparative note is confined only to the juxtaposition between the ICC
and the ECCC.
307 Rule 23(1)(b) of the Internal Rules (amended on 5 September 2008, 6 March 2009, 11 September 2009, 9
February 2010 and 17 September 2010).
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victims’ right to claim reparations before the ICC, the right to claim reparations and the
right to participate in the ECCC’s proceedings are intertwined. That is to say, the right to
claim reparations is confined to victims who assume civil party standing in the criminal
justice process.
The distinct scope of the right to claim reparations before the ICC as compared to
the ECCC is a logical reflection of the fact that reparation proceedings at the ICC are
governed by a separate cluster of provisions, namely article 75 and the corresponding
provisions of the Rules, i.e. rule 94 et seq., while this is not the case at the ECCC. In
addition, an order for reparations at the ICC does not form part of the judgment on the
merits (more precisely, of the conviction), whereas at the ECCC a decision on the civil
party claims is to be made in the judgment, as stipulated by rule 100 of the Internal Rules.
In conclusion, it is worthwhile considering that each of the two approaches on the
right to reparations contemplated above has its counterpart in a domestic setting. For
instance, besides the Cambodian legal system, similar to the ECCC is also the system in
the Philippines where civil party action is an automatic corollary of the institution of
criminal proceedings. More specifically, the civil action for the indemnification of the
harm suffered as a result of the offense(s) charged is, in principle, deemed instituted with
the criminal action, unless the victim waives the right to claim reparations or reserves the
right to institute civil action separately from the criminal proceedings or institutes civil
action prior to the criminal action.308
On the other hand, equivalent to the reparations regime set forth by the ICC’s
constitutive instruments is, for instance, the legislative approach in Bolivia. Victims who
have not taken part in proceedings adjudicating the individual criminal responsibility of
the accused are entitled to apply for reparations to the Judge who pronounced the sentence
within three months of having been informed of the final sentence.309 Similar is the
situation in Nicaragua, where a civil claim can only be lodged following a final conviction
and sentence.310 The claim is to be filed before the same judicial authority which has
adjudicated the proceedings on the individual criminal responsibility of the accused.311
308 Rule 111(1) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
309 Article 382(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
310 Article 81 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
311 Ibid.
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8.2. Group-Specific Rights
Turning back to the ICC, the second category of rights to be considered within the present
classification are the group-/(class-)specific rights. Rights falling within this category are
rights which may be employed solely by a particular group/class of victims. An example
of a right that may be employed only by victim-participants is the right to present views
and concerns pursuant to article 68(3) and the complementing rules. Said differently, only
successful victim-applicants, i.e. victims admitted as participants in proceedings following
the application procedure set forth in rule 89, are entitled to make use of the right to
present their views and concerns in the course of the proceedings. Logically, the rights
which ensue from the right to participation are, in principle, likewise restricted to victim-
participants. Among those rights are: the right pursuant to rule 90 to choose freely a legal
representative; the right according to rule 91 to have their legal representative participate
in proceedings, including the right to question witnesses; the right envisaged in rule 92(6)
to be notified of decisions of the Court delivered at stages of the proceedings in which
victims or their legal representatives have taken part; the right pursuant to rule 93, first
sentence, to give their views upon an invitation by the Chamber on any issue; the right to
consult the record of the case in accordance with rule 121(10) and 131; the right pursuant
to rule 224(1) to participate in the hearing or to submit written observations in the context
of procedure for review concerning reduction of sentence.
In addition to victim-participants, the purview of some rights includes likewise the
so called ‘victims who have communicated with the Court’ in relation to the situation or
the case at hand. Admittedly, according to the Court’s jurisprudence, this group of victims
is broader than victim-participants in the strict sense. Victims who have communicated
with the Court, ‘whilst not having (as yet) been allowed to participate in proceedings,
have nevertheless been in contact with the Court.’312 Consequently, victims who have
communicated with the Court with respect to the situation or the case at hand are not
necessarily (only) victim-participants pursuant to article 68(3). A group-specific right
equally afforded to victim-participants and to victims who have communicated with the
Court is, for instance, the right to receive notification set forth in rule 92(2) and (3).
312 Kony et al., PTC II, 10 August 2007, para. 93.
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Other group-specific rights are the rights ensuing from participation in reparation
proceedings. Only victims who take part in reparation proceedings, i.e. victims claiming
reparation, are entitled to the following rights: the right to request assessment of
reparations pursuant to rule 97; the right to request that the Court does not proceed with a
reparation order under rule 95(2)(b); the right to receive a copy of the reparations order
according to rule 218(4); the right to request the Chamber to determine the necessity, if
any, for protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture pursuant to rule 99; as well as
the right to be consulted by the Presidency on matters related to the disposition and/or
allocation of property or assets envisaged in rule 221; the right to appeal against an order
for reparations pursuant to article 82(4). A common feature of the above enumerated
group-specific rights is that they may only be executed by victims who have participated
in proceedings on reparations. This is due to the fact that only this group of victims are
affected by the outcome of the reparation proceedings. Consequently, any other victim
who has not participated in the proceedings on reparations has no legal standing therein,
thus, is not entitled to the rights pointed out above.
Other group-specific rights are the rights which belong exclusively to victims of
sexual violence. Among those rights are the rights pursuant to rules 71 and 72, to which
mention has already been made, as well as the right to have special assistance and gender-
sensitive measures provided by the Registry facilitating the participation of such victims
in proceedings as provided for by rule 16(1)(d) and the relevant regulations of the
Regulations of the Court.
9. Service Rights and Procedural Rights
A further differentiation of the rights which victims may exercise throughout the ICC’s
process to be addressed herewith ensues from the classification between procedural rights
and service rights.313 The latter category implies rights which enable victims to keep
abreast with the developments of the criminal justice process and the progress of the
proceedings, as well as to avail themselves of assistance and other appropriate services
provided by the Court’s organs throughout the proceedings.
313 See Carolyn Hoyle and Lucia Zedner, ‘Victims, Victimization, and Criminal Justice’ in Oxford Handbook of
Criminology, Maguire et al. (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 461-488, p. 474. See further Yvonne
McDermott, ‘Victims and International Law: Remedies in the Courtroom?’, Hague Justice Journal, vol. 4:3
(2009), pp. 199-213.
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9.1. Service Rights
The notion ‘service rights’ may be regarded as having originated in the context of
domestic proceedings. The relevant legal literature observes that such rights are aimed at
‘improving the experience the victim has of the criminal justice system’.314 Consequently,
service rights are those rights which entail support for victims by the criminal justice
authorities in the broadest sense of the word.315 Service rights are considered to be ‘largely
neutral in due process terms’,316 since, albeit they ‘ameliorate the criminal process for
victims’,317 they do not afford victims a means of making an impact on the process
itself.318 Hence, service rights ‘refer to services to victims which do not affect
procedure’.319
One palpable example of a service right is the right to information envisioned in
rule 92.320 Pursuant to this provision, in order for victims to avail themselves of the right
to apply for participation and to take part in the proceedings, they should be notified
accordingly. It is important to note that the right to information is largely acknowledged
as a service right of a ‘particularly significant nature’.321 Such a standpoint is hardly
surprising bearing in mind that the right to receive information, especially about the
progress of the case, forms part of the internationally accepted basic elements of fairness
for victims.322 In fact, the importance of the right to be informed goes beyond the realm of
participation in (international) criminal proceedings. The need to be properly informed has
been addressed in the broader context of citizen participation, also referred to as
‘participation of the governed in their government’,323 as early as the 1970s. The relevant
literature has acknowledged that ‘[i]nforming citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and
314 Helen Fenwick, ‘Procedural 'Rights' of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the Criminal Justice
Process?’, The Modern Law Review, vol. 60:3 (1997), pp. 317-333, p. 321.
315 See in this aspect Sam Garkawe, ‘The Victim-Related Provisions of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Victimological Analysis’, International Review of Victimology 8 (2001), pp. 269-289, at pp. 282-283,
where the author suggests a division between victim-related provisions in the ICC’s legal framework relevant to
victim support before and during the proceedings and protection-related provisions.
316 Ibid., p. 322.
317 Fenwick, supra note 314, p. 319.
318 Ibid.
319 Hoyle and Zedner, supra note 313, p. 474.
320 See in the same vein, Fenwick, supra note 314.
321 Ibid., p. 326.
322 Ibid.
323 Sherry R. Arnstein, ‘A Ladder Of Citizen Participation’, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol.
35:4 (1969), pp. 216-224, p. 216.
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options’ is ‘the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation.’324 It thus
becomes evident that, in order to make use of one’s rights, a person must be aware, i.e.
must be informed, of their existence. Consequently, ‘[i]n order to enable victims’ full
exercise of their inherent rights’,325 the dissemination of the relevant information prior and
throughout the duration of trials proves indispensable.
Besides the right to information as set forth in rule 92, equally attributable to the
service rights category are the right to protective and special measures envisaged by the
ICC’s legal framework, as well as the right to counseling, legal advice and assistance as
provided for in rules 16(b)(c), 17(a)(i)(ii)(iii) and 18(b), and regulation 81 of the
Regulations of the Court. The Regulations of the Registry contain further examples of
service rights with respect to victims, such as the right to: relocation, accompanying
support persons, dependent care, extraordinary allowances, transportation,
accommodation; the right to receive support, including in the field, such as psychological,
social assistance and advice, allowances.326
9.2. Procedural Rights
The procedural rights, on their part, afford victims an opportunity to get involved in the
criminal justice process, to have their voices heard and, accordingly, to make their impact
and/or contribution to the criminal justice process to the extent envisaged by the legislator.
Consequently, the procedural rights category encompasses among others: the right to
participation stricto sensu set forth in article 68(3) and its complementing rules; the right
to access to judicial review within the context of reparation proceedings in accordance
with article 82(4); the right to make representations and submit observations as provided
for by articles 15(3) and 19(3); the right to give their views as regards procedural matters
upon the invitation of the Chamber according to rule 93; the right to have their views
sought by the Chamber before imposing or amending any conditions restricting liberty
pursuant to rule 119(3).
324 Ibid., p. 220.
325 Gioia Greco, ‘Victims' Rights Overview under the ICC Legal Framework: A Jurisprudential Analysis’,
International Criminal Law Review, vol. 7 (2007), pp. 531-547, p. 541.
326 See Regulation 79 et seq. of the Regulations of the Registy.
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It is beyond the shadow of a doubt that the service rights and the procedural rights
of victims are intertwined.327 The entitlement of victims to service rights throughout the
ICC’s proceedings enables the proper exercise of their procedural rights.328 To illustrate
by reference to the core service right – the right to information - unless victims are
informed in a timely and accurate manner about the criminal proceedings taking place, as
well as of the options for involvement conferred upon them by the ICC’s normative basis,
victims would not be in a position to make an informed choice and to decide, accordingly,
which way to proceed.
10. Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Rights
The review of the Court’s normative basis warrants a further distinction of the rights
conferred to victims in the course of the proceedings, namely, between rights afforded
exclusively to victims and rights afforded to victims and other persons alike. While
victims are the sole bearers of the majority of the victim-related rights pursuant to the
constitutive instruments, still, certain rights pertaining to victims may likewise be
employed by a wider group of persons, such as other non-party participants or even
persons who are extraneous to the proceedings at hand.
10.1. Exclusive Rights
That said, the right to participation pursuant to the general victims’ participation scheme
belongs exclusively to victims. The same holds true with respect to the right to partake in
proceedings of limited object and purpose, such as those envisaged in articles 15, 19, and
reparation proceedings.
327 In the same vein, commentators observe that service rights have procedural implications. See Hoyle and
Zedner, supra note 313, p. 474.
328 See in the same vein González, supra note 228, p. 26, where the author describes the right to notification and
publicity of proceedings as ‘subsidiary rights’ to the right to participation and contends that these subsidiary
rights are fundamental to assure that victims can exercise their right to participation.
101
10.2. Non-Exclusive Rights
By contrast, the right to protection is endowed to victims, as well as to members of their
families, witnesses and any other person at risk on account of a testimony or the activities
of the Court. This inference is premised on the analysis of article 54(3)(f) which obliges
the Prosecutor to take or to request from the Chamber in charge of the proceedings
measures for the protection of any person who is at risk. In the same fashion are rules
81(4) together with rules 87 and 88, all of which include within their purview victims,
witnesses, as well as other persons at risk.
Within the latter category of rights also worth noting is the right set forth in article
82(4). The scope and the application of this right go further than the other non-exclusive
rights discussed hitherto. Article 82(4) entitles a bona fide owner of property adversely
affected by an order for reparations to appeal that order as long as it adversely affects him
or her. Accordingly, besides victims, the right to appeal an order for reparations is also
explicitly afforded to a person who is extraneous to the proceedings at hand (yet is
adversely affected by their outcome).
11. Rights Falling Within Several Classifications
In view of the classifications of the rights of victims suggested by the present analysis, it
becomes apparent that one and the same right may belong to several classifications
simultaneously, depending on the criterion applied. For instance, article 82(4) in addition
to being a right of a non-exclusive character is also a specific right (i.e. afforded only to
victims claiming reparations) of an imperative character. Article 82(4) is also a right of a
positive character, the employment of which is triggered by the victim him- or herself. In
addition, this right falls within the category of rights effectuated only through a legal
representative.
Other examples of rights which are assigned to several categories are the victims’
right to make representations pursuant to article 15(3) and to submit observations
according to article 19(3). They both represent non-conditional, case-specific rights of an
imperative and of a positive character.
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The right of victims under rule 93 to have their views requested on any matter by
the Chamber and the right of victims set forth in rule 119(3) to have their views requested
and considered by the Chamber before imposing or amending any conditions restricting
liberty both represent passive rights. However, while the former also falls within the
category of rights of a non-imperative character, the latter represents a right of an
imperative character.329
Before proceeding with the detailed analysis of each of the components of article
68(3), the victims’ rights’ classification suggested hitherto identifies the right to
participation as a positive right of a uniform applicability, of a conditional and, at the
same time, of an imperative character. As previously discussed, indicative in this respect
is the wording of article 68(3) ‘where the victims’ personal interests are affected’
(manifesting the conditional character of the right) and ‘shall allow and consider’ the
views and concerns of victims (manifesting both the imperative and the positive character
of the right). Consequently, ‘whilst the judicial decision under [a]rticle 68(3) is overall not
discretionary, the Court possesses [still] substantial discretion to determine whether the
particular elements of the test have been established [footnotes omitted]’.330 The
imperative feature of the right dictates that once the Chamber reaches a positive
determination that the victims’ personal interests are affected, it is duty-bound to enforce
the victims’ right to participation.
329 By contrast to the wording ‘may’ used in rule 93, the wording employed in rule 119(3) is ‘shall’.
330 Vasiliev, supra note 258, p. 649.
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CHAPTER THREE
Purpose and Substance of Article 68(3)
Within the classification of the rights bestowed on victims by the Court’s normative basis
the right to participation pursuant to article 68(3) distinguishes itself as an embodiment of
the fundamental regime of the engagement of victims in proceedings before the ICC.
Article 68(3) reflects the views of the drafters about the role and the place of victims in
the overall design of the ICC’s process by explicitly delimiting the contours of their
participation, its substance and extent. Thus, as widely acknowledged, this norm
represents the cornerstone, the foundation of victims’ involvement in proceedings.
As previously noted, article 68(3) conditions the right to participation through the
presentation of views and concerns on the fulfillment of the following cumulative
requirements: 1) the victims’ personal interests must be affected by the proceedings at
hand; 2) the procedural stage at which participation is sought must be deemed appropriate
by the Chamber in charge of the proceedings; 3) the participation of victims must be
conducted in a manner not inconsistent with or prejudicial to the rights of the accused and
a fair and impartial trial.
1. Insight into the Origins of Article 68(3)
Before embarking on the analysis of each separate element of the victims’ right to
participation for the purpose of presenting their views and concerns, first, the origins of
article 68(3) should be discussed comparatively. Notwithstanding its unprecedented nature
in the realm of international criminal justice,331 this normative text mirrors the language of
article 6(b) of the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power (‘the 1985 UN Declaration’, ‘the Declaration’),332 also hailed
as ‘the Victims’ Magna Carta’.333 This explicit stipulation in an international legal
331 The novel nature of the standing of victims as participants in their own right before the ICC has been
discussed in detail in the preceding chapters.
332 See e.g. Donat-Cattin, supra note 13, p. 1279; Lubanga, Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis to the
Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06
concerning the "Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-925, 13
June 2007 (Separate opinion of Judge G.M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 13 June 2007).
333 Stover et al., supra note 2, p. 512.
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instrument of the right of victims to convey their views and concerns is an essential
acknowledgment of the fact that victims have their own stake in the criminal justice
process, national and international alike.
The right to express their views and concerns in the course of the proceedings
endows victims with the possibility to have a say in the arena of criminal justice.
Accordingly, victims’ right to participation is an emanation of the right to ‘allocution’,
that is, of the right to have their voices heard. Victimological studies ascribe the origins of
the procedural justice concept ‘voice’ to the late 1970s when it was introduced ‘as a
procedural determinant in the literature related to procedural justice […] aimed at
replacing the term “process control”’. According to commentators, ‘voice’ or ‘process
control’ represent ‘the opportunity to be involved, [to] express one’s concerns and to be
heard’334 in the course of the criminal proceedings. Hence, it is essential to note that the
‘procedural justice concept of voice not only concerns the opportunity to speak, but also
to be heard.’335
Article 6(b) of the 1985 UN Declaration provides an eloquent manifestation of the
right of victims to have a voice in the realm of criminal justice. The Declaration is drafted
as a basic legal document embodying overarching precepts of access to justice and fair
treatment of victims of crime, lying at the heart of modern jurisdictions. As the
Declaration itself proclaims, it ‘is designed to assist [g]overnments and the international
community in their efforts to secure justice and assistance for victims of crime and victims
of abuse of power’.336 Article 6(b) of the Declaration, therefore, enunciates tenets of a
universal character aimed at providing guidance to contemporary criminal justice systems
in facilitating ‘the responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of
victims’.337 As such, this legal text is of a general character and is thus equally applicable
to different judicial systems, irrespective of the legal tradition to which they relate. As
duly noted in literature, ‘the victim-oriented norms at the international level consist
principally of general recommendations on granting victims access to justice that also
334 Tinneke Van Camp and Jo-Anne Wemmers, ‘Victim satisfaction with restorative justice: More than simply
procedural justice’, International Review of Victimology, vol. 19 (2013), pp. 117-143, p. 124; Stover et al., supra
note 2, p. 513.
335 Ibid., Van Camp and Wemmers, p. 128.
336 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, Preamble,
article 3.
337 See article 6(b) of the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power.
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contemplate significant flexibility for state compliance.’338 Consequently, article 6(b) of
the Declaration is not to be imported wholesale and/or verbatim into any distinct system.
Instead, the precise implementation and application of the principles articulated in the
provision should be tailored to the specific nature of the respective jurisdiction.339 Hence,
the 1985 UN Declaration leaves room for differing interpretations. The specific decision
as to the extent to which victims can be involved in the decision-making process in a
domestic setting is left to the discretion of the national legislator.
Indubitably, modern legal systems are the result of the migration of legal ideas and
trends and are thus all mixed to some extent.340 Notwithstanding the convergences taking
place between the two main legal traditions prompted in part by the growing importance
of supranational institutions and international human rights norms,341 the continental -
common law dichotomy is still noticeable depending on the prevalent disposition of
jurisdictions towards precepts lying at the heart of the civil law or the common law
tradition. Since the comparison between legal systems entails observing and explaining
differences and similarities alike,342 it is worth noting that the right of victims to play a
role and have a say in the course of the proceedings is reflected in each of the two leading
criminal justice paradigms. The differences, however, lie in the manner and the extent to
which victims are integrated within the criminal justice process. Although the right of
victims to have their voices heard is introduced in both common law and continental
criminal proceedings, it is implemented differently. The manner, the substance and the
extent of the intervention of victims in proceedings vary depending on the specificities of
the criminal jurisdiction and the ulterior goal of victims’ participation therein. The
common law approach is premised on the more ritualistic idea of affording victims an
access to a forum where their voices will be heard and their victimhood will be
acknowledged.343 By contrast, continental jurisdictions enjoin victims with a more
pragmatic role which extends to the possibility to directly impact the fact-finding process
338 Aldana-Pindell, supra note 226, p. 1409.
339 See in the same spirit article 6(b) of the UN Declaration.
340 Schlesinger et al., supra note 17,  p. 12.
341 Ibid.,  p. 287.
342 Ibid., p. 37.
343 Mary Margaret Giannini, ‘Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and the
Crime Victims’ Rights Act’, Yale Law and Policy Review, vol. 26 (2007-2008), pp. 431-484, p. 452. See also in
the same vein, Peggy M. Tobolowsky, ‘Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After
the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime’, New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement, vol.
25 (1999),  pp. 21-105.
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and, eventually, the outcome of the case. In continental jurisdictions victims’ involvement
comprises matters pertaining to the core of the subject-matter of the proceedings, while
within the common law model victims have a say on issues falling outside the heart of the
subject-matter of the case and, as such, are not central to the case.
Common law jurisdictions of today tend towards affording victims a greater say in
the criminal justice process, which, however, does not transform them into parties or
quasi-litigants.344 By comparison with civil law jurisdictions, the right of victims to
partake in proceedings is considerably limited. Victims enjoy the right to present their
views and concerns to the criminal justice authorities (police, Prosecutor, the Court)345
through the submission of victim statements, also known as victim impact statements346 or
victim personal statements.347 Hence, victims’ right to allocution is mainly employed
through the submission of statements that afford victims the possibility to reflect the
impact of the offence on them and/or their families (in physical, psychological, social,
emotional and etc. aspects). If submitted at the initial stages of the criminal process, the
views and concerns of victims are to be considered by the police and/or the Prosecutor for
the purpose of the future case.348 Some jurisdictions envisage the possibility for victim
impact statements to be incorporated into the case record and considered by the judicial
authority at the concluding, sentencing phase of the trial. However, in the majority of
common law jurisdictions victims are not afforded the possibility to make sentencing
recommendations.349
Although the submission of a victim impact statement is contingent on the will of
the victim, whether this statement will subsequently be used by the relevant authorities
depends entirely on the discretion of the latter. Further, victim impact statements do not
represent evidentiary material unless they are adduced in accordance with the rules
344 Ibid., Giannini, p. 446.
345 Victim impact statements have been introduced in Canada, USA, Australia, England and Wales. Victim
impact statements are typically in a written form, though in Canada they could be read out loud by the victim in
court. Through the victim impact statement the victims employ their right to say what they feel is important for
the court to know. Victim impact statements reflect the impact of the crime on the victim and are taken into
account at the sentencing stage by the court after a conviction has been pronounced and/or by the Prosecutor at
the initial stages of the proceedings and may inform the latter’s choice whether to proceed with the case or not.
Victims in common law countries could also express views and concerns as regards specific matters, such as the
release of the accused on parole, etc.
346 In the USA.
347 In the UK.
348 See Matti Joutsen, ‘Listening to the Victim: the Victim’s Role in European Criminal Justice Systems’, Wayne
Law Review, vol. 3-4 (1987-1988), pp. 95-124, p. 102.
349 The USA represent an exception. The UK and New Zealand expressly forbid this.
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governing the submission of witness evidence.350 Consequently, victims do not have the
right to actively impact of their own accord the evidence germane to the subject-matter of
the case. 351
Thus, apart from the possibility to describe and reflect the effect of the crime in a
victim impact statement, victims have limited say in the course of the proceedings. The
victims’ right to allocution is confined to the right to submit views and concerns on a
limited number of specific issues, such as the interim release of the accused, parole
conditions, licence conditions, cautioning, plea negotiations, etc. Hence, notwithstanding
certain recent developments aimed at the enhancement of victims’ service rights
throughout the proceedings, common law jurisdictions afford a public platform to victims
to share the impact of the crime upon them and voice concerns as regards matters which
fall outside of the core of the subject-matter of the case at hand. That is to say, victims’
views and concerns have no direct bearing on the judicial decision-making, including on
the individual criminal responsibility of the alleged offender(s).
Unlike victims in the common law tradition, in continental systems, in addition to
having an independent standing in their own right in proceedings, victims are vested with
an array of participatory rights equating them, as a rule, to a party. Depending on the
specificities of each particular system, victims are provided with the right to join pending
criminal proceedings as an auxiliary/subsidiary accusers aimed at supplementing the
public prosecution and/or assume the role of civil parties requesting reparations for the
damages sustained. Accordingly, there are two main nuances within the continental model
of victim participation: 1) participation for the purpose of contributing towards the
ascertainment of the truth, irrespective of any claim for reparations 2) participation
contingent on and for the purposes of bringing civil action in the criminal justice arena.
These two nuances are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since some continental
jurisdictions provide for combination of the two.352 In addition, some jurisdictions also
350 In the UK, for instance, if the Prosecutor would take the view that the victim impact statement contains
evidence to be lead at trial, he or she should inform the defence of the intention to lead that evidence before the
trial takes place, including to disclose it in the manner provided for by law.
351 See further on victim impact statements in the UK the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Victims’ Code),
published on 29 October 2013 and entered into force on 10 December 2013.
352 E.g. Bulgaria, Germany (Nebenklage) and (Adhäsionsverfahren). However, those systems which follow the
partie civile model of victim participation, such as France and the Netherlands, opt for the second nuance.
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afford victims the right to initiate private prosecutions concerning offences against
essentially private interests.353
In continental legal systems victims partake in criminal proceedings as of right, not
upon a judicial assessment of whether the proceedings at hand affect their personal
interests. The impact of proceedings on the victims’ personal interests and, respectively,
their right to intervene are recognized by virtue of the law. In addition, the participation of
victims is not confined to any particular procedural phase. The standing of a party to the
proceedings provides victims with full participatory rights throughout the entire criminal
justice process. Victims are usually placed on an equal footing with the Prosecutor and the
defence as regards the possibility to impact the fact-finding process and, respectively, the
outcome of the case. On the whole, victims are afforded the opportunity to submit and
examine evidence at trial, to oppose the collection of certain pieces of evidence, to request
expert opinions.354
Hence, by contrast to victims in common law systems their counterparts in
continental jurisdictions have the right to actively intervene on matters directly related to
the fact-finding process, such as to adduce pieces of evidence or to request the collection
of evidence on the subject-matter, including evidence concerning the individual criminal
responsibility of the accused. Consequently, victim participation within the continental
tradition has the potential to considerably impact both the conduct and the outcome of
proceedings. Thus, victims may be regarded as full-fledged contributors to the
proceedings and, accordingly, to decision-making in continental jurisdictions.355
Attributing the victims’ participation model carved out by the ICC’s founders to
any specific pattern existing at the national level would prove unwarranted, not least
because of the hybrid nature of the Court’s legal framework. The ICC’s procedural design
is an adroit and innovative blend of the two main legal paradigms existing at the domestic
plane, the ‘melting pot’ of some of the most adequate tendencies of criminal procedures
stemming from all families of legal systems.356 As will be discussed shortly, the victims’
participation scheme set forth in article 68(3) rather than being patterned exclusively
353 E.g. Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands.
354 This observation is without prejudice to some specificities of certain jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands,
where evidence is gathered upon the request of the victim by the Prosecutor.
355 Christodoulos Kaoutzanis, ‘Two Birds with One Stone: How the Use of the Class Action Device for Victim
Participation in the International Criminal Court Can Improve Both the Fight Against Impunity and Victim
Participation’, University of California, Davis, vol. 17:1 (2010), pp. 111-150, p. 114.
356 Donat-Cattin, supra note 13.
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(predominantly) after the civil law or the common law tradition, embodies characteristics
of various domestic jurisdictions fashioned according to the ICC’s unique design and
mandate.357 The Court’s legal framework and its model of victims’ participation illustrate
an ingenious technique of espousing at the international horizon the universal ideas lying
at the heart of criminal justice.358
The fact that article 68(3) represents an almost literal implementation of the right
of victims pursuant to article 6(b) of the ‘Victims’ Magna Carta’ is an eloquent sign of the
endeavours of the Court’s founders towards introducing victims of atrocity crimes as
protagonists in their own right at the international criminal justice scene. At the same
time, the perusal of article 68(3) attests to the understanding that this new international
procedural phenomenon should not take place at all costs,359 that is to say, it should not
thrive at the expense of other essential criminal justice objectives.
The ICC’s drafting history suggests that the quest of the right balance between
affording victims an independent standing in proceedings and other fundamental criminal
justice objectives, such as fairness, due process and expeditiousness, proved a
cumbersome undertaking. During the shaping of the statutory norm on victims’
involvement in proceedings different emphasis was placed upon the inherent value of
victims’ participation and how far it should extend.360 The text of article 68(3) underwent
numerous variations aimed at reconciling the conflicting views of the founders as regards
the standing and the role of victims in the proceedings before the Court. The fact that the
passage on victims’ participation in the Draft ICC Statute was in square brackets implies
357 This fact is duly reflected in the jurisprudence of the Court, where it is acknowledged that the victims’
participation scheme of article 68(3) ‘has no immediate parallel or association with the participation of victims in
criminal proceedings in either the common law system […] or the Romano-Germanic system of justice’. See the
elaborate analysis of article 68(3) in the Separate opinion of Judge Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber
in the Lubanga case of 13 June 2007, paras. 8 et seq. See, in particular, para. 11.
358 See in this strain Schlesinger et al, supra note 17, p. 42. Also, in the same fashion, the Judges of the ECCC
have opined that combining at the international level the two main legal domestic systems is a part of a move
towards a ‘homogenous system’ at the international level, adapting procedures from both common law and civil
law traditions to ensure they fit the realities on the ground – see Kelsall et al., supra note 281, p. 18. See also
Cappelletti, supra note 277, p. 689, who rightly observes that ‘[w]hatever the oscillations and whims of a
particular time and place, there are today basic developments and trends shared in common by all modem
societies.’
359 See in the same vein, Spiga, supra note 10, p. 1384.
360 Emily Haslam, ‘Victim participation at the International Criminal Court: a triumph of hope over experience?’,
The Permanent International Criminal Court : legal and policy issues, Dominic McGoldrick et al. (eds.), 2004,
pp. 315-334, p. 325.
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that the proper placement of victims in the ICC’s procedural design was a controversial
and contentious matter.361
As a result, as article 68(3) now stands, it equilibrates restorative values
incorporated through the participation of victims in their own right362 with the core
imperatives of modern criminal justice. Along with the recognition of the victims’ right to
take part in proceedings, this legal text articulates safeguards for due process, procedural
fairness and efficiency. For the purpose of containing the genie in the bottle,363 the drafters
have explicitly confined the participation of victims to instances where their intervention
proves warranted (that is, when the victims’ personal interests are affected) and is not
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused, procedural fairness and
impartiality.
Given the above it becomes evident that article 68(3) serves the attainment of a
number of concurrent and equally important goals: 1) meeting the expectations of the
international community aimed at affording victims a part on their own in international
criminal proceedings; 2) safeguarding the expeditiousness and efficiency of proceedings
by preventing the ICC’s process from being flooded with myriad persons appearing before
the Court and 3) ensuring the fairness of the process vis-à-vis the accused. The first
objective is reflected in the wording ‘shall permit’, which, as noted earlier, entrusts an
obligation upon the relevant Chamber to allow the participation of victims should the
prerequisites for that arise. However, the Chamber is ‘duty bound’364 to permit victims to
have a say and to have their views and concerns considered by the decision-maker only in
case of a positive determination as regards victims’ personal interests and the
361 See in the same vein Van Boven, supra note 114; William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court. A
Commentary on the Rome Statute, Oxford Commentaries on International Law, Oxford University Press, 2010,
pp. 832-833.
362 Jo-Anne Wemmers, ‘Where do They Belong? Giving Victims a Place in the Criminal Justice Process’,
Criminal Law Forum, vol. 20 (2009), pp. 395-416, p. 414, where it is observed that the criminal justice
authorities could integrate restorative values in the proceedings. See also Brianne McGonigle, ‘Bridging the
Divides in International Criminal Proceedings: an Examination into the Victim Participation Endeavor of the
International Criminal Court’, Florida Journal of International Law, vol. 21 (2009), pp. 93-152, p. 102, where it
is observed that ‘participation of the victim in the process (whether legal or non-legal)’ is among the key features
of ‘restorative justice’.
363 A periphrasis of the discussion suggested by Roland L. Warren, ‘Model Cities First Round: Politics, Planning,
and Participation’, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 35:4 (1969), pp. 245-252, p. 245,
concerning resident participation. With respect to the latter phenomenon the author observes that ‘perhaps
originally conceived as something which could be contained-like the genie in the bottle, [it] has somehow
emerged and grown to impressive proportions [… as a] powerful new force on the urban scene’.
364 Separate opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 13 June 2007, para.
15.
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appropriateness of their intervention.365 The proviso conditioning the admission of victim-
participants on the assessment as to whether their personal interests are affected and
whether the intervention sought is appropriate embodies the two latter objectives pointed
out above. First, the personal interests requirement incarnates the rationale that victims
should be allowed to intervene only when their participation is justified, that is to say,
when their personal interests are at stake. Secondly, even when the personal interests of
victims are affected, their participation could still be denied if it is deemed inappropriate
at that specific stage of proceedings or if the manner of the intervention sought would be
inconsistent with the rights of the accused, fairness or expeditiousness of proceedings.
Accordingly, when victims are admitted to intervene at a particular procedural stage
and/or with respect to (an) issue(s) that has a bearing on their personal interests, still, their
participation is not unlimited. The extent of the intervention of victim-participants is
subject to the directions of the Chamber in charge of the proceedings aimed at ensuring
that the manner of participation would not infringe the rights of the accused, procedural
fairness and impartiality. Hence, as duly noted by commentators, victims before the ICC
who participate at some stages of the proceedings may subsequently be ‘prohibited’ (more
precisely, not allowed or not authorized) from participating in others.366
Commentators note that the Statute and the Rules say little as to how victim
participation is to be put in practice,367 which leads some to conclude that article 68(3) is
‘frustratingly vague’368 and ‘affected by a fundamental lack of clarity’.369 However, the
present author concurs with the understanding that broad, elastic formulations, as is the
case with article 68(3), allow more flexibility in the interpretation of a given norm.370
This, on its part, provides better adaptability of both the wording and the spirit of the law
to the circumstances and exigencies of each particular case. The language of article 68(3)
clearly indicates the intentions of the drafters to that effect by enjoining the respective
365 See also e.g. Spiga, supra note 10, p. 1380, according to whom the Court is duty-bound to enable victims to
participate in their own right when the conditions for participation are met.
366 Mohan, supra note 279, p. 745.
367 Jo-Anne Wemmers, ‘Victims and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Evaluating the Success of the ICC
with Respect to Victims’, International Review of Victimology, vol. 16 (2009), pp. 211-227, p. 214.
368 Charles P. Trumbull IV, ‘Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings’, Michigan
Journal of International Law, vol. 29 (2007-2008), pp. 777-825, p. 793, at footnote 116, according to which:
‘[o[ne commentator notes that much of the confusion relating to victim participation could be avoided "if the
victim standing rule was not so vague." Mugambi Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and
Defendants at the International Criminal Court, 26 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 249, 269 (2007) [reference in the
original].’
369 Zappalà, supra note 11, p. 149.
370 Schlesinger et al., supra note 17, p. 263 et seq.
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Chamber with the arduous task to give effect to the victims’ participation regime in an
ingenuous way in view of the specificities of the proceedings at hand.
In this respect, although on the surface the purpose of article 68(3) may not seem
readily apparent,371 the Court should construe the objective of this provision in light of the
nature and the specificities of the ICC’s procedural architecture, the overall spirit of the
Court’s constitutive instruments as well as the relevant rules which complement it.
Indubitably, ‘[r]econciling the broad right of participation which article 68(3) creates and
the right of the accused to have only one opponent is a difficult task.’372 Still, some
explicit guidance as to the manner and the extent of the involvement of victims pursuant
to the general victims’ participation scheme laid down in article 68(3) is provided by
virtue of rules 89-91. The corresponding provisions in the Rules give an explicit
formulation of the procedure to be followed by victim-applicants (rule 89) wishing to
intervene in the criminal process and the conditions governing the legal representation of
victim-participants in proceedings (rule 90). Through the introduction of the right of the
legal representative to make observations and submissions (written and/or oral), to attend
hearings and to question witnesses, experts and/or the accused upon an application to the
Chamber, rule 91 illustrates, albeit non-exhaustively, certain forms (modalities) of
victims’ involvement in proceedings following an admission for participation by virtue of
article 68(3). At this point it is worth recalling that the right to intervene in proceedings by
way of questioning witnesses, experts and/or the accused pursuant to rule 91 is both
vicarious and conditional. First, victims may avail themselves of the right to intervene in
the examination of evidence solely through their legal representative. Secondly, the
employment of this right is left to the assessment and ruling of the Chamber in light of the
particular circumstances of the case. Thus, rule 91 further endorses the letter and the spirit
of article 68(3) and rule 89(1) which leave to the Chamber in charge of the proceedings
the determination of the appropriateness and the manner of the intervention of victim-
participants against the backdrop of the interests at stake and the precepts of fairness,
impartiality and expeditiousness.
This legislative approach and the whole rationale behind the victims’ participation
regime as set forth in the normative framework manifests that the ICC’s criminal justice
371 Haslam, supra note 360, p. 325.
372 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 372.
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process is not merely ‘a means to obtain fair outcomes’.373 The introduction of concurrent
guarantees concerning the right of victims to partake in the proceedings, the fair trial
rights of the parties, as well as expeditiousness ensure that the procedure itself is also fair.
In this regard commentators aptly note that, albeit authorities working in the criminal
justice system cannot guarantee favourable outcomes, they can (and must) guarantee fair
procedures,374 that is, procedural justice.375
That said, as attested by the perusal of article 68(3) and its complementing rules,
the victims’ participation scheme at the ICC adheres to the ‘common core of legal
concepts and precepts shared by some or even most of the world’s legal systems’.376
While the role afforded to victims by virtue of article 68(3) goes beyond the position of
the victim in common law systems, the place of victim-participants before the ICC falls
short of the full-fledged standing of victims characteristic of continental jurisdictions.
Whereas in common law jurisdictions the right of victims to have their voices heard is
confined ex lege to particular instances and stages of the proceedings, the intervention of
victims for the purpose of presenting their views and concerns pursuant to article 68(3) is
not limited to a particular procedural stage or issue arising in the course of the criminal
justice process. Furthermore, the presentation of victims’ views and concerns before the
ICC is not restricted to any specific form or manner of presentation. Rather, the manner of
presentation of victims’ views and concerns is left to the discretion of the Chamber in
view of the specificities of the proceedings at hand. Hence, victims in common law
jurisdictions play a more limited role in proceedings as compared to victims before the
ICC.
The independent standing of victims in proceedings in their own right, separate and
distinct from that of witnesses, is a common feature between the ICC’s and the continental
model of victims’ involvement. The participation of victims pursuant to both models is
not confined to any particular procedural stage. Nevertheless, by contrast to the automatic
right of victims to participate in continental criminal proceedings, the possibility for
373 Wemmers, supra note 362, p. 215.
374 Ibid.
375 Procedural justice studies show that a fair procedure is appreciated regardless of its impact on the outcome –
see in this regard Wemmers, supra note 362, p. 215, who also suggests that fair procedures ‘cushion’ negative
outcomes, making them more palatable. In other words, ‘recent research indicates that those involved in criminal
justice are ‘primarily concerned with the procedure by which the outcome was derived and not with the outcome
itself’ – see McGonigle, supra note 362, p. 98.
376 Schlesinger et al., supra note 17, p. 42.
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victims to intervene in the ICC’s process is not provided as of right, but is contingent on
the requirements set out in article 68(3). Besides being conditional, the right of victims to
partake in the ICC’s proceedings is likewise limited to the presentation of victims’ views
and concerns and does not extend to the rights of the parties that are explicitly provided
for by the legal framework. Hence, the present comparison warrants the conclusion that
the ICC’s participatory model does not extend to the full-fledged model of continental
jurisdictions.
Contemplated from a broader perspective going beyond the criminal justice realm,
the rationale behind the ICC’s victims’ participation regime appears to share common
grounds with the ideas underpinning intervention of interested persons in ongoing
litigation familiar to both common law and civil law jurisdictions.377 Pursuant to this
participatory regime, the possibility for intervention is provided to persons who, despite
not being a party to the action, have a personal stake in the outcome. The person whose
interests are affected by the outcome of the case has a legitimate interest in intervening
and is thus afforded the right to enter the litigation at hand.378
The similarities between the regime of victims’ involvement set forth in article
68(3) and the precepts underlying intervention of interested persons are readily apparent.
Akin to the prerequisite that the victims’ personal interests must be affected by the ICC’s
proceedings in order to warrant intervention, the employment of the litigation rights of an
intervener is contingent on the assessment of the applicant’s interest by the judicial
authority in charge of the proceedings. That is, the decision-maker must take into
consideration whether the prospective intervener has a sufficient stake in the outcome of
the case, the adequacy of representation of his or her legitimate interests and the prejudice,
if any, to the parties if intervention is allowed. Furthermore, even when intervention is
granted, the intervener is not necessarily afforded all the rights of the parties at the trial or
at the appellate levels.379 Following a case-by-case assessment by the respective judicial
body, the intervener may be accorded only few of the litigation rights of the parties. This
approach is in tune with the principled understanding that ‘it should not follow from the
377 See the elaborate study on intervention of interested persons suggested by David L. Shapiro, ‘Some Thoughts
on Intervention before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 81:4 (1968), pp. 721-772.
378 Further on the distinction between intervention as of right and permissive intervention, i.e. intervention
subject to specific requirements, see ibid.
379 Ibid. The author correctly observes that even a person with the right to intervene may not have a right to
appeal from an adverse decision on the merits.
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right to intervene on a given issue that the intervener obtains all the rights […] [accorded
by the legal framework] with respect to every issue.’380 Along the same lines and equally
true is the observation that ‘the interests of […] [an intervener] may be adequately served,
and his [or her] contribution ensured, by something less than full-scale participation at
every stage.’381
Still, unlike the intervention of victims before the ICC, the intervention in civil
litigation is a once-and-for-all event. After the person is admitted as an intervener, he or
she is accorded the rights of an intervener as provided for by the legal framework.
Conversely, at the ICC, victims must demonstrate personal interest in issues arising in the
course of the proceedings in order to justify their intervention with respect to an issue or a
proceeding at stake.
The considerations developed hitherto warrant the conclusion that the participation
of victims before the ICC echoes to a considerable extent the ideas underpinning the
involvement of interested persons in an ongoing litigation. Consequently, the reference to
victim-participants as ‘interveners’ into the ICC’s criminal justice process advanced in the
legal literature does not seem fortuitous.382
Following the brief introduction suggested hitherto into the overall rationale of
article 68(3) and the guiding principles on which the victims’ participation model is
founded, careful consideration should in turn be given to each of the prerequisites of the
involvement of victims as set out in the provision. The perusal of article 68(3) brings to
the fore manifold issues, such as: the proper interpretation of the term ‘personal interests’;
the interpretation of the term ‘proceedings’; whether the manner of victims’ participation
should be pre-determined in a conclusive way at the outset of proceedings or the
substance and the extent of the intervention should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
depending on the specificities of the issue(s) or the proceedings at hand; the exact
substance and connotation of the term ‘views and concerns’, as well as how far victims
may reach in the proceedings through the presentation of their views and concerns before
the Court. The accurate answer to the questions raised above has a direct bearing on the
proper functioning of the victims’ participation model carved out by the founders and,
ultimately, on the efficient and timely conduct of the ICC’s process as a whole.
380 Ibid., p. 754.
381 Ibid., p. 759.
382 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, 2nd
edition, 2004, p. 173.
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2. The ‘Personal Interests’ Requirement
The cornerstone of the intervention of victims in the ICC’s process by virtue of article
68(3) is the personal interests requirement. This proviso is the fundamental starting point
for the admission of victim-participants in proceedings for the purpose of presenting their
views and concerns. Said differently, the personal interests criterion is ‘the conditio sine
qua non for the application of […] article [68(3)]’.383
In fact, the existence of an interest, i.e. a personal stake in the proceedings, is a
criterion that is equally crucial for any procedural intervention, irrespective of the
character of the litigation at hand. As has been noted in the general context of
intervention, the nature and the extent of the applicant’s interest in the proceedings lies
‘[a]t the heart of almost every intervention’.384 It thus follows that the requirement for a
personal interest is amongst the most prominent ‘common strands in the area of
intervention’385 whether in the context of adjudication before courts, agencies, and
arbitrators386 or any other form of litigation.
At the ICC, the essential importance of the personal interests criterion has been
acknowledged in the Court’s jurisprudence. Along the observation that the ‘status or
identity of a person as a victim does not legitimize as such participation in any
proceedings before the Court […]’,387 it has been held that in order to ‘qualify for
participation […], the personal interests of a victim […] must be affected.’388
In view of the considerations contemplated hitherto the personal interests proviso
stands out as an essential feature distinguishing the status of a victim-participant from the
status of a party at the ICC. The requirement for a personal interest in the proceedings
denotes that victims, unlike the Prosecutor and the defence, cannot intervene
automatically, as of right in the criminal justice process. Instead, victims can do so only as
long as and to the extent to which they have a demonstrable personal stake in the
proceedings at hand. Still, the constitutive instruments are silent as to what the requisite
383 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 368.
384 Shapiro, supra note 377, p. 729.
385 Ibid., p. 740.
386 Ibid.
387 Separate opinion of Judge G.M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 13 June 2007, para. 13.
388 Ibid.
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personal stake in proceedings exactly signifies. Lacking an explicit definition in the ICC’s
constitutive instruments, the elucidation of the notion of ‘personal interests’ is thus left to
the Chambers of the Court.
The accurate interpretation of the personal interests requirement is crucial for the
proper operation of the general victims’ participation scheme as intended and designed by
the drafters. On the one hand, as noted in the legal literature, an overly strict interpretation
of this criterion could potentially lead to denial of the victims’ right to participate.389
However, it holds equally true that a rather elastic interpretation of the personal interests
criterion would likewise occasion an alarming scenario whereby victims would be
afforded an excessive intervention without any justification provided in the statutory
framework. An unwarranted intervention, on its part, would put at risk the efficient and
timely conduct of proceedings. Unduly delaying the proceedings could cause prejudice
not only to the parties, but to the victims themselves and could, eventually, put their
security at risk.390
Discerning the exact substance, scope and connotation of the personal interests
requirement pursuant to article 68(3) has a direct bearing on the resolution of a variety of
issues, such as: 1) the scope of victims who can take part in the proceedings at hand, that
is, whether any victim of any crime falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction has a ‘personal
interest’ to intervene or only victims of those crimes that are the subject-matter of the
respective proceedings; 2) whether the general interest of victims in the dispense of justice
qualifies as a ‘personal interest’ within the meaning of article 68(3) sufficient to warrant
intervention with respect to (a) particular issue(s) arising in the course of the proceedings;
3) whether the impact of the proceedings on the victims’ personal interests (according to
the phrase ‘where the personal interests of victims are affected’) is to be (pre)determined
in the abstract and in a uniform manner or should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in
light of the circumstances of the case at hand.
In order to unravel the proper connotation of the personal interests criterion, this
requirement should not be construed in isolation on its own. Read in the context of the
procedural architecture, the overall rationale and guiding principles permeating the ICC’s
process, the personal interests criterion reveals itself as being two-fold (two-pronged).
389 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 368
390 Jérôme de Hemptinne, ‘Challenges Raised by Victims' Participation in the Proceedings of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 8:1 (2010), pp. 165-179, p. 167.
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Within the purview of the notion ‘personal interests’ pursuant to article 68(3) concurrently
belong: 1) the personal interests of victims that warrant their admission as participants in
proceedings for the purpose of expressing views and concerns and 2) the personal
interests of victim-participants that justify specific intervention with respect to a particular
proceeding or issue arising in the course of the ongoing process. Consequently, this
requirement of article 68(3) encompasses, first, the personal interests of victims
warranting access to the proceedings at hand and, secondly, the personal interests of
victims warranting intervention in a particular proceeding or issue subsequent to their
admission as participants.
2.1. Personal Interests of Victims Warranting Access to the Proceedings at
Hand
The first prong of the requirement for a personal interest differentiates victims who are
linked to the subject-matter of the case under consideration from victims who are
extraneous to the proceedings at hand. That is to say, the personal interests criterion
distinguishes victims who are entitled to access a given criminal justice process from
victims who do not fall within the purview of article 68(3) with respect to the current
proceedings. Only victims with a personal stake in the respective proceedings would,
accordingly, be entitled to apply for intervention with the prospects of being admitted to
participate. It thus follows that the first prong of the personal interests proviso comprises
the personal link of a victim with the subject-matter of a given criminal justice process.
Hence, the personal interests criterion delineates the scope of potential victim-
participants pursuant to article 68(3) in the context of a particular criminal justice process
taking place at the ICC. Consequently, as rightly noted in literature, the personal interests
requirement entails that article 68(3) is addressed specifically to victims of a given
crime.391 Accordingly, the personal interests criterion is intrinsically linked to the state of
victimhood. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the legitimate interest of victims, i.e. ‘an
interest of a legal nature’,392 that justifies their intervention in the proceedings emanates
from the harm suffered as a result of the criminal conduct under consideration.393
391 Ibid.
392 See article 62 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Conversely, non-legitimate, thus irrelevant,
are, for instance, the political interests of victims. See in this respect the findings of the Pre-Trial Judge at the
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This aspect of the personal interests proviso relating victims to the subject-matter
of the proceedings at hand echoes the requirement for a causal link between the alleged
harm and the crime under consideration pursuant to the victims’ eligibility provision of
rule 85 introduced subsequent to the adoption of the Rome Statute. Both the personal
interests and the causal nexus criteria are shaped upon the common tenet that only victims
linked to the subject-matter of the proceedings at hand may intervene by virtue of article
68(3). In other words, only victims who have suffered harm as a result of the crime(s)
under examination have a personal stake in the respective proceedings, in their
development and, eventually, in their outcome.
In addition, before proceeding with the second prong of the personal interests
criterion it is to be noted that the notion ‘personal’ goes beyond the interest of the wider
public and of the international community as a whole in bringing to book the perpetrators
of egregious crimes falling within the Court’s jurisdiction. The term ‘personal’ implies an
individual (private) rather than a public (communal) interest. That is to say, the wording
‘personal’ implies concreteness rather than generality. Consequently, ‘personal’ entails
more than a general interest in the outcome of the case. In fact, this observation is equally
applicable to intervention in any litigation. In this regard as early as the 1960s it has been
acknowledged that a prospective intervener ‘must have more of a stake in the proceeding
than simply a concern with the general precedent value of the decision’.394 The interest of
the intervener must be concrete and directly related to the subject-matter of the
proceedings at hand.395
2.2. Personal Interests of Victims Warranting Intervention in a Particular
Proceeding  Subsequent to Their Admission as Participants
While the first prong of the personal interests requirement relates to the question of
whether a victim has a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings at hand and,
STL in the Ayyash et al. case in the Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, 8 May 2012, para.
124. The Pre-Trial Judge has considered that the political interests of victims, if any, should not influence the
decision on whether the victim-participants should be divided into groups (in view of the fact that some victims
had expressed the desire not to be associated with the political interests of certain other victims).
393 Donat-Cattin, supra note 13, p. 1286.
394 Shapiro, supra note 377, p. 729.
395 See in the same vein, Haya de la Torre case, Judgment of 13 of June 1951, I.C. J. Reports 1951, p. 9 with
respect to the intervention sought by Cuba.
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respectively, in the criminal justice process as a whole, the second prong of the criterion
relates to the question whether a victim–participant has a personal interest in engaging in
specific matters emerging throughout the proceedings. Accordingly, the fact that a victim
has a personal interest in a particular criminal justice process as a whole does not
automatically entail that the victim will necessarily have a personal stake in any procedure
or issue arising in the course of the proceedings. Said differently, the second prong of the
personal interests requirement identifies amongst the victims admitted to participate
pursuant to article 68(3) those victim-participants who may intervene with respect to a
particular proceeding or issue(s). Hence, the second prong of the personal interests
criterion serves the purpose of determining whether victims admitted for participation will
be allowed to present views and concerns on a separate proceeding or issue. This second
prong of the personal interests proviso thus refers to the specific personal interests of
victim-participants. Therefore, the personal interests comprised by the second prong of
this criterion are, by implication, context-specific. Given the above it becomes apparent
that the specific personal interests come into play once a person is admitted as a victim-
participant before the ICC following a positive determination of his or her victim status
with respect to the proceedings at hand. These interests legitimize the intervention of
victims at particular stages of proceedings.
2.3. Reflections in the Literature and in the Jurisprudence
In light of the considerations advanced hitherto, the view of some commentators that the
personal interests requirement is superfluous, since it should be automatically met once a
person is granted victim status,396 proves untenable. The recognition of a person as a
victim and consequently his or her admission as a participant in proceedings represents an
acknowledgement of, inter alia, the causal nexus between the harm allegedly sustained by
the victim and the crimes under consideration, that is, an acknowledgement of the
personal stake of the victim in the proceedings. As noted earlier, the personal interests of
victims in a given criminal justice process bear a different connotation from the general
interest of the international community in justice being meted out. At the same time,
admission in proceedings does not entail that each victim-participant would be able to
396 De Hemptinne, supra note 390, p. 168.
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intervene automatically, as of right and/or indiscriminately with respect to any matter that
arises in the course of the proceedings. Whether a victim-participant has a personal stake
in issues surfacing in the course of the proceedings is a different question that must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
The jurisprudence of the Court also reflects the complexity of the notion of
‘personal interests’. Initially TC I favoured a rather flexible interpretation of the personal
interests criterion neglecting altogether the requisite personal link between the victim and
the crime under examination. The Chamber has held that potentially any victim of any
crime falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction could be entitled to partake in proceedings
before the Court, regardless of whether the alleged harm sustained by the victims ensued
from the circumstances of the case at hand.397 This view has expanded the notion
‘personal interests’ of article 68(3) so as to comprise the general interest of any victim
with respect to any criminal proceeding, manifested, inter alia, in the interest in the
determination of the truth and the punishment of the perpetrator(s).398 Such a broad
interpretation of the notion ‘personal interests’ fails to take into account the fact that
victims allegedly harmed by a behaviour falling outside the subject-matter of the case
under consideration do not have a personal stake in the proceedings at hand.
Consequently, they do not have a personal interest to intervene pursuant to article 68(3).
Conversely, in tune with the rationale behind the personal interests criterion the
Appeals Chamber has discerned the necessity for a personal stake in the extant
proceedings. The Chamber held that only victims of the crimes charged will be able to
demonstrate that the trial affects their personal interests.399 As eloquently noted in a
separate opinion to the Appeals Chamber Judgment, ‘the personal interests [of victims] to
the extent they are affected by the proceedings’ are ‘the cause that legitimizes their [i.e.
the victims’] participation, the cause that distinguishes them from other victims’.400
Further, in the same vein in addressing the question ‘[o]f which victims (of those coming
within the [rule 85] definition) the personal interests are at stake in any given
397 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008. The Chamber, by majority, ruled, on the one hand, that ‘a victim of any
crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court can potentially participate’. On the other hand, the Chamber
noted that ‘it would not be meaningful or in the interests of justice for all such victims to be permitted to
participate’ because the evidence and issues for examination will be ‘wholly unrelated’ to the crimes that caused
harm to such victims.
398 The victims’ interest in the establishment of the truth consists of seeing punishment not against the accused,
that is, punishment at any cost, but only against the guilty person – see Donat-Cattin, supra note 13, p. 1283.
399 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 11 July 2008, para. 62.
400 Separate opinion of Judge G.M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 13 June 2007, para. 20.
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proceedings’401 it has been noted that these are the personal interests of ‘victims who
suffered harm from the crime or crimes, the subject-matter of’402 the proceedings at hand.
The logical conclusion has thus been advanced that article 68(3) confers ‘upon a specified
class of victims a right to participate, in the circumstances envisaged therein, in
proceedings before the Court.’403
 With respect to the intervention of victim-participants on a particular issue or
proceeding emerging throughout the criminal process, the Appeals Chamber has endorsed
the understanding that the victims’ right to take part in proceedings on interlocutory
appeals is not automatic.404 Thus, with respect to the context-specific interests which
would warrant intervention with regard to a particular proceeding or matter at stake,
applicants have been requested to demonstrate how their personal interests are affected by
the issue certified for appeal.405 That is to say, the victims applying for intervention must
be related to the sub judice decision in order for their interests to be affected by the issue
and/or proceedings at stake (i.e. by the issue on appeal and/or by the appeals
proceedings).406 For instance, in the Situation in Uganda, where the subject-matter of the
interlocutory appeals proceedings was mental harm and its determination, the Appeals
Chamber quite reasonably found that this issue did not fall within the scope of the
personal interests of a victim-participant whose status as a victim and, accordingly, right
to participate were based solely on an alleged physical harm.407
3. ‘Are Affected’
Following the examination of the purview of the notion ‘personal interests’ as enunciated
in article 68(3), attention should be drawn to the expression ‘where the personal interests
of victims are affected’. The review of the relevant jurisprudence shows that the language
‘are affected’ is likewise susceptible to two opposing interpretations: 1) the personal
401 Ibid., para. 13.
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid., para. 10.
404 Kony et al., Appeals Chamber, Decision on the participation of victims in the appeal, ICC-02/04-01/05-324,
27 October 2008, para. 8.
405 Ibid.
406 Dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 27 October 2008,
ICC-02/04-01/05-324, para. 16.
407 Situation in Uganda, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal, ICC-02/04-
164, 27 October 2008, para. 11 et seq.
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interests being affected as a whole and in general by the very fact of the proceedings
taking place or, conversely 2) the personal interests being affected by a particular
proceeding or issue, depending on the circumstances.
3.1. ‘Systematic’ Interpretation
According to the first view, the personal interests of victims are perceived as being
affected as a matter of principle by the very fact of a given criminal justice process. Thus,
this approach regards the personal interests of victims as being always and in general
affected by the ongoing proceedings. As a result, pursuant to this view, the intervention of
victims is at all times warranted. This standpoint proves unsustainable for the following
reasons. First, the general interest of victims in the establishment of the truth and in the
punishment of the perpetrator(s) has been taken into account by the Court’s founders
during the drafting of the constitutive instruments and is, accordingly, reflected in the very
possibility of victims to have an independent standing in their own right in the ICC’s
proceedings. The enunciation of the right of victims to appear before the ICC in a capacity
different than witnesses is an endorsement in itself of the overarching interest of victims
to know the truth and to have their voices heard. Secondly, the approach just discussed
renders devoid of substance the explicit requirement of article 68(3) for an assessment on
the part of the Chamber of whether the intervention sought is warranted and appropriate in
light of the circumstances at hand.
The ‘systematic approach’ advanced in the initial jurisprudence of PTC I is an
emanation of the understanding discussed above. In the context of the investigation stage
of the proceedings in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo the Chamber
perceived the personal interests of victims as being in general affected by the proceedings
at hand, since the victims’ participation at this procedural stage could serve ‘to clarify the
facts, to punish the perpetrators and to request reparations’.408 The Chamber observed that
‘the personal interest of the victims flows from (i) the desire to have a declaration of truth
by a competent body (right to truth); (ii) their wish to have those who victimized them
408 Situation in DRC, PTC I, 17 January 2006, para. 63
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identified and prosecuted (right to justice) and (iii) the right to reparation.’409 As discussed
in the preceding paragraph, such a ‘generous access of victims to the proceedings’410 runs
afoul of both the wording and the spirit of article 68(3). It is worth reiterating that if the
drafters had in mind the systematic approach, favoured by PTC I, the Court’s founders
would have themselves predetermined the right of victims to intervene automatically and
autonomously without prior judicial determination, as is the case with participation in
proceedings of limited object and purpose pursuant to articles 15 and 19.
3.2. Case-Specific Interpretation
Pursuant to the alternative view, the assessment of whether the personal interests of
victims are affected is case-specific. This view favours a casuistic interpretation of the
wording ‘where the personal interests of victims are affected’. This understanding is in
tune with the very language of the provision, in particular, the usage of the conjugation of
the verb ‘to be’ in its present tense - ‘are’ affected – and not in the conditional tense -
‘may be’ affected. Hence, in order to warrant intervention with respect to a specific issue
and/or proceeding, the personal interests of victims must be actually affected rather than
merely potentially, hypothetically or generally affected by the proceedings at hand. This
understanding is not only in line with the overall spirit of article 68(3), but also chimes to
a great extent with the overarching precepts governing intervention by interested persons
in general. As previously observed, a person wishing to intervene must have more of a
stake in the proceeding than simply a concern with the general precedent value of the
decision.411 The determination of an interest, as well as whether this interest is affected by
the ongoing proceedings necessarily involves an exercise of discretion (and, accordingly,
a case-by-case determination) rather than the application of a mechanical formula.412 In
practice, observations in the same vein have been advanced, for instance, by the
Prosecutor, who has contended that the personal interests requirement must be interpreted
more concretely than the general interest of any victim in the progress and the outcome of
409 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of
Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 May 2008 (Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I,
13 May 2008), paras 31-44.
410 Schabas, supra note 361, p. 827.
411 See Shapiro, supra note 377.
412 Ibid., p. 758.
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the process. Further, the Prosecutor has averred that victims wishing to intervene should
be required to show that ‘judicially recognizable personal interests’ are affected by the
proceedings in which they apply for participation.413
The above considerations lend support to the conclusion that the expression ‘where
the personal interests are affected’ reflects the endeavours of the drafters to afford victims
the possibility to engage with an issue or in a given proceeding that has a bearing on their
personal interests and to prevent, accordingly, an unwarranted intervention with respect to
an issue or a proceeding that has no effect on the victims’ personal interests. This
approach is consistent with the fundamental legal principle that involvement in any
proceeding is warranted only when the intervener can demonstrate a concrete, personal
interest in the matter at issue. In addition, it serves to ensure that the intervention of
victims rather than being an end in itself that would eventually disrupt the proceedings,
should adhere to the overarching interests of justice in general.
Consequently, the question whether the personal interests of victims are affected in
the course of the proceedings in a way that would warrant intervention is a matter that
must be contemplated in light of the specificities of the proceedings at hand. Neither could
the particular personal interests of victims in the ongoing proceedings be encompassed by
a single definition, nor could the instances which may affect them be predetermined in
advance of the actual proceedings. It could not be predetermined beforehand and in the
abstract how, when and to what extent an issue or a proceeding at hand would in reality
affect the personal interest of victims in the course of the proceedings. Furthermore, as
practice shows, the one and the same matter may affect the personal interests of certain
participating victims, whereas it may have no bearing on the personal interests of other
victims. At this point, the scenario that unfolded before the Appeals Chamber in the Kony
et al. case is worth recalling. The Chamber found that the subject of the interlocutory
appeal had a direct bearing on the personal interests of a certain group of victims, namely
of those victims whose victim status was at issue in the sub judice decision. At the same
time, the interlocutory appeal did not affect the personal interests of the rest of the victim-
participants whose victim status was not at issue. In fact, akin to the ICC (except for the
initial case-law of PTC I, which was subsequently discarded) the STL as well favours the
casuistic interpretation of the expression ‘are affected’. In the same fashion, the Pre-Trial
413 Lubanga, Prosecutor’s Reply to Applications, ICC-01/04-346, 25 June 2007, para. 19.
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Judge in proceedings at the STL has held that in order for victims ‘to participate in
proceedings […] in relation to a specific issue, a VPP’s [victim-participant’s] personal
interests must be affected by the particular issue under consideration [footnote
omitted].’414 Accordingly, it has been held that ‘[w]here the VPPs' [victim-participants’]
personal interests are not affected by the particular issue at a specific stage in the
proceedings in which they seek to intervene, their participation will either be limited or
prevented accordingly [footnote omitted].’415 In the same vein, the Pre-Trial Judge found
that whenever the law requires authorization by the Chamber, it creates ‘an ongoing
review regime’ with respect to the victims’ entitlement to perform a procedural act.416
That is to say, victims’ participation is not a once-and-for-all event.417
4. Appropriateness
The impact on the victims’ personal interests of an issue or an incidental proceeding does
not per se justify the participation of victims at any particular stage of the process. Once
the Chamber has ascertained that the personal interests of victims are affected, by virtue
of article 68(3) it shall determine whether the participation of those victims is appropriate
at the stage of  the proceedings at which intervention is sought.
Article 68(3) entrusts the respective Chamber with the authority to determine the
appropriateness of the victims’ intervention both as regards the proceedings and the
manner in which it should take place. Hence, the appropriateness requirement set forth in
article 68(3) may be portrayed as two-pronged. The first prong of this criterion relates to
the procedural stage at which the intervention is sought. The second prong relates to the
appropriateness of the intervention itself, including the manner in which it is to take place,
which, as a matter of principle, must not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused, fairness and impartiality of proceedings. 418 The appropriateness requirement
with its two components is further endorsed through the stipulation of rule 89(1), which
414 Ayyash et al., Decision of the Pre-Trial Judge of 18 May 2012, para. 18.
415 Ibid.
416 Ibid., para. 51.
417 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008, para. 101.
418 As noted in Bemba, by PTC II, in the Decision of 22 April 2009: ‘Even when the personal interests of victims
are affected within the meaning of article 68 (3) of the Statute, the Court is still required, by the express terms of
that article, to determine that it is appropriate for their views and concerns to be presented at that stage of the
proceedings and to ensure that any participation occurs in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.’
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enjoins the Chamber with the discretion to determine the proceedings and the manner in
which participation is deemed appropriate. Consequently, by virtue of article 68(3) and
the complementing provision of rule 89(1), the determination of the appropriate
proceedings and the manner of victims’ intervention are left to the discretion of the
Chamber in charge of the proceedings.
The appropriateness both of the proceedings and of the intervention sought should
be evaluated in light of the purpose of the proceedings in question,419 as well as in light of
the precepts of a fair and impartial trial and the rights of the accused.420 If the solicited
intervention goes beyond or is unrelated to the scope and the purpose of the proceedings
at hand, the participation of victims would not be appropriate.
4.1. Appropriate Stages of the Proceedings
The first prong of the appropriateness requirement prompts the issue concerning the scope
of the term ‘proceedings’ within the ambit of article 68(3). In view of the multi-layered
architecture of the ICC’s process, the question arises as to whether participation in
proceedings pursuant to article 68(3) relates to proceedings taking place before a
Chamber, i.e. judicial proceedings, or should be construed broadly as encompassing also
the initial stage of the process, that is, the investigation of a situation.
In order to properly discern the compass of the notion ‘proceedings’ as enunciated
in article 68(3) one should take heed of the intentions of the drafters as regards the
confines of victims’ involvement in the ICC’s process, as previously discussed. The exact
substance of the wording ‘proceedings’ should also be construed in light of the stipulation
which entrusts explicitly and exclusively the Chamber with the authority to determine the
appropriateness of victims’ intervention. Notably, the Prosecutor does not fall within the
purview of article 68(3). If the drafters had intended the principled possibility for victims
to participate at the investigation stage, the Prosecutor as the ICC’s organ in charge of the
investigation of a situation would have been vested with a similar discretion to assess the
appropriateness of the victims’ intervention at this initial stage of the criminal process.
Logic, therefore, dictates that the investigation of a situation as a whole is not comprised
419 Ruto et al., PTC II, Decision on the Motion by Legal Representative of Victim Applicants to Participate in
Initial Appearance Proceedings, ICC-01/09-01/11-14, 30 March 2011, para. 6.
420 Separate opinion of Judge G.M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 13 June 2007.
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by article 68(3). Accordingly, the investigation of a situation does not represent
‘proceedings’ within the scope of the fundamental provision on victims’ participation.
At this point, however, the following clarification proves essential. During an
investigation specific instances and/or incidental proceedings may occur that fall within
the primary authority of the Chamber, such as the scenario delineating a unique
investigative opportunity pursuant to article 56 or other functions of the Pre-Trial
Chamber in the course of an investigation, as enunciated in article 57. In other words,
whenever a specific instance or incidental proceeding arising in the course of the
investigation would necessitate judicial determination, such instances would be comprised
by the term ‘proceedings’ of article 68(3) due to the primary authority of the Chamber in
their resolution.
Although at present the same logic transpires from the case-law of all of the ICC
Chambers, a view in the opposite strain has been espoused by PTC I in its initial
jurisprudence. The Chamber has held that the expression ‘stages of the proceedings’
comprises the situation stage as a whole, including the investigation of a situation.
According to these findings, the investigation of a situation and the pre-trial phase of the
case are appropriate stages of the proceedings for victim participation under article 68(3).
On the basis of a number of terminological, contextual and teleological arguments the
Chamber reached the conclusion that the term ‘proceedings’ does not necessarily exclude
the investigation of a situation and thus interpreted this notion as including the stage of
investigation of a situation. Along these lines, the Chamber concluded that victims have ‘a
general right of access to the Court at [the investigation] stage.’421 This ruling led the
Chamber to accord the so called ‘procedural status of victim’ to the successful applicants
at the investigation stage as a whole, outside the context of (a) specific proceeding(s).
It comes as no surprise that this understanding remained isolated and was
eventually reversed by the Appeals Chamber which opined that the investigation as such
does not constitute a stage of the proceedings in the meaning of article 68(3). The
Chamber made the apposite distinction between the procedural nature of an investigation
and of a judicial proceeding, by noting that an investigation represents ‘an inquiry
conducted by the Prosecutor into the commission of a crime.’422 For the purpose of article
68(3) the Appeals Chamber found that the term ‘proceedings’ denotes a ‘judicial cause
421 Lubanga, PTC I, 17 January 2006, para. 45.
422 Situation in the DRC, Appeals Chamber Decision of 19 December 2008, para. 45.
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pending before a Chamber’, since the word ‘procedural’ indicates something pertaining to
procedure. The Chamber embraced the correct stance that victims are not deprived from
the possibility to intervene at the investigation stage of proceedings altogether, as long as
there are judicial proceedings taking place at the investigation stage (that is, proceedings
of which the Chamber is in charge, not the Prosecutor). As a result, the understanding was
advanced that the victims’ right to participate does not encompass the Prosecutor’s
investigation of a situation, except for particular judicial proceedings affecting
investigations to the extent that the victims’ interests are affected.423
Similarly, PTC II has sketched in a succinct, but eloquent way, the different
scenarios within the context of an investigation constituting an issue leading to judicial
determination which may be deemed appropriate for victims’ participation. Such
scenarios, as the Chamber found, are outlined in articles 53, 56(3) and 57(3), other
instances under rule 93 and also other instances which may arise where victim
participation may be deemed appropriate following a case-by-case determination of
whether their personal interests are affected and the intervention proves in fact
appropriate. This judicial finding is a further indication of the fact that the issues which
may arise in the course of the proceedings can only be presumed to a certain extent, but
cannot be predetermined exhaustively in advance. Equally worth noting is the opposite
scenario contemplated by the Chamber, whereby a judicial proceeding would not require
judicial determination, thus, would not be deemed appropriate for victims to intervene -
the initial proceedings before the Court pursuant to article 60. These proceedings serve a
limited purpose as set out in article 60(1) and, therefore, quite logically, have no bearing
on the personal interests of victims.
In view of the above it becomes evident that, except for the initial stage of the
criminal process, i.e. the investigation stage as a whole, article 68(3) encompasses a broad
spectrum of proceedings (and stages of proceedings) that may be deemed appropriate by
423 Ibid. This view is embraced at present by PTC I, which has revised its initial view as regards the compass of
the term ‘proceedings’ and has, accordingly, embraced a completely new approach with respect to new
applications. See e.g. Situation in DRC, PTC I, Decision on victims’ participation in proceedings relating to the
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-593, 11 April 2011, where the Chamber identified
the judicial proceedings in which victim participation could take place. It held as well that the granted
‘procedural status’ can no longer be sustained in the form envisaged before, denouncing the existence of a
general right to participate to victims. Similarly, in Banda and Jerbo, Decision on Victims' Participation at the
Hearing on the Confirmation of the Charges, ICC-02/05-03/09-89, 29 October 2010, para. 60 et seq., the
Chamber enumerated the rights of victims to be employed via their legal representatives during and prior to the
confirmation of charges hearing, as envisaged in the legal framework, but stated that it would decide on a case-
by-case basis whether to grant specific possibility or not.
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the Chamber in charge for victims to intervene, following a case-by-case assessment of
the impact on the victims’ personal interests. In this regard, comparatively speaking, an
essential distinguishing feature between the ICC and the STL comes into sight. By
contrast to the ICC, the procedural stages at which victim-participants at the STL may
intervene are more limited by virtue of the legal framework. Although article 17 of the
STL’s Statute is almost a literal duplicate of article 68(3), according to the explicit
stipulation of rule 86(A) of STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, participation
pursuant to article 17 may only take place subsequent to the confirmation of the
indictment by the Pre-Trial Judge under rule 68 of STL’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.424 Hence, victims at the STL are not entitled to participation in proceedings
leading up to the confirmation of the indictment, unlike their counterparts at the ICC. The
latter have the possibility to intervene, subject to the requirements of article 68(3), in the
confirmation of charges proceedings pursuant to article 61 and even in incidental judicial
proceedings during the investigation stage (such as under article 56, 57, as previously
mentioned). Accordingly, at the STL, procedural stages preceding the confirmation of the
indictment by the Pre-Trial Judge are deemed not to be appropriate by virtue of law.
4.2. Appropriateness of the Intervention
Next to be noticed is that even when a stage of the proceedings is deemed appropriate for
the participation of victims, the requested intervention must in itself also be appropriate.
Therefore, the appropriateness of the intervention as such is necessarily case-dependent
rather than purely hypothetical. Notably, the same logic imbues also the relevant
jurisprudence. For instance, as regards the request of victims to submit amicus curiae in
the pre-trial proceedings in the Bemba case, the Court has found that such an intervention
on the part of victims was not appropriate, notwithstanding the fact that by virtue of rule
103(2) victims may respond to amicus curiae observations upon the discretion of the
Chamber. The Court reached its reasoning heedful of the fact that victims had already
submitted observations with regard to the same issue subject of the amicus curiae
424 Rule 86(A) of STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence reads as follows: ‘If the Pre-Trial Judge has confirmed
the indictment under Rule 68, a person claiming to be a victim of a crime within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction may
request the Pre-Trial Judge to be granted the status of victim participating in the proceedings pursuant to Article
17 of the Statute.’
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observations.425 By contrast, the intervention of victims was deemed appropriate in an
interlocutory appeal in the Lubanga case concerning the Trial Chamber’s decision to stay
the proceedings. The Court held that the issue under consideration impacts the victims’
ability to present their views and concerns and could ultimately preclude them from the
opportunity to claim reparations, should the accused not be convicted.426
5. Modalities of Participation
Subsequent to the examination of the personal interests and the appropriateness
requirements of article 68(3), next to be contemplated is the way in which the Chamber in
charge of the proceedings should specify the manner and the extent of the participation of
victims. The review of the Court’s jurisprudence prompts the question whether the
judicial determination of the manner in which intervention is deemed appropriate should
be pre-determined at the outset, in the abstract and in a uniform way or should be assessed
and specified in light of the circumstances of the particular case pending before the
Chamber.
Save for the few illustrations in the Rules of the manner in which victims may
intervene, for instance, in the examination of evidence, as set forth in rule 89 and 91, the
legal framework does not contain any exhaustive stipulation regarding the appropriate
proceedings or the manner of participation of victims pursuant to the general victims’
participation scheme. This is an eloquent indication of the fact that instead of confining
the mode and the extent of the victims’ participation to a specific pattern, the normative
basis allows judicial flexibility in the determination of victims’ involvement in
proceedings which is to be fashioned to the circumstances of each particular case.427
Judicial ingenuity, however, should adhere to the spirit and the rationale lying at the heart
of the normative basis. Otherwise, if it would go beyond the framework laid down by the
425 Bemba, PTC II, Decision of 22 April 2009.
426 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s
Decision to Stay the Proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-2556, 18 August 2010.
427 See in the same vein, Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010. See also the Independent Panel of
Experts Report on Victim Participation at the International Cirminal Court (based on the Panel’s meeting and
consultations held in The Hague on 24-27 April 2013), p. 12, according to which ‘[a]n issue primarily for the
Judges who ultimately decide is the way victims participate in proceedings.’
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law-makers, judicial creativity would occasion ‘a wholesale departure from the intention
of the drafters’.428
5.1. Uniform Pre-determination of Modalities of Participation
Given the importance of a case-by-case determination of the impact of the proceedings on
the victims’ personal interests, as well as of the appropriateness of the intervention sought,
a predetermination of the manner of participation of victims in a given proceeding would
seem contrary to the design and the rationale behind victims’ participation at the ICC.
Nevertheless, the uniform predetermination of the manner of victims’ involvement has
been favoured initially by Pre-Trial Chamber I. The Chamber construed the will of the
drafters as enjoining the relevant Chamber with the authority to enunciate beforehand and
as a matter of principle the mode and the extent of victims’ participation by way of
exhaustive sets of rights equally applicable to all victim-participants in the proceedings of
the case at hand.429 This line of reasoning has been termed by the Chamber as a
‘systematic approach’ as regards the manner of victims’ involvement in proceedings,
whereby the set of procedural rights which participating victims may exercise is clearly
determined. In other words, the manner of participation is a once-and-for-all event and, as
such, is not subject to any further consideration throughout the proceedings.430 On the
basis of an extensive study of national jurisdictions pertaining to the two prevailing
traditions, the Pre-Trial Chamber elaborated categories of rights to which victims would,
as a matter of principle, be entitled in the course of the pre-trial stage of the case. PTC I
observed that the rights accorded to victims in domestic criminal proceedings are neither
per se prejudicial nor inconsistent with the rights of the accused, nor to fairness and
impartiality of proceedings.431 As a result, taking heed of the main features of the ICC’s
pre-trial proceedings and the object and purpose of the relevant provisions, the Chamber
made a general and a conclusive predetermination of the set of procedural rights which are
428 See para. 11 of the Joint Separate opinion in Ruto and Sang case to the Judgment on the appeal of the
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's Request
for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial” Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of
Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's Request for Excusal from Continuous
Presence at Trial”, ICC-01/09-01/11-1066, 25 October 2013.
429 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 13 May 2008.
430 Ibid., p. 23, para. 49.
431 Ibid., para. 66.
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‘to be attached’ to the procedural status of victim at the pre-trial stage of a case.432
Pursuant to the approach contemplated above, the instances warranting the intervention of
victims in the course of the criminal justice process are determined in a comprehensive
way at the outset of proceedings. Hence, the scope of the victims’ participation rather than
being decided on a case-by-case basis in light of the circumstances of the proceedings of a
given case is contemplated in the abstract and in principle, irrespective of the specificities
of each case. Consequently, the modalities of participation elaborated by the Chamber
rather than reflecting the personal interests of victims arising from the circumstances and
the specificities of the case at hand, emanate from the common interests of any victim in
general.
Such a ‘systematic approach’ towards the manner of participation of victims in
proceedings neither corresponds to the wording, nor to the spirit of article 68(3) and the
complementing provision of rule 89(1). A general determination of the manner of victims’
intervention before the ICC outside the context of actual proceedings taking place before
the Chamber is inconsistent with the rationale underlying the general victims’
participation scheme. Such a comprehensive determination of victims’ intervention
appears random and speculative, as it is not tailored to the specificities of a given case
and, accordingly, its implication on the personal interests of participating victims.
Furthermore, the establishment of modalities of participation explicitly confined to several
sets of rights does not constitute a creative interpretation of the legal framework as set
forth by the Court’s founders, but is a judicial exercise in redrafting the existing normative
basis. Interestingly enough, the Chamber in support of its approach of establishing sets of
rights for victim-participants referred to the codes of criminal procedure of national
jurisdictions ‘which clearly pre-establish the set of procedural rights that […] victims can
exercise at the pre-trial stage of a case.’433 This judicial reasoning, however, fails to
distinguish the different legal nature of the codes of criminal procedure, on the one hand,
and judicial decisions, on the other. While the former represent sources of law and, as
such, are the result of a legislative activity, the purpose of judicial decisions is confined to
interpreting and applying the existing legal framework to the circumstances of a particular
case. Hence, since the judges of the ICC, akin to their colleagues at the national and
international level alike do not have legislative authority, the jurisprudence of the Court
432 Ibid., para. 79.
433 Ibid., para. 50, footnote. 61.
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cannot complement the ICC’s normative basis. As aptly put, albeit in a different context,
such a ‘departure from the intention of the drafters in order to give effect to a creative
interpretation of the Statute would appear to be an inappropriate arrogation of the
legislative function by the judiciary’.434
In addition, determining beforehand, in a conclusive way and in the abstract the
scope of victims’ intervention in proceedings could neither encompass, nor preview all
instances which may arise in the course of the proceedings with a bearing on the personal
interests of participating victims, thus warranting their intervention. Therefore, in practical
terms a predetermination in advance could be regarded as a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, victims would be prevented from participating at instances, which albeit having
a bearing on the their personal interests, would fall outside the modalities of participation
set in advance by the Chamber. As a result, in effect, the right of victims to intervene in
proceedings would be unduly limited by depriving victims of the possibility to present
their views and concerns on (an) issue(s) affecting their personal interests. On the other
hand, it would suffice for a victim wishing to intervene to invoke a category of rights (a
modality of participation) elaborated by the Chamber, irrespective of whether the issue or
the proceeding at stake would indeed affect the victim’s personal interests. As a
consequence, the proceedings could be flooded with victims intervening on issue(s) with
no bearing whatsoever on their personal interests. Such a scenario would, on its part,
unduly delay the proceedings. Delay in proceedings, as previously observed, would
eventually infringe, among others, also the rights of the victims themselves.
5.2. Contextual (‘Casuistic’) Determination of Modalities of Participation
By contrast to the ‘systematic approach’, initially favoured by PTC I, the jurisprudence of
the Court at present reveals a preference towards the case-by-case determination of the
appropriate proceedings and the manner of victims’ involvement.435 The reference
‘casuistic’ emphasizes the distinction between this approach and the ‘systematic
approach’ introduced initially by PTC I.436 Pursuant to the casuistic approach, the manner
434 See para. 11 of the Joint Separate opinion in Ruto and Sang case to the Judgment on the appeal of the
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013.
435 The importance of and the need for a case-specific approach is underlined also by commentators. See in this
strain the Independent Panel of Experts Report, supra note 427, p. 12 et seq.
436 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 13 May 2008.
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of participation of victims in a given case is fashioned to the specificities of the
circumstances at hand. The modalities of victims’ intervention in the course of the
proceedings are contemplated in a non-exhaustive way by the Chamber in charge of the
proceedings.437 Consequently, the modalities envisaged by the relevant Chamber are
without prejudice to any (different, unanticipated, etc.) instances which may arise
throughout the proceedings necessitating an assessment on a case-by-case basis of the
specific manner and extent of the intervention of victims in light of the particular
proceeding or issue at stake. Hence, pursuant to this approach specifying the manner and
the extent of intervention is not a once-and-for-all event and, thus, should be tailored to
the specific issues arising in the course of the actual proceedings.
Along these lines, for instance, the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case438
proclaimed that the question of whether the personal interests of victims are affected is
necessarily fact-dependent and ‘should be decided on the basis of the evidence or issue
under consideration at any particular point in time’. This opinion was based on the
observation that ‘although in a general sense, victims have multiple and varied interests
[…] in order to participate at the present trial these interests must relate to the evidence
and the issues the Chamber will be considering during the trial’.439 In the same spirit, the
Trial Chamber in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case observed that the determination of the
appropriate time and modalities of exercising the victims’ right to intervene are case-
dependent. The Chamber further stated that its discretion in this regard should be
exercised in light of various factors, such as ‘the nature and scope of the charges, the
number of victims taking part in the proceedings and the degree of similarity between
their respective interests, as well as the manner in which they are represented.’440
Similarly, PTC II ruled that applications for participation at the situation stage are to be
submitted to the Chamber only when an issue arises which would require a judicial
determination or with respect to which victims have applied to participate with the view of
presenting their views and concerns.441
437 This casuistic approach introduces in Lubanga (TC I, Decisions of 18 January 2008 and 26 June 2009) has
been endorsed subsequently by the rest of the chambers. See e.g. Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010.
438 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008.
439 Ibid., para. 97 and 101.
440 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 54.
441 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, PTC II, Decision of 3 November 2010, para. 10 et seq.
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Before proceeding with the next issue within the scope of article 68(3), an example
of a manner of participation which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused or fairness, expeditiousness of proceedings is the participation, as a matter of
principle, through the victims’ legal representative(s), not in person. This manner of
participation represents a safeguard for the fair trial rights of the accused who would not
have to face in person a myriad of victims in the courtroom.442 Furthermore, as noted in
literature, legal representatives are professional counsel and, as such, they have both the
skills and the ethical boundaries needed.443
6. Views and Concerns
The next issue to be addressed within the compass of the general victims’ participation
scheme is related to the rationale behind the expression ‘views and concerns’. Unraveling
the substance and scope of the presentation of views and concerns by virtue of article
68(3), just like the accurate interpretation of the rest of the prerequisites of this provision,
delimits the intensity and the substance of the involvement of victims throughout the
proceedings. Consequently, elucidating the wording ‘views and concerns’ would enhance
the proper discernment of the extent to which victim-participants are entitled to intervene
and to make their contribution to the conduct, development and/or outcome of a given
process.
6.1. Connotation of the Notion ‘Views and Concerns’
In its aspiration to bring to light the proper meaning of the expression ‘views and
concerns’ the Court has suggested an elaborate study of the wording of article 68(3)
employed in the different versions of the Statute (Spanish, French, Russian). As a result,
the Court has concluded that the term ‘views’ in the context of article 68(3 signifies
‘opinion, stance or position on a subject’, while ‘concerns’ signify ‘matters of interest to a
442 See in the same vein Spiga, supra note 10.
443 Ibid., p. 1384, where the author opines that victims’ participation must not be allowed at all costs. Safeguards
for the fair trial rights of the parties is the manner of participation – predominantly, as a rule, in a vicarious way,
through a legal representative. Also, as duly noted by the author, most procedural rights are employed by the
legal representatives in view of the fact that as professional counsel they have both the skills and the ethical
boundaries needed.
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person; matters that preoccupy him/her.’444 Consequently, the expression ‘views and
concerns’ has been construed to denote ‘opinion and preoccupations’.445 Interpretation in
the same vein has been advanced by the Prosecutor, who contended that the presentation
of views and concerns is ‘a right to present [the victims’] personal perspective or opinion
on an issue [emphasis added]’.446 Put differently, the views and concerns of victims ‘are
referable to the cause that legitimizes their participation, the cause that distinguishes them
from other victims, namely their personal interests to the extent that they are affected by
the proceedings.’447
Given the above, it is reasonable to infer that as regards issues arising in the course
of the proceedings which have a bearing on the personal interests of participating victims,
the latter are entitled to voice their stance, convey their emoting448 and put forward their
preoccupations on the issue at stake.449 The range of issues on which victims can express
views and concerns cannot be determined in advance in view of the necessity for a case-
by-case determination of whether a given issue has a bearing on the victims’ personal
interests. Consequently, as noted in the legal literature, the views and concerns of victims
my refer to ‘anything related to the proceedings, from relaying personal experiences to
discontent related to the speed or efficiency of the trial.’450
6.2. Substance and Extent of the Presentation of Views and Concerns
Along this strand of thoughts the issue that comes to the surface concerns the exact
substance and extent of the victims’ right to be heard and its impact on proceedings. The
question arises as to how far victims could intervene in the criminal justice process
through the presentation of views and concerns. The related provisions in the Rules,
namely rule 89 and rule 91, shed some light on this issue, however, only to a certain
444 Separate opinion of Judge G.M. Pikis to the Decision o f the Appeals Chamber of 13 June 2007, para. 15.
445 Ibid.
446 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, para 72.
447 Separate opinion of Judge G.M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 13 June 2007, para. 16, as
well as Dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008.
448 Ian Edwards, ‘An Ambiguous Participant. The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making’, British
Journal of Criminology, vol. 44 (2004), pp. 967-982, p. 979.
449 Similarly, the Victims Participation Unit at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has contended that ‘views and
concerns’ ‘should be broadly understood as encompassing various forms of input of both legal and factual
nature, and concerning both the crime itself and the course of the criminal proceedings at hand.’ – see Ayyash et
al., STL-11-01/PT/PTJ, VPU Submission on Legal Issues pursuant to the Pre-Trial Judge’s Decision of 5 April
2012, 23 April 2012, para. 35.
450 McDermott, supra note 33, p. 41.
138
extent. According to these norms the expression of victims’ views and concerns may take
the form of opening and closing statements, written or oral observations or submissions.
In addition, the views and concerns of victims may touch upon elements of evidence
having a bearing on their personal interests. As rule 91(3) itself proclaims, in order to give
effect to article 68(3), victims are afforded the possibility to engage in the examination of
oral evidence via their legal representative upon the authorisation of the Chamber. Thus,
logically the views and concerns as envisaged in article 68(3) may take the form of
questions to witnesses, experts and the accused. Through the presentation of views and
concerns in the form of questioning, victims are afforded the possibility to bring to the
attention of the Chamber relevant information with a bearing on their personal interests
elicited from the respective witness, expert or the accused.
In addition, through the expression of their views and concerns victims could
contribute towards the elucidation of the wider background against which the events
falling within the subject-matter of the case took place. As noted in the legal literature, the
presentation of victims’ views and concerns could enhance the better understanding of the
Court of the particular circumstances of the case, as it ‘puts the [alleged] crimes in
perspective by giving an idea of the reality in times of conflict’. 451 To the same effect, the
Court itself has acknowledged that the presentation of the victims’ views and concerns
may ‘potentially enable the Chamber to better understand some of the matters at issue,
given [the victims’] local knowledge and social and cultural background.’452 Hence,
through their views and concerns victims may provide the Chamber with their local
knowledge of the background of the case.453
Doubtlessly, the views and concerns of victims could enhance the Court’s
understanding of the socio-cultural specificities of the region where the alleged crimes
have been committed. They could also shed light on specific circumstances on the ground
of which the Court does not have enough experience and/or knowledge, such as, for
instance, particular cultural factors affecting the evidence of witnesses.454 In addition, by
451 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 373.
452 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 Jan 2010, para. 75.
453 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 03 March 2010, para. 60.
454 See, for instance, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), ‘Enhancing Victims’ Rights before the
ICC. A view from Situation Countries on Victims’ Rights at the International Criminal Court’, November 2013,
where it is noted that  ‘[v]ictims shed light on the issue of identity and the use of names [in the] DRC’ (at p. 20),
as well as that ‘[a]t various stages of the Bemba case (CAR), victims’ legal representatives from the field
clarified the relevance of different languages spoken by the different actors in CAR during the commission of the
crimes.’ Further in the same vein, take heed, for instance, of some regions in Africa where people live in an oral
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conveying their stance and/or preoccupations regarding issues which affect their personal
interests victims may draw the attention of the Chamber to information germane to the
subject-matter of the case at hand. The victims’ views and concerns could as well bring
forth certain issues related to the conduct of proceedings, including concerning the
collection and/or the examination of evidence. The fact that the views and concerns of
victims may assist the Chamber in its approach to the evidence in the case has likewise
been acknowledged in the jurisprudence.455
6.3. Non-evidentiary Character of Victims’ Views and Concerns
Still, notwithstanding the potential of the victims’ views and concerns to enhance the
Court’s understanding of the particulars of the case, it is essential to note that they do not
as such constitute pieces of evidence, thus, do not form part of the evidentiary material.
By conveying their stance and/or preoccupations regarding issues which affect their
personal interests victims may draw the attention of the Chamber to information relevant
to the subject-matter at hand. However, the information contained in the views and
concerns cannot as such be incorporated into the evidentiary material. As rules 89 and 91
unequivocally show, the  regime governing the presentation of views and concerns by
victims is separate and distinct from the regime applicable to the submission of evidence.
None of the manners of presentation of victims’ views and concerns provided for in rule
89 and 91, i.e. through submissions, observations or statements, represents a technique of
placing evidence before the Chamber. Furthermore, the presentation of views and
concerns is not subject to the regime governing testimonies set forth in articles 69(1) and
70. This lends further support to the conclusion that the presentation of views and
concerns does not in itself represent a submission of testimony or any other type of
evidence.456
tradition and, accordingly, report information as eyewitnesses, irrespective of whether they have perceived the
facts in person or have heard them recounted by someone else. If the Court is not aware of such a specificity of a
particular culture or region, the reliability and credibility of witness testimony may be put at issue. A similar
scenario unfolded in proceedings before the ICTR, during the Akayesu trial proceedings, where it became clear
that evidence that had been reported as an eyewitness account was in fact a second-hand account. See The
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Chamber I, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 155.
455 Lubanga, TC I, 26 June 2009, para. 25.
456 Similarly, the Prosecutor has observed that the views and concerns of victims do not constitute submission of
evidence – see Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, para. 72.
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This line of reasoning entails a negative answer to the question whether the
presentation of victims’ views and concerns could ‘mask’ the submission of evidence on
the part of victim-participants ‘under the guise of unsworn allocution’.457 The
considerations advanced hitherto that expressing views and concerns before the Court is
not tantamount to placing oral evidence related to the subject-matter of the proceedings at
hand engender the following issues. The first question that comes to the fore concerns the
possibility of a victim-participant to assume simultaneously the capacity of a witness in
the ICC’s proceedings for the purpose of incorporating his or her recollections of the
events under consideration into the evidentiary material, subject to the requirements of
relevance and admissibility. Another essential issue within the context of the ICC’s
evidentiary procedure and the place of victims therein is whether and, if yes, in what way
and to what extent victim-participants could engage in the fact-finding process of their
own accord (that is, through the submission and/or the examination of evidence). The
elucidation of the matters just raised is pivotal for the further delimitation of the place of
victim-participants in the ICC’s system and the extent to which their involvement in the
proceedings could contribute to and impact the evidentiary process and, ultimately, the
outcome of the case. In the chapters to follow each of the two issues is addressed from a
comparative perspective, in light of the specificities of the ICC’s procedural architecture
and the principles governing the fact-finding process in proceedings adjudicating the
individual criminal responsibility of the accused, as well as in reparation proceedings.
457 Giannini, supra note 343, p. 446 citing Amy Baron-Evans, ‘Traps for the Unwary Under the Crime Victims'
Rights Act: Lessons from the Kenna Cases’, 19 Federal Sentencing Report 49, 51-52 (2006) at footnote 64.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Duality of Status
The fact that the presentation of views and concerns is not in itself a means by which the
victim’s account of the crime(s) under consideration could be incorporated into the ICC’s
evidentiary material brings forth the question as to the manner in which victims could
place oral evidence before the Chamber germane to the subject-matter of the proceedings
at hand. In other words, the issue that comes to the fore concerns the so called ‘duality of
victim-witness status’. As the latter expression implies, it refers to individuals who
assume simultaneously two legal standings in the criminal justice process – of a victim-
participant and of a witness appearing before the Court.
To start with, it is to be noted that the notion ‘duality of status’ is not to be found in
the ICC’s constitutive instruments. The Court’s founding documents do not contain
provisions related specifically to individuals with victim-witness status.458 Instead,
separate sets of legal texts envision the standing and the rights of victims and of witnesses
in the proceedings. Notwithstanding the lack of an explicit legal text referring to dual
status individuals in the ICC’s founding documents, the questioning of victims is
envisioned in article 54(3)(b) within the purview of the prosecutorial powers during an
investigation. To the same effect is rule 72(2), governing the questioning of a victim of
sexual violence at trial. In the same spirit, rule 88(5) casts a duty on the Chamber to be
vigilant in controlling the manner of the questioning of a victim, so as to avoid any
harassment or intimidation of this individual. Logic, therefore, dictates that the ICC’s
legal framework accommodates the possibility of a victim to assume the parallel capacity
of a witness in proceedings.459
Still, at the inception of the ICC some commentators have advanced the view that
‘in order fully to safeguard the rights of the accused’ the combination between victim and
witness status in one and the same case before the ICC should not be allowed.460 Not
458 As has been noted, neither the Statute, nor the Rules clarify the relationship between participating victims and
victim-witnesses – see Haslam, supra note 360, p. 327.
459 See in the same vein, Baumgartner, supra note 22, p. 433, who observed that ‘[n]either the Statute nor the
Rules excludes [sic] victims from participating in the proceedings to testify as witnesses.’
460 Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, according to whom ‘it will be necessary to ensure that a victim may
not simultaneously be a witness and a party in one and the same case’ (italics in the original).
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surprisingly, this standpoint remains isolated and unpopular both among academics and in
practice. Such a proposition is not only contrary to the rationale of the provisions
discussed above, but it also neglects the fact that victims are individuals with personal
(whether direct or indirect) experience and perceptions relevant to the ascertainment of the
circumstances of the case. As highlighted earlier, the eligibility of an individual qua
victim pursuant to rule 85(a) is premised, inter alia, on the requirement that he or she has
suffered harm as a result of (a) crime(s) within the jurisdiction of the Court. Hence, the
eligible harm is the damage inflicted upon the individual through the alleged commission
of the particular crime(s) under consideration. Consequently, victims possess personal
(often first-hand) experience and perception of facts comprised by the subject-matter of
the proceedings at hand. Indubitably, the account of circumstances relevant to the case
perceived personally by the victim could contribute to the elucidation of the facts under
consideration. Since a victim’s testimony may represent a valuable piece of evidence, by
implication victims could also appear as witnesses in the same case.
A similar standpoint is endorsed in the literature on international criminal
proceedings in general. It is widely acknowledged that by virtue of their unique situation
during the conflict victims would be in the best position to help unearth the truth of the
alleged crimes.461 Commentators rightly note that victims are those who have witnessed
the crime(s) and also live with the consequences of these crime(s)462 and, therefore,
without victims and witnesses the criminal justice bodies have little chance of success.463
Along the same lines is the legislative approach adopted by the majority of
jurisdictions which afford victims an independent standing at the criminal justice scene.
The swift comparative review of national and international jurisdictions attests to the fact
that duality of victim-witness status is a well-established procedural phenomenon.
461 David S. Sokol, ‘Reduced Victim Participation: A Misstep by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia’, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 10 (2011), pp. 167-186.
462 Cohen, supra note 22, p. 353.
463 Chea Leang and William Smith, ‘The Early Experience of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia’ in International Criminal Justice. Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to Its Review, Roberto
Bellelli (ed.), Ashgate, pp. 143-168, p. 158.
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1. Approaches Towards Duality of Status at the Domestic Level
The combination of the status of victim with the capacity of a witness in the same
proceedings is a common feature of most national legal systems which provide victims
with an autonomous standing in proceedings, distinct from that of a witness.464 Pursuant to
the respective legal frameworks an individual is not exempt from the duty to testify as a
witness, in spite of his or her participation in proceedings as an injured party (damaged
person/victim)465; as a private accuser (subsidiary prosecutor/private (accessory)
prosecutor)466; as a complainant or a plaintiff (known as ‘querellante’ in Latin American
jurisdictions)467; as a civil party (civil claimant/plaintiff)468 or as a victim-participant with
an independent position in proceedings.469 Hence, the majority of national jurisdictions
stipulate not merely the right, but the obligation of the victim to assume the parallel
capacity of a witness in the same case.  In most systems, the questioning of the victim is
464 Romania represents an exception in this regard. According to article 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code the
harmed party may be heard as a witness only if he or she does not constitute him- or herself as a civil party and
will not take part in the trial as a victim. Hence, the victim is deprived from the possibility to assume the status
of a witness in the same case.
465 Article 158 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Albania; article 59(2)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Armenia; article 86(10) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina; chapter 6, section 7(1)(5) of
the Criminal Procedure Act of Finland; article 72 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine; article 55(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Code of Uzbekistan; article 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Nicaragua; Article 55(3)
of the Criminal Procedure Code of Macedonia, article 60(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Moldova. By
virtue of article 294-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code of South Korea, in case a victim avails him- or herself of
the right to file a petition for giving a statement in the course of the proceedings, the Court shall admit such
victim as witness for examination.
466 Article 305 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Honduras; article 95(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Montenegro; article 92 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Serbia; article 87.7.4 of the Criminal Procedure Code
of Azerbaijan; article 283(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Croatia; article 50(1) and (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Kyrgyzstan; articles 325-326 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Taiwan; article 212 read in
conjunction with articles 215-216 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Swaziland.
467 Articles 67, 80, 86 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Argentina; article 292 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Bolivia; article 80 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Costa Rica; article 134 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Guatemala; article 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Paraguay; article 112 of the
Criminal Procedure Code of El Salvador; article 123 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Dominican
Republic.
468 Article 61(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Armenia; article 53(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code of
Kyrgyzstan; article 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Peru.
469 Book II of the Criminal Code of Malta (Malta does not have a separate Criminal Procedure Code, Book II of
the Criminal Code is entirely devoted to procedural issues). See also Jean Paul Grech, ‘Criminal Justice Systems
in Europe and North America: Malta’, in Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America, HEUNI, 2006,
The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations. Up until 2002 the
victim in Malta could only participate as a witness. After the amendments in 2002 the victim has an independent
participant standing in proceedings with a number of rights, such as: the right to engage a legal representative, to
examine witnesses, to produce evidence; to be a principal witness him- or herself. According to section 410(4) of
Book II of the Criminal Code, the injured party has the right to be present in court in all hearings even if he or
she is a witness.
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governed by the same provisions applicable to the questioning of witnesses.470 The
majority of domestic jurisdictions, with a few exceptions,471 introduce the possibility that
witnesses be compelled to appear in proceedings for the purpose of testifying.
Consequently, by implication, victims may likewise be obliged to appear before the
criminal justice authorities in order to give their account of facts relevant to the case. At
this point it is worth noting that the lack of a prohibition against the dual status of victim
and witness in the same case in national jurisdictions has also been acknowledged in the
ICC’s jurisprudence as early as the issue of the combined victim-witness status arose.472
2. Approaches Towards Duality of Status at the International Level
2.1. Criminal Justice Bodies
At the international level, criminal justice bodies follow a similar approach towards the
issue of dual status individuals. The analysis of international(ized) adjudicative
institutions shows that such jurisdictions either do not contain provisions prohibiting the
parallel participation as a victim and as a witness in the same case or explicitly provide for
the combination of a formal victim status in proceedings with the capacity of a witness.
Akin to the majority of domestic jurisdictions, international(ized) criminal justice bodies
which grant victims a standing in their own right, whether as parties or as non-party
participants, also afford the possibility of victims to give testimony.
The ECCC, where victims enjoy the status of civil parties in proceedings, provides
an intriguing example in this respect. Although rule 23(4) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules
may at first blush be construed as prohibiting the incorporation of a victim’s statement
470 See e.g. article 118(1)2 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Bulgaria; section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Germany; article 410 read together with article 416 of the Law on Criminal Procedure of Spain; section
37(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Estonia; chapter 6, section 7(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act of
Finland; article 55(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Macedonia; section 151(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code of Latvia; articles 58(10) and 60(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Moldova; chapter 28, section
411(2) and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act of Norway; article 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code of China;
article 160 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Indonesia.
471 Thus, for instance, pursuant to section 38(1)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Estonia the victim has the
right to refuse to give testimony; according to section 98(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Latvia, the victim
cannot be compelled to testify; in Russia the victim can refuse to testify under specific circumstances – see
articles 42(2), 78(1) and (2), 277(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
472 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, Decision on the Application for Participation of Witness 166
ICC-01/04-01/07-632, 23 June 2008 (Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 23 June 2008), para. 21, where the
Chamber draws on the legal frameworks of various civil law jurisdictions, such as Brazil, France, Germany,
Spain.
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into the evidentiary material once the latter assumes civil party status, such an inference
would prove rather hasty and, ultimately, incorrect. According to this provision, once a
victim becomes a civil party he or she can no longer ‘be questioned as a simple witness in
the same case and […]  may only be interviewed under the same conditions as a [c]harged
[p]erson or [a]ccused [emphasis added]’. The relevant legal regime governing the
questioning of a civil party is set out in rule 59 of the Internal Rules, whereas the legal
regime governing the questioning of ‘simple’ witnesses is laid down in rule 60 of the
Internal Rules. The juxtaposition between these two concurrent procedures, however,
shows that the differences are confined to the manner in which civil party’s statement(s),
on the one hand, and ‘simple’ witnesses’ statements, on the other, are to be placed before
the criminal justice authorities for the purpose of their incorporation into the evidentiary
material. The two regimes differ in terms of the stipulation of compellability, taking of an
oath or affirmation, presence of a lawyer during questioning and the initiative upon which
the statement is being gathered.473 At the same time, notwithstanding the differences just
mentioned, both the questioning of witnesses and the interview of civil parties represent
methods of gathering evidence. Witnesses’ testimonies and civil parties’ statements alike
(to the extent to which they give account of facts relevant to the case) are pieces of oral
evidence. Indicative in this regard is rule 91 of the Internal Rules which provides that after
the questioning of the accused, the Chamber shall hear the civil parties, witnesses and
experts. Hence, albeit the victim who has assumed civil party status can no longer be
formally referred to as a ‘simple’ witness, the statements of a civil party when questioned
form part of the evidentiary material.
The evidentiary character of the statements given by civil parties during their
interviews in the course of the proceedings has also been explicitly acknowledged in the
jurisprudence of the ECCC. After observing that due to their civil party status victims
were no longer questioned as witnesses and were exempt from the requirement to testify
473 Firstly, according to rule 24 of the Internal Rules before testifying witnesses shall take an oath or affirmation
to state the truth. By contrast, no such obligation exists with respect to a civil party when interviewed. As a
consequence, civil parties, unlike witnesses, cannot be held accountable for giving false statement(s) in
accordance with rule 36 read together with rule 35(2) of the Internal Rules. Secondly, witnesses may be
compelled to appear before the Court in order to testify by virtue of rule 60(3) of the Internal Rules. The legal
framework lacks a similar provision with respect to civil parties. Thirdly, rule 59(2) of the Internal Rules
envisions that the interview of a civil party shall take place only in the presence of his or her lawyer, unless the
civil party waives this right. Conversely, ‘simple witnesses’ are not entitled to the presence of a lawyer, except
for instances related to issues of self-incrimination. Fourthly, civil parties may also be interviewed upon the civil
party’s own request in accordance with rule 59(5) of the Internal Rules. Witnesses, on their part, appear before
the Court only when summoned, thus, not on their own initiative.
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under an oath or affirmation,474 the Trial Chamber in Case 001 noted that civil parties
‘may nevertheless testify and have their statements put before the Chamber and assessed
as evidence where relevant and probative.’475 Consequently, this ruling endorsed the
evidentiary nature of the civil parties’ statements given during their questioning at trial.
Similarly, at the STL where victims are granted the standing of independent
participants in their own right, the legal framework envisions the possibility for the
concurrent appearance of a victim-participant in the capacity of a witness in proceedings.
Recent developments in the Tribunal’s legal framework reveal a drift towards the
enhanced possibility of victims to contribute to the evidentiary material by way of their
testimony. More specifically, rule 150(d) of the Rules (as amended of 8 February 2012)
extends the right of victims to give evidence as witnesses in proceedings. According to
this provision, ‘[a] victim participating in the proceedings may be permitted to give
evidence if a Chamber decides that the interests of justice so require.’ Conversely, the
repealed version of rule 150(d) of the Rules provided that a victim participating in the
proceedings should not be permitted to give evidence unless a Chamber decided that the
interests of justice so require. Hence, the present redaction of this provision reveals a shift
away from the restrictive approach and an inclination towards a more permissive regime
with respect to duality of victim-witness status.
The same rationale finds reflection in the STL’s jurisprudence. The Pre-Trial Judge
observed that ‘[t]he fact that a person may act in the capacity of a witness shall not serve
to deprive that person of his rights to participate in proceedings as a victim.’476 This ruling
represents an eloquent acknowledgement of the fact that the concurrent participation as a
witness and as a victim-participant in the same proceedings places the individual
personally affected by the events under consideration at an independent standing going
beyond the role of a mere ‘evidentiary cannon fodder’ or, in other words, of a mere
information-provider.477 In a subsequent decision478 the Pre-Trial Judge acknowledged
that the Tribunal’s legal framework provides ‘for the circumstance where a [victim-
participant] – notwithstanding his [or her] capacity as a [victim-participant in
474 ECCC, Case 001, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Chamber Judgment, 26 July 2010
(ECCC, Case 001, Trial Judgment, 26 July 2010), para. 52.
475 Ibid., para. 78.
476 Ayyash et al., Pre-Trial Judge, Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, 8 May 2012, para.
102(i).
477 Edwards, supra note 448, p. 976.
478 Ayyash et al., Decision of the Pre-Trial Judge of 18 May 2012, para. 60.
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proceedings] is called to give evidence as a witness.’ The Pre-Trial Judge adopted the
term ‘dual status victims’ as coined in the ICC’s jurisprudence.
Comparatively speaking, it follows that, irrespective of whether giving testimony
by dual status individuals is governed by the regime applicable to the questioning of
witnesses or by a specific set of provisions,479 the combined victim-witness status proves
neither a novel, nor an exceptional criminal justice phenomenon in an international and in
a domestic setting alike. This legislative approach is hardly surprising given the fact that
individuals who have personally experienced facts and circumstances relevant to the case
represent an essential source of information conducive to the elucidation of the subject-
matter of the case at hand.
2.2. Other Adjudicative Bodies
Notably, an understanding in a similar vein transpires in proceedings taking place outside
the purview of international criminal trials. International arbitral proceedings, as well as
proceedings before the ICJ also accommodate the possibility for an individual who has
personally perceived facts relevant to the case to provide testimony, irrespective of
whether he or she assumes another procedural capacity in the same case.
In this respect, the Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration of
the International Arbitral Tribunal accommodate the possibility for ‘[a]ny person [to]
present evidence as a witness, including a [p]arty or a [p]arty’s officer, employee or other
representative.’480 In a similar fashion, the ICJ has arranged on several occasions for the
cross-examination of counsel of one of the parties, thus, has admitted the parallel
appearance of counsel as a witness in the same proceedings. As a result, counsel’s
pleadings that contained relevant factual information within his or her knowledge were
treated as testimony, while the remainder of the counsel’s pleadings were not treated as
factual assertions, but as legal argument.481 In these instances the ICJ has held that
479 For instance, at the ECCC while the questioning (interview) of witnesses is governed by rule 60, the
questioning (interview) of a civil party is envisaged in rule 59 of the Internal Rules.
480 See article 4(2) of the Rules.
481 Anna Riddell and Brendan Plant, Evidence before the International Court of Justice, British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, 2009, p. 342-343. See the cases discussed therein, namely, the case of
Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI case), I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 15, the case of Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), I. C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7,  where a member of the Slovak team of pleaders was introduced
as an expert witness. The same happened in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case where the International
Court of Justice admonished the parties for having included in their legal teams ‘experts who appeared as
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individuals providing evidence before the Court based on their scientific and/or technical
knowledge and on their personal experience should testify as experts, witnesses or in
some cases in both capacities rather than plead as counsel, so that they may be submitted
to questioning (and, ultimately, have their testimony incorporated into the evidentiary
material pertinent to the subject-matter). Consequently, the ICJ has given preference to the
individual’s capacity as a witness, i.e. as a source of factual information, rather than to his
or her professional capacity as a party’s lawyer.
In this respect, it should, however, be strongly underlined that an approach
allowing the parallel appearance of counsel as a witness in the same case should not be
accepted without demur. The simultaneous participation as a witness and as a person
adducing legal argument on behalf of a party is far from unproblematic. By giving factual
evidence as a witness the individual serves the interests of justice, thus, contributes to the
establishment of the truth, irrespective of whether the information he or she adduces
would eventually serve the interests of either party. At the same time, participation as
counsel serves exclusively the interests of the represented party, i.e. counsel’s client.
Thus, by virtue of his or her professional obligations counsel may see fit not to disclose
certain facts and circumstances that would seem inimical to the interests of his or her
client. Consequently, the combined witness-counsel status may give rise to an
insurmountable conflict of interests: between counsel’s professional duty towards his or
her client, on the one hand, and the duty to contribute to the establishment of the truth
ensuing from the witness capacity.
Similar caveats against such a ‘confusion of roles’482 between counsel and witness
have been voiced by commentators,483 as well as in the relevant practice. Before the ICJ,
for instance, albeit counsel agreed to be questioned as a witness, he objected in principle
against such a possibility by insisting that lawyers should not be admitted as witnesses in
proceedings affecting, directly or indirectly, their client’s interests.484
That said, the overall comparative review of international(ized) jurisdictions lends
support to the conclusion that, unless the combination of different statuses would entail a
counsel’ – see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, I.C.J.
Reports 2010, p. 14.
482 Ibid. The authors take the correct stance that whoever appears or speaks as an advocate of a party shouldn’t
assume another procedural status concurrently.
483 Ibid.
484 See in more detail ibid., pp. 342-343, in particular, the discussion of this issue in the ELSI case.
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conflict of interests (‘confusion of roles’), an individual with a formal standing in
proceedings, such as a victim, should not in principle be prohibited from appearing
simultaneously as a witness in the same case.
3. Duality of Status in the Context of Trials of Mass Atrocities
Notwithstanding the considerations advanced hitherto, it would be wrong to assume that
victim status would automatically entail the concurrent capacity of a witness in the ICC’s
proceedings. The personal appearance in a witness capacity of each individual recognized
as a victim pursuant to rule 85(a) would be both unwarranted and unfeasible. One salient
caveat in this regard ensues from the potentially high number of individuals qualifying as
victims in the ICC’s process, which would render impossible the personal appearance of
each before the Court. Furthermore, the principle of expeditiousness as ‘one of the core
components of fairness of the proceedings’485 together with the overarching criminal
justice tenets of efficiency and expediency dictate that not all evidence which is
admissible and relevant as provided for in article 69(4) should be gathered in proceedings
taking place at the international arena. Throughout the fact-finding process concerning
large scale and wide-spread atrocities, such as the crimes falling within the ICC’s
jurisdiction, the trier of fact should employ an adroit filtering mechanism as regards the
volume, the essence and the quality of information to be collected as evidence necessary
for the illumination of the subject-matter of the case at hand. Pieces of evidence merely
repeating or overlapping in substance, scope and focus with other evidence adduced to
ascertain the facts and circumstances under consideration would be redundant. The
production of evidence intended to shed light on facts which have already been
established by way of other evidence would be unnecessary, thus superfluous. If admitted,
repetitive evidence would lead to unwarranted delays of the criminal process to the
prejudice of the proper conduct of proceedings, the due process rights of the parties, the
interests of victims, and ultimately, of justice in general.
The inimical effects of the admission of superfluous evidence on the criminal
process have long ago attracted the attention of commentators. In the context of criminal
485 Ruto et al., PTC II, Order to the Defence to Reduce the Number of Witnesses to Be Called to Testifyat the
Confirmation of Charges Hearing and to Submit an Amended List of Viva Voce Witnesses, ICC-01/09-01/11-
221, 25 July 2011.
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proceedings in a domestic setting this issue was addressed already at the beginning of the
nineteenth century by the British jurist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham, known for his
‘inimitable style’.486 Bentham, in his habitual eccentric manner of expression, observed
that superfluous ‘testimony ought to be thrown out of doors’ since ‘it would add nothing
to the effect of other evidence, and would in no way contribute to the discovery of the
truth […]’.487 In addition, Bentham quite reasonably noted that redundant evidence
‘occasions loss of time to the judge, and, to the parties, a proportional quantity of expense,
delay, and vexation […]’.488
Notably, nowadays, the importance of a fact-finding process aimed at collecting
sufficient, as opposed to all evidence, for the proper conduct, organization, effectiveness
and expeditiousness of proceedings is widely acknowledged. National jurisdictions
provide limitations with regard to the quantity of the evidence to be gathered in the course
of the proceedings.489 At the international level, criminal justice bodies are either vested
with the authority to reject outright repetitious evidence or to employ alternative means
for the incorporation of such an information into the evidentiary material, such as by
accepting written statements in lieu of the witnesses’ personal appearance in court. This
enhanced judicial control over the fact-finding procedure is a reflection of the long-
standing idea in favour of ‘the need for a more activist judiciary to speed up’ the
proceedings.490
486 Ian H. Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 3rd edition, London Sweet & Maxwell, 2007, p. 522.
487 Jeremy Bentham, ‘A Treatise on Judicial Evidence’, J. W. Paget, 1825, p. 230.
488 Ibid.
489 The Chilean legislator has  made a rather specific restriction with respect to the quantity of evidence to be
introduced by the parties, namely, each party may present up to six witnesses to prove each of the facts alleged
(Articles 458 and 486 of the Criminal Procedure Code). In Honduras the Chamber in charge of the proceedings
is vested with the discretion to reject evidence which is irrelevant, disproportionate, excessive or merely dilatory
(Articles 199 and 317 of the Code). In Paraguay, the Chamber may limit the quantity of the evidence suggested
by the parties when it is manifestly excessive (Article 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code). El Salvador
provides for the exclusion of cumulative evidence, as well as of evidence leading to delay in proceedings
(Article 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code). In Taiwan the Court may overrule motion for examination of
evidence filed by the parties if it deems it to be unnecessary (Article 163-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code). In
South Korea in case of a number of victims who had filed a petition to make a statement in the course of the
proceedings concerning identical facts constituting elements of the crime(s) charged, the Court may limit the
number of persons admitted to make a statement  (Article 294-2(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code). This legal
regime reflects the understanding about the exclusion of repetitive and/or cumulative evidence suggested by and
related to victims.
490 See Cappelletti, supra note 277. The need for a more active role on the part of the judiciary and control of the
Chamber over the proceedings is a recurring theme in the literature enunciated as early as the beginning of the
last century. By reference to concerns raised by commentators at the beginning of the 20th century, the author
draws the attention to ‘the progressive decline of a two-party, laissez-faire concept of […] justice, as well as to
the  ‘exaggerations of the contentious procedure’. Although these observations have been made in the context of
civil litigation, the ‘major trend of universal dimensions’, to which the author refers, is equally, if not even more
compelling with respect to the realities of (international) criminal proceedings of today.
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The legal framework governing the evidence-gathering process before the
Cambodian hybrid tribunal provides the Chamber with the authority to reject outright
repetitious evidence.491 The STL, on its part, provides for the admission of written
statements and transcripts in lieu of an oral testimony in circumstances where the
evidence in question is of a cumulative nature, that is, when other witnesses have already
given or will give oral testimony of similar facts.492 Consequently, albeit unlike the
ECCC, the STL’s Chambers may not reject outright requests for the submission of
repetitious evidence, they may employ alternative means of incorporation of such pieces
of evidence so as to prevent undue delay of proceedings. Similar is the legal regime at the
ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL where a Trial Chamber may dispense with the attendance of a
witness in person and admit instead in whole or in part the evidence of a witness in the
form of a written statement or transcript of evidence instead of oral testimony. 493
The ICC provides examples of a jurisprudential acknowledgement of the
importance of collecting sufficient as opposed to collecting all evidence that is relevant
and admissible.494 The Court has noted that in order for a victim to be authorized to testify
his or her testimony must be considered ‘to make a genuine contribution to the
ascertainment of the truth’ and should not ‘be unnecessarily repetitive of evidence already
tendered by the parties.’
Considerations against the collection of superfluous evidence transpire also in
international proceedings taking place outside the realm of criminal justice. A similar
tendency towards disallowing the production of repetitious evidence emerges in the ICJ’s
proceedings,495 as well as in proceedings before the International Arbitral Tribunal.496
491 This possibility is explicitly envisioned in rule 87(3)(a) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules.
492 See rule 155(A)(i)A(a) of STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
493 Rule 92bis of ICTY, ICTR and SCSL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
494 See e.g. Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and testimony in
accordance with rule 140, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr, 1 December 2009, paras. 20 and 30; Bemba, TC III,
Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the
views and concerns of victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, 22 February 2012, para. 23(ii), where the Chamber
endorsed the understanding of Trial Chamber II as regards the admissibility of a victim’s testimony at trial.
495 The ICJ has addressed the burden of superfluous evidence in its Practice Direction III, according to which
‘[i]n view of an excessive tendency towards the proliferation and protraction of annexes to written pleadings, the
parties are […] urged to append to their pleadings only strictly selected documents.’ Albeit addressing explicitly
material submitted by the parties in the written phase of proceedings, this practice direction shows the ICJ’s
inclination towards restraining the admission of material by the parties only to relevant material. Also worth
noting in the present context is Practice Direction IX which epitomizes the tenet of expeditiousness by
promoting the timely submission of documentary evidence. To this end, the practice direction stipulates that the
parties should refrain from submitting new documents after the closure of the written proceedings.
496 See articles 8(2) and 9(2)(g) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2010)
which make an express stipulation to this effect. Furthermore, according to the latter provision, the International
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In view of all the above it is to be concluded that, unless a particular individual’s
account would be conducive to the further elucidation of the subject-matter of the case,
such a narrative would be redundant, thus, unnecessary. Consequently, as unique as each
personal victim’s and/or witness’s (hi)story may seem,497 individuals will combine the
status of victim with that of a witness before the ICC only as long as their personal
account is deemed necessary for the illumination of the facts under examination and, as
such, is intended to form part of the evidentiary material. Accordingly, as correctly noted
in the Court’s jurisprudence ‘the fact that a victim gives evidence under oath […] gives
him or her the status of a witness’.498 In other words, the victim-witness dual status relates
only to individuals who take part in the proceedings simultaneously as victims and as
witnesses actually called to testify pursuant to article 69(3).499
Without embarking at this point on a comprehensive analysis of article 69(3),500 it
is worthwile to briefly sketch the leading idea behind this core legal text in the ICC’s
evidence-gathering process. Article 69(3) sets forth an adroit combination between a
party-driven (‘hands-off’) mode of presenting evidence, traditionally characteristic of
adversarial systems, and a judge-controlled501 (‘hands-on’) evidence-gathering process
(traditionally characteristic of non-adversarial jurisdictions).502 Thus, while
acknowledging the right of the parties to submit evidence relevant to the case, this
provision likewise affords the Chamber in charge of the proceedings the authority to
request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of
the truth, i.e. including the testimony of a victim-participant.
Arbitral Tribunal shall, at the request of a party or on its own motion, exclude from evidence or production any
document, statement, oral testimony or inspection for, inter alia, considerations of procedural economy,
proportionality, fairness or equality of the parties that the Tribunal determines to be compelling.
497 Lubanga, TC I, Order issuing public redacted version of the ‘Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06,
a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial’,
ICC-01/04-01/06-2032, 9 July 2009 (Lubanga, TC I, 9 July 2009), para. 37.
498 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 20 January 2010, para. 88.
499 Lubanga,TC I, 18 January 2008, para. 132.
500 This provision is addressed in detail in the next chapter.
501 See the juxtaposition between the two main evidentiary methods at the national level suggested by Mirjan
Damaska in Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision. Faculty Scholarship Series, 1975, Paper 1589.
502 See in the same vein, McGonigle, supra note 362, p. 108.
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4. Acquiring Duality of Status
Following the assertion reached above that a victim-participant before the ICC could
simultaneously appear as a witness in the same case, the next issue to be explored is the
way in which an individual could acquire duality of victim-witness status.
The first scenario of acquiring duality of status would take place in case a person
has already been approached as a witness and only subsequently is admitted as a victim in
proceedings. In this event, the witness capacity will precede the legal condition of a
victim. An alternative scenario of duality of status could likewise unfold. Such would be
the case when the testimony of a particular individual is deemed necessary for the
establishment of facts relevant to the case following his or her acknowledgment as victim-
participant.
Within the latter scenario, an individual recognized as victim may assume the
status of witness if in the course of the proceedings the parties request to present evidence
by way of the testimony of that victim-participant in accordance with the first sentence of
article 69(3). Similarly, if the Chamber upon consideration of the requisites of article
68(3) read in light of article 69(3) determines that the personal interests of victims
together with its authority to ascertain the truth necessitate the testimony of a particular
victim, the latter will assume the capacity of a witness appearing before the Court.503
Practice shows that the different scenarios of combining victim status with the
capacity of a witness contemplated above may unfold concurrently in the course of the
proceedings. One such example represents the Lubanga trial where nine dual status
individuals took part in the proceedings, six of whom had been approached as witnesses
before assuming the standing of victims, whereas other three had been granted victim
status before testifying. At the pre-trial phase of the case six individuals whom the
Prosecutor had interviewed and whose testimony he intended to use as evidence in the
confirmation of the charges hearing applied to participate as victims in the proceedings.
Although these individuals were not admitted as participating victims by PTC I for the
purpose of the confirmation of charges hearing, subsequently they were recognized as
503 See article 68(3) read in light of article 69(3). This understanding has been properly reflected in the
jurisprudence of the Court. See Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 60, as well as Appeals
Chamber, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010
Entitled “Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial”, ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, 16 July 2010
(Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 16 July 2010).
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victim-participants at the trial stage of the process.504 In addition, the Trial Chamber also
admitted the testimony of three individuals participating in the proceedings as victims.505
Similar situation developed in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, where two
individuals had already been interviewed as prosecution witnesses before being granted
victim standing at the pre-trial stage of the case.506 Subsequently, at the trial stage of
proceedings four victim-participants were authorized to give testimony.507 The Trial
Chamber contemplated the different scenarios of acquiring victim-witness status by noting
that ‘neither the Statute nor the Rules prohibit victim status from being granted to a person
who already has the status of a prosecution or defence witness.’508 At the same time, with
respect to the possibility of a victim-participant to appear subsequently also as a witness in
the proceedings, the Chamber advanced the apposite observation that ‘[s]imilarly, rule 85
of the Rules does not prohibit a person who has been granted the status of victim from
subsequently giving evidence on behalf of one of the parties.’509
The combination of the standing of victim with the capacity of witness in
proceedings entails a number of intriguing issues of both legal and practical nature. An
essential legal matter which merits particular attention concerns the evidentiary character
of the information that emanates from individuals with dual victim-witness status. The
issue arises as to which information provided by victim-witnesses in their oral or written
statements and/or submissions in the course of the proceedings represent piece(s) of
evidence. For that purpose, the subsequent paragraphs will explore the manifold matters
related to the character of the information provided by dual status individuals in:
applications for participation as victim-participants; written statements given in the
capacity of a witness; views and concerns expressed in the course of the proceedings; oral
statements given as a witness, i.e. testimony. Next, attention will be drawn to other
equally important issues which are intrinsically linked to those outlined above, namely,
the admissibility and the probative value of the testimony of dual status individuals; the
504 Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 18 January 2008 and Decision of 15 December 2008.
505 Lubanga, TC I, 9 July 2009.
506 Prosecution witnesses 166 and 168 were later granted the status of victim-participant at the pre-trial stage of
the case.
507 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, Décision aux fins d'autorisation de comparution des victimes a/0381/09,
a/0018/09,a/0191/08 et pan/0363/09 agissant au nom de a/0363/09, ICC-01/04-01/07-2517, 9 November 2010.
508 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 110.
509 Ibid. (reference omitted).
155
impact (if any) of a dual status individual’s false or incorrect testimony on his or her
standing as victim-participant.
5. Juxtaposition Between Victims’ Applications for Participation and Written
Witness Statements
At the outset, in order to properly disentangle the issues enumerated above, one must
juxtapose the procedural character of a victim’s application for participation with the
procedural character of the statements made by the same person in a witness capacity. In
drawing such a comparison recourse should be made to the different purpose and confines
of the involvement of victims in proceedings and the participation as a witness. By
contrast to victims who take part in the ICC’s proceedings upon their own choice and
initiative, and in their own interest, witnesses participate only as long as they are
approached by the criminal justice authorities for the purpose of their testimony.510 Thus,
unlike the independent standing of victims as participants throughout all stages of the
judicial process, the participation of witnesses serves exclusively the establishment of the
truth and is limited to giving testimony at some stage of the criminal justice process.
The comparison between a victim’s application for participation and a witness
statement discerns a number of distinctions. The two differ in terms of: 1) the initiative
upon which each has been made; 2) the interests and the purpose that each of them serves;
3) the context in which each is being submitted and processed.
First, the choice whether to file an application for participation depends
exclusively on the victim-applicant. By contrast, witness statements are given upon the
request of the criminal justice authorities. Secondly, while an application for participation
serves the interests of the applicant to be admitted as victim-participant in proceedings,
witness statements serve exclusively the interest in the ascertainment of the truth.
Accordingly, witness statements are provided for the sake of the interests of justice rather
than in the witness’s own personal interest. Thirdly, the legal regime governing the
submission of victims’ applications for participation is delineated in a separate set of
provisions distinct from the regime governing the deposition of witness statements. The
application forms for participation are filled in and filed within the context of the
510 See article 64(6)(b) and rule 65.
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application procedure set forth in rule 89, whereas witness statements are given in the
context of the fact-finding process conducted by the criminal justice authority in charge of
the respective stage of proceedings (the Prosecutor or the relevant Chamber).
Accordingly, witness statements are collected in the course of the evidence-gathering
process for the purpose of the illumination of facts and circumstances under examination.
As such, they are pieces of oral evidence and form part of the evidentiary material. On the
contrary, the information in the victims’ applications for participation serves to
demonstrate whether the applicant is eligible for participation as enunciated in rule 85 and
article 68(3). Thus, the information provided by the victim-applicant serves to substantiate
the application so as to warrant the admission of the person by the Chamber as victim-
participant. The purpose of the information provided by victim-applicants is to enable the
Chamber to ascertain whether the incident(s) described in the application form fall(s)
within the factual scope of the case to be examined by the Chamber.511 In addition, by
contrast to the information given in a witness capacity, the information in the victim’s
application form does not in itself prove the facts alleged by the applicant or any other
circumstances under consideration. Hence, rather than representing statements of an
evidentiary nature, the contents of the application form assert facts without actually
proving them.
In that sense the application form resembles to some extent the document
containing the charges prepared by the prosecuting authority. Both allege that a harmful
behaviour has occurred within a certain time period and territory. The document
containing the charges serves the initiation of proceedings against the alleged perpetrator
for the purpose of bringing him or her to trial, just as the application for participation is
intended to warrant participation in proceedings. Accordingly, akin to the information
contained in a victim’s application form, the information presented in the document
containing the charges is not evidence in itself, but an allegation. Whether the asserted
events and harm have taken place as described, as well as whether the alleged harmful
behaviour is attributable to the person identified in the charges is subject to examination
and proof in the course of the criminal justice process. In other words, as bluntly put by
511 Ruto et al., PTC II, Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the
Related Proceedings, ICC-01/09-01/11-249, 5 August 2011, para. 46.
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the ICJ in the Bosnia case, ‘the claims made by the Prosecutor in the indictments are just
that – allegations made by one party.’512
Notwithstanding the similarities between the document containing the charges and
the application for victim’s participation, the two are far from being identical. Unlike the
Prosecutor who by virtue of regulation 52(c) of the Regulations of the Court must also
include legal characterisation of the facts alleged in the document containing the charges,
victim-applicants are not required to legally characterise the facts described in their
applications for participation. This distinction stems from the different procedural
standing and mission pursued by the prosecuting authority at trial. By contrast to the
prosecution, victims participate in proceedings in their own right and in the pursuit of
their own personal interests. Victim-applicants before the ICC are neither auxiliary
prosecutors, nor are they obliged to support the prosecution.513 Victims’ interests do not
necessarily coincide with those of the Prosecutor acting in the public interest.514 In
addition, victims apply for participation in a personal, not in a professional capacity.
Consequently, they are neither expected to have legal background nor to provide proper
legal characterization of the facts asserted in their applications for participation. For the
same reasons, victim-applicants are not required to identify the alleged perpetrators in
their applications for participation. According to the Court’s consistent jurisprudence, the
identification of the perpetrators is not among the information necessary for the
applications to be considered complete.515
Since the information contained in victims’ applications for participation is not of
an evidentiary character and, accordingly, does not form part of the evidentiary material, it
would be logical to assume that disclosure-related issues in that respect should not at all
arise. As the regime governing disclosure refers to ‘evidence’ in the Prosecutor’s
possession or control, information of a non-evidentiary character falls outside its purview.
512 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 217.
513 See e.g. Bemba, TC III, Decision on Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-1023,
19 November 2010, para. 17 et seq., where it is observed that victims are participants rather than parties to the
trial and shall not be considered as a support to the Prosecutor, as well as that they have a unique role, separate
from that of the parties and that their participation can assist the Chamber in its determination of the truth.
514 See along the same lines, de Hemptinne, supra note 390, where it is observed that unlike the Prosecutor who
must act as an agent of justice representing the public interest, victims intervene in a private capacity and their
motivation is purely personal.
515 See Ruto et. al., PTC II, 05 August 2011, para. 22, plus footnotes 26 and 27. See also Bemba, TC III, 12 July
2010, para. 94, where the Chamber has observed that the identification of the actual perpetrators by victim-
applicants would, first, be at times impossible and, secondly, would place an unfair burden on victim-applicants.
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Still, as the review of the ICC’s jurisprudence shows, initially some Chambers have
favoured the disclosure of information provided by victims in their applications for
participation.
In this regard, in the Lubanga case, following an application by the defence, TC I
concurred without demur with the view of the Prosecutor that the applications for
participation of dual status individuals should be considered in the same way as
statements of witnesses, and that they are covered by rule 76(1).516 Lacking any thorough
consideration of the specific nature of a victim’s application for participation, the
Chamber ruled that the Prosecutor must apply ‘the same approach to this material as […]
to any other exculpatory material in [the Prosecutor’s] possession’, subject to the lack of
any objections on the part of the dual status individuals’ representatives. The Chamber
subsequently reiterated its stance in an oral decision on the familiarization process, where
it observed that ‘these application forms should be treated by the Office of the Prosecutor
in exactly the same way as all other [a]rticle 67(2) and [r]ule 77 material. They should be
looked at to see whether they contain evidence or other material which comes under […]
that statutory provision or that rule.’ This approach was later sustained by TC III, which
on the basis of the concurring views of the parties ruled that the applications for
participation by dual status individuals shall be treated as ‘prior witness statements’517 and
left to the discretion of the Prosecutor to determine whether the application forms of dual
status individuals should be disclosed.518
The judicial findings of the two Trial Chambers call for a critical consideration as
they fall short of discerning the stark difference between the legal character of an
application for participation and a witness statement which has already been contemplated
above. Furthermore, the interpretation of both article 67(2) and rules 76-77 which
envision ‘evidence’ in the Prosecutor’s possession or control warrants the conclusion that
victims’ applications are not subject to disclosure from the Prosecutor to the defence. In
516 See the oral decision of TC I in the Lubanga case on the familiarisation process, referred to by the
Prosecution in its ‘Prosecution Response to the Defence Observations on the Modalities of Victim Participation
at the Trial Stage’, ICC-01/04-01/07-877-tENG, para. 24, where the Chamber observed that ‘weʹve set out a
procedure whereby the representative of the relevant victim applicant should be consulted to see whether there
are objections to disclosure taking place in relation to those portions that have been identified. If disclosure is to
take place with redactions, the proposed redactions need to be brought to the attention of the Bench, because it is
for us to decide whether or not redactions are appropriate and accord with the interests of justice and, in
particular, the accusedʹs rights to a fair trial.’
517 Bemba, TC III, 12 July 2010, para. 55 et seq.
518 Ibid., para. 59.
159
this respect it is worth recalling that, unlike witness statements and other evidentiary
material, the applications for participation of dual status individuals are not gathered by
the Prosecutor in the course of his or her investigation, but are submitted to the Chamber
within the application procedure set forth in article 68(3) read together with rule 89.
Hence, the sole authority in possession and control of the applications for participation is
the relevant Chamber and not the Prosecutor. The parties by virtue of rule 89(1) are
provided with copies of the application forms for the limited purpose of making, if they so
wish, observations as regards the eligibility of the applicants as victim-participants
according to rule 85 read together with article 68(3). Consequently, the ruling that
victims’ applications for participation should be treated as prior witness statements lacks
legal basis.
At the same time, although the application form does not in itself contain
evidentiary material and thus is not subject to disclosure, its contents may serve as the
basis for the collection of information by the Prosecutor. Information collected on the
basis of a victim’s application may subsequently be used as evidence in the proceedings
and, to the extent to which it may contain exculpatory information or may be material for
the preparation of the defence, would be subject to disclosure pursuant to article 67(2) and
rules 76-77.
A similar line of reasoning has been espoused in the Ruto et al. case where the Pre-
Trial Chamber has been seized with a defence’s request for transmission of unredacted
victims’ applications to the Prosecutor in order for him to fulfil his disclosure obligations
pursuant to article 67(2).519 By contrast to TC II and TC III, the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled
that ‘the information provided by the applicants in their applications for participation can
under no circumstances be considered as evidence’ by observing that ‘such information
has been provided by the applicants to the Chamber only for the purposes of
substantiating an application for participation but not to give evidence on either points of
fact or law in the present case.’ Hence, in addition to the emphasis on the distinct purpose
of the application for participation, the Chamber endorsed the non-evidentiary character of
the information contained therein. This conclusion was premised on the observation that
the information in the applications for participation ‘was not collected by the Prosecutor
519 Ruto et al., PTC II, Decision on the Defence Requests in Relation to the Victims' Applications for
Participation in the Present Case, ICC-01/09-01/11-169, 8 July 2011 (Ruto et al, PTC II, 8 July 2011), para. 9, as
well as Ruto et al., PTC II, 5 August 2011, para. 107.
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during his investigation and cannot therefore be defined as “evidence”’. Eventually, the
Chamber asserted that the information provided by the victim-applicants in the
applications for participation is not subject to disclosure between the parties ‘even if
information provided therein can be considered exonerating in nature’. Still, the Pre-Trial
Chamber reasonably noted that the information contained in the application forms, albeit
lacking evidentiary character, could indicate to the Prosecutor that ‘the applicants may
possess information to be considered exculpatory within the meaning of article 67(2), in
which case the Prosecutor’s investigation should extend to cover such information.’520
Worth noting is the pertinent clarification made by the Chamber that ‘only in case
information in the victims’ possession is collected by the Prosecutor and reveals itself as
exculpatory in nature and/or in any way material for the preparation of the defence, the
Prosecutor will be under the statutory obligation to disclose to the Defence any such
evidence [emphasis added].’521
6. Juxtaposition Between Victims’ Views and Concerns and Testimony
Following the examination of the procedural character of victims’ applications for
participation, a comparison should be drawn between the procedural character of
submissions made by dual status individuals in their capacity as victims, i.e. by way of the
presentation of views and concerns, and in their witness capacity, i.e. by way of giving
testimony. This issue is intrinsically linked to the question regarding the position and the
role of victims in the evidence-gathering process, which is the subject of consideration of
the next chapter. In addition, bearing in mind that the notion ‘views and concerns’ has
been addressed in detail in the context of the prerequisites of article 68(3), the present
section will be confined to suggesting a parallel between the purpose and substance of the
views and concerns of dual status individuals and their testimony.
As mentioned earlier in relation to article 68(3), the possibility for victims to
present their views and concerns in the course of the proceedings is separate and distinct
from the possibility of a dual status individual to give testimony. Through the presentation
of views and concerns victims convey their stance and/or preoccupation(s) with respect to
(a) particular issue(s) which arise(s) in the course of the proceedings and has a bearing on
520 Ruto et al, PTC II, 8 July 2011,para. 11.
521 Ibid.
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victims’ personal interests. Accordingly, in this way victims express their opinion on
matters that arise throughout the criminal justice process and impact the development and
conduct of proceedings. Said differently, through their views and concerns victims
communicate their feelings to the decision-maker.522 Likewise, by way of presenting their
views and concerns victim-participants may draw the attention of the Chamber to pending
issues, such as the approach to be taken to reparations.523 Still, it is to be recalled that,
albeit victims’ views and concerns may affect the correct evaluation by the Chamber of
facts relevant to the case (for instance, by pointing to local traditions and customs),524 they
do not themselves form part of the evidentiary material.
Testimony, on its part, serves the ascertainment of facts under consideration. By
way of his or her testimony, the individual communicates to the criminal justice
authorities his or her own personal experience, knowledge and recollections of facts
comprised by the subject-matter of the case. Testimony is thus a narrative concerning
events that have occurred before the initiation of the criminal justice process.
Consequently, testifying individuals do not voice an opinion with respect to issues
pending throughout the proceedings, but provide a statement of facts relating to past
events. That is to say, the witness gives ‘testimony only about matters of which the
witness has personal knowledge.’525 Accordingly, by contrast to victims’ views and
concerns, the testimony of a victim given in accordance with article 69(1) represents a
piece of oral evidence and as such forms part of the evidentiary material.
It thus follows that, albeit having the potential to enhance the Court’s better
understanding of the case at hand, the views and concerns of victims expressed in the
course of the proceedings do not per se prove or disprove the facts under consideration.
By contrast, through their account given in the form of a testimony dual status individuals
place evidentiary material before the Court. As a consequence, by way of testifying
individuals with combined victim-witness status could impact directly the ascertainment
of the subject-matter of proceedings.
522 Edwards, supra note 448, p. 976.
523 Lubanga, TC I, Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express their
views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, 26 June 2009
(Lubanga, TC I, 26 June 2009), para. 40.
524 For instance, the local traditions were considered to influence the manner of giving testimony – at times
witnesses were speaking in first name as if they had personally experienced the events, although this was not the
case.
525 Dennis, supra note 486, p. 491.
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The ‘critical distinction’526 between a dual status individual’s views and concerns
and his or her testimony has been articulated in a consistent and unanimous way by the
Court. In the Lubanga case, as regards the request of three victims to appear in person at
trial in order to express their views and concerns and to present evidence by way of their
testimony, the Court made the pertinent emphasis on the distinct procedural character of
the process of victims ‘expressing their views and concerns’ as opposed to ‘giving
evidence’.527 Accordingly, the Court held that in order for the victims to incorporate their
statements into the trial evidence, such statements must take the form of a testimony. In
other words, in order to directly impact the evidentiary material, victims must ’give
evidence under oath from the witness box.’528 Consequently, in addition to their victim
standing the victims must assume the status of a witness.529 In fact, this situation reflects
the first scenario, contemplated above, of acquiring duality of status, whereby an
individual is first accorded the status of victim-participant and subsequently is called to
testify.
This approach was further reiterated in the Abu Garda case. During the
confirmation of charges hearing PTC I emphasised that the presence at the seat of the
Court of the dual status individual concerned was ‘in his capacity as a witness, not as a
victim authorised to participate in the proceedings.’530
The distinct nature of a victim’s views and concerns and a witness testimony was
likewise emphasized in the Bemba case. While the Chamber authorized the personal
appearance of three victims for the purpose of expressing their views and concerns via
video link, during the hearing the Presiding Judge repeatedly reminded the parties and the
participants that the views and concerns are not part of the evidentiary material and that,
accordingly, through the expression of their views and concerns the victims would not
provide evidence. For this reason, the victims who presented their views and concerns in
person did not make a solemn undertaking envisaged in rule 66 as to the truthfulness of
their statements. The victim-participants were neither questioned by the parties nor by the
Chamber. The legal representative was allowed a limited intervention in the course of the
526 Lubanga, TC I, 26 June 2009, para. 25.
527 Ibid.
528 Ibid.
529 Ibid.
530 Abu Garda, PTC I, Confirmation of charges hearing, Transcript, ICC-02/05-02/09-T-13-ENG ET WT, 20
October 2009, pp. 95-96.
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hearing aimed at facilitating the victims in the presentation of their views and concerns.531
Thus, in contrast to the three victims who assumed duality of status by giving testimony in
the Lubanga trial, the three victims in the Bemba trial did not become dual status
individuals. The latter shared their plight before the Court without, however, submitting
evidentiary material by way of their statements.
A brief comparative glance beyond the ICC reveals that the distinct procedural
character of a victim’s views and concerns as compared to testimony has likewise been
acknowledged by other judicial institutions at the international level. At the ECCC, where
civil parties (unlike ‘simple’ witnesses) do not take an oath when questioned, they are
granted the opportunity to make a statement at the conclusion of their testimony
pertaining to their suffering.532 Notwithstanding the lack of a formal distinction in the
legal framework between civil parties’ views and concerns and testimony, the
jurisprudence of the Court has at all time distinguished between testimony on the facts at
issue and a general statement of suffering, which civil parties can freely make at the end
of their interview.533 In this respect, as posited by the Trial Chamber in Case 002,534 the
civil party’s testimony is subject to adversarial argument, while the statement of suffering
of the same individual is not. In light of this clarification and given rule 87(2) of ECCC’s
Internal Rules, according to which only evidence put before the Chamber and subject to
examination forms part of the evidentiary material, it follows that civil parties’ statements
of suffering do not represent evidence.535 Accordingly, akin to the views and concerns of
ICC’s victims expressed in the course of the proceedings, the statements of suffering of
civil parties at the ECCC do not form part of the evidentiary material.536
531 Bemba, TC III, Transcript of open session hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-227-Red-ENG CT WT, 25 June 2012,
p. 2, at lines 11-18.
532 See The Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Case File Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC
(ECCC, Case 002), Decision on Request to Recall Civil Party Tccp-187, for Review of Procedure Concerning
Civil Parties' Statements on Suffering and Related Motions and Responses (E240, E240/1, E250, E250/1, E267,
E267/1 and E267/2) of 2 May 2013 (ECCC, Case 002, Decision of 2 May 2013).
533 Ibid.
534 The Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Case File Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC.
535 See further in the same vein the analysis suggested by Mélanie Vianney-Liaud, ‘Civil Parties’ Statements of
Suffering at the ECCC’, http://destinationjustice.org/civil-parties-statements-of-suffering-at-the-eccc/, p. 3.
536Another essential clarification advanced in the ECCC’s jurisprudence is that a civil party’s statements of
suffering neither could become a pretext for the introduction of new facts by the civil party nor for the
advancement of allegations against the accused that have not been subject to adversarial argument. Accordingly,
where a statement of suffering would introduce new factual allegations, particularly if inculpatory, an
opportunity for adversarial challenge would be given to the defendant. See ECCC, Case 002, Decision of 2 May
2013, para. 19.
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Another judicial institution which has also made an apposite distinction between
an opinion expressed by a witness and the testimony of that witness is the ICJ.537 The
Court has not treated as evidence ‘any part of the [witness] testimony […] which was not
a statement of fact, but a mere expression of opinion as to the probability or otherwise of
the existence of such facts, not directly known to the witness.’ The Court further opined
that ‘[t]estimony of this kind, which may be highly subjective, cannot take the place of
evidence.’ The Court reached the reasonable conclusion that ‘[a]n opinion expressed by a
witness is a mere persona1 and subjective evaluation of a possibility, which has yet to be
shown to correspond to a fact; it may, in conjunction with other material, assist the Court
in determining a question of fact, but is not proof in itself.’538
7. Admissibility and Probative Weight of the Testimony of Dual Status
Individuals
In light of the parallel between the procedural character of victims’ views and concerns
and victims’ testimony a thorough examination of the manifold intriguing aspects of the
testimony of dual status individuals as an evidentiary material proves apposite. The
concurrent participation as a victim and as a witness in the same proceedings entails a
variety of issues related to the admissibility and the probative weight of the testimony of
dual status persons, some of which have been addressed in the legal literature,539 as well
as in practice.540
Before proceeding with the issue at stake, a few preliminary words on the
substance of the core evidentiary concepts employed in the present section are to be
briefly sketched at this point. Evidence must, first and foremost, be relevant in order to
form part of the evidentiary material. As eloquently described by scholars in the field of
evidence law, this means that the evidence at hand ‘must relate to some fact which is a
537 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 (ICJ, Nicaragua case, Judgment on the Merits), para. 68.
538 Ibid.
539 Observers raise the question whether victims would lose the possibility to be questioned by the Prosecutor or
whether the evidence they provide by way of their testimony would be of lesser weight – see Victims’ Rights
Working Group, Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court. Summary of Issues and
Recommendations, November 2013, p. 11.
540 See in this respect the objections of the defence against the dual status of witness 166 at trial addressed in
Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 23 June 2008, para. 13 et seq. due to the witness’s access to the confidential part
of the case file.
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proper object of proof in the proceedings.’541 Closely related to the concept of ‘relevance’
is the term ‘admissibility’. The latter denotes the quality of the evidence, namely, that it
must be ‘properly […] received by a court as a matter of law’.542 Logic dictates that
irrelevant evidence is always inadmissible. However, the opposite scenario is not
necessarily true. There may be instances where not all evidence that is relevant would also
be admissible. The legislature may limit or prohibit the reception of certain types of
evidence, notwithstanding their relevance.543 Next, evidence that is both relevant and
admissible is subject to evaluation by the decision-maker with respect to its probative
weight. Thus, as duly observed in the recent Judgment on the appeal of Thomas Lubanga
against his conviction, ‘[w]hile the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence do
not specifically refer to [the] concepts [of the credibility of the witness and the reliability
of his or her testimony], they are part of the evaluation of evidence required of a Trial
Chamber by article 74 (2) of the Statu[t]e.’544 Consequently, when evaluating the weight
of the oral evidence at hand, the trier of fact must assess meticulously its credibility and
reliability.545
As noted both in literature546 and in practice,547 these two concepts, albeit being
intrinsically connected, are not interchangeable. In determining whether the testimony is
credible the judicial authority will consider ‘the extent to which the witness can be
accepted as giving truthful evidence in the sense of honest or sincere testimony.’548 When
evaluating the reliability of the witness testimony, the Court will appraise ‘the truthfulness
of [the] testimony in the sense of its accuracy.’549 It thus follows that the notion
‘credibility’ relates to the truthfulness of the testimony, while the notion ‘reliability’
541 Dennis, supra note 486, p. 5 and the corresponding footnote, where it is observed that the ‘facts which are the
proper objects of proof are […] called material facts’.
542 Ibid.
543 See, in general, ibid. and the examples provided by the author in that respect.
544 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, Public Redacted Version of the Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo against his conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, 1 December 2014 (Lubanga, Appeals Chamber
Judgment of 1 December 2014), para. 239.
545 See Dennis, supra note 486, p. 6.
546 See also in the same vein the note provided by Lynne Marek in the National Law Journal, September 21,
2009 (available online) describing an instance where federal Prosecutors in Chicago have requested a U.S.
District Judge for reconsideration of a ruling on false testimony with the contention that the testimony at issue
was actually ‘truthful, but inaccurate’.
547 See Lubanga, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 1 December 2014, para. 239, where the Chamber noted ‘a
strong link between the two concepts [of credibility and reliability]’ and clarified that ‘while credibility is
generally understood as referring to whether a witness is testifying truthfully, the reliability of the facts testified
to by the witness may be confirmed or put in doubt by other evidence or the surrounding circumstances
[footnotes omitted].’
548 See Dennis, supra note 486, p. 6.
549 Ibid. As the author correctly notes, honest witnesses may sometimes give evidence that is inaccurate.
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relates to its accuracy. Consequently, ‘although a witness may be honest, and therefore
credible, the evidence he or she gives may nonetheless be unreliable because, inter alia, it
relates to facts that occurred a long time ago or due to the “vagaries of human perception”
[footnote omitted].’550
As far as the testimony of individuals with combined victim-witness status is
concerned, this type of evidence, just like any other testimony which is part of the trial
evidence, is subject to judicial assessment as regards its relevance and admissibility and,
eventually, its trustworthiness.551 In light of the considerations concerning duality of status
posited hitherto, it is logical to conclude that the mere fact that an individual appears in
one and the same case in the capacity of a witness and a victim does not per se render his
or her testimony inadmissible or unreliable. The admissibility and the probative value of
the testimony of dual status individuals, akin to any other piece of evidence collected in
the course of the proceedings, should be determined on a case-by-case basis against the
backdrop of the circumstances of the case in accordance with article 69(4). This logic is
further premised on the rationale of rule 63(2), which envisions that the Chamber shall
assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance and admissibility
in accordance with article 69. In the same vein is rule 64(3), pursuant to which the
Chamber shall not consider evidence that it has ruled irrelevant or inadmissible.
Consequently, the legal framework does not determine in advance the relevance or
admissibility of any evidence. Instead, quite wisely, this task has been entrusted by the
drafters to the discretion of the trier of fact.
In addition, it would be equally wrong to presume that dual status individuals have
a material interest in the conviction of the accused. First, as noted at the very outset, the
participation in proceedings leading to the adjudication of the individual criminal
responsibility of the alleged offender does not in itself entail an interest of victims in
safeguarding future claims for reparations. Participation in proceedings on the merits of
the criminal case and participation in reparation proceedings following a conviction are
two separate and distinct possibilities accorded to victims by the ICC’s statutory
instruments which may be employed independently of one another.552 Secondly, the
550 Lubanga, Appeals Chamber Judgment of 1 December 2014, para. 239.
551 Article 69(4) and (7) and article 74.
552 The independent character of proceedings on the merits and reparation proceedings has also been endorsed in
the Court’s jurisprudence. See e.g. the recent jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga, where it is
observed that ‘a request for reparations pursuant to rule 94 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is not
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widely acknowledged interest of victims in the establishment of the truth would be
safeguarded only when the actual perpetrator is brought to justice.553
Hence, the testimony of dual status individuals should not be presumed partial by
default. Rather, its accuracy and credibility or the lack of such are to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis against the backdrop of the totality of the evidence collected in the
course of the proceedings as provided for in article 74. In accordance with this norm,
when evaluating the evidence given by the dual status individual by way of his or her
testimony the Chamber shall determine whether this piece of evidence corresponds with
other evidence gathered at trial or, rather, remains isolated. For instance, consideration
should be given to the fact whether the previous testimony (if any) of the dual status
individual is consistent with the testimony given at trial, as well as whether the account
given by that person is corroborated by other pieces of evidence. This appraisal, however,
can be undertaken after the completion of the evidence-gathering process in light of the
totality of the evidentiary material collected in the course of the proceedings.554
Accordingly, the probative value of the testimony of dual status individuals should be
assessed by the Court case by case on the basis of a scrutinized analysis of whether and to
what extent the version of the facts conveyed by the dual status individual comports with
the rest of the evidence. Hence, the reliability and the credibility of the testimony of the
dual status individual, as is the case with any other type and piece of evidence, depends on
the extent to which it is substantiated by evidence of a different nature or obtained from
other sources.
Logic in the same vein permeates the ICC’s jurisprudence and is also reflected in
the case-law of the ECCC. In this respect, the ICC has acknowledged the lack of any
prohibition or limitation in the Court’s founding texts of the admissibility or probative
value of the evidence of individuals with combined victim-witness status.555 The Court
dependent upon either the filing of an application for participation pursuant to rule 89 of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence or being granted the right to participate in the proceedings in relation to the accused person's guilt
or innocence or the sentence.’ – Lubanga, Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 14 December 2012, para. 69. The
ECCC has also observed that at the ICC ‘a civil action is not a prerequisite for victim participation in […]
proceedings’- see ECCC, Case 001, Trial Chamber Decision of 9 October 2009, para. 38.
553 See along these lines, Ashworth, supra note 213, who contends that no one and certainly not the victims of
crime has a defensible interest in the conviction of innocent people.
554 The logical understanding that the evidentiary material gathered in the course of the proceedings must be
evaluated in its totality is also embraced in the relevant jurisprudence. See e.g. Lubanga, Appeals Chamber
Judgment of 1 December 2014, para. 22, footnote 16 referring to similar findings of the ICTY in the Mrkšić and
Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment, para. 217.
555 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 23 June 2008, paras. 19 and 24.
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noted that ‘the crucial factor in assessing the reliability [and the credibility] of … [dual
status individuals’] oral statements or testimonies’ would lie in the fact whether there
were substantial differences between the statements of victim-witnesses given before they
had access to other evidence in the case record and their statements after they had had
access to the other evidence in the case record.556 Further, the Court has observed that a
uniform predetermination of the admissibility or the probative value of dual status
individuals would deprive the truth-finding authority from potentially ‘highly relevant and
probative testimony of witnesses for the sole reason that they have also been authorised to
participate in the proceedings as victims.’557 In support of its understanding the Court has
also drawn on the experience of national jurisdictions, which, it noted, lack ‘any rule
automatically reducing the probative value of the evidence given by [….] individuals
holding […] dual status.’558 At the same time, it has been duly noted that if substantial
doubts would arise as to the credibility of the testimony of a particular dual status
individual, on the basis of a case-by-case assessment the Chamber may eventually decide
not to admit that specific victim to the witness’s stand.559
Similarly, as already mentioned, the ECCC’s Chambers are also in favour of the
case-by-case assessment of the credibility and probative value of the civil parties’
statements. The Chambers have asserted that the weight to be given to civil party
testimony should be assessed in light of the credibility of that testimony.560 Consequently,
neither the ICC, nor the ECCC attach a lesser or a greater weight to any piece of oral
evidence whether provided by victim-participants/civil parties or by ‘simple’ witnesses.
The same understanding should likewise apply to the testimony of dual status
individuals who prior to their examination have been given access to the evidence
556 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 23 June 2008, para. 27(i) and (ii).
557 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 88.
558 Katanga and Ngudjolo, PTC I, 23 June 2008, para. 26.
559 See in more detail, Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, Décision relative au maintien du statut de victime
participant à la procédure des victimes a/0381/09 et a/0363/09 et à la demande de Me Nsita Luvengika en vue
d'être autorisé à mettre fin à son mandat de Représentant légal desdites victimes, ICC-01/04-01/07-3064, 7 July
2011 (reclassified as public on 16 August 2011), para. 42 et seq. The Chamber found that the testimony of one
victim who had been authorized to give testimony at trial would not be conducive to the ascertainment of the
truth due to considerable doubts in her credibility. The Chamber decided not to allow the testimony of that dual
status individual on the basis of a scrutinized consideration of the submissions of the victim’s legal
representative, who himself had seriously questioned the veracity of the account of his client.
560 ECCC, Case 002, Decision of 2 May 2013, para. 22. See also para. 11 referring to the observations of the Co-
Prosecutors as being in the same vein. The Prosecution submitted that the probative value of civil party’s
testimony should be assessed by the Trial Chamber in accordance with the same standards as that of witnesses
and not accorded lesser weight/value merely because civil parties’ testimony is not given under oath. The
Prosecution further submitted that the testimony of a civil party should not be considered to possess an
inherently lesser value merely because it was not given under oath.
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contained in the record of the case, including the statements of other witnesses.
Arguments in support of this understanding could be drawn on the rationale behind rule
140(3), second sentence. According to this norm, the fact that a witness has heard the
testimony of another witness (which may affect and/or influence the accuracy of his or her
recollections), shall not in itself warrant the witness’s disqualification form testifying.
Instead of ruling out the testimony altogether, the fact that the victim-witness is examined
after having heard the testimony of (an)other witness(es) shall be noted in the record and
considered by the Chamber when evaluating the evidence.561
Provisions to the same effect are to be found in the legal frameworks of other
international(ized) criminal justice fora, such as the SCSL, the STL and the ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In this strain, rule 90(D) of SCSL’s
Rules stipulates that even if a witness has heard the testimony of another witness before
testifying, the witness shall not for that reason alone be disqualified. The same viewpoint
is almost verbatim reflected in rule 150(C) of STL’s Rules, as well as in rule 90(C) and
rule 90(D) of the Rules of the ICTY and ICTR, accordingly.
As to the ECCC, although its framework does not contain an explicit provision
akin to the ones just mentioned, rule 84(3) of the Internal Rules provides for the
possibility of each party to request the Chamber to hear any witness present in the
courtroom who was not properly summoned to testify. As the wording of the provision
suggests, such witnesses would already be present in the courtroom, thus, by implication,
they would have heard the testimony of the witnesses who had testified before them at
trial. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that rule 84(3) of ECCC’s Internal Rules reflects
the same rationale. Accordingly, also at the Cambodian tribunal the fact that a witness has
heard the testimony of other witnesses would not render such testimony inadmissible.
By the same token, witnesses at the ECCC that are in a relationship with a party
are not disqualified from testifying for that sole reason.562 The reliability of the testimony
of such individuals, as the testimony of any other witness, is to be appraised by the trier of
561 In a similar fashion, the defence in Lubanga argued that the Chamber should apply to dual status individuals
the same system that applies to witnesses who are not participating as victims, treating their testimony in the
same way – see Lubanga, TC I, Decision on certain practicalities regarding individuals who have the dual status
of witness and victim, ICC-01/04-01/06-1379, 5 June 2008 (Decision of 5 June 2008), para. 20.
562 See rule 24(2) and (3) of the Internal Rules. According to rule 24(3) of the Internal Rules, before testifying
each witness shall be asked by the judicial authority whether he or she is in a relationship with either party – the
charged person/the accused or a civil party. Witnesses in a relationship with a party are, however, not
disqualified from testifying for that sole reason. Instead, as stipulated by rule 24(2) of the Internal Rules, such
witnesses shall be questioned without having taken an oath.
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fact against the backdrop of the totality of the evidence gathered at trial. The only instance
where a testimony would be rendered outright inadmissible, as envisaged in rule 24(4) of
the Internal Rules, is where there is evidence of criminal responsibility of the witness in
question.
Interestingly, by contrast to the rest of the institutions pointed out above, the ICJ
has explicitly regarded two forms of testimony as being prima facie of superior
credibility. The first is ‘the evidence of a disinterested witness[, that is,] one who is not a
party to the proceedings and stands to gain or lose nothing from its outcome’. The second
testimony identified by the Court as prima facie of superior credibility is ‘so much of the
evidence of a party as is against its own interest’.563 Accordingly, said findings distinguish
between two types of testimony: testimony of disinterested witnesses and testimony of
partial witnesses. Nevertheless, the ICJ did not regard the testimony of a partial witness as
inadmissible or unreliable by default, but simply admonished that it would ‘treat such
evidence with great reserve’.564 Similarly, the Court did not rule out other pieces of
evidence, such as affidavits produced for the purposes of litigation, albeit it held that they
would be treated ‘with caution’.565 In the view of the Court, it would not be inappropriate
to receive such affidavits (although it would treat them with caution), as long as these
pieces of evidence attested to personal knowledge of facts by a particular individual.566
All the above speaks in favour of the case-by-case appraisal of the probative
weight and trustworthiness of any piece of oral evidence, irrespective of whether it is
provided by a dual status individual or by a ‘simple’ witness, by a disinterested or by a
partial witness.
An additional argument against the uniform predetermination of the probative
value or credibility of a victim’s account of relevant facts emanates from a jurisdiction
which expressly prohibits duality of victim-witness status. In Romania, where victims are
parties to the proceedings, they cannot be heard as witnesses.567 Nevertheless, the
statements of the victim participating as a party to the case are not necessarily deprived of
563 ICJ, Nicaragua case, Judgment on the Merits, para. 69.
564 Ibid., para. 70.
565 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 659, para. 244.
566 Ibid.
567 According to article 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Romania, the harmed person may be heard as
witness if he doesn’t constitute him- or herself as civil party and will not take part in the trial as victim.
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any probative weight.568 Instructive in this regard is article 75 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, according to which, although the statements of the victim or the civil party given at
trial do not represent evidence on their own, they may nevertheless lead to the truth to the
extent to which they are corroborated by all the evidence in the case. Accordingly, to the
extent to which the statements of the person assuming victim standing are in line with the
evidentiary material, they may be taken into consideration by the trier of fact in its
determination of the subject-matter of the case. Hence, although not formally constituting
evidence, following a case-by-case evaluation, the statements of the victim may
nevertheless serve as ‘relevant material’.
Lastly, in the broader context of the admissibility, probative weight and
trustworthiness of oral evidence in general the following should also be taken into
consideration. Although due to his or her unique standing in the criminal justice process
the accused could be presumed partial by default, still, some common law jurisdictions
explicitly allow the simultaneous appearance of the accused as a witness,569 whereas
others (mainly continental systems) provide for unsworn statements to be made on the
part of the accused.570 The nature of such unsworn statements is twofold.571 First, the
unsworn statements of the accused serve his or her defence and thus the law does not
require an undertaking as to their truthfulness.572 At the same time, unsworn statements
form part of the evidentiary material provided that they contain (as a whole or in part)
568 By virtue of articles 76 and 77 the hearing of the victim as a party and the civil party is conducted pursuant to
the provisions concerning the hearing of the defendant.
569 See e.g. section 17(2) of the Evidence Act 2008 of Australia, according to which the defendant is not
competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution, thus, a contrario, is a competent defence witness.
See to the same effect, section 53(4) read together with section 53(1) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence
Act 1999, UK. At the same time, however, once the accused decides to take the witness’s stand, he or she can
subsequently be cross-examined by the Prosecutor in said jurisdictions. The accused is a competent witness
pursuant to rule 608 read together with rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence of the USA.
570 The possibility for the accused to make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence (i.e. a
statement without a solemn declaration(oath)) is characteristic of continental systems and is not completely
unfamiliar on the international criminal justice scene. This practice, which existed back at Nuremberg, is
nowadays statutorily provided for by article 67(1)(h) of the Rome Statute (alongside with the concurrent
possibility to testify under oath, i.e., to take the witness stand). Before the entry into force of the Rome Statute
the possibility for an accused to make an unsworn statement  was introduced at the ICTY by virtue of rule 84bis
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted 2 July 1999).
571 See § 164. (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Austria (Strafprozeßordnung 1975), which makes an
explicit proviso regarding the twofold nature of the statements of the accused (Vernehmung des Beschuldigten):
‘[…] Der Beschuldigte ist auch darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dass seine Aussage seiner Verteidigung dienen,
aber auch als Beweis gegen ihn Verwendung finden könne [emphasis added]’.
572 For instance, section 60(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Germany makes a prohibition of oath with
respect to suspected persons; likewise, articles 103 and 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code of France expressly
distinguish between the status of a witness and that of a suspect and provide for an oath of truthfulness as
applicable solely to witnesses.
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information relevant to the case.573 Thus, in criminal justice systems which accommodate
the possibility for the accused to make an unsworn statement, such statements do not have
a pre-determined evidentiary weight. Instead, their probative value is evaluated by the
Court case by case on the basis of a scrutinized analysis of whether and to what extent the
version of the facts as conveyed by the accused is corroborated by other evidence. The
credibility of the accused’s unsworn statement, as is the case with any other type and
piece of evidence, depends on the extent to which it is substantiated by the rest of the
evidentiary material.574
To conclude, the extent to which the trier of fact would take into consideration the
testimony of any witness, who could be considered partial due to the fact that he or she
assumes another parallel standing in proceedings, such as of a victim-participant, a civil
party or an accused would depend on its consistency with the rest of the evidentiary
material. Hence, eventually the probative weight of such pieces of evidence would be
assessed case-by-case by the Court in light of the totality of the evidence gathered in the
course of the proceedings.
8. Impact of an Inconsistent Testimony Provided by a Dual Status Individual
on that Person’s Victim Standing
Another question that emanates from the present topic is whether the individual’s victim
standing could be affected on account of the evidence given in his or her capacity as a
witness. This issue, akin to the trustworthiness of the testimony of dual status individuals,
can neither be pre-determined nor resolved in the abstract, but should be assessed on a
witness-by-witness basis.
Depending on the circumstances, the following two scenarios could unfold. If,
albeit inconsistent, the testimony of the dual status individual would not cast doubt on the
information which had substantiated his or her eligibility as a victim in proceedings (i.e.
his or her identity, the harm suffered, the causal link between the harm and the crime(s)
under consideration), the victim’s standing would not be affected. Conversely, a testimony
disproving or contradicting information which had previously warranted the
573 For instance, article 114 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code of Bulgaria explicitly designate the accused’s
statements as evidentiary material.
574 See in more detail on this issue, Schabas and Bachvarova, supra note 301.
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acknowledgement of victim status would invalidate the basis upon which the assessment
of rule 85 was conducted and which, accordingly, had justified the judicial authorisation
of that person’s victim standing in proceedings.
This matter has arisen in the Lubanga trial where each of the two scenarios of
acquiring duality of status took place. As noted at the beginning of the present chapter, six
witnesses who had been interviewed by the Prosecutor in the course of the investigation
were subsequently granted the right to partake as victims in proceedings575 and three
victims were authorised to give evidence at trial by way of a testimony in accordance with
the requisites of article 68(3) and 69(3).576
In the judgment on the merits, the Chamber, following its evaluation of the
evidence and the entire proceedings pursuant to article 74, divided its findings concerning
individuals who assumed the standing of victim together with that of a witness in two
different sections.577 With respect to two out of three victims who testified at trial in
accordance with article 69(3) read together with article 68(3), the majority of the Chamber
noted ‘significant weaknesses’ as regards the evidence these two individuals gave and the
‘internal inconsistencies [that their testimonies contained] which undermine[d] their
credibility.’578 The Trial Chamber concluded that two of the three victim-witnesses ‘at the
instigation or with the encouragement’ of the third victim-witness ‘stole’ the identities of
others in order to benefit from participating in the proceedings at hand. Ultimately, against
the backdrop of the ‘material doubts’ concerning the identities of the two victims who
testified, the Chamber concluded that ‘its original prima facie evaluation [of the victim
status of the three individuals] was incorrect’ which required that the Chamber amend any
earlier order as to their participation, to the extent necessary.
With regard to the rest of the dual status individuals upon consideration of the
totality of the evidence collected in the course of the proceedings the Chamber noted that
the inconsistencies in their personal accounts related not only to facts germane to the
575 By virtue of the Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings of 15 December
2008.
576 By virtue of the Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express their
views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032, 9 July 2009.
577 Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March 2012 (Lubanga Trial
Judgment). The judicial findings with respect to dual status individuals who had been granted victim status after
having been interviewed by the Prosecutor as witnesses were incorporated in paras. 484 et seq. and paras.1362 et
seq. of the Judgment, while the findings related to the victims who were subsequently admitted as witnesses
before the Court were developed in para. 499 et seq.
578 Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 502.
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criminal responsibility of the alleged offender, but also to facts such as the harm allegedly
sustained and the casual link between the alleged harm and the crimes under
consideration.579 Subsequently, the Chamber, by majority, found that given the doubts to
the honesty, reliability and accuracy of the individuals with combined status it would be
‘unsustainable to allow victims to continue participating if a more detailed understanding
of the evidence has demonstrated they no longer meet the relevant criteria’.580 As a
consequence of its findings, the majority of the Chamber determined that the victim status
of all nine dual status individuals must be withdrawn.
The partially dissenting Judge contended in favour of the preservation of the
individuals’ victim standing, notwithstanding their contradictory testimonies. In the view
of the dissenting Judge, although the testimonies of the dual status individuals due to
inconsistencies, contradictions and weaknesses should not be used for determining the
individual criminal responsibility of the accused, they should not affect the individuals’
status as victim-participants in proceedings.581 The dissenting Judge averred that ‘it
[would be] unfair and discriminatory to impose upon individuals with dual status a higher
evidentiary threshold […] as regards their victims’ status, while all other victims
participating in the proceedings have not been subject to thorough examination by the
parties and the Chamber […]’.582
The contention of the dissenting Judge reflects the general understanding that dual
status individuals should not be placed at a more (un)favourable position as compared to
persons who are only victim-participants in proceedings.583 However, the arguments in the
dissent neglect the fact that the purpose of the examination of dual status individuals in
their witness capacity, like the examination of persons who are only witnesses, is not to
further substantiate, validate or verify their standing as victims in proceedings. Instead,
the purpose of the testimony of dual status individuals when appearing as witnesses is to
contribute to the ascertainment of the truth through their personal account of the events
under consideration. Hence, when participating in proceedings as witnesses, dual status
579 In particular, controversies arose with respect to the wounds inflicted upon some of the dual status
individuals, as well as with respect to the recruitment of dual status individuals - some of whom contended that
this occurred outside the temporal scope of the charges.
580 Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 484.
581 Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Odio Benito to the Lubanga Trial Judgment (Dissent to the Lubanga
Trial Judgment), para. 25 et seq.
582 Dissent to the Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 35.
583 See in the same spirit the Decision of 5 June 2008 which discussed certain practicalities regarding dual status
individuals.
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individuals are treated as any other witness and, therefore, are neither subjected to an
additional review as regards their victim status, nor are they imposed any higher
evidentiary threshold concerning their eligibility as victims. Nevertheless, indubitably, the
testimony of persons with combined status would by implication also touch upon facts
germane to their victim standing, such as their identity, the type of the harm suffered, the
manner in which it was inflicted as a result of the commission of the crime(s) under
consideration, etc. (but beyond that the two distinct standings should not be confused).
Therefore, if the testimony of dual status individuals would contradict or distort the
information which formed the basis of the Chamber’s rule 85 assessment, it would be
contrary to the truth-finding mission of criminal justice as well as to the due process rights
of the parties if the judicial authority would simply ignore this newly obtained
information. Consequently, if the Chamber would conclude that had the newly produced
information been available at the time of its prima facie evaluation of the rule 85 criteria it
would not have substantiated an acknowledgement of victim status, the participation of
the respective victim would no longer be warranted.
Notwithstanding the vociferous caveats against withdrawal of victim status that
followed the decision of the Trial Chamber,584 such a course of action would neither be
contrary to the letter nor to the spirit of the ICC’s legal framework. Instructive in this
regard is rule 91(1), which explicitly envisions the possibility for a Chamber to modify a
previous ruling under rule 89, that is, its initial judicial determination of a victim status.585
Furthermore, as the review of the relevant case-law attests, this instance of withdrawal of
victim status was not the first to have taken place in proceedings before the ICC.
A similar scenario unfolded at the trial stage in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case
where serious doubts were raised with respect to the veracity of the accounts provided by
two victim-participants for the purpose of their admission in proceedings.586 In light of the
newly obtained information and on the basis of rule 91(1), the Chamber amended its
584 Lubanga, ‘Request for reconsideration of Trial Chamber I's decision to withdraw the status of participating
victims in the proceedings to a/0047/06, a/0048/06, a/0050/06 and a/0052/06’, 23 March 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2845 (Lubanga, Request for reconsideration).
585 See in the same vein, Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 7 July 2011, para. 25 referring to the Registry’s
observations in this respect, namely that ‘in light of the information provided by the Legal Representative of the
two victims, the Chamber may modify its previous ruling and rule anew on their victim status.’ (reference
omitted).
586 The concerns were raised by the then victims’ legal representative who himself had reason to doubt in the
credibility of his clients, as well as in the veracity of their accounts which had formed the basis of their
acknowledgement of victim status.
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previous ruling and revoked the victim standing of the two individuals.587 By contrast to
the situation in the Lubanga case, where the victim standing was repealed following the
examination of the individuals as witnesses, the Chamber in the Katanga and Ngudjolo
case withdrew its authorization allowing the appearance of the two victims for the purpose
of testifying and revoked, accordingly, their victim standing.
A swift comparative glance detects the existence of similar approaches at both the
international and domestic levels. At the STL, the Court has observed that the recognition
of victim status at the pre-trial phase of the case is without prejudice to a subsequent
determination in a final judgment whether an individual who has been granted the status
of victim-participant on the basis of prima facie evidence is or is not a victim of an attack
falling within the Court’s jurisdiction.588 In a similar fashion, the ECCC has revoked the
civil party standing of several individuals after noting that sufficient doubt had been raised
with respect to their victim standing.589 Notable in this respect is the fact that in their
submissions to the Supreme Court Chamber the civil party appellants themselves, as noted
by the Chamber, did not submit ‘that the Trial Chamber may never revoke civil party
status once granted.’ Rather, the civil party appellants merely averred that ‘once
recognized by the Chamber as [c]ivil [p]arties, this status should remain unless specific
and identifiable evidence is presented that casts doubt on the status [reference omitted].’590
At the domestic level, an analogous scenario is reflected, for instance, in the
Criminal Procedure Code of Moldova. Pursuant to the relevant provisions, the criminal
justice body will cease the participation of a damaged party at the respective procedural
stage if the alleged damages which had warranted the recognition of the person as a
damaged party are not substantiated.591 In the same vein if, following the recognition of a
person as a civil party, it is established that there are no grounds for granting civil party
status, the criminal justice body in charge of the proceedings will suspend the
587 See Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 7 July 2011, para. 49: ‘Accordingly, in light of all of the information
currently available to it, the Chamber considers, pursuant to rule 91(1) of the Rules, which provides that a
chamber may modify a previous ruling under rule 89, that it must amend the part of the Decision of 31 July 2009
granting a/0381/09 and a/0363/09 the status of victim participating in the proceedings, and hence decides to
revoke their standing.’
588 Ayyash et al., Decision on Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings, 8 May 2012, para. 3.
589 See ECCC, Case 001, Trial Judgment, 26 July 2010, as well as ECCC, Case 001, Appeal Judgment of 3
February 2012, in particular, para. 649: ‘Although [the defendant] did not dispute this Civil Party application, the
Chamber nevertheless cannot uphold it [due to the lack of sufficient evidence establishing kinship or bonds of
affection between the direct victim and the civil party admitted to participate alleging harm based on the arrest
and execution of a direct victim]’. See further on this issue Stover at al., supra note 2.
590 ECCC, Case 001, Appeal Judgment of 3 February 2012, para. 452.
591 Article 59(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
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participation of that person as a civil party in the case.592 Hence, as a consequence, the
participation of the damaged party is suspended.
9. Consequences of a Withdrawal of Victim Standing. Possible Remedies
The withdrawal of victim status entails the question of the remedy, if any, available to an
individual whose status of victim-participant has been revoked.593 The Court’s legal
framework is silent on both the withdrawal of victim status as well as on whether a victim
could challenge the relevant judicial ruling in such a case. Attention to the lack of a
possibility for challenging the revocation of the standing of victim-participant has been
drawn by the Office of Public Counsel for Victims in its request to the Trial Chamber for
reconsideration of its decision on withdrawal.594 The request was rejected by the Chamber
as unwarranted and without any legal basis.595
Notwithstanding the silence of the constitutive instruments on the issue at stake, in
the event of a withdrawal of victim status the last sentence of rule 89(2) together with
regulation 86 of the Regulations of the Court could be invoked by analogy. Pursuant to
rule 89(2), a victim whose application has been rejected may file a new application later in
the proceedings. Regulation 86 of the Regulations of the Court provides the possibility for
the filing of an application at the appeals stage of proceedings. On the basis of these
provisions the inference could be advanced that, if the first instance judgment is appealed
by either party, the person whose victim status has been withdrawn at the trial stage of
proceedings could file a new application for participation at the appeals stage of the case.
592 Article 61(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
593 See in the same vein www.internationaljusticeproject.com/2012/04/24/lessons-learned-from-the-lubanga-trial-
what-it-means-for-victims-the-development-of-the-icc-legal-aid-system.
594 See Lubanga, Request for reconsideration, para 10.
595 Lubanga, TC I, Order refusing a request for reconsideration, ICC-01/04-01/06-2846, 27 March 2012.
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10. Practical Matters Occasioned by the Participation of Dual Status
Individuals596
Besides the legal issues contemplated hitherto, the concurrent participation both as a
victim and as a witness in the proceedings may intensify concerns related to the well-
being, security and protection of dual status individuals. It thus becomes apparent that
duality of status engenders a variety of issues having important practical implications
related to: the responsibilities of the Court and its organs as regards the security and
protection of dual status individuals; the exchange of information in relation to individuals
with dual status; the way dual status individuals should be contacted by the parties, their
legal representative(s) and the Court’s organs; the way communications regarding dual
status individuals among the Court’s organs should take place.
These issues arose for the first time in the Lubanga case597 as the first ICC case to
go to trial.598 Therefore, the first Chamber to ponder on the matters just mentioned is TC I.
The subsequent section will draw particular attention to the Trial Chamber’s decision of 5
June 2008 as the first decision especially dedicated to dual status individuals. As such, this
decision has addressed a number of matters which the combination of the two procedural
capacities occasions in practice. It is worth noting that the relevant judicial findings have
been sustained in the subsequent ICC’s jurisprudence599 and also find reflection in the
jurisprudence of the STL in its consideration of the phenomenon of duality of status.600
596 A previous draft of this section forms part of the following publication by the PhD candidate: ‘The
International Criminal Court 2006-2008. Commentary on ‘Witnesses’’, in Annotated Leading Cases of
International Criminal Tribunals, Andre Klip and Steven Freeland (eds.), Intersentia, 2014, pp. 366-390.
597 See Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008, paras. 103 et seq., para. 132, as well as the Decision of 5 June 2008.
598 See Lubanga Trial Judgment; Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute,ICC-01/04-01/06-
2901, 10 July 2012; Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2904, 7 August 2012. At the time of writing all three decisions are the subject of pending proceedings on
appeal.
599 See e.g. Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, Decision on a number of procedural issues raised by the Registry,
ICC-01/04-01/07-1134, 14 May 2009.
600 See Ayyash et al., Decision of the Pre-Trial Judge of 18 May 2012, para. 61, which explicitly refers to the
findings of the ICC’s Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case and the need of tailored protective measures as regards
dual status individuals, acknowledged in said jurisprudence.
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10.1. Role of the Registry and its Sections as Regards the Protection of Dual
Status Individuals
Certainly, among the most pressing concerns with respect to victims and witnesses in a
criminal trial are issues related to their security and protection. Consequently, a number of
legal texts of the Court’s constitutive instruments contemplate the respective
responsibilities of the different ICC’s organs. The Court’s statutory documents
acknowledge the primary functions of the Registry and its units in this regard. The
Registry is entrusted with a variety of tasks and responsibilities aimed at ensuring the
protection and security of victims and witnesses. Among the primary responsibilities of
the Registry in this respect are the duty: to provide in consultation with the Office of the
Prosecutor protective measures and security arrangements and other appropriate
assistance;601 to consult the Chamber on protective measures sought upon the motion of
the Prosecutor or the defence or upon the request of a witness or a victim;602 to make an
assessment, pending decision by the Chamber, whether disclosing information contained
in a victim’s application may jeopardise his or her safety and security;603 to formulate
long- and short-term plans for protection;604 to maintain and assess admission of witnesses
to the ICC protection programme.605
Logically, the legal regime governing the security and protection of victims and
witnesses is likewise applicable to the security and protection of individuals with
combined victim-witness status. Still, the combination of these two legal standings in the
one and the same case occasions in practice questions that are not addressed explicitly by
the legal framework. One such issue concerns, for instance, the manner in which the
different organs of the Court, parties and participants could contact dual status individuals,
especially victim-witnesses included in the ICC’s protection programme, without putting
their security at risk.
In its decision on dual status individuals of 5 June 2008 Trial Chamber I
acknowledged the Registry’s primary duty of assisting witnesses and victims as far as
their security and protection is concerned, as well as its obligation to consult the organs of
601 Article 43(6).
602 Rule 87.
603  Regulation 99(1) of the Regulations of the Registry.
604  Rule 17.
605  Regulation 96 of the Regulations of the Registry.
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the Court on protective measures.606 In conformity with this understanding based on the
relevant normative framework, the Chamber ruled that all contact between a dual status
individual included in the ICC’s protection programme, i.e. a protected individual, and the
organs of the Court, the parties and the participants shall be facilitated by the Victims and
Witnesses Unit (‘the VWU’). Similarly, in line with the VWU’s primary responsibility re
protected individuals, the Chamber stressed that the unit is not obliged to disclose to a
party or to a participant details of contact with such individuals.607 The risk-assessment
duty of the VWU, as entrusted by the statutory documents, has also been reflected
accordingly and enhanced through the instructions of the Chamber that the unit should be
made aware of the dual status of protected individuals.608 In the same vein, in order to
enable the Victims Participation and Reparations Section (‘the VPRS’) to properly
perform its duties as regards participating victims, the Chamber endorsed the
recommendations advanced by the Registry that the VPRS should be made aware by the
VWU whether a person with dual status is in the protection programme so that the contact
between the VPRS and that individual be facilitated.609
10.2. Exchange of Information Concerning Dual Status Individuals
Another important matter regarding dual status individuals which has arisen in practice
concerns the exchange of information on individuals with dual status. First and foremost,
an emphasis should be made to the importance of the legal representatives’ awareness of
their clients’ combined status so as to ensure that the rights of victims would not be
compromised or put at risk by their witness standing.
Again, the first Chamber to contemplate this issue was TC I. The Chamber invited
the Registry, the parties and participants to discuss and suggest possible avenues of
606 The primary functions of the Registry and its units with regard to witnesses and/or victims (and, as
appropriate, other persons on account of witness’s testimony) as stipulated by the legal framework are: to
provide in consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor protective measures and security arrangements and
other appropriate assistance (article 43(6) of the Rome Statute); to consult the Chamber on protective measures
(rule 87 ); to formulate long- and short-term plans for protection (rule 17); to maintain and assess admission of
witnesses to the ICC protection programme (regulation 96 of the Regulations of the Registry); to ensure the
confidentiality of communications relating to specific victims within the Court; to make an assessment, pending
Decision by the Chamber, whether disclosing information contained in an application from a victim may
jeopardise his or her safety and security (regulation 99(1) of the Regulations of the Registry).
607 Lubanga, Decision of 5 June 2008, paras. 53b. and 53c.
608 Ibid., para. 53d.
609 Ibid., para. 75.
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exchange of information concerning dual status individuals.610 The mechanism of
communication eventually endorsed by the Chamber on the basis of the submissions
received merits a brief consideration. Two alternative mechanisms of exchange of
information were approved aimed at enabling the victims’ legal representative(s) to
request and obtain information as regards dual status individuals: an ‘inter partes’611
mechanism and an alternative procedure envisaging exchange of information through the
Chamber. 612
The order in which the two alternative mechanisms have been introduced suggests
that the communication between the legal representative(s) and each of the parties is to be
preferred to communication through the Chamber. Although this understanding has not
been explicitly reflected by the Court, logic dictates that the direct communication
between the parties and the legal representative(s) concerning dual status individuals
would facilitate and expedite the conduct of proceedings. Moreover, the involvement of
the Chamber on issues not contested by the parties and the participants which neither
require judicial resolution nor judicial sanction may lead to undue overloading of the
Chamber and may ultimately delay the proceedings.
Furthermore, the ‘inter partes’ mechanism of communication which is to be
initiated and take place without the involvement of the Chamber reflects the principal
responsibility of the legal representative(s) in securing their clients’ interests. This
understanding is eloquently manifested in the communication mechanism between the
legal representative and the Prosecutor.613 Indicative in this regard are the concurrent
610 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008, para. 138(h).
611 Since neither victims, nor their legal representative(s) are parties to the proceedings, the reference to the ‘ inter
partes’ mechanism is in inverted commas. This mechanism of communication takes place without the
involvement of the Chamber between the legal representative(s) and the parties: communication with the
Prosecutor (para. 55 of the decision) and communication with the defence (para. 57 of the decision).
612 Lubanga, Decision of 5 June 2008, para. 56a which sets forth the procedure through an application by the
legal representative(s) to the Chamber.
613 The communication mechanism with the Prosecutor could be summarised as follows. When the legal
representative(s) become aware that their client may have dual status they should provide the Prosecutor with
that person’s individualizing information. The plain wording of this ruling implies that information of any kind
and from any source would suffice for the legal representative(s) to initiate a communication with the Prosecutor
in order to verify its correctness. The decision further prescribes that the Prosecutor, on his or her part, should
check whether the individual has dual status, as well as whether he or she is in the ICC protection programme
and should communicate this to the legal representative(s). In addition, it is provided that in the communication
back to the legal representative(s) the Prosecutor should also verify whether he or she intends to make an
application for protective measures pursuant to rules 87 and 88 . Admittedly, this stipulation is in tune with the
duty cast upon the Prosecutor by articles 54(3)(f) and 68(1) , and rules 87-88  to take or to request security and
protective measures related to witnesses, victims and other persons at risk, subject to the primary authority of the
Chamber. This condition appears, however, somewhat superfluous, since the last two paragraphs of the decision
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requirements governing the communication between the legal representative(s) and the
Prosecutor, provided for by the Chamber.614 The solicitor-client relationship, envisioned
as one of the requirements, guarantees that the person contacting the Prosecutor on behalf
of the dual status individual is authorised to represent him or her and, accordingly, to
communicate and to receive information concerning that individual. The solicitor-client
relationship is also an essential safeguard for the individual concerned which stems from
the responsibilities of the legal representative(s) provided in the Code of Professional
Conduct for counsel.615 In addition, the confidentiality proviso is an emanation of
counsel’s duty to respect the professional secrecy and confidentiality, as enshrined in,
inter alia, article 8 of the Code of Professional Conduct for counsel. Finally, the consent
of the dual status individual would ensure that the identifying information would be
disclosed between the legal representative(s) and the Prosecutor upon the knowledge of
that person. This standpoint emanates from the principled idea throughout the ICC’s legal
framework that the will of the individual concerned should be taken into consideration by
the relevant authority whenever the issue of his or her well-being, safety or protection
arises.
At the same time, the analysis of the communication between the legal
representative(s) and the defence, as agreed upon by the parties and the participants and
affirmed by the Chamber, is prone to criticism.616 The perusal of the relevant judicial
findings suggests that the mere fact that the identity of the dual status individual is already
known to the defence would suffice in the view of the Chamber (as well as in the views of
the parties and participants) for the individual’s identifying information to be
communicated to the defence. However, this ruling neglects the fact that the defence’s
awareness of the victim’s identity does not automatically presuppose that this person is a
(potential) defence witness. The identity of a victim may be known to the defence for a
variety of reasons. Therefore, regardless of the parties’ and the participants’ agreement on
(paras. 77 and 78) similarly instruct that the legal representative(s) should be notified of the parties’ intention to
refer a dual status individual to the ICC protection programme. See para. 55d of the decision.
614 These requirements are as follows: there should be a solicitor-client relationship between the individual and
the legal representative(s); all communications must be confidential; there should be a consent of the individual
to the legal representative(s) that his or her identity be disclosed to the Prosecutor.
615 ICC-ASP/4/Res.1.
616 This communication procedure is much more simplified than the communication with the Prosecutor.
According to the decision, if the identity of the victim is known to the defence in advance, the legal
representative(s) should communicate to the latter the name of their client. In its communication back to the
legal representative(s) the defence should inform if the name provided is of a potential defence witness.
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the procedure to be followed, the Chamber should not have approved it without demur.
Indubitably, it is the Court that bears the utmost responsibility for the protection of
individuals whose safety could be at stake in the proceedings. As a consequence, the
disclosure of any identifying information to the defence, in particular the fact that the
individual concerned participates as a victim in the proceedings, should have been made
contingent on the consent of that person, akin to the express stipulation in that respect
within the communication mechanism between the legal representative and the
Prosecutor.
The alternative procedure envisioning the exchange of information on dual status
individuals through the Chamber represents an adroit example of the utmost authority of
the Chamber in charge of the proceedings with respect to a person’s safety and security.
Accordingly, if the exchange of information as regards victim-witnesses takes place
through the Chamber the protective functions of the judicial authority take precedence
over the respective duties of the legal representative(s) in securing the safety of the
individuals concerned.
10.3. Contact Between Dual Status Individuals, the Parties and Other
Participants
The analysis of the two procedures of communication of information concerning dual
status individuals endorsed in practice provides an important indication of the fact that the
safety of persons with (potential) dual status represents a matter of utmost priority. The
exchange of information concerning dual status individuals entails another equally
essential practical matter. The question arises as to the way in which the parties and other
participants could approach dual status individuals without posing any risks to the safety
and well-being of the latter. As the jurisprudence of the Court manifests, the safety of dual
status individuals is a key concern also when contact between such persons and the
parties, participants and the organs of the Court is being considered.
Consequently, in order to ensure that contact between dual status individuals and the
parties does not take place at the expense of that person’s security or well-being the
Chamber in charge of the proceedings should introduce appropriate safeguards.
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This logic imbues the approach adopted in practice. Acknowledging the legal
representatives’ primary responsibility for guaranteeing the safety of their clients, the
Court conditioned the contact with a dual status individual initiated by either party on
prior notice by the party to the person’s legal representative(s).617 Another essential
judicial ruling in that respect is the endorsement of the leading role of the VWU in
facilitating contact between the parties, participants and dual status individuals.
The central role of the VWU was similarly acknowledged by the Chamber in the
context of the opposite scenario, according to which a person with dual status would be
the one requesting contact with the parties or other participants. That the Chamber
discussed such a scenario is somewhat surprising given the fact that neither witnesses, nor
victims, nor, accordingly, dual status individuals are parties to the proceedings. Therefore,
the reasons which, in the view of the Chamber, may warrant a request by dual status
individuals to approach on their own initiative a party or another participant remain rather
elusive. Be that as it may, what is important to note is that the Chamber once again
reiterated its principled understanding about the central role of the VWU in the
communication between dual status individuals, parties and other participants.
Also on previous occasions the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case had embraced
the view that, as a matter of principle, contacts between the parties, participants and
witnesses should take place through the VWU.618 This standpoint has subsequently been
adopted by other Chambers. Throughout its jurisprudence the Court has recognized the
role of the VWU as the relevant disinterested body of the Court to facilitate contacts
between the parties, participants and dual status individuals and ruled that the Unit should
have a representative present at the meeting(s).619 This stipulation provides an eloquent
illustration of the important role entrusted to the VWU during the interview of victims and
witnesses, namely of being in charge of arranging and facilitating the relevant interviews.
Also essential to note is the requirement envisioned by the Court for the presence
of a representative of the VWU during the interview. The latter would, indubitably,
617 Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 5 June 2008, para. 59a.
618 Lubanga, TC I, Decision on the Prosecution’s application for an order governing disclosure of non-public
information to members of the public and an order regulating contact with witnesses, ICC-01/04-01/06-1372, 3
June 2008, para. 11 and 14; Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 5 June 2008, para 59b.
619 See e.g. Bemba, TC III, Decision defining the status of 54 victims who participated at the pre-trial stage, and
inviting the parties' observations on applications for participation by 86 applicants, ICC-01/05-01/08-699, 22
February 2010; Abu Garda, PTC I, Confirmation of charges hearing, Transcript, ICC-02/05-02/09-T-13-ENG,
20 October 2009, pp. 95-96.
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guarantee that the interview is conducted in an objective way with due regard for the well-
being of the dual status individual. Logically, the primary purpose of the presence of the
VWU’s representative as a neutral organ of the Court with specific protective functions
would serve to ensure the respect for the safety and well-being of the victim-witness
during the contact with the opposite party.
In addition, the core role of the VWU has also been recognized in the context of
communications with dual status individuals that are without legal representation.
Instructive in this respect are the relevant findings of TC I, according to which whenever
the VPRS would need to contact an unrepresented victim-witness, the VWU should be
responsible for informing the section as to whether that person is in the ICC’s protection
programme. As correctly observed, the issue of communication between the two units of
the Registry is essentially an internal Registry issue and, thus, should be resolved by the
latter.
Notably, the Court did not condition the contact of the VPRS with protected
individuals upon the consent of the party who referred the person to the ICC’s protection
programme. Though not expressly articulated, this judicial ruling is an acknowledgement
of the core function of the VWU and VPRS as the Registry’s units called upon to serve
and safeguard the interests of victims (i.e. victim-applicants, victim-participants, as well
as dual status individuals), including, but not limited to their protection, safety and well-
being in the broadest sense of the word. Hence, the communication between the VWU and
the VPRS should facilitate contact between the VPRS and protected individuals rather
than put them at risk. In the same spirit and for the purpose of protecting and ensuring the
well-being of dual status individuals, the correct view was endorsed that the VWU and the
VPRS shall neither reveal the identity of that person to the parties (if the victim has
requested so), nor the fact that he or she is included in the ICC’s protection programme
and has dual status.
In view of the above, the discussion of duality of status attests to a myriad of
complex matters of both legal and practical nature that the simultaneous participation of
victims as witnesses called to testify brings to the fore. As will be seen shortly, similarly
complex and intriguing proves the part played by victims of their own accord in the
process of gathering evidence at the ICC.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Victims and Evidence
The procedural phenomenon of duality of victim-witness status and its potential to
contribute to the evidentiary material represents only one aspect of the multifaceted issue
concerning the place and the role of victims in the evidence-gathering process. The
present chapter will explore in turn the extent and the manner in which participating
victims may intervene and, eventually, impact the ICC’s evidence-gathering process on
their own will and initiative. The issue which calls for a thorough consideration concerns
the extent to which victim-participants may engage at the fact-finding stage of the case,
the stage where the processing of evidence unfolds.620
The processing of evidence comprises the submission and the examination of
evidence alike and represents, in essence, the nucleus of the criminal justice process.
Consequently, the fact-finding process determines the outcome of the case at hand. The
latter is adjudicated upon a scrutinized evaluation and analysis of the evidentiary material
gathered in the course of the proceedings.
At the outset, worth recalling is the multilayered procedural architecture and the
unique mandate of the ICC, which, besides participation in proceedings on the merits of
the criminal case also affords victims the possibility to claim reparations. Thus, the
sections to follow will contemplate the corresponding standing and roles of the Prosecutor
and the defence, of the Chamber and of victim-participants in the submission and,
respectively, in the examination of evidence on the merits, as well as in the developing of
evidence pertinent to reparations.
1. The Role of the Parties and of the Chamber in the Processing of Evidence
on the Merits of the Criminal Case
Before embarking on the analysis of the place and the role of victims in the evidence-
gathering process on the merits, some general remarks on the processing of evidence at
the ICC prove exigent. The perusal of the core statutory provisions on evidence at the case
620 Damaska, supra note 501, p. 1090.
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stage of proceedings – article 69(3) read in conjunction with article 64 - lends support to
the conclusion that the proof-gathering style before the ICC is both party-driven and
judge-controlled.621 Article 69(3) is an excellent example of the blending of legal ideas
characteristic of the two traditional criminal justice paradigms existing in a domestic
setting.622 As already mentioned in passing during the analysis of duality of status, this
norm accommodates both the common law and the continental models of developing
evidence. While the first evidence-gathering style is being portrayed as partisan623 or
‘hands-off’,624 the latter proof-gathering method is referred to as official625 or ‘hands-
on’.626 In this strain commentators have observed that ‘terms like cross-examination and
other typical terms of art (“catch words”) for either common or civil law are
conspicuously absent from the Statute and the Rules […] [since the] [d]rafters wanted to
make clear that what is sought is really a mixed procedure.’627
The first sentence of article 69(3) reflects the adversarial (partisan) approach,
which is a hallmark of common law jurisdictions. Pursuant to this procedural model, the
collection of evidence is left to the discretion and to the initiative of the parties, i.e. the
Prosecutor and the defence, as adversaries on the criminal justice arena. Accordingly,
pursuant to the adversarial proof-taking style, the judicial intervention is more limited in
comparison to the non-adversary fact-finding paradigm prevalent in continental systems
of adjudication. In other words, as duly noted in the relevant literature, ‘the common law
model places the task of producing evidence entirely upon the parties, with no obligation
for the judges to seek additional forms of evidence to sustain their factual and legal
findings.’628
At the same time, the second sentence of article 69(3) introduces a concurrent,
judicially pro-active mechanism of developing evidence designed to ensure the
completeness of the factual and evidentiary material collected in the course of the
621 McGonigle, supra note 362, p. 107.
622 See the juxtaposition suggested by Damaska, supra note 501.
623 Mirjan Damaska, ‘Of Hearsay and its Analogues’, Minnesota Law Review, vol. 76 (1992), p. 425-458.
624 Claus Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique
Compromise’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003), pp. 603-617, p. 604.
625 Damaska, supra note 501.
626 Kress, supra note 624.
627 Kai Ambos, ‘International criminal procedure: “adversarial”, “inquisitorial” or mixed?’,
InternationalCriminal Law Review, vol. 3 (2003), pp. 1–37, p. 20.
628 Riddell and Plant, supra note 481, p. 57 and the reference in footnote 13 to RR Allen Jr and T. Bernard.
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proceedings and assessed by the trier of fact.629 By virtue of this legal text the Chamber
may proprio motu order the production of all evidence that it considers necessary for the
determination of the truth. Hence, the Chamber has the authority to act on its own
initiative and to collect all evidence necessary for the establishment of the truth which
goes beyond the evidence adduced by the parties. Consequently, the second sentence of
article 69(3) is a reflection of the continental model of developing evidence vesting the
decision-maker with an active role in the evidentiary process premised on the judicial duty
for the ascertainment of the truth.
1.1. The Role of the Parties in the Processing of Evidence
The sequence in which article 69(3) envisages the involvement of the parties and of the
Court in the process of developing evidence lends support to the conclusion about the
principal role of the parties in that respect. This legislative approach is a logical reflection
of the fact that the primary initiative for the processing of evidence rests with the
Prosecutor and the defence as the key stakeholders in proceedings. After all, as posited in
the legal literature, the evidence in a criminal trial is ‘aimed at proving or disproving the
matter that has been put before the court for resolution.’630 In light of this, logically,
‘introducing evidence is not a stand-alone right, but is a right which ‘belongs to and is a
core right of the parties – […] [that is] those who bring or answer to a case before the
court’.631
1.2. The Role of the Chamber in the Fact-Finding Mechanism
Nevertheless, leaving the process of gathering evidence exclusively to the initiative and
the discretion of the parties may have an inimical effect on the comprehensiveness and
completeness of the factual basis for the judicial determination of the subject-matter at
hand.632 As, undoubtedly, the ultimate objective of criminal proceedings is the
629 Damaska, supra note 501, p. 1093, according to whom the pitfalls of the adversarial model of developing
evidence may affect the completeness of the factual basis for the decision.
630 Friman, supra note 25.
631 Ibid., p. 49.
632 See along the same lines Damaska, supra note 501, p. 1093. The same concerns have been raised in the
context of proceedings at the ICJ, where commentators have noted that neglecting the Court’s powers to proprio
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establishment of the truth, if the trier of fact is of the opinion that the search for the truth
necessitates the collection of further evidence, the authority pursuant to the second
sentence of article 69(3) comes into play. Notwithstanding the assertion that ‘while the
Prosecutor has the duty [italics in the original] under [a]rticle 54(a) “to establish the truth”
there is no parallel provision for the Trial Chamber as such’,633 still, the relevant literature
acknowledges that the Chamber’s authority to request the submission of all evidence that
it considers necessary for the determination of the truth ‘comes very close’ to an
obligation to establish the truth.634 In fact, the judicial authority to request the submission
of all evidence conducive to the ascertainment of the truth pursuant to article 69(3) and
the duty of the Chamber to determine the truth represent two sides of the same coin.
Some authors contend that pursuant to article 69(3) the judges ‘may choose to take
an active part, which is more reflective of traditional inquisitorial systems, or they may
choose to let the parties dominate the proceedings.’635 Hence, according to this view, the
judges have the option of exercising a dominant role in the proceedings.636 Such an
understanding sounds rather hasty as it fails to unravel the whole rationale behind article
69(3). The thorough analysis of this legal text lends support to the conclusion that the
Chamber is duty-bound to assume an active role in the evidence-gathering process in case
it considers that the evidence submitted by the parties does not suffice for the
ascertainment of the subject-matter at hand. In light of its duty to unearth the truth, if the
Chamber deems that the elucidation of the facts and circumstances under examination
necessitates the collection of further evidence in addition to that adduced by the parties, it
must take over the evidence-gathering process. That is to say, in order to properly fulfill
the ultimate objective of the criminal justice process – the establishment of the truth - the
Court is duty-bound to avail itself of the powers pursuant to article 69(3) when the
necessity for that arises.
The Chamber’s duty to intervene in the evidence-gathering process in order to
determine the truth is likewise reflected in article 64(6)(d). This legal text empowers the
motu gather additional evidentiary material results in insufficiency of evidence on the basis of which the Court
reaches its findings on the merits of the case – see Riddell and Plant, supra note 481, p. 69.
633 Robert Heinsch, ‘How to achieve fair and expeditious trial proceedings before the ICC: is it time for a more
judge-dominated approach?’ in The Emerging Practice of the ICC, Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.),
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009,  pp. 477-500, p. 486.
634 Ibid.
635 McGonigle, supra note 362, p. 109
636 Ibid. See also Ambos, supra note 627, pp. 19-20.
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Trial Chamber to order the submission of evidence in addition to that already collected
prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties. The same logic imbues also
the proceedings on an admission of guilt stipulated in article 65 and rule 139. Pursuant to
these norms, the Chamber is neither bound by the accused’s admission of guilt, nor by any
discussions between the parties in this regard, including the modification of charges or the
penalty to be imposed.637 As provided for in article 65(2) and (3), notwithstanding the
admission of guilt by the accused, the Trial Chamber shall order continuation of the trial
under the ordinary trial procedures, unless it is satisfied that the evidence presented
establishes all the essential facts that are required to prove the crime to which the
admission of guilt relates. In addition, regardless of the admission of guilt made by the
accused, still, the Chamber may request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence as
provided for in article 65(4),638 if it considers that a more complete presentation of the
facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the
victims. Given all the above and the fundamental importance of the search for and the
determination of the truth, the view that the ICC’s judges ‘are not in principle supposed,
save in very exceptional cases, to involve themselves in the gathering of evidence’639 is
neither in concord with the wording nor with the spirit of the evidence-related framework.
The judicial duty for active involvement in the fact-finding procedure aimed at the
ascertainment of the truth, which imbues the ICC’s proof-gathering style, transpires also
in proceedings before other international(ized) fora. An apposite example in this regard
provides the ECCC’s legal framework, which envisions the Chamber’s duty for the
determination of the truth in a similar fashion. To this effect is rule 87(4) of the Internal
Rules which empowers the judicial authority to summon or hear any person as a witness
or admit any new evidence, as long as the Chamber deems it to be conducive to
establishing the truth.
The ICJ reveals a similar example in this respect. According to article 53(2) of
ICJ’s Statute, the decision-maker is not discharged from the duty to ascertain that the
637 Articles 65(3) and 65(5).
638 Hence, the active role of the Chamber in the fact-finding process neither should nor could be confined only to
the collection of evidence that is beneficial to the accused. See, however, an opinion in the opposite strain -
Zappalà, supra note 11.
639 Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1412, who observe that the ICC’s process does not provide for ‘an
investigative judge with responsibility for collecting all items of evidence which […] help to establish the truth’
at the investigative stage of proceedings. Similarly, according to the dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the
Appeals Chamber Judgment of 11 July 2008, para. 12, ‘[n]either the Trial Chamber nor the Pre-Trial Chamber is
concerned with the collection of evidence’.
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claim is well founded in fact and in law, regardless of the fact that a party does not appear
in proceedings or fails to defend its case. Consequently, by virtue of this legal text, the
ultimate authority for the establishment of the truth rests with the trier of fact.
Observations in the same vein have been voiced in the relevant literature where it is
acknowledged that determining the facts is a core responsibility of the Court.
Commentators have advanced the reasonable assertion that the ICJ may not consider as
proven the facts alleged by one party for the sole reason that the other party has not
cooperated in producing evidence.640 Similarly, in a Separate Opinion to the ICJ’s Oil
Platforms case it has been averred that the Court’s evidentiary rules should be
administered in a fair and equitable manner, so that the Court gets at the whole truth as the
basis for its final conclusion.641
In light of this succinct comparative note, it becomes evident that the key role of
the parties in the processing of evidence does not, as a matter of principle, exempt the
judicial authority from its core task to establish the truth and, accordingly, to be actively
engaged in the collection of evidence, when necessary. The active involvement of the
parties in the processing of evidence does not affect the authority of the decision-maker to
proprio motu gather evidence in addition to that already collected prior to trial or
presented by the parties during the trial.642
Bringing the ICC back into focus, the power of the Court to collect evidence on its
own motion pursuant to article 69(3) occasions the question whether the Chamber is
constrained to request evidence exclusively from the parties or has an unfettered authority
to request all evidence conducive to the establishment of the truth from anyone, regardless
of the source.
The view that the Chamber may request the submission of evidence solely from the
parties, albeit rather debatable, finds some support in the literature and in practice. To this
effect, the dissenting Judges to the Appeals Chamber Judgment of 11 July 2008 have
opined that ‘[t]he reference to the submission of evidence in the second sentence [of
article 69(3)] refers [...] to the ability of the Court to request the parties to submit all
640 Riddell and Plants, supra note 481, p. 119 and footnote 146.
641 Separate opinion of Judge Owada, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2003, p. 161.
642 This authority is premised both on article 64(6)(d) and article 69(3).
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evidence that is necessary for the establishment of the truth’,643 consequently, that ‘[t]he
Trial Chamber […] may request either party to submit all evidence that it considers
necessary for the determination of the truth’.644
In the same spirit, some commentators have contended that ‘[i]n terms of the
context […] the [second] sentence [of article 69(3)] probably means, “The Court shall
have the authority to request [from the parties]645 the submission of all evidence that it
considers necessary for the determination of the truth.”’646 Also, it has been averred that,
albeit the wording of ‘[a]rticles 64(6)(d) and 69(3) […] indicates that someone else is to
present the further evidence; […] the provisions do not specify who should then do so:
always the prosecution (in the light of the objectivity principle in [article] 54(1)(a) of the
ICC Statute), one of the parties, or even a ‘participant’ like a victim?’647
 The careful perusal of the ICC’s statutory documents warrants the conclusion that
neither the letter nor the spirit of the law lends support to such a restrictive interpretation
of the Chamber’s evidence-gathering powers. The normative basis does not pre-determine
or limit the manner in which the decision-maker is to elucidate the facts and
circumstances under consideration in the case at hand. The relevant legal texts neither
explicitly, nor implicitly dictate that the Chamber could request solely from the parties
(and participants) the submission of all evidence which it considers necessary for the
determination of the truth. Quite to the contrary, the Chamber has the authority to call
additional evidence itself648 and could equally request the evidence necessary for the
ascertainment of the truth from any person, not merely from the parties and participants
(thus, irrespective of whether that person has any standing in the proceedings of the case
at hand).
This logic is deeply rooted in a number of provisions of the ICC’s legal
framework. In particular, by virtue of article 72(2) the Court is vested with the power to
request information or evidence from ‘a person’. This norm envisions ‘a person who has
643 Lubanga, Partly dissenting opinion of 23 July 2008 of Judge Philippe Kirsch to the Judgment of the Appeals
Chamber of 11 July 2008, (partly dissenting opinion of Judge Kirsch), para. 19.
644 Lubanga, Dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008, para.
12.
645 Square brackets and italics in the original.
646 McDermott, supra note 33, p. 43.
647 Friman, supra note 25, p. 494 (references omitted).
648 See a contention in the opposite vein: Friman, supra note 25, p. 494. The author espouses the view that article
69(3) ‘indicates that someone else is to present the further evidence; another solution would have been to allow
the Court to call additional evidence itself.’
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been requested [by the Court] to give information or evidence’. The expression employed
in article 72(2) denotes a person extraneous to the proceedings at hand, who is in a
possession of information and/or evidence conducive to the determination of the truth. To
the same effect is article 73, which authorizes the Court to request third-party information
or documents. Pursuant to this norm, the Court is empowered to request from a State Party
the production of documents or information which are in its custody, possession or
control. States Parties to the Rome Statute could neither assume the standing of a party
nor of a participant in its own right in the ICC’s proceedings.
Given this fact and in light of the explicit proviso of article 73 it is to be concluded
that the powers of the Court to request evidence go beyond the parties and the participants
to the case at hand. In the same vein is rule 73(6) which envisages the possibility for the
Court to seek from the ICRC or from other sources ICRC information, documents or other
evidence which it deems to be of great importance for a particular case. Just like State
Parties, envisioned in article 73, the ICRC, referred to in rule 73(6), is neither a party nor
a participant in proceedings before the Court. Consequently, each of the legal texts
contemplated above stipulates scenarios whereby evidence conducive to the ascertainment
of the truth is gathered on the Court’s own motion from sources which are not confined to
either party or participants.
Notably, the same rationale permeates the evidence-gathering process before other
criminal justice bodies at the international level. To this effect is, for instance, rule 87(3)
of ECCC’s Internal Rules, which stipulates that the Chamber bases its conclusion on
evidence from the case file provided it has been put before it by a party or if the Chamber
itself has put it before the parties. The latter part of the provision is an unambiguous
indication of the authority of the Chamber to call evidence proprio motu from sources
different from the parties and, accordingly, to place such evidence before the parties.
Similarly, according to rule 98 of ICTY’s and ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, besides its power to request additional evidence from the parties, the Trial
Chamber is vested with the authority to summon witnesses on its own motion and to order
their attendance. Consequently, the ad hoc tribunals have the authority to collect evidence
not solely by requesting its submission from the parties, but also to call evidence
themselves in addition to that presented by the Prosecutor and the defence.
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At the SCSL, rule 85(A)(iv) which governs the order of presentation of evidence
makes an explicit and separate reference to the evidence ordered by the Trial Chamber as
distinguished from the evidence to be presented by the parties. Hence, the logical
conclusion to be advanced is that the Chamber has the discretion to collect and put before
the parties evidence gathered on its own volition, that is, evidence not submitted by the
parties.
The legal framework of another adjudicative body at the international level beyond
the realm of criminal proceedings - the ICJ – enjoins the decision-maker with a similar
authority in the processing of evidence. In addition to the evidence that the Court may
order from the parties,649 it may equally request additional information from sources
extraneous to the extant proceedings, such as, for instance, public international
organizations. Instructive in this regard are the provisions of article 34(2) of the ICJ’s
Statute and article 61(1) of the ICJ’s Rules of Court. According to the latter provision, at
any time prior to the closure of the oral proceedings, the Court may, not only at the
request of a party, but also proprio motu request a public international organization to
furnish information relevant to a case before it. Similarly, pursuant to article 62(1) of the
Rules of Court, in addition to requesting evidence or explanations from the parties
considered to be necessary for the elucidation of the case, the Court may seek other
information for this purpose. Furthermore, by virtue of article 62(2) of the Rules of Court
the ICJ is empowered to call witnesses on its own motion.650
1.3. The Role of the Victims in the Fact-Finding Process in Proceedings on the
Merits of the Criminal Case
All the above manifests that the ICC’s legal framework provides for an active part of both
the parties and of the Court, when necessary, in the processing of evidence on the merits
of the case. Conversely, with respect to victims, the Statute makes no mention of their
649 The wide discretion of the Court to gather evidence on its own volition is reflected in article 49 of the Statute,
according to which the Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents of the parties to produce
any document. See along the same lines article 62(1) of the Rules of Court, according to which the Court may at
any time call upon the parties to produce such evidence or to give such explanations as the Court may consider
to be necessary for the elucidation of any aspect of the matters in issue.
650 In the same vein are the observations advanced by commentators that the ICJ has been invested with wide-
ranging authority to intervene in the production of evidence and to obtain evidence on its own initiative. See
Riddell and Plant, supra note 481.
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role, if any, in the developing of evidence on the subject-matter of the criminal justice
process. The ICC’s drafting history reveals that the issue whether victims could intervene
in the evidence-related process proved to be problematic and prompted diverging views
among delegations.651 Eventually, as reflected in the relevant literature and in the Court’s
jurisprudence,652 the question whether and to what extent victims could impact the
processing of evidence was left outside the Statute’s purview. Subsequently, the silence
was partially remedied by the introduction of rule 91. This norm introduced the
conditional possibility for victims to intervene in the examination of evidence via their
legal representative(s), thus, vicariously. The Rules, however, akin to the Statute, remain
silent as to whether victims may play an active part in the evidence-gathering process
through the submission of evidence. Consequently, the ICC’s normative basis does not
provide an answer to the question whether victims could impact the scope and substance
of the evidence by way of placing material before the Chamber.
The rationale behind the divergent legal regimes governing the involvement of the
parties and of victims in the process of developing evidence stems from the essence of the
ICC’s criminal procedure which designates different roles to the Prosecutor and the
defence, on the one hand, and to victims, on the other. On the whole, the primary purpose
of the criminal justice process, national and international alike, is bringing to book
criminal offenders through their prosecution and, in case of an adjudication of guilt, their
punishment. Hence, the core of the subject-matter of the case delineated by the charges
brought by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber,653 is the
individual criminal responsibility of the accused in light of the objective and subjective
elements of the crimes under consideration. By implication, the subject of examination
and proof in the course of the proceedings subsumes, but is not confined to facts related to
the inimical consequences of the commission of the crime(s) charged. Consequently, the
elucidation of the harm sustained by victims as a result of the alleged crime(s) is not the
sole objective of proceedings adjudicating the individual criminal responsibility of the
accused. Said differently, ‘[a]lthough serving the interests of victims is both a laudable
651 Bitti and Friman, supra note 235, p. 461.
652 Schabas, supra note 361, p. 832 in the same spirit; Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 52,
where it is observed that ‘during the drafting of the Statute, proposals for the victims to be able to present
evidence for the purpose of establishing the criminal responsibility of the accused via their legalrepresentatives
were not retained in the final version of the Statute.’
653 See in the present context also article 61(9)  and regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court both of which
envision the possibility for subsequent amendment of the charges.
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goal and obligation of the Court, it is not the primary function [of the Court]. Rather, the
Court’s primary purpose is to establish the truth as it pertains to the guilt or innocence of
an accused through efficient and fair proceedings.’654
As previously mentioned, in order for the parties to achieve the objectives they
pursue at trial, they are empowered by law to take an active role in the process of
developing evidence. The Prosecutor who brings the charges against the accused is,
accordingly, supposed to substantiate them, whereas the defence endeavours to disprove
the charges.655 At the same time, unlike the parties, victims at the ICC are exempt from
the task to either prove or disprove the charges brought against the accused.656 Victims
neither bring nor support or answer to a case concerning the individual criminal
responsibility of the accused. Given the fact that, by contrast to the Prosecutor and the
defence, victim-participants are not primary protagonists at the ICC’s arena, they are
assigned a limited involvement in the evidence-gathering process.657 If participating
victims were entitled to an unqualified intervention in the processing of evidence, this
could impact the strategy of the parties and their approach towards the evidentiary
material (with respect to their lines of questioning, etc.) chosen to best serve the interests
they represent at trial. As a result, the parties’ contribution to the ICC’s fact-finding
procedure and, ultimately, their impact on the outcome of the case could be inimically
affected. In addition, an unrestricted involvement of victims in the evidence-gathering
process would likewise jeopardize the expeditiousness of proceedings and shift the focus
of the ICC’s process away from its core purpose to collateral issues instead.
Similar is the situation at the STL, where victim-participants assume a role akin to
the one afforded to victims in the ICC’s proceedings on the merits.658 Although the STL’s
legal framework provides a more elaborate regime of victims’ engagement in the
evidentiary procedure, the overall concept underpinning the relevant provisions is in tune
with the victims’ non-party standing. Hence, albeit victim-participants at the STL are
654 McGonigle, supra note 362, p. 144 (footnote omitted).
655 Similarly, Dissent of Judge Pikis to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008.
656 See in this strain Friman, supra note 25, p. 492, who observes that ‘the general victim participation scheme of
the ICC […] does not relate to the victim pursuing a particular matter to be adjudicated by the Court; he or she
does not bring a case (leaving aside the procedural standing of the victim with respect to reparations).’
657 As duly noted by Judge Pikis, ‘the proof or disproof of the charges is a matter affecting the adversaries […]
The victims have no say in the matter […] It is not the victims’ concern […] to either prove or disprove the
charges […] The presumption of innocence leaves no room for anyone other than the Prosecutor to assert the
contrary and seek to prove it by the adduction of relevant evidence, admissible in the criminal proceedings
before the Chamber.’ – see the Dissent to the Appeals Chamber Judgment of 11 July 2008.
658 Note, however, that the STL’s legal framework does not provide for reparation proceedings.
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explicitly afforded the possibility to take part in the submission, as well as in the
production of evidence, still they may not intervene in the fact-finding procedure
automatically, as of right. The involvement of victim-participants in the processing of
evidence is contingent on the discretion and authorization of the Chamber in charge of the
proceedings. The latter, on its part, rules on the victims’ request after consultation with the
parties. All of the above attests to the similar rationale behind the scope of victims’
intervention in the evidentiary procedure before the ICC and the STL. Both judicial
institutions provide for a more limited involvement of victim-participants in the evidence-
gathering process than that enjoyed by the parties.
Not surprisingly, at the ECCC the situation in that respect is different. To start
with, the perusal of the legal framework manifests that the part assigned to victims in
proceedings before the Cambodian tribunal goes beyond the presentation of views and
concerns. Victims at the ECCC assume a central role in proceedings which emanates from
their standing as a party to the case, i.e. civil parties. This ‘tripartite structure of
proceedings’ at the ECCC, as asserted by commentators, takes the participation of victims
a step further than that envisaged by the ICC.659
More precisely, civil parties are afforded as of right an active and independent role
in the proof-gathering process. Civil parties are not only granted the right to engage in the
examination of evidence, but are likewise explicitly accorded the right to adduce evidence
themselves in their own right, will and initiative.660 This enhanced involvement of civil
parties in the evidentiary process is a corollary of their central standing in proceedings
and, accordingly, of the nature and extent of civil party action.
Besides seeking reparations,661 the other concurrent purpose of civil party action
envisaged in rule 23(1) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules is to support the prosecution.662
Hence, in order to avail themselves of this right, civil parties are granted a greater leeway
659 Kelsall et al, supra note 281, p. 28.
660 See, in particular, rule 59(5) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules, according to which civil parties at any time during
an investigation may request the Co-Investigating Judges to interview him or her, question witnesses, go to a
site, order expertise or collect other evidence on his or her behalf. In the same vein is rule 31(10) of the Internal
Rules (concerning the appointment of (an) additional expert(s) upon the civil parties’ request). See also rules
55(10), 80(2) and 84 of the Internal Rules.
661 Rule 23(1)(b) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules.
662 Some authors interpret this provision as introducing a requirement that the civil parties support the
prosecution, thus, regard it as undermining the rights of the accused – see the discussion suggested by Stan
Starygin, ‘Internal rules of the extraordinary chambers in the courts of Cambodia (ECCC): Setting an example of
the rule of law by breaking the law?’, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, vol. 3(2) (2011), pp. 20-42, p. 21
et seq.
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in the processing of evidence on the merits, both in terms of the submission and the
examination of evidentiary material. In the present context it is worth clarifying that
supporting the prosecution is neither an obligation, nor does it equate the status of civil
party to that of additional Prosecutor(s), notwithstanding some publications in the
opposite sense.663 The jurisprudence of the ECCC has consistently acknowledged that
supporting the prosecution is a right afforded to civil parties.664 As rightly observed, the
entitlement of civil parties to support the prosecution ensues from the civil parties’ interest
in the determination of the elements of the crime which, if proved, form the basis for their
civil claims.665 Nevertheless, civil parties, unlike the Prosecutor, are not required to
perform prosecutorial and/or investigative actions.666 Civil parties at the ECCC are
afforded the possibility to request investigatory actions from the Co-Investigating Judges,
but are not obliged to do so.667 This is an additional clear-cut indication that supporting the
prosecution is solely an entitlement rather than an obligation. The only party that is
obliged to perform prosecutorial/investigative actions is the Prosecutor by virtue of the
onus of proof set forth in rule 87(1), second sentence of ECCC’s Internal Rules.
Consequently, the civil parties’ entitlement to an active involvement in the evidence-
gathering process in their own right, will and initiative is a reflection of the essence and
purpose of civil party action as provided by law.
All the above illustrates that the extent of victims’ involvement into the fact-
finding procedure is a corollary of the standing and the role afforded to them in the
proceedings as a whole. The greater the part played in the criminal justice process, the
greater the engagement in the processing of evidence afforded by law.
663 Charline Yim, ‘The Scope of Victim Participation Before the ICC and the ECCC’, News about the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal (available online), Sunday, 13 February 2011.
664 ECCC, Case 001, Trial Chamber Decision of 9 October 2009, para. 33.
665 Ibid.
666 Ibid., para. 26, where the Chamber correctly noted that the civil parties have the right (ergo, not the
obligation) to support/assist the prosecutor, however, their role must not transform them into additional
prosecutors.
667 See e.g. rule 59(5) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules, which employs the conditional wording ‘may’.
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2. Production of Evidence on the Merits of the Criminal Case
2.1. Production of Evidence by the Parties
The interdependence between a person’s standing in proceedings and the role in the
processing of evidence becomes even more distinct when the explicit and autonomous
right of the parties to submit evidence is juxtaposed with the silence of the ICC’s legal
framework in relation to victim-participants. For that purpose, a succinct overview of the
wide-ranging entitlement of the parties as regards the production of evidence on the merits
and the corresponding disclosure obligations proves herewith apposite.
Given that ‘evidence is the medium or means by which a fact is proved or
disproved’,668 the right of the parties to actively engage in the submission of evidence
germane to the subject-matter under consideration is intrinsically linked to the mission
they pursue at trial. The Prosecutor and the defence alike may produce evidence as of
right, by virtue of articles 64(8)(b) and 69(3), first sentence. In accordance with these
provisions, the parties are empowered to lead evidence relevant to the case, subject to the
directions of the Presiding Judge. Consequently, the ICC’s legal framework affords the
parties the right to submit evidence pertinent to the subject-matter at hand on their own
will and initiative, and without the prior authorization of the Chamber.
The entitlement to submit evidence entails a reciprocal obligation for the disclosure
of evidence intended for use at trial. For the sake of safeguarding the fairness of
proceedings and, in particular, of ensuring that a party is not taken by surprise by evidence
presented by its opponent, both the Prosecutor and the defence are required to disclose the
evidence on which they intend to rely at the hearing. To that effect are rules 76-77 and
rules 78-79, respectively, which introduce disclosure obligations of each party vis-à-vis
the opposite party. In the same vein, at the trial stage of proceedings when the Court avails
itself of the authority to collect evidence on its own motion pursuant to article 69(3),
second sentence, the parties shall have the opportunity to get acquainted with and discuss
the evidence put before them by the Chamber. Instructive in this respect is article 74(2)
668 See Riddell and Plant, supra note 481, at p. 79, where the authors cite Corpus Juris Secundum: A Complete
Restatement of the Entire American Law, FJ Ludes and HJ Gilbert (eds.), vol. 31A, West Publishing, 1964, p.
820.
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which stipulates that the Court may base its decision only on evidence submitted and
discussed before it at the trial.
As far as the pre-trial stage of the case is concerned, the timely disclosure of
information between the Prosecutor and the person in respect of whom a warrant of arrest
or a summons to appear has been issued is to be ensured by the Pre-Trial Chamber in
charge of the proceedings by virtue of article 61 and rule 121. For the purpose of enabling
adequate preparation for trial article 64(3)(c) entrusts the Trial Chamber with the duty to
ensure that the parties perform their disclosure obligations sufficiently in advance of the
commencement of the trial, including by convening status conferences for that purpose, as
provided for in regulation 54(l) of the Regulations of the Court.
In the context of disclosure of evidence, a brief consideration should also be given
to the following. In addition to any other disclosure required by the legal framework,
article 67(2) enjoins the prosecuting authority with the obligation to disclose to the
defence any exculpatory evidence in its possession or control that it believes: show or tend
to show the innocence of the accused; mitigate the guilt of the accused; may affect the
credibility of the Prosecution’s evidence.669 This provision serves as an eloquent
illustration of the specific mission pursued by the Prosecutor in the course of the
proceedings, that is, the mission of an ‘officer of justice rather than [of] a partisan
advocate”.670 In fact, a number of statutory provisions entrust the prosecuting authority
with the duty of objectivity in the course of the criminal justice process, from its very
inception up until the pronouncement of final judgment.671 By reference to the ICC’s
drafting history,672 the Appeals Chamber has posited that ‘the Prosecutor’s disclosure
obligations to the accused are linked to the Prosecutor’s role in conducting the
investigation, and stem from the Prosecutor’s obligation to investigate incriminating and
exonerating circumstances equally under article 54(1)(a)’.673
669 As regards the right of the defence to disclosure TC II opined that this right cannot be considered to be
absolute and should be balanced with the right to protection to which witnesses and victims are entitled – see
Katanga and Ngudjolo, Version publique expurgée de la « Décision relative à la protection des témoins à charge
267 et 353 » du 20 mai 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1156-Conf-Exp), ICC-01/04-01/07-1179, 28 May 2009, para.
31.
670 Kress, supra note 624, p. 608 (italics in the original).
671 See in addition articles 54, 82 and 84, as well as article 81 and rule 152(2).
672 United Nations General Assembly, Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee, 23 August 1996,
A/AC.249/L.15, p. 14: ‘Given the fact that the Prosecutor would have earlier access to evidence and /other
information, it was recommended that a mechanism be found that would neutralize any potential advantage to
the Prosecutor over the defence.’
673 Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 16 July 2010, para. 75.
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The above lends support to the conclusion that both the right of the parties to
produce evidence on the merits of the case, as well as their reciprocal disclosure
obligations are subject to an elaborate set of provisions in the ICC’s constitutive
instruments.
2.2.  The Contribution of Victims to the Production of Evidence on the Merits
of the Criminal Case
It is worth recalling that, by contrast to the comprehensive regime delineating the
production of evidence by the parties and the respective reciprocal disclosure obligations,
the legal framework does not envision a possibility for victims to adduce evidence. The
ICC’s drafting history attests to the fact that considerations in this regard were
contemplated throughout the negotiations, but were ultimately discarded. As noted both in
practice and in literature, this was due to the fact that the drafters were unable to agree on
more precise provisions on this point.674 Consequently, the silence of the Court’s legal
texts on the possibility of victims to engage in the presentation of evidence represents a
‘constructive ambiguity’ rather than an oversight on the part of the founders.
The silence of the Court’s normative basis should not, however, be construed as
ruling out outright any possibility for victims to contribute to the collection of evidentiary
material. It would be wrong to presume that the lack of an explicit provision in this
respect is tantamount to a prohibition. As will be seen shortly, in the course of the fact-
finding stage of proceedings instances may arise where victims could enhance the
processing of evidence either in a passive or in a more pro-active way.
Victim-participants may contribute to the fact-finding process in a passive way,
that is, by providing material relevant to the case not upon their own initiative, but when
requested to do so. Such a scenario would unfold when a victim-participant is called to
testify, and thus assumes simultaneously the status of witness appearing before the
Court.675 Although the procedural phenomenon of duality of victim-witness status has
already been contemplated at length, a few features of the scenario pursuant to which a
674 See e.g. Schabas supra note 361, p. 832; Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 52, where it is
observed that ‘during the drafting of the Statute, proposals for the victims to be able to present evidence for the
purpose of establishing the criminal responsibility of the accused via their legal representatives were not retained
in the final version of the Statute’ (footnote omitted).
675 See infra the chapter on dual status individuals (Chapter Four).
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victim takes the witness’s stand are worth recalling at this point. When the testimony of a
particular participating victim is deemed important for the ascertainment of the truth, two
possible courses of action come to the fore. Pursuant to the first one, the victim’s
appearance at trial may be arranged by the parties by virtue of their right to submit
evidence pursuant to article 69(3). The second possibility is when the Chamber acting
proprio motu in accordance with article 69(3) read in conjunction with article 64(6)(d)
requests the appearance of the victim for the purpose of taking the witness’s stand. As a
result, the victim’s testimony would be collected as a piece of oral evidence upon the
initiative of the parties or upon the discretion of the  relevant Chamber,676 but not upon the
initiative of the victim-witness concerned. In other words, pursuant to this scenario, the
concurrent participation of the victim as a witness in the same case is contingent on the
need of the parties and/or the decision-maker for such an involvement.677
A different scenario allowing a more pro-active role on the part of victims in the
processing of evidence could likewise come to the surface. During the presentation of
their views and concerns victims may bring to the attention of the parties and the Chamber
certain piece(s) of evidence relevant to the case, the collection of which has neither been
requested by the parties nor ordered so far by the Chamber. It is reasonable to expect that
some material in the knowledge and/or possession of victim-participants with a bearing on
their personal interests could be conducive to the ascertainment of circumstances germane
to the subject-matter at hand. Hence, such pieces of evidence may prove necessary for the
further illumination of facts relevant to the case and, ultimately, for the determination of
the truth. This train of thoughts occasions the question as to how relevant material brought
to the attention of the parties and the Chamber by victim-participants could be
incorporated into the evidentiary material. In other words, ‘could victims in reality
[engage in the production of evidence] without being a party?’678
676 In the same spirit, in his partly dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008
Judge Kirsch distinguished the question whether victims may lead evidence from the victims’ ability to be called
as witnesses to give evidence. The same scenario, pursuant to which victims are passive evidence-providers
(sources of evidence), would unfold when victims are requested by the Chamber to provide also other type of
evidence, apart from testimony, of which the Chamber or the parties are aware to be in the possession of the
victim concerned. See in this regard, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 16 July 2010, para. 86: ‘This is also
the case where it is specifically brought to the attention of the Trial Chamber by one of the parties or participants
that potentially exculpatory information exists and is in the possession of a participating victim’.
677 See in the same vein, Edwards, supra note 448, p. 976.
678 Friman, supra note 25, p. 494.
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Concerns of the kind are not surprising in view of the silence of the constitutive
instruments in this regard. The lack of any explicit provision on the potential involvement
of victims in the evidence-gathering process has prompted divergent standpoints in
practice. The initial jurisprudence in the Lubanga case679 espoused the view that victims,
upon discrete application and judicial authorization, could tender evidence which would
assist the Chamber in the determination of the truth ‘if in this sense the Court has
“requested” the evidence’.680 These findings sound somewhat incoherent and ambiguous,
to say the least. On the one hand, the wording ‘tender’ suggests that the evidence would
be submitted upon the victims’ own motion, while at the same time the wording ‘request’
implies instead that the evidence would be collected upon the discretion and on the
demand of the Chamber. If these judicial findings were to be interpreted in favour of
affording victims the initiative to lead evidence on the merits of the case, i.e. to actively
intervene in the evidence-gathering process upon their own choice and initiative, the
procedural standing of victims would be equated to the standing of parties to the
proceedings. Undoubtedly, such a viewpoint would run afoul of the intentions of the
drafters as regards the essence and the confines of the involvement of victims in the ICC’s
process. As previously noted, victims, by contrast to the Prosecutor and the defence, do
not assume the role of chief adversaries on the ICC’s arena on the merits of the criminal
case.
It is to be noted that two of the Judges of the Appeals Chamber dissented from this
understanding by contending that the right to lead evidence belongs exclusively to the
parties and by underscoring the victims’ non-party standing in the ICC’s criminal justice
process.681 The dissenting Judges opined that allowing victims to engage in the collection
of evidence would be contrary to the wording and the spirit of the Court’s normative basis
and thus completely ruled out such a scenario.
Indubitably, the majority’s understanding could potentially efface the fundamental
difference between the position of the parties and of victim-participants in proceedings on
the merits. The two dissents, on their part, fall short of discerning any possibility whereby
information which affects the victims’ personal interests and is conducive to the
determination of the truth could be incorporated into the evidentiary material without
679 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008; Lubanga, Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008.
680 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008, para. 108.
681 Lubanga, Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Kirsch and dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the Judgment of
the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008.
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infringing the spirit of the law. Consequently, whereas the majority’s understanding is
overly indulgent, the standpoint advanced in the dissents appears quite restrictive.
These two rather opposing viewpoints in the ICC’s initial jurisprudence have
subsequently been reconciled to a certain extent by the Appeals Chamber.682 Whilst the
Appeals Chamber’s Judgment (this time unanimously) did not grant victims a right to
adduce evidence, it nevertheless acknowledged the possibility whereby information
provided by victims which is relevant to the determination of the truth could be
incorporated by the Chamber into the evidentiary material. The Appeals Chamber
conditioned the inclusion into the trial evidence of material in the possession and/or
knowledge of victims upon the following concurrent requirements. First, the evidence at
hand should be such as to affect the victims’ personal interests. That is to say, the
intervention of victims pursuant to article 68(3) should be warranted in the present
instance. Secondly, the evidence must be necessary for the establishment of the truth.
Thirdly, its inclusion in the evidentiary material must not be prejudicial to or inconsistent
with the rights of the accused, fairness and impartiality of the proceedings. This time the
Appeals Chamber clearly underscored that ‘victims do not have the right to present
evidence during the trial’,683 since, unlike the parties, they lack the possibility to adduce
evidence autonomously, i.e. independently from the discretion and the authorisation of the
Chamber. Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber noted the possibility of victims being
requested by the Chamber in charge of the proceedings to submit evidence upon an
assessment of the requirements contemplated above and in accordance with the
Chamber’s powers pursuant to the second sentence of article 69(3).684 On the basis of the
above it is reasonable to conclude that pursuant to the scenario depicted by the Appeals
Chamber, the decision-maker would be acting according to its authority envisaged in
article 64(6)(b) and (d) to order the production of evidence in addition to that already
collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties. This, as noted
earlier, could be achieved by, inter alia, requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses, the production of documents or other evidence.
These findings of the Appeals Chamber are in tune with the rationale behind
victims’ participation before the ICC. Through the presentation of views and concerns
682 Katanga and Ngudjolo, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 16 July 2010.
683 Ibid., para. 48.
684 Ibid.
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victims could ‘‘whisper in the Court’s ear’ about the need for, and perhaps even
availability of, additional evidence.’685 Accordingly, the possibility for victims to bring to
the knowledge of the parties and the Chamber evidentiary material beneficial to the
ascertainment of the truth with a bearing on their personal interests would contribute to
the fact-finding process. This manner of contributing to the evidentiary material would not
result in victims interfering with or assuming the autonomous role assigned to the parties
in the evidentiary process: a course of action which would contradict the will of the
drafters. At the same time, by bringing evidentiary material to the attention of the Court
victims could substantiate assertions advanced in their views and concerns, thus, would
ensure that their participation is meaningful rather than purely symbolic.
Likewise, evidentiary material becoming known for the first time during the
presentation of victims’ views and concerns could assist the judicial authority in
performing its duty to determine the truth. However, once victims have directed the
attention of the parties and of the Chamber to the pieces of evidence, their pro-active role
in the processing of evidence would be exhausted. The Chamber could either decide to
request on its own initiative the submission of evidence brought into view by victims or
could be ‘moved’686 by the parties to avail itself of its proprio motu powers envisaged in
articles 64(6)(d) and 69(3). Nevertheless, whether evidence brought up by victims in
support of their views and concerns would be deemed important for the ascertainment of
the truth and would eventually be incorporated into the evidentiary material would depend
entirely on the discretion of the decision-maker. The Chamber, upon a twofold assessment
of, first, whether the evidence at hand affects the victims’ personal interests in light of
article 68(3) and, secondly, the relevance and the necessity of such a material for the
establishment of the truth, would decide whether at all to request its submission from the
respective victim-participant(s). As the Appeals Chamber has bluntly put it, ‘[t]his
decision is within the Trial Chamber’s discretion.’687
The present train of thoughts entails the question whether victims should be
enjoined with disclosure obligations with respect to material the production of which has
685 Friman, supra note 25, p. 494.
686 The ICJ may likewise be ‘moved’ to avail itself of its powers to request evidence on its own volition – see the
example suggested by Riddell and Plant, supra note 481, at p. 59 – a party may request the Court to exercise its
proprio motu powers under article 62 of ICJ’s Statute to request evidence on its own motion (referring to the
ELSI case).
687 See the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 16 July 2010, para. 85.
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been ordered by the Chamber following its assessment pursuant to article 68(3) in
accordance with article 69(3). Since such evidence would be called by the Chamber acting
proprio motu on the basis of a case-by-case determination, it would be reasonable to
conclude that no general disclosure obligation should be imposed on victims vis-à-vis
either party or other participating victims. As already clarified, a general disclosure
obligation is a corollary of an autonomous right to lead evidence, which does not extend
to victims. Furthermore, it could not be known in advance which evidence suggested by
victims would, if at all, be considered necessary for the determination of the truth. Only if
the material put forward by victims is deemed conducive to the elucidation of the truth,
would the Chamber request its submission. Accordingly, only then would disclosure to the
parties and/or to the rest of the victim-participants be necessary. In other words, in the
event that the Chamber concerned orders the submission of material in the possession of
victims, the fair trial rights of the accused would indubitably necessitate disclosure on a
case-by-case basis. The disclosure of evidence would then take place upon an order for
disclosure of the Chamber in charge of the proceedings.
The same line of reasoning transpires in the relevant jurisprudence. In the view of
the Appeals Chamber, since none of the ICC’s constitutive documents ‘expressly oblige[s]
the [v]ictims to disclose exculpatory [or incriminating] evidence to the accused’,688
‘imposing a general disclosure obligation on the victims […] would disregard the
[victims’] limited role […] of presenting their views and concerns where their personal
interests are affected […] [as well as] the differing roles of the victims vis-à-vis the
parties.’689 At the same time, the fact that specific instances may nevertheless require the
disclosure of evidence by the victims to the accused has been acknowledged by the
Appeals Chamber.690 Upon a review of the relevant jurisprudence of both the ECtHR and
the IACtHR the Chamber inferred that ‘disclosure of evidence after the commencement of
trial [does not per se result] in a violation of the accused’s human rights.’691 The Appeals
Chamber thus ruled that when victims are requested ‘to submit evidence that was not
previously disclosed to the accused […] [the Chamber] will order the disclosure of the
688 Ibid., para. 72.
689 Ibid., para. 75.
690 See the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 16 July 2010, para. 71. According to the Chamber, such
instances would arise ‘when a party or participant brings to the attention of the Trial Chamber that such
information is available and the Trial Chamber finds that such information is necessary for the determination of
the truth.’
691 Ibid., para. 51.
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evidence to the accused sufficiently in advance of its presentation at the trial, and take any
other measures necessary to ensure the accused’s right to a fair trial, in particular the right
to “have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence” [footnote
omitted]’.692
For the reasons set out above, victim-participants have no general obligation to
disclose to the parties evidence in their possession, unlike the reciprocal disclosure
obligation of each party vis-à-vis the other party pursuant to rules 77 and 78. This,
however, is without prejudice to the requirement of regulation 52(2) of the Regulations of
the Registry obliging the parties and equally victim-participants to provide to the court
officer the evidence intended for use at a hearing in advance of the scheduled hearing.693
Practice shows that the difference between rules 77-78 and regulation 52(2) of the
Regulations of the Registry could appear somewhat elusive694 due to the fact that both sets
of provisions refer to evidence intended for use at a hearing. However, whereas rules 77
and 78 are aimed at safeguarding the fair trial rights of the parties through the stipulation
of reciprocal obligations for disclosure of the evidence on which the parties intend to rely
throughout the proceedings, the purpose of regulation 52(2) of the Regulations of the
Registry is to ensure the preparation, practical organization and proper conduct of the
hearing. Therefore, unlike the question concerning the disclosure of evidence in the
possession of victim-participants, which is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, there
is a general obligation imposed on victims by the legal framework to present in advance to
the court officer any document intended for use at the hearing.
3. Examination of Evidence on the Merits of the Criminal Case
Having contemplated the issues related to the submission of evidence and, in particular,
the extent of victims’ involvement therein, the question which logically comes to light
concerns the examination of evidence on the merits. Evidence adduced by the parties and,
692 Ibid., para. 55.
693 Regulation 52(2) of the Regulations of the Registry requires the parties and the participants to provide to the
court officer the evidence they intend to use at a hearing at least three full working days before the scheduled
hearing.
694 See Lubanga, Decision on various issues related to witnesses’ testimony during trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-1140,
29 January 2008 (Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 29 January 2008), for reference to the submission of the defence
which refuted the Prosecutor’s submissions that the disclosure of documents to be used in questioning is
governed by rules 77-78 of the Rules, contending that the only legal regime applicable was regulation 52 of the
Regulations of the Registry.
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equally, evidence presented upon the request of the Chamber in accordance with article
69(3) is subject to examination. Instructive in this respect is article 74(2) which provides
that the Court may base its decision only on evidence submitted and discussed before it at
the trial.
The essence and the confines of victims’ intervention in the examination of
evidence at trial become easily discernible against the backdrop of the rights of the
Prosecutor and the defence accorded in that respect by the constitutive instruments.
Therefore, in order to properly fathom the part assigned to victims in the process of
examining evidence on the merits the present analysis should first contemplate the
corresponding role of the parties.
3.1. Examination of Evidence by the Parties
By virtue of rule 140(2)(b), the prosecution and the defence equally have the right to
examine a witness about relevant matters related to the witness’s testimony and its
reliability, the credibility of the witness and other relevant matters. In tune with
internationally recognized due process rights of the accused, rule 140(2)(d) enunciates the
right of the defence to be the last to examine a witness, irrespective of the party who calls
that witness. The law neither envisages any restrictions as regards the questioning of
witnesses performed by the parties, nor limits the scope of questioning by either the
Prosecutor or the defence to the witness’s initial testimony. The logical conclusion,
therefore, is that each party may, as of right, question one and the same witness about any
matter relevant to the subject-matter of the criminal case. The rationale behind this legal
approach stems from the importance of a witness’s testimony as a valuable piece of oral
evidence. Furthermore, since the testimony of a witness may contain information essential
for the ascertainment of various issues germane to the subject-matter of the case, the legal
framework neither pre-determines, nor limits the scope of the witness’s examination by
the parties to the witness’s initial testimony.
Indubitably, albeit not expressly envisaged in the relevant provisions, but duly
noted in the jurisprudence of the Court, the parties should conduct the questioning in such
a manner so as to avoid recalling witnesses unnecessarily.695 This understanding is equally
695 Ibid., para. 32.
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applicable as a matter of principle to the questioning of all witnesses regardless of the
calling party. Likewise, the Chamber, when questioning a witness pursuant to its authority
under article 69(3) and rule 140(2)(c) should conduct a comprehensive examination of the
witness and ensure that all relevant questions have been exhausted. Questioning which
would prevent the unnecessary recalling of witnesses at trial would achieve multifaceted
purposes.
First, this would safeguard the witness’s psychological and, in all likelihood,
physical well-being as envisaged in article 68(1). The witness would not experience the
anxiety of appearing anew before the Court. As a result, any potential further secondary
victimization and/or traumatization of that person would be prevented. In addition, the
witness would be spared various inconveniences which the travelling to a foreign country
on account of giving testimony may otherwise entail, such as spending time away from
one’s family, from everyday activities, from work and/or education, etc.
Secondly, avoiding recalling witnesses at trial would ensure expeditious and
effective judicial proceedings. The latter, on their part, safeguard the fair trial rights of the
accused, in particular, his or her right to be tried without undue delay enshrined in article
67(1)(c). Similarly, expeditiousness and effectiveness of the proceedings serve the
interests of victims and the interests of justice in general.
Thirdly, avoiding recalling witnesses is also cost-effective, as it spares judicial
time and resources.696 The travelling, transportation and accommodation of witnesses
while in The Hague involve expenses. Other practicalities related to the proper conduct of
the questioning of a witness at trial (such as simultaneous interpretation) are also time-
consuming and costly.
Recalling witnesses at trial may also have an adverse impact on the search for the
truth not least because of the ‘vagaries of memory’.697 Admittedly, memory is prone to
fade with the passage of time. In other words, ‘the passage of time tends ‘to edit’ one’s
recollection of certain events’.698 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect witnesses’
696 Similar considerations have been advanced by the ICTY which favoured the cross-examination of witnesses
via video-link to their in-court appearance, noting that it would be ‘a misuse of the Tribunal’s resources, and
incompatible with the expeditious completion of the trial, to have the [f]our [w]itnesses travel to The Hague to
give their brief testimonies.’ – see The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al, IT-06-90-T, Reasons for decision
granting prosecution’s motion to cross examine four proposed rule 92 bis witnesses and reasons for decision to
hear the evidence of those witnesses via video-conference link, 3 November 2009.
697 Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 1, p. 1400.
698 Kelsall et al, supra note 281, citing J. Cartwright, at p. 36.
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recollections of relevant facts to become less clear and precise with time, thus less
reliable. Furthermore, the reappearance of a particular witness before the Court may
become difficult or even impossible (for instance, due to subsequent physical or mental
impairment affecting the witness’s fitness to give testimony or death).
In the present context it is also to be noted that the legal framework does not
require the parties to disclose in advance their lines of questioning. The idea behind this
legislative approach stems from the fact that the lines of questioning embraced by a party
would depend to a significant extent on the issues raised and the answers given during a
witness’s examination at trial.699 Furthermore, the lines of questioning would also depend
on the strategy chosen by the parties to best serve the mission they pursue at trial. As to
the Prosecutor, he or she will be expected to question the witnesses in a way which would
not merely serve the Prosecutor’s case but also the search for the truth pursuant to the
prosecutorial duty of objectivity entrusted by article 54(1)(a).
Nevertheless, exceptions may arise when prior disclosure of the lines of
questioning by the parties would be necessary, in particular when the protection of
traumatized or vulnerable witnesses is at stake. In chime with its duty for the protection of
the victims, witnesses and their families as provided for in article 68(1), the Chamber
concerned may order as an appropriate measure for the protection of traumatized or
vulnerable witnesses prior disclosure by the parties of the questions or the topics they seek
to cover during the questioning. The adoption of such an approach, which is to be
assessed on a witness-by-witness basis, would correspond to the primary responsibility of
the Chamber under article 64(2) to ensure the fair and expeditious conduct of the
proceedings with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses.
3.2.  Examination of Evidence by the Victims
By contrast to the Prosecutor and the defence, the possibility for victims to engage in the
examination of evidence, envisaged by the Court’s legal framework, is neither
699 See to the same effect, Lubanga, TC I, Decision of 29 January 2008.
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autonomous, nor full-fledged.700 Moreover, this possibility may be employed by victim-
participants only in a vicarious way. According to the relevant provisions, victims may
not intervene in the examination of evidence in person, but solely through their legal
representative(s). The latter, on their part, cannot take part into the process of examining
evidence as of right.701 In order to intervene in the examination of evidence, the legal
representative must be authorized to do so by the Chamber in charge of the proceedings.
Hence, the involvement of the victims’ legal representative(s) in the examination of
evidence on the merits, such as in the questioning of witnesses, experts and the accused, is
subject to a judicial assessment on a case-by-case basis, which will be discussed in more
detail in the subsequent paragraphs.
The idea underpinning the extent and limits of victims’ involvement in the
questioning of witnesses, experts and the accused is in tune with their non-party standing
in proceedings on the merits. The legal regime governing the engagement of victims in the
examination of evidence adheres to the overall rationale of the victims’ participation
scheme carved out by the Court’s founders. Thus, it may be inferred that the regime
regulating the involvement of victims in the examination of evidence just as victims’
participation, taken as a whole, is ‘an example of the novel nature of the [ICC’s legal
framework], which is not the [exclusive] product of either the Romano Germanic or the
common law legal systems.’702
Consequently, the separate and distinct legal framework delineating the role of the
victims in the examination of evidence manifests the endeavours of the drafters to balance
the possibility for meaningful participation on the part of victims with the rights of the
parties, expeditiousness and fairness of proceedings. On the one hand, conditioning the
intervention of victims in the examination of evidence upon the discretion of the Judges
would guarantee that it is not inconsistent with the precepts of procedural fairness and the
rights of the key stakeholders in proceedings. At the same time, affording victims the
700 As duly noted by Judge Kirsch in his partly dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11
July 2008, para. 31, rule 91(3) ‘regulates the limited manner in which victims may be permitted to put questions
to a witness’.
701 See in the same spirit the dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11
July 2008. Also worth noting in the present context is the observation of TC I, according to which the
questioning by the victims’ legal representative is ‘an example of the novel nature of the Statute, which is not the
[exclusive] product of either the Romano Germanic or the common law legal systems.’ – see Decision on the
Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal Representatives of Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, 16
September 2009 (Lubanga, TC I, 16 September 2009), para. 24.
702 Ibid.
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possibility to engage in the examination of evidence would ensure that their participation
is not merely symbolic. The intervention of victims in the examination of evidence could
likewise contribute to shedding further light on certain pieces of evidence. It may as well
‘potentially enable the Chamber to better understand some of the matters at issue, given
[the victims’] […] local knowledge and social and cultural background.’703
Before proceeding with the analysis of the specific provisions regulating the part
played by victims in the examination of evidence, it is worth recalling that due to its
complexity the intervention of victims in the ICC’s evidence-gathering procedure was left
outside the Statute’s purview. For that reason, the relevant norms are to be found in the
Rules instead.
The central provision governing the intervention of victims in the examination of
evidence is rule 91(3). This legal text allows the victims’ legal representative to engage in
the questioning of witnesses, experts  and the accused. This possibility, as noted at the
very outset, is subject to a number of qualifications. That is to say, rule 91(3) ‘regulates
the limited manner in which victims may be permitted to put questions to a witness.’704
First, the questioning by the victims’ legal representative does not take place
automatically, as of right, but is contingent on an application in this regard to the
Chamber. In addition, the legal representative may be required to provide a written note of
the questions to be posed to the witness, expert or the accused, on which the parties will
be allowed to make observations. Next, unlike the Prosecutor and the defence, the legal
representatives may be required to disclose in advance their lines of questioning not only
with respect to vulnerable or traumatized witnesses, but with respect to any witness in
general.
In its decision whether to grant the request for intervention the Chamber, pursuant
to rule 91(3)(b), is enjoined with the task to perform a balancing test contemplating the
manifold interests which are at stake: the interests of the parties and of the victims
together with the interests of the witness(es) concerned against the backdrop of the
requirements of fairness, impartiality and expeditiousness of the proceedings. In light of
all these considerations, if the Chamber grants the request of the legal representative, it
may give concrete directions on the manner and order of the questions and the production
703 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 75, footnote omitted.
704 See the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Kirsch to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008,
para. 31, as well as the dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the same Judgment.
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of documents in accordance with its statutory powers. The Chamber may as well decide to
put itself the question(s) on behalf of the legal representative, if it considers it appropriate.
It thus follows that the Chamber, vested with primary authority and control over
the proceedings, is entrusted with the task to ensure that the intervention sought by the
legal representative is appropriate at the respective stage of the proceedings and that the
questioning will not be performed at the expense of the fair trial rights of the parties705 or
the efficient and timely dispense of justice. An acknowledgement to that effect is also
reflected in practice, where it has been observed that ‘[t]he Chamber must take a global
view for each witness, to ensure that the overall effect of the questioning by victims does
not undermine the rights of the accused and his fair and impartial trial.’706 Thus, since the
intervention of the victims’ legal representative may have an impact on a variety of
interests which are at stake in the course of the proceedings, including the interests of the
person giving testimony or expert opinion, it is for the Chamber to determine the
questions to be allowed and the way they will be put to the witness, expert or the accused.
Given all the above, it becomes evident that the intervention of the legal
representative in the examination of evidence on the merits is subject to the scrutiny,
directions and strict control of the Chamber in charge of the proceedings. Consequently,
the regime set forth in rule 91(3) clearly indicates that the rationale behind the
engagement of victims in the examination of evidence emanates from the overall
philosophy of victims’ participation, embodied succinctly in article 68(3), and discussed
at length in a previous chapter.
Consistent with the statutory regime governing the involvement of victims in
proceedings, rule 91(3) neither predetermines nor confines the scope and the manner of
the questioning conducted by the legal representative to a particular range of issues.
Accordingly, the scope of the examination of a witness, expert or an accused by the
victims’ legal representative is subjected entirely to the discretion of the Chamber. As
already noted above, in its determination the Chamber in charge of the proceedings would
have to take into consideration the specificities of the case, the precepts of fairness and
705 In the same vein, Lubanga, TC I, Decision on the defence observations regarding the right of the legal
representatives of victims to question defence witnesses and on the notion of personal interest -and- Decision on
the defence application to exclude certain representatives of victims from the Chamber during the non-public
evidence of various defence witnesses, ICC-01/04-01/06-2340, 11 March 2010, para. 35, where the Chamber
observed that ‘[t]he Chamber must take a global view for each witness, to ensure that the overall effect of the
questioning by victims does not undermine the rights of the accused and his fair and impartial trial’.
706 Ibid.
214
expeditiousness, the interests of the key stakeholders in proceedings and likewise the need
for a meaningful participation on the part of victims.
Logically, depending on the circumstances, the guilt of the accused may fall
among the issues which the legal representative would seek to address by way of
questioning a particular witness, expert or the accused upon authorisation by the Chamber.
Thus, questions touching upon the individual criminal responsibility of the accused rather
than being ruled out as a matter of principle, should be considered by the Chamber in light
of the victims’ personal interests and the due process rights of the accused.
The same line of reasoning has guided the Court throughout its jurisprudence. The
first Trial Chamber to address this issue – the Chamber in the Lubanga case - held that it
would allow appropriate questions to be put by the victims’ legal representative(s)
whenever the victims’ personal interests are engaged by the evidence under
consideration.707 Further in the same spirit, the Chamber noted that ‘the victims’ legal
representatives may […] question witnesses on areas relevant to the interests of the
victims in order to clarify the details of their evidence and to elicit additional facts,
notwithstanding its relevance to the guilt or innocence of the accused.’708 At the same
time, an important emphasis has been made that the questions by the victims’ legal
representative(s) must be ‘confined […] to the particular issues and evidence which
engage [the victims’] personal interests’.709 Trial Chamber II, on its part, has reiterated the
understanding, which is equally applicable to any intervention on the part of victims in the
course of the proceedings, that the questioning pursuant to rule 91(3) should not be
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and the precepts of a fair and
impartial trial.710
In the same fashion, the Appeals Chamber has found that the questions which may
be put by the legal representative in accordance with rule 91(3) may pertain to the guilt or
innocence of the accused as long as the victims’ personal interests are affected.711
Although one of the dissenting Judges also opined that the questions pursuant to rule
91(3) must ‘necessarily relate to the victims’ personal interests that legitimise their
participation’, he made the apposite clarification that such questions should not relate ‘to
707 Lubanga, TC I, 18 January 2008, para. 108.
708 Lubanga, TC I, 16 September 2009, para. 26.
709 Lubanga, TC I, 11 March 2010, para. 33.
710 Katanga and Ngudjolo, TC II, 22 January 2010, para. 74.
711 Lubanga, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, para. 102.
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facts of which the accused was not forewarned by the disclosure of evidence on the
subject’.712
In light of the foregoing, it is logical to be inferred that the role played by victim-
participants in the processing of evidence on the merits is in keeping with their non-party
standing in the ICC’s criminal justice process.
4. Victims’ Role in the Processing of Evidence Germane to Reparations
Besides the involvement of victims in the evidence-gathering process on the merits of the
case, another important issue which calls for separate consideration is the part accorded to
victims in fact-finding proceedings and/or hearings on reparations. As previously noted,
the possibility for victims to participate in reparation proceedings is distinct and
independent from the possibility to intervene in proceedings on the merits of the criminal
case. This scenario is different from the situation of civil parties before the ECCC, for
instance, where the civil claim is a prerequisite for the participation of civil parties in the
case.
4.1. The Essence of Reparation Proceedings in Brief
Unlike proceedings regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, reparation
proceedings concern the civil action brought by victims on the criminal justice arena.
Reparation proceedings focus on the victims’ request for indemnification for the damages
sustained as a result of the crime(s) under consideration in the event of a conviction. Thus,
while the victims’ interest in the determination of the harm incurred as a result of the
alleged crime(s) is an ancillary objective and only one among the manifold interests which
are at stake in the proceedings adjudicating the individual criminal responsibility of the
accused, it represents the principal, core subject of reparation proceedings. It thus follows
that within the context of reparation proceedings the victims’ interest in indemnification
takes precedence over the more general interest represented by the Prosecutor in
proceedings on the merits aimed at achieving justice through individual and general
deterrence. Consequently, in reparation proceedings the restorative values of criminal
712 Dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis to the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008, para. 17.
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justice prevail over its retributive objectives.713 Therefore, not surprisingly, the victims’
right to claim reparations has been identified as ‘the most important restorative element in
the Statute’.714
4.2.  Parties to the Reparation Proceedings
By contrast to their non-party standing in the criminal justice process, the stake of victims
in an award of compensation positions them as chief players at hearings and/or
proceedings limited to reparations. Victims bear the onus of proving the scope and the
extent of the damage, loss and/or injury which they claim to have sustained as a result of
the criminal conduct under consideration. Therefore, as duly observed, ‘any element of
the civil action that goes beyond the elements of the crime charged needs to be
demonstrated’ by the victim seeking reparation.715 Hence, victims rather than the
Prosecutor assume the role of principal protagonists, that is, the standing of a party in
proceedings related to reparations.
The leading part of victims in reparation proceedings is largely acknowledged in
the relevant literature, where it is observed that at the reparations stage victims may
assume the role and function of parties716 with ‘the accompanying right to bring
evidence’.717 The same understanding is reflected in one of the dissents to the Appeals
Chamber’s Judgment of 11 July 2008 in the Lubanga case. According to the dissenting
Judge, ‘[the] provisions concerning leading evidence relating to guilt or innocence at trial
contrast with the provisions that apply to reparations. […] The restrictions on victims
questioning witnesses that apply to the legal representatives of victims at the trial do not
apply to this aspect of the proceedings.’718 It thus follows that the participation and the
input of victims is determinative for the outcome of reparation proceedings. That is to say,
unlike victims’ participation in proceedings adjudicating the individual criminal
responsibility of the accused, the role of victims in proceedings on reparations can be
713 See in the same vein Mekjian and Varughese, supra note 9, with respect to the interrelationship between
punitive and restorative justice values in the context of the ICC’s proceedings.
714 Bitti and Friman, supra note 235, p. 457.
715 ECCC, Case 001, Appeal Judgment of 3 February 2012, para. 428.
716 Zappalà, supra note 11, p.154 and p. 13, as well as Friman, supra note 25, p. 497.
717 Friman, supra note 25, p. 497.
718 Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Kirsch to the Appeals Chamber’s Judgment of 11 July 2008.
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defined as ‘dispositive’719 or, in other words, as capable of influencing the outcome of
such proceedings.
The ICC’s legal framework contains numerous indications of the chief role of
victims and the primacy of their interests in reparation proceedings. An eloquent
indication of the principal, i.e. party standing of victims and the primacy of their interests
in reparation proceedings provides article 82(4). By affording, as of right, the possibility
for the victims’ legal representative to appeal the order for reparations,720 this norm
represents a clear-cut recognition of the victims’ leading part in reparation proceedings. It
is important to note that the scenario envisioned by article 82(4) is the only instance where
victims are granted an explicit and autonomous right of appeal. The ICC’s normative basis
doe not provide for any other similar right of appeal to victim-participants with respect to
the judicial findings on the merits of the case or the sentence.721
Another inference about the primary role of victims in proceedings on reparations
ensues from article 75(3). This legal text outlines the importance of the representations
from or on behalf of the victims which the Chamber must consider before proceeding with
an order for reparations. In the same vein, article 75(6) places a special emphasis on the
interests of victims in reparation proceedings by ruling out any interpretations of the
regime governing reparations to the prejudice of victims. Rule 97(3), for its part,
postulates as a guiding principle within the context of the assessment of reparations that
the Chamber should equally respect the rights of victims and of the convicted person.
The fact that, in the event of a conviction, an order for reparations could be made
against the convicted person outlines the latter (and, accordingly, the defence) as the other
principal actor in reparation proceedings. This rationale permeates the provisions of article
75(2) and article 76(3) read in conjunction with article 76(1) which expressly conditions
the submission of representations concerning reparations upon a conviction.
Consequently, the relevant legal framework identifies the convicted person as the person
719 Edwards, supra note 448, p. 974. The author identifies the ‘dispositive’ type of victim participation as a
participation, according to which, victims have control over a particular decision.
720 By contrast, as previously noted, victims do not have the right to appeal decisions of acquittal, conviction or
sentence – see article 81.
721 Article 81. Further on the right to appeal and the interrelation between the right to appeal and a person’s party
standing in proceedings see the analysis suggested by Boyle, supra note 221, where the author observes that the
right to appeal decisions of the Trial Chamber is a confirmation (implicit) of the victims’/civil parties’ status as
full parties in trials.
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against whom the Court may make an order for reparations. Respectively, the convicted
person is the party which endeavours to refute the victims’ claim(s) for reparations.
The diverse nature of reparation proceedings and the different standing of victims
therein find reflection in the more recent jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber in the
Lubanga case.722 Upon a juxtaposition between the lack of a right of victims to appeal a
conviction and sentence and their explicit right to appeal an order for reparations the
Chamber concluded that the victims are ‘parties to the [reparation] proceedings and not, as
is the case at other stages of the proceedings, participants who, under article 68 (3) of the
Statute, may present their views and concerns where their personal interests are
affected.’723 At the same time, the Chamber observed that the Prosecutor is not a party to
the appellate proceedings on reparations. For that reason the prosecuting authority was not
invited to submit a response to the documents in support of the appeals.724
The same understanding has been advanced in the jurisprudence of the ECCC. The
tribunal has ruled that the Prosecutor ‘has no interest in individual civil claims, [thus] may
normally not intervene in a civil action which is based on adversarial proceedings between
the [c]ivil [p]arties and the [a]ccused’. 725 Hence, pursuant to these judicial findings the
Co-Prosecutors have no role in seeking reparation.726
The acknowledgement made by each of the two judicial institutions of the distinct
standing of victims and of the Prosecutor within the context of reparation proceedings as
opposed to proceedings adjudicating the alleged criminal conduct adheres to the essence
of reparation proceedings, as well as to the guiding principles lying at the heart of the
respective legal framework. By contrast, the first ICC Chamber to address reparations-
related issues – the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case – neglected the fact that the
Prosecutor, unlike the victims, is not a party to the reparation proceedings. As a
consequence, in the Chamber’s scheduling order both the Prosecutor and the defence
together with the victims were invited to file submissions on the principles to be applied
by the Chamber with regard to reparations.727 Furthermore, the prosecuting authority, on
722 Being the first case to go to trial and to be concluded with an adjudication of the guilt of the accused, the
Lubanga case logically provided the first occasion for the Court to address the issue of reparations.
723 Lubanga, Decision of the Appeals Chamber of 14 December 2012, para. 67.
724 Ibid., para. 74.
725 ECCC, Case 001, Trial Chamber Decision of 9 October 2009, para. 23.
726 Ibid., para. 42.
727 Lubanga, TC I, Scheduling order conceming timetable for sentencing and reparations, 14 March 2012, para.
8.
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an equal footing with the victims and the defence, was requested by the Chamber to state
whether it would seek to call expert evidence in the proceedings on reparations. This
approach runs afoul of the normative basis on reparations, as well as of the overall nature
and core purpose of reparation proceedings which leave the Prosecutor outside the
purview of reparations. The perusal of the reparations-related provisions in the ICC’s
constitutive instruments lends support to the conclusion that the prosecuting authority has
no say on matters, such as the production or the examination of evidence relevant to
reparations, or the outcome of reparation proceedings.728
4.3. The Role of the Victims in the Evidence-Gathering Process Related to
Reparations
The specificities of reparation proceedings as compared to proceedings on the merits
warrant the different legislative approach as regards the substance, scope and extent of
victims’ intervention in the processing of evidence germane to reparations. Within the
context of reparations-related issues victims are afforded an active and enhanced
involvement in the processing of evidence, both in terms of its production and
examination.
In the context of the production and the processing of evidence relevant to
reparations, victims are explicitly entitled to submit evidence for the purpose of
substantiating the information provided in their claims for reparations. Illustrative in this
regard is article 94(1)(g), according to which victims are required to provide in their
requests for reparations supporting documentation, including identifying information of
witnesses, to the extent possible. Furthermore, with respect to the assessment of
reparations victims and their legal representative(s) are entitled by virtue of rule 97(2) to
request the appointment of appropriate experts to assist the Court in determining the scope
and the extent of the relevant harm.
The same holds true as regards the entitlement of victims to engage in the
examination of evidence related to reparations. By contrast to proceedings on the merits,
the intervention of the legal representative in the examination of evidence concerning
728 See, more specifically, rule 97 which does not envisage the Prosecutor within its purview. Consequently, the
Prosecutor is not afforded the right to call expert evidence related to the assessment of the damages sustained by
victims. It thus follows that pursuant to the applicable legal framework the Prosecutor is not afforded a
possibility to call expert evidence concerning the assessment of reparations.
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reparation issues is conditioned solely on permission by the Chamber in charge. Unlike
questioning in proceedings related to the individual criminal responsibility of the accused,
in reparation proceedings the legal representative is neither required to make a formal
application to the Chamber nor to provide a written note of the questions to be put to the
witness, expert or the accused. It is therefore to be concluded that in reparation
proceedings victims are afforded greater latitude from the Chamber’s directions and
control than in proceedings concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused. This line of
reasoning stems from the perusal of rule 91(4), according to which, when the legal
representative seeks to intervene on evidence confined to reparations the restrictions of
rule 91(3)(a) and (b) do not apply. The only stipulation is that the questioning of
witnesses, experts and the accused by the legal representative should take place upon
permission of the Chamber.729
All of the above is an articulate reflection of the leading and autonomous part
accorded to victims in the processing of evidence relevant to reparations. The right to
actively engage in the fact-finding procedure concerning reparation claims entails that the
intervention of victims in reparation proceedings has a bearing on the substance, the
completeness, as well as on the quantity of the evidentiary material. Consequently, the
participation of victims in proceedings on reparations directly impacts the outcome of
reparation claims. It is, therefore, to be concluded that, by contrast to the ‘non-
dispositive’,730 i.e. non-determinative role in proceedings adjudicating the individual
criminal responsibility of the alleged offender(s), victims assume central, thus,
determinative role in proceedings concerning reparations.
729 The perusal of rule 91 discerns an inconsistency between the numerical and the literal reference of rule 91(4)
to the restrictions on questioning by the legal representative. According to rule 91(4), for a hearing limited to
reparations, ‘the restrictions on questioning by the legal represedntative set forth in sub-rule 2 shall not apply.’
However, as has been previously discussed, the said limitations, to which rule 91(4) refers, are spelled out in
sub-rule 3 instead. The drafting history of the Rules suggests that the inconsistency between the numerical and
literal reference of rule 91(4) is due to the fact that sub-paragraph 1 was adopted and introduced into the
provision of rule 91 subsequently, in later negotiations, following the creation of the rest of the sub-paragraphs.
See in the same vein, Mekjian and Varughese, supra note 9, p. 26.
730 Edwards, supra note 448.
221
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The place of victims before the International Criminal Court and their role in the
proceedings proves to be a multifaceted and thought-provoking issue. The thesis has
aimed at unravelling some of the core features that characterize victims as independent
stakeholders accorded a sui generis standing in the multilayered design of the ICC,
different from the Prosecutor and the defence, as well as from other participants. Although
this new legal phenomenon has been hailed as a laudable development at the international
criminal justice scene, it is to be borne in mind that ‘every good and perfect thing carries
within it the seeds of its destruction through an excess of its virtue’.731 Accordingly, the
research has striven to provide a balanced and an objective insight into the place and the
part assigned to victims at the ICC from the viewpoint of an impartial observer.
As reiterated on a number of occasions, the Court bears the onerous and
momentous task to properly construe the will of the drafters in balancing the restorative
with the retributive objectives lying at the heart of the ICC’s system. The thesis has
repeatedly emphasized the strive of the Court’s founders to ensure that the role of victims
as autonomous protagonists would not take place at the expense of the fairness,
impartiality, efficiency and expeditiousness of the proceedings. In deciphering the
safeguards for a proper equilibrium in that respect, the thesis has considered the substance
and the limitations of the part accorded to victims in view of the overarching criminal
justice imperatives, the mission pursued by the parties at trial, as well as in light of the
context and object of the proceedings at hand.
The exhaustive dissection of the place of victims and their role in the Court’s fact-
finding mechanism equally necessitates a parallel with the legal regime and practice of
other jurisdictions. The comparative glance at the domestic and supranational levels
affords a broader view of the prevailing ideas, standards and trends in the field of victim-
related issues and in the area of evidence law, including on a larger scale going beyond
the criminal justice horizon. Viewed comparatively, it becomes evident that the legal
framework, the proof-gathering style and the model of victims’ participation at the ICC
are imbued with universal ideas and precepts lying at the heart of modern criminal justice.
731 Steven J. Twist, ‘The Crime Victims’ Rights Amendment and Two Good and Perfect Things’, Utah Law
Review (1999), pp. 369-382.
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The context-specific interpretation of the standing and the role allotted to victims
by the Court’s founding documents is a guiding idea permeating the thesis. With respect
to the interpretation of the victim eligibility criteria, for instance, while the recognition of
deceased persons as victims for the purpose of participation pursuant to article 68(3) has
been highlighted as questionable, it has been posited that deceased individuals fall within
the purview of rule 85(a) for the purpose of reparation proceedings. Consequently, the
eligibility criteria for victim status should be assessed in a creative way reflecting the
specificities and the purpose of the proceedings at which admission is sought. The
context-specific interpretation of the victim definition is also exigent with respect to the
requirement for a causal nexus between the alleged harm and the purported crime(s) under
consideration. As previously noted, the accurate interpretation of the causal link eligibility
criterion has a direct bearing on the scope of potential victim-participants. Bearing in
mind the growing number of victim-applicants, the correct elucidation of the causal link
criterion thus proves essential for the efficient functioning of the Court as a whole.
As the ICC gains momentum, the overwhelming number of victim-participants
comes to no surprise. It is a logical corollary of the enhanced awareness about the Court’s
unique mandate with respect to victims. Still, developments of the kind necessitate
reassessment and adaptation of some of the initial ideas enunciated in the ICC’s normative
basis. In particular, reconsideration of the manner of employment of certain rights
accorded to victims proves indispensable in order to meet the exigencies of the complex
realities of trials of mass atrocities taking place before the first permanent international
criminal jurisdiction.
For that purpose, as posited in the course of the discussion of the rights of victims
within the ICC’s system, certain rights, such as the right to participation for the purpose of
presenting views and concerns, should be exercised predominantly in an indirect way,
through the victims’ legal representative(s). Given the realities of the ICC’s proceedings
to date, participation via a legal representative would ensure that the right pursuant to
article 68(3) is employed without prejudice to the proper conduct of the trial or to the
precepts of due process, efficiency and expeditiousness. Viewed from a comparative
perspective, this conclusion finds solid grounds in the recent jurisprudence of both the
STL and the ECCC which attests to a steadfast drift away from participation in person due
to analogous considerations.
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At this point, it is to be recalled that the assessment of whether the manner of
participation is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair
and impartial trial comes into play only after the positive determination by the Chamber in
charge of the proceedings that the victims’ personal interests are affected by the
proceedings at stake, as well as that the stage at which the intervention is sought is
appropriate. The divergent jurisprudence on the prerequisites of article 68(3) bears witness
to the fact that the proper illumination of the fundamental provision on victims’
participation has posed a challenge to the Chambers, especially at the inception of the
Court. The analysis of the conflicting views lends support to the conclusion that the
accurate interpretation of the criteria pursuant to article 68(3) necessitates a case-specific,
contextual approach taking into consideration the idiosyncracy of the extant proceedings.
As the research has endeavoured to show, the opposite approach favouring the
predetermination of the personal interests of victims as being per se and in general
affected by the proceedings and the uniform introduction of ‘sets of procedural rights’ to
which victims would be entitled throughout the criminal process, run afoul of the
intentions of the drafters. The uniform predetermination of the prerequisites for victims’
intervention would render their participation automatic, i.e. as of right, thus, would leave
article 68(3) devoid of substance. As a consequence, such an approach would blur the
distinction between the standing of a victim and the standing of a party to the proceedings
and would entail, accordingly, inimical implications on the efficient and fair conduct of
the judicial process as a whole.
Besides the arguments advanced hitherto, an endorsement of the context-specific
approach ensues from the parallel between the victims’ participation model at the ICC and
the procedural phenomenon of ‘intervention of interested persons’ in ongoing litigation,
known in national and international proceedings alike.732 Just like the right of victims to
intervene pursuant to article 68(3), the employment of the litigation rights of an intervener
is contingent on the case-by-case assessment of the Chamber concerned whether the
prospective intervener has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the case, the adequacy of
representation of his or her legitimate interests and the prejudice, if any, to the parties if
intervention is allowed.
732 See in this respect article 62 of the ICJ’s Statute.
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The fact that, unlike the Prosecutor and the defence, the right of victims to take
part in proceedings is not automatic, but is contingent on a number of prerequisites set
forth in article 68(3), is an eloquent indication of their distinct non-party standing in
proceedings on the merits of the criminal case. At the same time, the possibility of
victims, albeit conditional, to intervene in the ICC’s process upon their own initiative and
in their own right, is an essential distinguishing feature between victim-participants and
other participants, such as witnesses.
By contrast to persons with victim standing, the participation of witnesses is
confined to their appearance as information-providers to the extent to which their
testimony is deemed necessary by the criminal justice authorities for the elucidation of the
subject-matter at hand. Thus, witnesses do not take part in proceedings of their own
accord, but solely as long as they are summoned to testify. Furthermore, the participation
of witnesses is exhausted once they provide their account of the facts relevant to the case.
Hence, the part played by witnesses does not go beyond the role of mere ‘evidentiary
fodders’,733 which renders their participation in proceedings short-lived and incidental.
Notwithstanding the above, as evidenced by the thesis, instances may arise
whereby a person taking part in proceedings as a victim could also appear as a witness in
the one and the same case. This scenario entails the combination between the standing of
victim with the capacity of a witness, referred to as ‘duality of status’. The research has
suggested a comprehensive and innovative insight into the procedural phenomenon of
dual victim-witness status from a comparative perspective against the backdrop of
universal evidentiary concepts and principles regarding relevance, admissibility, and
probative value of evidence (i.e. credibility and reliability), completeness of the
evidentiary material (that is, necessity, sufficiency and surplus of evidence). The analysis
has discussed at length the different scenarios of acquiring duality of status and has
suggested intriguing juxtapositions between the procedural nature and substance of
victims’ applications for participation and witness statements, as well as between the
procedural nature of victims’ views and concerns and of witness testimony. Attention has
also been drawn to the highly complex issue regarding the impact of an inconsistent
testimony provided by a dual status individual on that person’s victim standing and the
consequences of a withdrawal of victim standing. Given the lack of a serious
733 Edwards, supra note 448, p. 976.
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consideration in the relevant literature to date, the thesis has endeavoured to fully
encompass and to contemplate as meticulously as possible the manifold thought-
provoking issues that duality of status brings to the fore.
The discussion of the sui generis standing of victims in the ICC’s proceedings
would not be exhaustive without an analysis of their role in the Court’s fact-finding
procedure. In fact, besides the conditional character of the victims’ right to intervene in
proceedings pursuant to the general participation scheme of article 68(3), the place of
victims in the ICC’s evidentiary procedure on the merits of the criminal case is another
salient characteristic of the victims’ independent yet non-party standing. The analysis of
the part accorded to victims in the fact-finding procedure entails, by implication, a
juxtaposition with the corresponding role played by the parties in that respect. Therefore,
in order to properly delimit the role of victim-participants in the evidentiary process, a
discussion of the ICC’s fact-finding mechanism, as well as of the rights of the parties and
the powers of the Chamber pursuant to article 69(3) is indispensable.
As the present study has shown, the latter provision is an excellent example of the
blending of legal ideas characteristic of the two traditional criminal justice paradigms
existing in a domestic setting,734 since it accommodates features of both the common law
and the continental models of developing evidence. This mixed nature of the ICC’s proof-
gathering style presupposes an active involvement in the evidence-gathering process of
the parties, as well as of the Chamber, when the latter deems it necessary for the
establishment of the truth.
By contrast, as attested by the perusal of the Court’s constitutive documents, the
Rome Statute is silent on the involvement of victims in the processing of evidence, both in
terms of the submission and the examination of material. Although this silence has been
partially remedied in the Rules through the stipulation of the conditional possibility for
victims to intervene in the examination of evidence via their legal representative(s), still,
the ICC’s normative basis does not provide an answer to the question whether victims
could impact the scope and substance of the evidence by way of placing material before
the Chamber. Heedful of the inability of the drafters to agree on the possibility of victims
to engage in the presentation of evidence on the merits of the criminal case, careful
consideration has been given to the ways in which victims could contribute to the
734 See the juxtaposition suggested by Damaska, supra note 501.
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evidentiary material without, however, assuming an active role in the submission of
evidence. The research has contemplated the possibility of victims to bring to the attention
of the Chamber in the course of the presentation of their views and concerns relevant
information beneficial to the ascertainment of the truth with a bearing on their personal
interests. By drawing the attention of the Chamber to pieces of evidence victims could
substantiate assertions advanced in their views and concerns which would ensure that their
participation is meaningful rather than purely symbolic. Such course of action would not
contradict the will of the Court’s founders due to the fact that the ultimate decision
whether such information should be incorporated into the evidentiary material would rest
with the Chamber.
The rationale behind the role of victims in the evidentiary process germane to
reparations, as the present study shows, is rather different. Victims are endowed with a
greater leeway in the processing of evidence related to reparations which is a logical
corollary of the subject-matter of proceedings adjudicating claims for reparations. The
latter focuses on the nature and the extent of the alleged harm sustained by victims as a
result of the commission of the crime(s) under consideration – a feature that entails the
victims’ party standing in reparation proceedings.
In view of the foregoing, the overall conclusion to be advanced is that depending
on the subject-matter and the purpose of the proceedings at hand victims at the ICC may
assume a part that does not affect outcomes directly (as non-party participants with
limited intervention in the evidentiary process - in proceedings on the merits of the
criminal case), as well as a part that impacts outcomes directly (as parties with central role
in the evidentiary process - in reparation proceedings). Consequently, the standing of
victims in the Court’s multilayered design and their role in proceedings ensue from the
purpose of their participation as enunciated by the Court’s legal framework. The latter is,
indubitably, intrinsically linked to the objective and the subject-matter of the proceedings
at hand.
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ANNEX II
LIST OF CASES AND JURISPRUDENCE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
I. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04
a) Pre-Trial Chamber I
Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, ICC-01/04-
101-tEN-Corr, 17 January 2006
Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative of the Applicants on the
application process for victims’ participation and legal representation, ICC-01/04-
374, 17 August 2007
Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation in the
Investigation, ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, 31 January 2008
Decision on the request of the legal representative of victims VPRS 3 and VPRS 6
to review an alleged decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed, ICC-01/04-582, 25
October 2010
Decision on victims’ participation in proceedings relating to the situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-593, 11 April 2011
b) Appeals Chamber
Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings in
the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December
2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor against the decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007’, ICC-01/04-556, 19 December 2008
Cases:
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, case N. ICC-01/04-01/06
Pre-trial stage
a) Pre-Trial Chamber I
Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, ICC-01/04-
01/06-228-tEN, 28 July 2006
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b) Appeals Chamber
Judgment on the Appeal of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the
Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of
the Statute of 3 October 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, 14 December 2006;
Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals
Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and
a/0105/06 concerning the "Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2
February 2007, ICC-01/04-01/06-925, 13 June 2007
Trial stage
a) Trial Chamber I
Decisions:
Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 18 January 2008
Decision on various issues related to witnesses’ testimony during trial, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1140, 29 January 2008
Decision on the Prosecution’s application for an order governing disclosure of non-
public information to members of the public and an order regulating contact with
witnesses, ICC-01/04-01/06-1372, 3 June 2008
Decision on certain practicalities regarding individuals who have the dual status of
witness and victim, ICC-01/04-01/06-1379, 5 June 2008
Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings, ICC-
01/04-01/06-1556, 15 December 2008
Redacted version of ‘Decision on ‘indirect victims’’, ICC-01/04-01/06-1813, 8
April 2009
Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express
their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, ICC-
01/04-01/06-2032, 9 July 2009
Public annex to the Decision on the applications by 7 victims to participate in the
proceedings of 10 July 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/06-2035), ICC-01/04-01/06-2065-
Anx2, 23 July 2009
Decision on the Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal Representatives of
Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, 16 September 2009
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Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express
their views and
concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-
Anx, 26 June 2009
Decision on the defence observations regarding the right of the legal
representatives of victims to question defence witnesses and on the notion of
personal interest -and- Decision on the defence application to exclude certain
representatives of victims from the Chamber during the non-public evidence of
various defence witnesses, ICC-01/04-01/06-2340, 11 March 2010
Oral decision on the familiarisation process, referred to by the Prosecution in its
‘Prosecution Response to the Defence Observations on the Modalities of Victim
Participation at the Trial Stage’, ICC-01/04-01/07-877-tENG, para. 24
Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-
2901,10 July 2012
Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations,
ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 7 August 2012
Orders and Transcripts:
Status Conference, 12 January 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-101-ENG
Order issuing public redacted version of the ‘Decision on the request by victims a/
0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express their views and concerns in person
and to present evidence during the trial’, ICC-01/04-01/06-2032, 9 July 2009
Order refusing a request for reconsideration, ICC-01/04-01/06-2846, 27 March
2012
Judgment:
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March
2012
Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Odio Benito to the Trial Judgment
b) Appeals Chamber
Decisions:
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Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s
Decision to Stay the Proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-2556, 18 August 2010
Decision on the admissibility of the appeals against Trial Chamber I’s “Decision
establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” and
directions on the further conduct of proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/06-2953, 14
December 2012
Judgments:
Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial
Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432, 11 July 2008
Dissenting opinion of 11 July 2008 of Judge Georghios M. Pikis to the Judgment
of the Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008
Dissenting opinion of 23 July 2008 of Judge Philippe Kirsch to the Judgment of the
Appeals Chamber of 11 July 2008
1.3.  Appeals stage
Judgment:
Public Redacted Version of the Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo against his conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, 1 December 2014
The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, case N. ICC-
01/04-01/07
Pre-trial stage
a) Pre-Trial Chamber I
Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim
at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, 13 May 2008
Decision on Limitations of Set of Procedural Rights for Non-Anonymous Victims,
ICC-01/04-01/07-537, 30 May 2008
Public Redacted Version of the Decision on the 97 Applications for Participation at
the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-579, 10 June 2008
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Decision on the Application for Participation of Witness 166, ICC-01/04-01/07-
632, 23 June 2008
 Trial stage
a) Trial Chamber II
Decision on a number of procedural issues raised by the Registry, ICC-01/04-
01/07-1134, 14 May 2009
Version publique expurgée de la « Décision relative à la protection des témoins à
charge 267 et 353 » du 20 mai 2009 (ICC-01/04-01/07-1156-Conf-Exp), ICC-
01/04-01/07-1179, 28 May 2009
Order on the organisation of common legal representation of victims, ICC-01/04-
01/07-1328, 22 July 2009
Grounds for the Decision on the 345 Victims’ Applications for Participation in the
Proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/07-1491-Red-tENG, 23 September 2009
Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and testimony in accordance with
rule 140, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr., 1 December 2009
Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-
1788-tENG, 22 January 2010
Décision aux fins d'autorisation de comparution des victimes a/0381/09,
a/0018/09,a/0191/08 et pan/0363/09 agissant au nom de a/0363/09, ICC-01/04-
01/07-2517, 9 November 2010
Décision relative au maintien du statut de victime participant à la procédure des
victimes a/0381/09 et a/0363/09 et à la demande de Me Nsita Luvengika en vue
d'être autorisé à mettre fin à son mandat de Représentant légal desdites victimes,
ICC-01/04-01/07-3064, 7 July 2011 (reclassified as public on 16 August 2011)
b) Appeals Chamber
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II
of 22 January 2010 Entitled “Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at
Trial”, ICC-01/04-01/07-2288, 16 July 2010
The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, case N. ICC-01/04-01/10
Pre-Trial Chamber I
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Decision on the 138 applications for victims’ participation in the proceedings ICC-
01/04-01/10-351, 11 August 2011
II. Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05
Cases:
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, case N. ICC-01/05-01/08
1.1. Pre-trial stage
Pre-Trial Chamber II / III
Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/05-01/08-320, 12 December
2008
Decision on the Requests of the Prosecutor and the Legal Representatives of
Victims for Re-classification of the Document Submitted by the Authorities of the
Republic of South Africa and for Notification of Other Documents, ICC-01/05-
01/08-480, 19 August 2009
Decision concerning the Application by the Legal Representative of Victims
a/0278/08, a/0279/08, a/0291/08 to a/0293/08, a/0296/08 to a/0298/08, a/0455/08
and a/0457/08 to a/0467/08 filed on 20 April 2009, 22 April 2009
Fifth Decision on Victims’ Issues Concerning Common Legal Representation of
Victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-322, 16 December 2008
1.2. Trial stage
Trial Chamber III
Decisions:
Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications by
victims to participate in the proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-807, 30 June 2010, and
the Corrigendum, ICC-01/05-01/08-807-Corr, 12 July 2010
Decision on the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications by
victims to participate in the proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-807, 30 June 2010
Decision on common legal representation of victims for the purpose of trial, ICC-
01/05-01/08-1005, 10 November 2010
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Decision on Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings, ICC-01/05-01/08-1023,
19 November 2010
Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims
to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138,
22 February 2012
Decision defining the status of 54 victims who participated at the pre-trial stage,
and inviting the parties' observations on applications for participation by 86
applicants, ICC-01/05-01/08-699, 22 February 2010
Transcripts:
Transcript of open session hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-T-227-Red-ENG CT WT, 25
June 2012
III. Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04
a) Pre-Trial Chamber II
Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-101, 10 August
2007
Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-125, 14 March
2008
Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-172, 21
November 2008
b) Appeals Chamber
Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Appeal, ICC-02/04-164, 27
October 2008
Cases:
The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic
Ongwen, case N. ICC-02/04-01/05
Pre-trial stage
a) Pre-Trial Chamber II
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Decision on victims’ applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06 ICC-02/04-
01/05-252, 10 August 2007
Decision on victims' applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-101,
10 August 2007
Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation, ICC-02/04-01/05-282, 14
March 2008
b) Appeals Chamber
Decision on the participation of victims in the appeal, ICC-02/04-01/05-324, 27
October 2008
Dissenting opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis to the Decision of the Appeals
Chamber of 27 October 2008, ICC-02/04-01/05-324
Judgment on the Appeals of the Defence against the Decisions of PTC II of 14
March 2008 on Victims’ Applications for Participation in the Case, ICC-02/04-
01/05-371, 23 February 2009
IV. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05
a) Pre-Trial Chamber I
Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, ICC-02/05-
111, 6 December 2007 and the Corrigendum, ICC-02/05-111-Corr, 14
December 2007
b) Appeals Chamber
Decision on Victim Participation in the appeal of the Office of Public Counsel
for the Defence against PTC I’s Decision of 3 December 2007 and in the
appeals of the Prosecutor and the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence
against PTC I’s Decision of 6 December 2007, ICC-02/05-138, 18 June 2008
Cases:
The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, case N. ICC-02/05-02/09
Pre-Trial Chamber I
Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage, ICC-
02/05-02/09-121, 25 September 2009
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Decision on the 52 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the
Case, Public Redacted Version, ICC-02/05-02/09-147-Red, 9 October 2009
Transcript, Confirmation of charges hearing, ICC-02/05-02/09-T-13-ENG, 20
October 2009
The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed
Jerbo Jamus, ICC-02/05-03/09
Pre-trial stage
Pre-Trial Chamber I
Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Hearing on the Confirmation of the
Charges, ICC-02/05-03/09-89, 29 October 2010
V. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09
      Pre-Trial Chamber II
Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Section Concerning
Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Statute, ICC-01/09-4,
10 December 2009
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 31 March 2010
Decision on Victims' Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation in
the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-24, 3 November 2010
Cases:
The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, (Henry Kiprono Kosgey) and Joshua
Arap Sang, case N. ICC-01/09-01/11
Pre-trial stage
Pre-Trial Chamber II
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